Executive summary
This report focuses on the main developments in global competition enforcement in 2022. The OECD CompStats database currently includes eight years of data from 77 jurisdictions. An Excel file with a complete set of graphs covering all competition enforcement indicators, i.e. all indicators on all years (2015-22), can be found on the OECD Competition Trends publication website.
The report consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of competition enforcement in the participating jurisdictions. Chapter 2 describes the main developments in 2022 compared to 2021, for resources, cartel and abuse of dominance enforcement, and advocacy. Chapter 3 presents a more detailed (in-focus) analysis of merger control data and trends, including a review of all merger prohibitions between 2015-22.
This section covers the key developments in 2022 for resources, cartel enforcement, abuse of dominance enforcement, and advocacy. Merger control is covered in a subsequent standalone chapter.
Resources
Competition staff continued growing – There was continued growth in the number of competition staff in 2022, although the growth was lower than in 2021. The average number of competition staff per competition authority was 130 in 2022, up from 125 in 2021, and considerably higher than 118 in 2020. There was an increase in every region except Asia-Pacific. The average number of competition staff increased in every year from 2015 to 2022.
Nominal competition budget increased but real budget decreased – Average nominal competition budget increased in all regions except Asia-Pacific. The highest increase (18.1% compared to 2021) was seen by non-OECD jurisdictions, mostly driven by two of them. However, average real competition budget decreased in all regions. This suggests that the significant increase in annual growth rate for nominal competition budget (10%) in 2022 across all jurisdictions, was predominantly due to inflation, as it was negative at -2.6% for real competition budget.
Cartel enforcement
Leniency applications increased in all regions for the first time since 2015 – For the first time since 2015, when the OECD began collecting the Competition Statistics data, the total number of leniency applications increased in all regions, reversing the previous downward trend. The total number of leniency applications increased from 201 in 2021 to 248 in 2022, an annual growth rate of 23.4%. The resurgence began in 2021 in Europe, continuing in 2022, and accompanied by an increase in all regions.
Cartel ex-officio investigations increased by 19.3% – Average cartel ex-officio cartel investigations increased to 8.4 in 2022 (representing an annual growth of 19.3%), countering the steady decline from 14.7 in 2016 to 7.1 in 2021.
Cartel dawn raids remained stable – The average number of cartel dawn raids remained stable in 2022 (with an average across all jurisdictions of 3.6 in 2022, identical to 2021), slightly increasing in the Americas and Europe, while decreasing in Asia-Pacific and MEA. In all regions, we had witnessed a significant decline in 2020, mostly resulting from the Covid-19 lockdowns.
Cartel decisions decreased, mostly in Europe – In 2022, there was a decline in the average number of cartel decisions in Europe and MEA but an increase in Americas and Asia-Pacific. The average across all jurisdictions fell from 6.8 in 2021 to 6.3 in 2022. The biggest decline was in Non-OECD European jurisdictions, where the annual decrease on cartel decisions was around 41%. Two possible explanations for the decline in cartel decisions include the decrease in ex-officio investigations between 2016 and 2021 (including decrease in investigations due to covid during 2020-21) and the consistent decline in leniency applications since 2015.
Cartel bid-rigging decisions increased by 9.7% – There was an increase in bid-rigging cases between 2021 and 2022 (the only two years for which OECD CompStats data for bid-rigging decisions exist), namely from 154 to 169. The average number of bid-rigging decisions across all jurisdictions increased by 9.7% in 2022. As a percentage of all cartel decisions, bid-rigging decisions across all jurisdictions increased from 32% in 2021 to 38% in 2022, although there were some regional differences. In 2022, the region where bid-rigging decisions represented the highest percentage of cartel decisions was MEA (40%).
The industries with the most cartel decisions in 2022 were manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade – The top 10 industries based on the total number of cartel decisions remained relatively similar to the ranking in 2021. “Manufacturing”, “Construction” and “Wholesale Trade” were still the three industries with the most cartel decisions in 2022. However, they only represented 44% of all cartel decisions in 2022, down from 48% in 2021. “Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting” was the industry where the number of cases grew the most, representing 7% of the cases in 2022 (up from only 2.4% in 2021).
Cartel settlements decreased, notably in MEA – The average number of cartel cases with settlements was relatively stable in 2022, albeit with regional differences. Notably, in MEA, the average cartel cases closed with settlements decreased from 4.3 to 2.9.
Abuse of dominance enforcement
Abuse of dominance investigations declined in 50 jurisdictions – The average number of abuse of dominance investigations launched by competition authorities declined in all regions, except MEA. In 82% (50 out of the 63 jurisdictions with relevant data for all years), the number of investigations declined or remained unchanged. The average number of investigations launched was down from 5.6 in 2021 to 4.2 in 2022 across all jurisdictions, a decline of around 25%.
Abuse of dominance decisions kept their downward trend – The average number of abuse of dominance decisions per jurisdiction declined slightly overall, from 2 in 2021 to 1.5 in 2022. This continues a slow downward trend over the period, from an average of 2.4 abuse of dominance decisions per jurisdiction in 2015 to 1.5 in 2022. Despite the increase observed in 2021, there was a significant decrease in the number of abuse of dominance decisions in both OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions, reverting to 2020 levels.
The industries whith the most abuse of dominance decisions in 2020 were manufacturing, transportation and wharehousing, and information – The top 10 industries based on the total number of abuse of dominance decisions in 2022 was similar to 2021. “Manufacturing”, “Transportation and Warehousing” and “Information” remained in the top three industries with the highest number of abuse of dominance decisions in 2022, representing 47% of total decisions.
Abuse of dominance settlements and commitments declined notably in Americas – The average number of abuse of dominance cases in which settlements, plea bargain procedures, commitment procedures, or other types of negotiated/consensual procedures for settling infringement cases were used slightly declined in 2022, however this was mostly driven by the Americas, while in other regions such as Europe and MEA, their use increased.
Sanctions
Fines imposed by competition authorities decreased in 2022 – Fines for both cartels and abuse of dominance cases declined in 2022. The average abuse of dominance fine imposed per jurisdiction declined 52% from 42.5 million euros in 2021 to 20.4 million euros in 2022. The average cartel fine imposed per jurisdiction decreased 45% from 89.8 million euros in 2021 to 49.5 million euros in 2022.
Each edition of OECD Competition Trends includes a chapter that addresses a certain topic in more detail. This year’s edition focuses on merger control.
Merger notifications dropped in 2022 – In 2022, there was a drop in the number of overall merger notifications predominantly driven by a decline in OECD jurisdictions. The number of merger notifications in non-OECD jurisdictions continued to increase in 2022, although at a slower rate than in 2021.
Merger intervention rate increased significantly in OECD jurisdictions – Contrary to 2021, there was a significant increase in the merger intervention rate – the proportion of transactions in which competition authorities intervened, either by imposing a remedy or by prohibiting a transaction – in 2022. Most of this increase was driven by OECD jurisdictions, while there was a slight decline for non-OECD jurisdictions.
Competition authorities approved more mergers with remedies – The rising overall intervention rate in 2022 has been mostly driven by an increase in the use of remedies (which increased by more than 55%), rather than prohibitions and withdrawn mergers which remained relatively stable.
Prohibitions are concentrated in a few jurisdictions –The five jurisdictions with the most prohibitions represent 54% of all prohibitions during the period 2015 to 2022 (116 of 216 prohibitions). This includes South Africa, United States, United Kingdom, Israel and the European Union.
Horizontal theories of harm are the most common in prohibition decisions – Horizontal theories of harm make up the vast majority in merger prohibition decisions. Most are horizontal unilateral theories of harm, while horizontal coordinated theories of harm are similar in amount to vertical theories of harm. Conglomerate and public interest theories of harm are negligible in merger prohibition decisions.
The industries with most prohibitions between 2015-22 were manufacturing, retail trade, and transportation and warehousing – Prohibitions are more common in industries that are typically characterised by homogenous products and where there may be more likely issues related to a horizontal overlap, such as manufacturing, retail trade and transportation and warehousing.
