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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL WILL IN ENABLING LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT

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The role of political will in enabling long-term development approaches to forced displacement

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Keywords: social and economic inclusion, development planning, development co-operation, development effectiveness, forced displacement, refugees, internal displacement

JEL classifications: F5; F35; J15; O2; O19;

Abstract

This paper examines the role of mobilising political will in establishing the conditions necessary for economic and social inclusion of refugees, internally displaced persons, and formerly displaced persons who achieve durable solutions such as voluntary return. It investigates the role and conditions to mobilise political will for more comprehensive and inclusive policies that can lead to long-term local development in contexts of forced displacement in low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs). Case studies from Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Iraq and Lebanon illustrate the ways in which political will, or its absence, can shape the approach to supporting the forcibly displaced and hosting communities. The paper also proposes a conceptual model for mobilising political will to facilitate sustainable development support in contexts of forced displacement.

Foreword

This paper is situated within the ambition of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the United Nations Action Agenda on International Displacement (UNAAID) to address forced displacement with longer term development approaches, supported by international development co-operation. Longer term development approaches in contexts of forced displacement require more inclusive policies in low- and middle-income countries hosting forcibly displaced persons, as well as in the development co-operation policies and practices by their partner countries. Political will is often referred to as the key ingredient to achieve longer term development approaches to forced displacement. Yet, what mobilising political will means in practice is less well understood.

In light of these questions, the OECD and the UN University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) have come together to unpack the concept of political will, how it can be mobilised for putting in place comprehensive and inclusive development policies, and what can be learnt from five country case studies.

This paper forms part of a series of papers on addressing forced displacement with a long-term perspective across all dimensions of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, issued jointly by the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) and the OECD Development Centre (DEV). It is a deliverable of the forced displacement workstream of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).

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Abbreviations and acronyms

CSOs	Civil society organisations
DSP	Durable Solutions Platform
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GCFF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GTRM	Refugee and Migrant Working Group (in Ecuador)
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDP nexus	Humanitarian-development-peace nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank Group)
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LICs	Low-income countries
MICs	Middle-income countries
PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
R4V	Regional Inter-Agency Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNAAID	UN Action Agenda on Internal Displacement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRCO	United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office
UNU CPR	United Nations University Centre for Policy Research

Executive summary

In the context of addressing forced displacement, the term political will is a black box. It has become global shorthand for explaining why comprehensive and inclusive policies to address forced displacement succeed or fail, in responding to high-level commitments outlined in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the UN Action Agenda on Internal Displacement (UNAAID).

Yet the very concept of political will remains poorly understood, defined, and measured. How, therefore, can policy makers and other stakeholders mobilise political will in various institutional and geographical contexts to address the challenges of forced displacement more effectively, in particular through development approaches? The paper addresses this problem by proposing a definition of political will as the product of a complex array of incentives and disincentives created by larger political and bureaucratic processes. It defines political will as including:

- a commitment from a defined set of actors and stakeholders
- the existence of a common understanding of a particular problem on the agenda
- the development of a collective approach
- implementation capacity.

Action to foster effective change thus entails more than trying to influence political leaders. It means engaging with the broader political institutions, structures, and processes within which political will is situated. It emphasises the need for a collective rather than individual endeavour. It also requires the involvement of those who are directly affected, in this case refugees and IDPs, as well as the hosting communities. This definition provides an actionable process rather than an aspirational notion contingent upon the political leadership of a small number of individuals.

What policy change in the context of forced displacement is political will needed for? The commitments outlined in the GCR and the UNAAID reflect the realisation that short-term solutions will not address long-term challenges related to forced displacement in both host and origin country. If refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) or returnees remain excluded from the economy and regular social services, they continue to depend on short-term parallel humanitarian services. The toolbox of humanitarian aid alone is insufficient to deliver durable solutions. Long-term solutions imply that refugees and IDPs are provided the tools and conditions to have more agency in their lives and livelihoods, more self-reliance, more ability to work and create work opportunities, such as self-employment. Such commitments also reflect the fact that fostering such a change will open more win-win opportunities between those that are forcibly displaced and their hosting communities. It also reflects the fact that better outcomes for the forcibly displaced can help pave the path towards other durable solutions, such as resettlement and return and re-integration.

Specifically, political will is necessary for achieving progress towards:

- Devising inclusive cross-sectoral policies that bridge silos in displacement-affected countries and enable sustainable development support for refugees, IDPs and host communities.

- Including refugees and IDPs in national development plans, climate action plans, sector strategies, and related costing and data collection exercises.
- Allocating development finance and national fiscal resources in displacement-affected, low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) towards the socio-economic inclusion of displaced populations and host communities, and durable solutions for displaced populations.
- Including refugees and IDPs in the planning and implementation of development co-operation.
- Providing development finance to displacement-affected countries, also reaching municipalities and other local actors in displacement-affected sub-national areas. This may include areas hosting refugees and IDPs, or their areas of origin.

Reviewing case studies of Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Iraq, and Lebanon, and drawing from the literature, the paper examines the role of political will in shaping development responses to forced displacement in LICs and MICs, where more than 70% of refugees and IDPs live. The case studies provide examples of good practices and challenges in achieving development responses to forced displacement across a range of different geographical and political contexts and document the ways in which stakeholders and policy actors can mobilise political will for development responses which are mutually beneficial for both hosting communities and the displaced.

Drawing on the findings from the case studies, the mobilisation of political will for development responses to forced displacement should be structured in relation to four tasks:

1. **Identification of stakeholders**

   A mapping of key stakeholders ensures that policy responses for mobilising political will reflect, and are responsive to, different governance levels, contexts and levels of formality, and that members of society affected by forced displacement are included.

2. **Assessment of stakeholder views of problems and solutions**

   An assessment of how the different stakeholders, including refugees and IDPs, members of hosting communities, and key stakeholders, view the problem and potential solutions.

3. **Alignment of problem and solution understandings**

   Developing a common understanding of the problem and possible solutions by strengthening familiarity and trust between relevant government and non-governmental actors.

4. **Building of firm commitments and mutual accountability**

   Building clear, shared commitments to deliver existing and new policies and activities that address the shared understanding of the problem and develop meaningful mutual accountability among stakeholders for delivery.

Finally, to monitor the commitment of actors over time, the paper suggests the following indicators:

1. the degree of government initiative;
2. choice of policies and programmes based on research evidence and practical options;
3. the extent to which government actors consult with, engage and mobilise stakeholders;
4. public commitment and allocation of resources;
5. the continuity and sustainability of effort;
6. progress in learning and adaptation.

1 Political will, forced displacement and inclusive socio-economic development

1.1. What is political will?

The role of political will in shaping policy implementation has been examined across a wide range of policy areas including, among others, the delivery of water and sanitation services (Landreth, 2015), food and nutrition security (Fox et al., 2015, te Lintelo and Lakshman, 2015), responses to HIV (Brinkerhoff, 2016), anti-corruption initiatives (Fritzen, 2005), efforts to combat organised crime (Idris, 2022), transitional justice (Pham et al., 2019), climate-smart agriculture (Raile et al., 2019), digital business (Senyo et al., 2019) and disaster risk reduction (Lassa et al., 2019). These are often contexts in which there is a significant gap between policy and practice, and where the absence of political is viewed as a significant barrier to implementation.

Despite this emphasis on the importance of political will, the term is poorly understood, lacks conceptual clarity and is difficult to operationally define and measure (Hammergren, 1998). It may be a temptingly simple and intuitive explanation for why policies succeed or fail, but often fills a space where political analysis is needed (Green, 2009).

This lack of definition means that political will is a *black box*: it is not known what goes into it, what happens in it, or what needs to happen to affect change (Hudson et al, 2018; Marquette, 2020). Reflecting this, references to the need for greater political will often fail to make explicit what such action would entail, and through which channels it would occur (Thompson et al., 2020).

It is important to unpack what is meant by political will for the following reasons:

- **There is an underlining assumption that political leadership is the only or most important thing determining political will.** Political will is typically understood as the willingness and commitment of (sometimes very high-level) political leaders to carry out reforms or implement policies to address problems (Idris, 2022). This emphasis on political systems and political leaders is very top-down and can leave individuals and organisations feeling powerless to effect change. Political will is not just about and responsive leaders, as important as these can be. (Persson and Sjöstedt, 2012)
- **The use of the term political will often serve to 'flatten out' political structures and processes.** Policymaking and implementation are inherently political processes in every sector, and forced displacement is no exception. The existence – or otherwise – of political will is often a reflection of power struggles between actors and competing value- and belief systems (*ideologies* or *paradigms*) associated with competing policy beliefs about different policy instruments. The failure to unpack political structures and processes makes it very difficult to identify what needs to happen to affect change. (Green, 2009)

- **There are differences in the opportunity structures to affect political will.** Authoritarian systems, leaders and their elites are not necessarily constrained by laws, courts, legislatures and popular opinion to the same extent as they are in political systems based on the rule of law. In democracies, the political will of policy makers and officials is affected to varying degrees by all of these.

- **The use of the term political will often ignore the contexts within which change takes place.** Effective policy development and implementation is not just about political will: it is also about resources, expertise, joined-up policy making. There are strong links between political will and implementation capacity (Kukutschka, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2010; Post et al, 2010). The capacity to enact political will depend not just on individual actors or agents but also on institutions and structures.

Unpacking political will

Political will as a concept is most usefully viewed as being integrated within larger political and bureaucratic processes, as a product of the complex array of incentives and disincentives that those processes create (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Drawing on the existing literature, it is possible to identify four key components of political will.

Figure 1.1. The key components of political will

1. **Commitment from a defined set of actors and stakeholders.** Political will requires motivated and strategic individuals or groups capable of approving, implementing and enforcing public policies in a particular geographic area (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Post et al., 2010; Hudson et al., 2018). This includes both individual actors and the organisations within which individuals function, and on whose behalf individuals often act.

2. **The existence of a common understanding of a particular problem on the agenda**. There needs to be consensus that a particular problem or condition has reached problem status, agreement on the nature of the problem, and agreement that the problem requires governmental (or other) action (Post et al., 2010). In the absence of a common perception of the problem, we would not necessarily be talking about a singular, aggregate political will, but about multiple different, non-cohesive preference sets.

3. **The development of a collective approach.** This is needed in order that motivated individuals or groups can overcome barriers to co-operation and form coalitions with sufficient power, legitimacy and influence to build, support or transform institutions and/or policies. Since it is impossible, save for exceptional cases, to expect imposition of individual will on to a political community, an

"aggregated approach" is needed which defines political will as a "collective effort" (Post et al., 2010).

4. **Implementation capacity**. Political will can be explained as a carefully calculated balance between political *want*, political *can* and political *must* (Malena, 2009). For power holders to commit and act in favour of a certain cause, they need "to want to undertake a given action, feel confident that they can undertake that action and feel that they must undertake that action" (Malena, 2009). In this conception of political will, the *must* refers to factors such as public pressure and citizen engagement while the *can* refers to capacity. Political will is therefore closely connected to implementation capacity: what may look to outsiders as a lack of political will to advance certain reforms may be a symptom of insufficient implementation capacity (Brinkerhoff, 2010).

This definition of political will:

- Has the potential to make political will an empirically useful and actionable concept rather than an aspirational notion contingent upon the political leadership of a small number of individuals;
- Takes us beyond trying to influence political leaders *per se* towards engaging with the broader political institutions, structures and processes within which political will is situated;
- Moves the analysis beyond seeing political will as simply the espousal of support for a particular policy towards a focus instead on the action dimensions of political will which translate expressed intention into concrete outcomes;
- Highlights the importance of mapping, understanding and, where appropriate, addressing insufficient government capacity including a lack of knowledge and/or resources;
- Helps us map the actors that can facilitate the mobilisation of political will at different governance and formality levels.

1.2. Political will in the wider global agenda on forced displacement

The need for political will to resolve the issues facing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been raised by the United Nations (UN)[1], the media[2] and civil society organisations[3], with UNHCR highlighting the need for political will since the mid-1980s[4]. In 2021, the UNHCR's Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs, told the annual meeting of the agency's Executive Committee in Geneva that "[t]he international protection crisis calls for urgent global collaboration and, above all, for political will" [5]. The challenge, she suggested, was not a shortage of laws and policies to protect the displaced but rather a lack of political will to implement them in practice. Political will, or the lack of it, has therefore become a global shorthand for explaining why policies succeed or fail. Many commentators have suggested that the forced displacement of people is caused by a lack of political will, and that displacement situations could be averted, mitigated, or resolved if only such will existed (Crisp, 2018).

This emphasis on political will is reflected in key policy documents and commitments, including the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (UNHCR, 2018). While the GCR is not legally binding, it was adopted by 181 countries and "represents the political will and ambition of the international community as a whole for strengthened co-operation and solidarity with refugees and affected host countries" (UNHCR 2018). The objectives of the GCR are to: (i) ease pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The mobilisation of political will is said to be central to achieving these objectives: "The global compact will seek to achieve these four interlinked and interdependent objectives *through the mobilization of political will*, a broadened base of support, and arrangements that facilitate more equitable, sustained and predictable contributions among States and other relevant stakeholders" (UNHCR, 2018, emphasis added).

In this context it is perhaps surprising that there has been little attempt to specify or define what political will means in contexts of forced displacement, nor what strategies can or should be employed to generate and sustain it (Crisp, 2018). If political will is important in contexts of forced displacement, then what it means needs to be defined concretely to examine the implications for policy responses to refugees and IDPs in different contexts.

1.3. Why political will matters for the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in long-term socio-economic development

Political will plays an important role in facilitating inclusive development policies, plans and their implementation, so that refugees and IDPs can become part of the economic and social development trajectory of the countries where they live, and in origin countries. Without political will, inclusive policies towards socio-economic development are unlikely to be put in place and to succeed during implementation. Over 70% of all forcibly displaced live in LICs and MICs, mostly in displacement situations which have become protracted over many years. A comprehensive approach to forced displacement, involving early development support alongside humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and inclusive climate action (Box 1.1) can be mutually beneficial for hosting communities and the displaced, and can facilitate preventions and solutions to resolve forced displacement. The GCR and the UNAAID for instance, call for responses to forced displacement to be made an integral part of sustainable development, rather than treating refugees and IDPs solely as a humanitarian concern. This view is also echoed in the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (OECD, 2019).

Box 1.1. Towards a humanitarian – development – peace (HDP) nexus approach in forced displacement contexts

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus, adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee as a legal Recommendation (OECD, 2019), is particularly relevant for internal displacement and refugee contexts, for prevention, and for achieving solutions for the forcibly displaced. The HDP nexus offers a comprehensive framework that goes beyond addressing immediate needs, expanding the scope of the response to include supporting public sector financing for displacement-affected countries, economic growth, and social cohesion, peacebuilding, and prevention.

The members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) adopted a Common Position (INCAF 2023) in November 2023 on *Addressing Forced Displacement with a Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Approach*. The Common Position provides a framework for operationalising the HDP nexus in forced displacement contexts, and outlines three priority engagement areas for development co-operation, peace, and climate action:

Engagement area 1: Support the early mitigation of shocks associated with the causes and consequences of forced displacement through comprehensive humanitarian, development, and peace support, and through climate action.

A. Mitigate the immediate needs of the displaced through the provision of fast and efficient assistance and protection services.

B. Mitigate the immediate impact on host communities through support to and dialogue with affected municipalities, local authorities, and communities.

C. Support affected countries, early on, to develop a comprehensive response and/or solutions strategy, and align with existing and planned humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and climate action programmes.

D. Coordinate towards better alignment, and/or complementarity, between humanitarian response plans, development, and peacebuilding co-operation instruments.

Engagement area 2: Include the forcibly displaced in sustainable development and climate action.

A. Mobilise political will and support national ownership of inclusive development policies, plans and practice.

B. Support countries and areas of origin with creating conditions conducive to voluntary return in safety and dignity.

C. Engage in policy dialogue with governments of displacement-affected countries on inclusive and solutions-oriented policies, laws, and service systems.

D. Include the displaced, and returnees, in development planning and co-operation processes, programmes, and their implementation.

E. Invest in self-reliance of the forcibly displaced to enable their agency and promote social cohesion.

F. Explicitly include forced displacement issues in climate change National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and their implementation.

G. Support tracking and monitoring of inclusion of the displaced in national statistics, national services, and the formal economy.

Engagement area 3: Address recurring drivers of forced displacement, support solutions, and support preparedness to cope with rising trends.

A. Expand the scope of forced displacement programming to countries and areas of origin.

B. Engage peace actors and support peacebuilding in areas of origin to prevent conflict and displacement, and to facilitate solutions.

C. Support private sector investments that build economic prospects and resilience in displacement-affected contexts, with particular attention to women, youth, and marginalised groups.

D. Engage in policy dialogue with countries and local communities at risk of being affected by a displacement crisis (internal displacement, and refugee influxes) on governance and systemic support for the forcibly displaced and host communities.

E. Integrate prevention, and preparedness for future displacement situations in development and climate change adaptation plans, programmes, and their implementation.

F. Increase support for climate action in countries facing high risks of forced displacement.

Development co-operation is inherently political and is informed by the decision-making powers of LIC and MIC governments, and by bilateral and multilateral development co-operation providers. Development interventions always involve a bargain between local communities and governments, and between LIC and MIC governments and development co-operation providers. These interventions and related development finance essentially constitute a handshake between the recipient government and its development partners.

The priorities and vision for sustainable development of LICs and MICs are enshrined in national development plans and often form the backbone of consultations with international development partners. Both refugees and IDPs are rarely included from the onset in national development planning, and often do not feature in political processes related to development co-operation and finance. Political will needs to be mobilised for the deliberate and explicit inclusion of both refugees and IDPs in policy, planning, and

implementation, including resource allocation. It plays an important role in facilitating inclusive economic and social development across a broad range of policy areas and tools:

1. Inclusive policies relating to public services, participation in the economy, and planning in displacement-affected countries, which enable sustainable development support for refugees and IDPs. Policies and legal frameworks facilitating the *de facto* inclusion of refugees and IDPs in national social services, population registries and statistical surveys, and access to the formal labour market.

2. Inclusion of refugees and IDPs in national development plans, climate action plans, sector strategies, and related costing and data collection exercises. These plans and strategies contribute to informing the allocation national budgets and development finance.

3. Allocation of development finance and national fiscal resources in displacement affected LICs and MICs for displaced populations and host communities. This includes financing social services for displaced populations through development finance and national fiscal systems. The relative cost may also decrease over time if displaced populations become taxpayers in the formal economy.

4. Targeting refugees and IDPs in the implementation of high- and country-level development co-operation strategies by development co-operation providers, including explicitly incorporating the displaced in sector strategies, in addition to stand-alone projects for forced displacement.

5. Providing development finance, and fiscal allocations, to local actors, including municipalities, in sub-national areas affected by forced displacement. Public services in these areas are often overwhelmed with additional populations, in part because they are often remote, isolated and not prioritised in regular national planning exercises.

Box 1.2. De-facto exclusion affects both refugees and internally displaced persons

It is important to identify and acknowledge the commonalities and differences between refugee and internal displacement situations from the legal, political, and operational perspectives (see Annex A for details). A common working assumption is that access to national services is more difficult for refugees, since the internally displaced, as citizens of the country, enjoy full rights to their country's services, at least in principle. However, a recent study on access to social protection for refugees and the internally displaced in twelve LICs and MICs found that there is large gap between *de jure* and *de facto* access to national social protection systems (OECD/EBA, 2022) for both groups. *De facto*, social protection services are equally limited for both refugees and IDPs.

1.4 Methodology

The methodology of this paper is based on a comprehensive review of existing literature on the concept of political will, as well as key informant interviews in five countries – Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Iraq and Lebanon – which provide illustrations of the ways in which political will, or its absence, can shape development responses to forced displacement as well as examples of how political will can be mobilised to address forced displacement in practice. The online interviews were undertaken by the authors, using a semi-structured interview instrument to ensure consistency across countries and key respondents (Annex B).[6]

Table 1.1. Number of key informant interviews by type of affiliation

	Civil society organisations	UN entities and multilateral development banks	Private sector	Government officials (host and donor countries)	*Total*
Number of interviews	13	19	3	5	**40**

The selection of key informant interviews was facilitated by UNHCR country offices in the five selected countries. UNHCR staff provided contact details to civil society organisations, international organisations (including UN agencies and multilateral banks), private sector actors and government officials from both host and bilateral donor countries. A total of 40 interviews were undertaken over a three-month period between March and May 2023 with a range of stakeholders and policy actors, with most interviews undertaken with CSOs and international organisations. A minimum of 6 interviews were undertaken in each country, with a maximum of 12 in Ecuador (Table 1.1 and Table 1.2).

Table 1.2. Number of key informant interviews by case study country

	Bangladesh	Cameroon	Ecuador	Iraq	Lebanon	*Total*
Number of interviews	6	6	12	6	10	**40**

The key informant interviews provide examples of good practice and challenges in mobilising development responses to forced displacement across a range of different geographical and political contexts.

In addition, UNU-CPR, OECD and UNHCR co-organised a policy roundtable in New York in June 2023 at which the framework and emerging evidence from the fieldwork were presented to an invited audience of UN entities, Member States and other stakeholders in advance of the SDG Summit (September 2023), the Global Refugee Forum (December 2023) and the Summit of the Future (September 2024). The dialogue aimed to support efforts to ensure forcibly displaced populations are included in development planning and help them deliver on their existing commitments and pledges.

2 Key tasks in mobilising political will for the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in socio-economic development

This section describes the tasks required to mobilise political will for development policies, plans and implementation inclusive of refugees and internally displaced persons. It provides guidance on how to operationalise the political concept described earlier in section 1.1 and illustrates what this means in practice in five country case study examples (Box 2.1). According to Raile et al. (2016), there are four tasks that need to be undertaken to mobilise political will in relation to a given issue or policy (Figure 2.1). These tasks are flexible enough to allow local context, knowledge, and understanding to play prominent roles. This flexibility also means that they can be applied across contexts to a variety of different social problems. Guiding questions for each of these four tasks are outlined in Annex C.

Figure 2.1. Four key tasks for mobilising political will

Source: Authors, after Raile et al., 2016

Box 2.1. Refugee and internal displacement context in the case study countries

Bangladesh

Bangladesh hosts over 960 000 refugees from Myanmar (UNHCR, 2023), most of whom are ethnic Rohingya of Islamic faith. They are settled mainly in the country's South-eastern Cox's Bazar District, in specifically designated and densely populated camp-like refugee settlements. The refugee host district Cox's Bazar is also the country's main tourist destination and has a commercial fishing port. Refugee assistance policies, by design and government strategy, pursue a strictly humanitarian approach. Officially, the primary solution for improving the refugees' conditions is described as their return home to Myanmar. At the same time, conditions in areas of origin in Myanmar are not favourable to return in safety and dignity as of mid-2023. Bangladesh's geography and high population density make it highly disaster-prone. At the end of 2022, 427 000 Bangladesh citizens were internally displaced due to natural disasters (IDMC, 2023). The refugee hosting locations have also been repeatedly affected by disasters. While Bangladesh continues to receive substantial amounts of foreign aid, its economic growth in recent decades has vastly reduced Dhaka's dependence on it, and thereby the relative importance of development assistance. Strategic decisions, including the approach to hosting refugees, are centralised, and largely determined by the prime minister, government leaders, and the ruling political party.

Cameroon

Cameroon has faced multiple forced displacement flows in recent years, and in different parts of the country. In the North and Far North provinces, there are 120 000 refugees and 428 000 IDPs. Although there are fewer than 30% of refugees in camps in Cameroon, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) had opted for the creation of a camp in 2017 (Mindanao), to deal with the growing concerns of IDPs. The camp was initially designed for 10 000 but is home to more than 60 000 IDPs today. There are also around 638 000 IDPs in the Southwest and Northwest provinces, because of tensions between English and French populations, the Cameroonian government, and the separatist movement in the Anglophone provinces. Violent conflict has continued in the Anglophone provinces, and at their borders. CSOs are increasingly unable to work in this region, due to the political tension over how the situation should be addressed. Finally, there are also refugees, coming mainly from the Central African Republic (CAR), which number around 330 000. These refugees stem from conflict that has lasted for many years in CAR and are viewed as being relatively well integrated in Cameroon. Refugees from CAR are mainly found in the East of the country. Respondents in interviews said that in villages, the difference between refugee and local children is barely discernible in schools.

Ecuador

Ecuador is a country of transit (mainly towards the South) and of destination for forcibly displaced persons. It is the main country of destination for refugees coming from Colombia. Ecuador is also one of the main countries of origin of refugees (going North, through the Darien Gap). There are 74 000 official refugees in Ecuador, mainly Colombians. In addition, and in recent years, there has been a sizeable number of Venezuelans entering the country, numbering now 502 000, but not all are recognised as refugees. In terms of IDPs, there are 420 conflict-IDPs, but respondents acknowledge that this is an undercount. IDPs are a difficult political issue, and several respondents did not want to speak specifically about this topic. In addition, there are 340 000 climate-induced displaced people in the country. Refugees are spread across the country, and it is important to consider local contexts in Ecuador, as they vary from region to region. Guayaquil, for instance, is the second biggest city in Ecuador and the main international port of Ecuador. It deals with all shipping to and from the USA and Europe for instance. For that reason, many Venezuelans, are attracted to the area for jobs, and the

private sector therefore plays an important role of inclusion and mobilising political will. It is a region of opportunity for refugees, but also for actors to test policy on inclusion.

Iraq

As of April 2023, Iraq had an internally displaced population of some 1.2 million IDPs and 5 million returnees. In addition, there are around 300 000 refugees (most of whom are Kurdish Syrian residing in the Kurdistan Region (Iraq) and an estimated 8 000 persons who are considered stateless (UNHCR, 2023). The displacement situation in Iraq is characterised by protracted humanitarian needs, extensive development needs, and opportunities for solutions. International partners are working with the Iraqi authorities towards transitioning the response to the humanitarian situation to an approach more rooted long-term development planning. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) decided to formally deactivate all "clusters" by the end of 2022, and to no longer formulate a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). The government closed all IDP camps in Iraq, while 25 IDP camps located in the Kurdistan Region (Iraq) remain. Challenges for displaced persons include missing civil documentation. This impedes their ability to access basic services and restitution and/or reconstruction programmes, and their inability to participate in the public affairs of the country. Iraq is an Upper Middle-Income Country, with significant fiscal income from oil production. While the country has witnessed severe war, conflict and civil strife, recent years have been relatively stable. The political and security environment remains complex. While integrated and part of the Federal Government of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region (Iraq) is governed distinctly separate by the Kurdish Regional Government.

Lebanon

Lebanon hosts the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, with around 1.5 million refugees displaced in the country – accounting for nearly a quarter of Lebanon's total population – as well as around half a million Palestinians and their descendants who fled to Lebanon during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict or moved to Lebanon from countries experiencing conflict, such as Syria. More than a decade after their arrival, an estimated 80% of the Syrians live in poverty and 36% below the extreme poverty line, while 90% of the Syrian refugees cannot cover their basic needs. Meanwhile Lebanon's political and economic crisis has resulted in widespread poverty, collapsing public services and growing community tensions, a situation compounded by the legacy of the country's October Revolution in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut port explosion in August 2020. The country has been divided into two rival political camps since 2016 with political institutions hardly being able to act since. A global food and fuel crisis has exacerbated the already dire situation. Currently around 4 million people, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese need humanitarian assistance. Shifting from a state of emergency response to a development-based approach to a protracted refugee crisis is made complicated by the Lebanese government's unwillingness to include Syrian refugees in development planning.

2.1. Task one: Identification of stakeholders

The key political and public stakeholders relevant to efforts to mobilise development responses to forced displacement will also vary across different geographical and political contexts. A careful stakeholder mapping is therefore needed to ensure that policy responses mobilising political will for development in contexts of forced displacement are effective at different governance levels and that members of society affected by forced displacement are not forgotten. Importantly, a stakeholder mapping also contributes towards identifying the most effective channels through which to work.

Relevant stakeholders in the mobilisation of political will for development responses to forced displacement might include among others:

Local stakeholders

- Elected officials at central and local levels, such as the executive, parliamentarians, and local council members
- Government officials and representatives at national level, and at local level in areas with refugee or IDP presence
- Law enforcement actors (police, border police, immigration authorities)
- Security forces
- Traditional local authorities, including traditional and village leaders, elders
- Religious leaders at central and local level, faith-based organisations
- National civil society organisations
- Refugee or IDP-led civil society organisations
- Unions and professional groupings (teachers, health workers, social workers)
- Journalists, media houses and online/social media activists
- Business representatives
- Members of the diaspora in other countries.

International stakeholders with local presence in the country

- Bilateral diplomatic representations
- UN entities
- Multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and regional banks
- Diplomatic representations of regional organisations
- International civil society organisations
- International business representatives
- International media representatives.

Stakeholder identification in practice: examples from the case study countries

Good practices

- Although there is no single entity regularly mapping and co-ordinating efforts towards addressing forced displacement in **Cameroon**, there is a general understanding among stakeholders as to who does, or should, be doing what, including across different Ministries. Respondents told us, for example that effective management of IDPs and refugees was realised in the far north of the country because everyone pulled in the same direction. Development actors also play an important role in mapping actors at the local level in Cameroon. The example was given of a new initiative in the Lake Chad region called PROLAC which supports local communities with a mapping of interventions by different partners, with the objective of better coherence.[7] Mapping the main actors within a specific sub-grouping, such as CSOs, is also key. For example, CHINGO is a network of international CSOs committed to addressing forced displacement in Cameroon which acts as a co-ordinator for CSOs and undertakes some mapping of activities.[8]
- A variety of different international organisations work with refugees and the government on refugee concerns in **Ecuador**. This is mainly the task of the IOM and UNHCR, but also WFP and UNICEF under certain circumstances. They work through a working group for refugees and migrants called the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants (GTRM, or R4V). The GTRM has been a catalyst institution for the co-ordination across international actors. Partnerships with the private sector have also been essential in Ecuador. The creation of national and regional

development officers within UNHCR has been a catalyst for co-ordination, mapping and cross-learning from other contexts in Ecuador. Stakeholder mapping has been important at the local level as well. In the city of Quito, for example, UNHCR has mapped out and coordinates with 11 different civil society organisations to carry-out its work, from shelter to psychosocial support. In the city of Guayaquil, UNHCR partners with a group of private sector actors called Corpei, with whom they have an established a Memorandum of Understanding. The partnership with Corpei is essential for coherence, but also because they can translate governmental and institutional messaging into argumentation and communication that more closely resounds with the private sector – including supermarkets and shipping companies. Corpei has been instrumental in building a narrative around win-win positions with regards to inclusion of refugees between private sector and government. Corpei has ensured a voice for UNHCR in private sector discussions on refugee inclusion. This partnership has led to tangible results. In May 2022, the GCR network in Ecuador and the NGO Sin Fronteras launched the *Inclusive Company Seal* recognising firms that act on the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees – most of the companies that have merited the seal are based in Guayaquil.

Challenges

- While there is a good understanding of the responsibilities and responses locally in **Cameroon**, several respondents commented that there is not enough central co-ordination on forced displacement across the country. Respondents hoped for more central leadership and a better mapping. There does not appear to be a mapping of all actors in the country, although projects are underway or on-going at regional or provincial levels. A major international multi-actor roundtable that took place in April 2022 concluded that there are similarities between projects taking place in different communities with different actors. For this reason, the Ministry of External Relations is trying to map good practices.

- While there are many stakeholder networks in **Ecuador**, respondents firmly shared that there is no national mapping of key actors. Any mapping is mostly undertaken at the local level, particularly in hot spots, and is specific to the locality.

- According to respondents in **Lebanon**, there has been a significant weakening of Lebanese civil society following a political crackdown after the October 2019 Revolution, as well as a significant outward migration resulting from the economic crisis that followed the October Revolution, Beirut port explosion and COVID-19 pandemic. The capacity of CSOs has been depleted due to these multiple challenges as well as political hostility towards refugees and dysfunctional governance structures. Although there are many CSOs in the country, it can be difficult to know which ones are active.

2.2. Task two: Assessment of problem and solution understandings

Ambitions for development are often marked by competing priorities between different actors. Those issues which are supported by a critical mass of political will, and issues which are considered a necessity – often basic social services – will be considered an immediate priority and benefit from the allocation of actual resources.

One example of where it is important to gain an understanding of the different perspectives of stakeholders is in relation to the content of a country's national development plans. The inclusion of forced displacement issues in development planning may be considered a priority by some stakeholders and not others. Other factors determining the content of a country's development priorities include the degree of its commitment to specific international agendas such as the SDGs, and the influence of development co-operation

partners. The dialogue between a recipient government and a development co-operation provider itself constitutes a negotiation over areas of common vision, priorities, and interests.

Refugees and IDPs must be included in any assessment of problems and solutions. They should be consulted about the challenges they face and what they perceive as potential solutions. In the absence of consultation with people directly affected by forced displacement, it is unlikely that political will can be mobilised for appropriate development interventions. Ensuring and supporting citizens to have the space for expressing their opinions is also a crucial element in generating political will, including in contexts where responses to forced displacement have become highly politicised. Forums that mobilise large numbers of citizens and directly demonstrate their capacity for collective action can be very effective in putting pressure on political leaders to take action to improve policy responses towards refugees and IDPs.

Potential activities to be undertaken in this part of the process of building political therefore include:

- Consulting refugees and IDPs
- Consulting members of hosting communities
- Consulting key stakeholders identified
- Gathering data and preparing analysis of perceived problems and solutions.

Assessment of problems and solutions in practice: examples from the case study countries

Good practices

- The Durable Solutions Platform (DSP) was established by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in 2016 to improve policy and programming approaches in support of durable solutions for displacement-affected communities from Syria.[9] From 2022, DSP has focused both on displacement in and from Syria and other displacement-affected populations in the Middle East including refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities. With a secretariat based on the regional level in Amman, Jordan and working across six countries (Syria, Jordan, **Lebanon**, Türkiye, Iraq, Yemen), DSP seeks to support a collective agenda on durable solutions. DSP is not an implementing agency, but rather focuses on convening actors that are active in the solutions space and that do not usually engage with each other despite their doing complementary work. This varies from humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development NGOs that are either locally led or international, including hybrid durable solutions working groups and NGO fora, to international financial institutions, governments, UN entities, private sector and research institutes.

Challenges

- In **Bangladesh**, there is gap between the strategic aspirations for the refugee response to use a humanitarian-only approach and recognised good practises globally to apply comprehensive responses across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, especially in protracted situations. Actors involved in the Rohingya refugee situation in Bangladesh feel that this gap between strategy and good practice is difficult to overcome, given strong sentiments on the issue. The deeper concern is the perception that any steps towards socio-economic inclusion and development approaches for Rohingya refugees may discourage return, undermine the local economy including tourism, leave less land available for the national population, and create unsustainable fiscal costs to the government. While the "problem" in this context appears to be well understood by all actors, the macro-level view on acceptable "solutions" is highly polarised without any alternatives. At the same time, the situation of IDPs displaced by natural disasters in Bangladesh has received less international attention than the Rohingya refugee situation. IDPs often live under conditions worse

than that of the refugees, according to respondents. Their access to national services and documentation often remains constrained, despite their de-jure enjoyment of full citizen rights in the country.

- In **Cameroon**, respondents gave multiple examples of the problems related to refugees and IDPs. Financial constraints are an issue for all stakeholders, with both the Ministries of Education and Health struggling to integrate new arrivals. The government of Cameroon has many agreements with different organisations, and conventions, but limited funding for delivery. Respondents told us that many displaced populations struggle to secure access to national identification cards and services, particularly education and that displaced populations are treated differently depending on whether they are refugees or IDPs and the area of the country in which they are located. IDPs in the north of the country and refugees from Cameroon and the Central African Republic are generally well received and treated by the government, IDPs from the southwest and northwest provinces less so. There are also tensions related to natural resources and land-use issues, some of which have been exacerbated by the arrival of IDPs, especially in the far north of the country. Respondents reported that the Cameroonian government is very hierarchical and can be intolerant of different views expressed by CSOs and exclude them from formal processes. Government approval is also required for activities which can lead to time lags.

- In **Iraq**, respondents reported that the local authorities in displacement affected areas – both IDP hosting and returnee receiving – face severe capacity and resource issues despite significant domestic revenue and development support. This in turn affects their ability to resolve important practical issues relating to inclusive government services and documentation for the displaced and returnees. Iraqi citizens who are internally displaced face greater exclusion challenges than non-Iraqi refugees hosted by the country. While there are high-level policy commitments to resolve this, in practice political will, and implementation capacity, is lacking to overcome practical challenges. Refugees hosted in the Kurdistan Region (Iraq) have been granted full access to national services such as education and health, based on their refugee registration documentation. Iraqi IDPs on the other hand face difficulties of having their basic identity and residence documents renewed or issued, as the administrative requirement is to issue these documents at the place of origin. A further specific example cited by respondents are delays, and only partial implementation reaching a very small portion of claimants, of compensation to returning IDPs who they find their property destroyed.

- In **Lebanon,** the assessment of problems and solutions reflects the country's complicated history, which has been shaped by inner-state conflicts and sectarianism, often further impacted by the strategic interests of external actors. This has resulted in very different understandings of the issues confronting the country, exacerbated by divergent political interests. Several respondents observed that international development and humanitarian actors often have a lack of understanding of the historical and political context of Lebanon and that there is a need for international organisations and development actors to put themselves in the shoes of Lebanese citizens, for whom the history of the Syrian invasion of the country continues to shape responses to Syrian refugees who have been living in the country since 2012.

2.3. Task three: Developing a common understanding of the problem and solutions

A key task in building political will is building a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda. Long-term, effective change in complex issue areas typically happens only if the government and key public stakeholders are pushing in the same direction. To achieve success, the government and large segments of the public must be willing to recognise the problem, understand the problem in a similar way, and agree on solutions. Political actions are not enough to effect large-scale change if the public opposes

or undermines such actions. Stakeholders need to agree that a particular issue or condition has reached problem status, agree on the nature of the problem, and agree that the problem requires government action.

Creating sufficient support for a particular policy solution is typically quite difficult if this common understanding is absent. For this reason, it will be important to facilitate alignment of problem and solution understandings. This approach emphasises the importance of broad groups of stakeholders agreeing upon aligned problem and solution definitions. Common understanding of a problem serves as the foundation for effective shared accountability across stakeholders. All this information then informs the choice of tactics for unifying understanding and for holding stakeholders mutually accountable. Parts of the process repeat as necessary. Paying attention to these tasks in a holistic and connected way improves the chances of success.

The following activities can be undertaken to build a common understanding of the problem:

- **Strengthen familiarity and trust between relevant civil society and state actors.** A lack of familiarity and trust between state actors, bureaucrats and citizens can be a great obstacle for political will. *Them versus us* mentality can make governments unaware of civil society, and civil society actors can be misinformed about government systems, laws and regulations. Providing a neutral space for discussion between stakeholders where both parts can share their views can help build political will for reform.

- **Seek critical collaborations.** Policy reforms and improvements to the implementation process require that multiple stakeholders agree to work together. This does not imply that government and civil society must agree with one another, but they need to be willing to interact, by affording neutral avenues for meaningful dialogue, for example.

- **Identify realistic pathways for implementing solutions.** For the issue at hand to be addressed in actual policies or resource allocations, practical pathways need to be identified. It is important that that these pathways build or link with existing working mechanisms and are possibly acceptable for all key stakeholders. A pathway is only "realistic", insofar it can be implemented in the context of the prevailing political economy.

Alignment of problem and solution understandings in practice: examples from the case study countries

Good practices

- Given the challenges associated with the provision of services in the Cox's Bazar district, the government of **Bangladesh** has been working to formulate a three-year District Development Plan with the engagement of development actors and development approaches and anchored in development planning structures. The co-ordination of the District Plan is supported by UNDP and has attracted operational support and financing by several development partners. It thus enables sustainable development support for the situation beyond annual humanitarian planning cycles.

  Local NGOs as trusted partners can have an important role in steering the response strategy towards a sustainable and context sensitive response strategy. Bangladesh is known for the capacity and innovation of their national NGOs, some of which, for example, BRAC, have also become significant actors internationally. According to respondents, national NGOs have significant voice and ability to influence government decision making, possibly more than international actors. They are more trusted, given their history in the country, and can be controlled more easily. Moreover, they have extensive experience with sustainable development work in the country. Some have worked with disaster IDPs in Bangladesh for years, and built extensive experience and relationships in this field, as is the case with the NGO Friendship. Respondents provided numerous examples to support this claim, including vaccination programmes,

reproductive health and family planning and food provision. Respondents highlighted the positive impact these activities have had in mobilising development responses to forced displacement issues, responding to the specific needs of displaced populations and connecting them with local populations.

- In **Cameroon**, there is evidence that the UN development system reform efforts has been a catalyst for better management of forced displacement. Respondents reported that the UN in Cameroon used to be divided on the response to forced displacement, with one part advocating for humanitarian concerns (with a humanitarian country team), and another for development responses (country team). Now the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (UNRCO) facilitates a joint approach, particularly in advocating with the government and funders. The Cameroonian national HDP nexus taskforce has also enabled better and more joint programming approaches to forced displacement. It is chaired by the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and includes more than 100 actors. The UNRCO has been playing a major role in advocating for joint development and humanitarian projects, but also in coordinating the UN response.

  To date there have been 75 cases of convergence between humanitarian and development approaches in projects, through joint planning between local services and the UN country team in **Cameroon**. An example of this convergence is the initiative in Logone-Birmi in the Far-North province, where successful nexus approach was implemented in the context of forced displacement, thanks to the support from the Peace Building Fund (PBF).[10] In November 2022, the Cameroonian Ministry of External Relations and UNHCR organised a multi-actor meeting featuring ministries, international organisations and CSOs to find common ground. The meeting was spurred by additional pressures, particularly by UNHCR, to apply an HDP nexus approach towards addressing forced displacement concerns. The conference was key in bringing all actors together to speak frankly about the challenges and the way forward, official pledges were made, which can and will be monitored. The conference has been referenced by heads of states and high-level actors when referring to the regional political will to address forced displacement, including the UN Special Representative for Central Africa. A challenge has been to break the silos and bring-in new actors, such as the Ministry of Finance, that could further catalyse action.

- Following three years of relative stability, the international community decided to phase out the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in **Iraq** as of 2023. As one respondent put it: "We humanitarians occupy all the space and must learn to let go. We are not the only ones doing a good job". Working closely with the Iraqi authorities, the objective of this transition has been to anchor support to the displaced and hosting communities in the country's wider development agenda and path towards the SDGs. It also clearly situates accountabilities for solutions with central and local government authorities. This paves the way for a development approach to support the remaining 1.2 million internally displaced person and 300 000 refugees, as well as for securing development support to the over five million returnees in the country. The ongoing transition has not been without challenges, as the dissolution of humanitarian co-ordination and assistance structures required government authorities to step up their engagement and service delivery, while capacities in the specific geographic areas of concern has been weak. Many IDPs and returnees still face significant protection challenges, including for example access to documentation, which now need to be resolved with an integrated development approach.

- Respondents in **Ecuador** reported that an important factor leading to the development of a common understanding of forced displacement is the fact that the country has been dealing, rather successfully, with a large refugee population from Colombia for many years. This means that during the inflow of Venezuelans, many local institutions and CSOs had already built capacity on how to manage forced displacement situations, and that there was significant involvement of the private sector, particularly in cities – as many in Ecuador have gained a significant amount of autonomy in managing forced displacement. One example is that of Guayaquil, which is a highly dynamic business centre, dominated by the port and shipping industry, and the main place where refugees

arrive from the North, but also return from Peru to the South. Working with local private sector partners, UNHCR has expanded and innovated around issues of livelihoods and co-ordination of the different actors, signing an MoU with the city of Guayaquil's development branch (EPICO), to mainstream the inclusion of refugees into the various programmes of the municipality. UNHCR also works with companies for training and educational purposes, for example, Humboldt Zentrum has worked closely with UNHCR to provide vocational training for refugees in Guayaquil, particularly for the restaurant sector. The company also works with IDPs displaced by violence within Ecuador.

- Respondents in Guayaquil highlighted the importance of local political and economic context in determining what is possible in different parts of **Ecuador**. They also highlighted the need for information to ensure that the plethora of initiatives in the city are well understood and. Where appropriate, connected. Respondents strongly felt that with every new initiative the response gets more fragmented, as actors (government, CSOs, international organisations) compete for resources and political space. Networks have come in to help coordinate and make responses more coherent, such as the Red Ecuatoriana de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo (RECID). Local space was also brought up as a key determinant for mobilising political will in the city. Having a local space where the Network for Local Mobility can operate, along with its members has been key, particularly for passing municipal ordinances. This includes space for refugees as well, to find the resources, often alongside other groups of concerns (children, LGBTQIA+, people with disabilities). Co-ordination challenges have been overcome by creating a Human Mobility Network, which includes CSOs, but also governmental ministries and meets on a regular basis.

- Respondents in **Lebanon** described growing efforts to build critical coalitions around issues affecting both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. Lebanon's political and economic crisis has resulted in widespread poverty, collapsing public services and growing community tensions. A food and fuel crisis has exacerbated the already dire situation. An estimated 80% of Lebanese live in poverty and 36% below the extreme poverty line, while 90% of the Syrian refugees cannot cover their basic needs. Currently around 4 million people, including 1.5 million displaced Syrians and 2.2 million vulnerable Lebanese, need humanitarian assistance. There are efforts to build alignment on solutions and problems. One example is in relation to increasing agricultural productivity, where efforts have been made to build coalitions between those wanting to improve conditions for the large number of Syrians working (>70% of all Syrians) in the sector and those wanting to increase Lebanese agricultural productivity for the benefit of the Lebanese.

   Examples of good practices include efforts by ILOs to establish a farmers' register and reduce child labour, and by an Arab NGO to provide social insurance for agricultural workers. Syrians are only 16% of the total number of agricultural workers in Lebanon so improvements in the sector would benefit a very large number of Lebanese agricultural workers. Much of the framing of initiatives is in terms of social protection. Education in Lebanon is another sector that has benefitted significantly from the presence of refugees because this has helped improve the education sector, for example, through the training of teachers and child protection policies that have benefitted the Lebanese population. These are areas where it may be possible to build a common strategy that benefits both the Lebanese population and Syrian refugees.

Challenges

- 'Humanitarian standards', such as SPHERE[11] and other international emergency sector standards, are not necessarily compatible with national standards of service provision. Continued use of separate standards for the displaced can form a blockage for their inclusion in the hosting context, and for the use of development approaches. This can hamper integration with sustainable approaches to service provision and wider development co-operation programmes. According to respondents in **Bangladesh**, the Rohingya refugee response has created a parallel system of

sector standards in the camps which are often higher than those for rural communities in the wider area. For example, the doctor-patient ratio is lower in refugee camps which means that there are higher costs for health care in the camps than for rural citizens, as more doctors are needed for the same number of patients.

- In **Cameroon**, respondents reported that whilst there have been improvements in co-ordination associated with the UN, support from the government for forcibly displaced populations is nonetheless limited, especially for IDPs in the south-western and north-western provinces and for those speaking English. A development approach to forced displacement is still not very present and the inclusion of refugees and IDPs is often not spoken, especially in the early stages of displacement. One respondent strongly felt that not enough of a big picture economic view was taken when dealing with forced displacement in Cameroon. A major issue on the development of a common approach in Cameroon is the lack of national strategy regarding forced displacement. Respondents reported that there is no meaningful national strategy on inclusion, despite the existence of legislative and policy instruments. Many initiatives are still piecemeal and uncoordinated.

- It is important to acknowledge that common understandings can shift, and political will can effectively disappear almost overnight. Although respondents reported positive examples of good practice in **Ecuador**, particularly in relation to the private sector, the country is going through a period of difficult political tension and instability. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on both the personal lives of people and the economy are considered to have been a contributing factor. And as in other contexts, refugees have become political scapegoats in the context of a deteriorating economic and political situation. Whilst there was support for the Venezuelans when they first arrived because they comprised relatively educated people, including doctors and lawyers, levels of support have waned over time and as new flows of people have arrived. For example, there are increasing crime rates across Ecuador which have been publicly attributed to Venezuelans.

  Mobilising political will for development responses to forced displacement has become more difficult as trust in government has fallen. One major area of concern in **Ecuador**, which may limit the possibility to mobilise political will, is the alignment and balance between national and local governments, and the relationships that are built across both. Although the term IDP is not used in Ecuador, there are growing number of people internally displaced as the security situation deteriorates. There are also refugees in Ecuador without documentation and this creates a snowball of other problems, including in relation to the education of children, who sometimes cannot attend school without documents even though school attendance is mandatory. While the social security system (IESS) may seem accessible from the outside, respondents explained that it not user-friendly. Meanwhile Ecuadorians themselves are leaving the country and now constitute one of the largest groups crossing the Darien Gap.

- Respondents in **Lebanon** described the challenges of trying to work with a huge range of actors and stakeholders, many of whom have different objectives and sometimes also competing agendas and mandates. Beyond the traditional problem of dealing with very heterogeneous actors within the humanitarian space, the issue of co-ordination is strongly influenced by the specificities of the Lebanese terrain. The government crisis including the lack of a President, and the somewhat unclear Lebanese open-door policy towards Syrian refugees, impact on the ability of development actors to address the needs of forcibly displaced populations in the country. Co-ordination between different donors constitutes a challenge, since not all donors operate in the same forums and do not always share the same values toward humanitarian and development assistance. In this specific case, the situation is further complicated by the very fact that some donors have divergent political agendas that underpin the very efforts of co-ordination and the establishment of a clear common policy, when it comes to Syrian refugees and towards the Syrian crisis. According to one respondent *"everybody has their own little territory, they are afraid to give up too much of their*

power. So, there is a lack of transparency about what there are doing, their funding streams and their vision*". Some respondents also commented on the tensions and different agendas of UN agencies in Lebanon*: "Communication between different agencies has been openly hostile on many occasions".

2.4. Task four: Building firm commitments and mutual accountability

The final stage in mobilising political will involves building clear, shared commitments to first deliver existing and new policies and activities to address the shared understanding of the problem and developing meaningful mutual accountability among stakeholders for their delivery. Potential activities include:

- **Lobbying and making use of legal/policy reforms**; including in relation to existing commitments under the GCR, inclusive services and accessible formal labour markets for displaced populations, and policy initiatives towards solutions to displacement situations, including voluntary return in safety and dignity, or sustainable integration of refuges and IDPs elsewhere.

- **Mobilising the donor community to strengthen government capacity** through the provision of technical assistance in policy analysis, formulation, priority-setting, programme design and cost analysis. Donors can intervene in monitoring the progress of measures taken to address the problem in order to diagnose whether or not the adopted policies need to be adapted or if institutions need further reforms.

- **Investing time and resources in documenting and publicising the expected concrete benefits of any changes**, for example, through research and evaluation (Crisp, 2018).

- **Allocating development finance** to build the capacity of public services and markets in LIC and MIC displacement affected countries, enabling them to extend services and development efforts also to displaced populations and returnees.

Building firm commitments in practice: examples from the case study countries

Good practices

- The engagement by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the Rohingya refugee response in **Bangladesh** contributed to over-coming costly and in-efficient short-term approaches to assistance. While overall strategic guidelines of the response foresee only the use of "temporary" structures for public infrastructure in the refugee camps, ADB as a development bank can only support sustainable interventions. In dialogue with the host government and partners, it was agreed that the ADB can engage, and their project has supported the construction of roads and permanent water and waste management structures in the refugee camps and host communities in Cox's Bazar. While this project constitutes significant progress towards a comprehensive response across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, challenges remain. Given the strict non-integration of services to refugees in government public services, the newly constructed infrastructures are not covered by governmental maintenance.

- **Cameroon** has one of the most generous and open legislative environments for refugees in the world. Cameroon is a signatory of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of Refugees, the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Refugee Convention as well as the Kampala Convention of 2009 (Decree of 31 December 2014). Cameroon is also a signatory of the GCR and has made a pledge towards the compact on access to health, education, social benefits and socioeconomic integration of refugees. Respondents highlighted a 2005 law implemented by decree in 2011 (Decree 389) through which refugees have a pathway and access to mobility, naturalisation, health and education services, in line with Cameroonian nationals. All children have

access to education free of charge under this agreement, including refugee children form countries such as the CAR who are integrated into local schools upon their arrival. They also pointed to an agreement signed between the Ministry of Health and UNHCR in 2011 on facilitating refugee (although not IDPs) access to health services in Cameroon by refugees, in six different regions. These services are free to refugees and are funded by UNHCR (70%) and the Cameroonian government (30%). To achieve an enabling environment, UNHCR and the Cameroonian national government have avoided creating new camps. In fact, Mindanao in the Far-North province (60k refugees) is the one single camp in the country. New situations are dealt with by creating "sites aménagés", which are new towns, integrated into Cameroonian society.

Importantly, for the mobilisation of political will, there is an on-going push for decentralisation in Cameroon, most recently reformed in 2019. The latest law stipulates that communes become themselves agents of development through decentralised decision-making. On many levels, this allows communities to act independently from the central administration. One of the major objectives is that communities can integrate refugees directly into their development plans. The entire process is coordinated by the Ministry of External Relations, which has visited each community with a mayor in Cameroon. UNHCR has also shifted its own policy in the country, by focusing on local integration directly dealing with focal points in city halls, since November 2021. Finding mutual benefits is key. A good practice highlighted by a respondent was that of the reforesting of the Mindanao camp in the Far North, which allowed refugees to work whilst supporting the country's climate change mitigation objectives.

- Despite the recent challenges noted above, **Ecuador** is internationally recognised as being progressive on addressing forced displacement issues, driven by the government, and working across a wide range of government departments including the Ministry of Social Inclusion (MIES) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and its International Protection Division. The overarching instrument for refugee inclusion is the 2017 Human Mobility Law, which led to a 2022 regularisation initiative by the national government to integrate refugees more effectively, which itself was instigated by wave of reform beginning in 2008 with a new national constitution. The constitution refers to human mobility as a right and has paved the way for the government and many other actors to work in amore holistic way, including new and alternative migratory pathways supported by UNHCR. The regularisation programme which, according to respondents, was implemented following advocacy and resources from international organisations and individual donor countries, including UNHCR, IOM, the USA and Canada, is a good example of political will being mobilised and implemented in practice. A first phase of regularisation took place in 2022, providing Venezuelan asylum-seekers with two years of regular status, the possibility to obtain an identification card, and the possibility to renew for another two years. A second phase was administered to other (non-Venezuelan) refugees, viewed as highly successful, objectively, in which 150 000 were regularised, and 48 000 granted temporary visas. The visas ease access to housing and enable individuals to set up businesses.

In 2022, Ecuador received a Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) loan from the World Bank, which had been a long objective of the country. The successful bid for a loan catalysed more positive policy for forcibly displaced persons, including the decree and final round of the regularisation programme. The GCFF loan itself played a fundamental role in mobilising political will, as the government needed to make reforms and promise certain elements to access the loan. External guidance, standards and support have been very instrumental in mobilising political will in Ecuador. For example, the US Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) has insisted that 70% of the beneficiaries of its loans in Ecuador should target refugees and 30% the local population – and this is now viewed as a good practice by all international partners.

Two examples of commitment through political will were provided for **Ecuador**. The first was during the 2016 earthquake in Esmeraldas. By advocating for their inclusion, UNHCR and the government were able to include Colombian refugees in money transfer programmes supporting affected

households. The second was that during the Covid-19 pandemic, despite low resources, number of vaccines and the situation seemingly daunting, the government and its partners were able to provide refugees in the country with Covid-19 vaccines.

- With support from UN and other development partners, the Kurdish Regional Government in **Iraq** adopted the *Refugee Education Integration Policy* in 2022. Since that time, refugee and asylum seeker children have been able to access government schools taught in the local curriculum and language. This important commitment was incentivised through targeted development financing by UN and development partners towards construction of school infrastructure and better support to teachers in the region. Joint advocacy efforts by UN and NGO partners contributed to the development of this policy.

  A network of local NGOs in Iraq was able to mobilise political will for resolving documentation issues in one specific area through continuous engagement and consultation with local authorities. They were able to build a trusted relationship with the authorities, listened to their concerns, and provided capacity building to the specific government offices working on documentation issues. They also covered related legal fees and costs of claimants, essentially removing the capacity / resource barrier on all sides. By building trust and applying local knowledge, the local NGO network connected displaced populations with the authorities who could resolve the issues they faced.

Challenges

- Short-termism leads to ineffective responses. The prevailing macro-level strategy of a humanitarian-only approach to the refugee response in **Bangladesh** has significant impact on the effectiveness of the refugee response. Authorities issue approvals for NGO projects for a maximum of six months, after which an extension needs to be requested. This limits planning certainty and the planning horizon. A local NGO described their approach to procurement under development programmes, outside the refugee response, as based on a long-term procurement plan. This leads to cost effectiveness of the response, due to longer commitments and partnerships with suppliers. In the humanitarian response to the Rohingya refugee situation, however, they report not being able to apply this approach. This leads to significantly higher costs of the interventions, compared to other ongoing development programmes.

  Moreover, while allocations from the World Bank IDA *Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities* were made available to the government of Bangladesh, the implementation of this development finance was outsourced by government departments to UN agencies. The desired policy dialogue associated with the Refugee Policy Review Framework was less effective, since the implementation was not integrated with existing national services, again leading to the development of parallel humanitarian services.

- In **Cameroon**, there is limited consideration of the HDP nexus approach and of inclusion, especially in the early stages of displacement, although respondents told us that with PBF funds, things are slowly changing. UNHCR is actively seeking to transfer more of its management role to the Cameroonian government, and specifically the Ministry of External Relations (MRE). Such a transfer is viewed by respondents as essential as it would possibly unlock the gridlock on legal recognition of documents, blocking free mobility across country, identification for services and access to the purchase of land. One respondent commented that there is a lack of participation by relevant stakeholders on the ground, another that Cameroon has done well in ratifying global conventions, like Kampala, but is falling short on following-through on action. Capacity issues were also raised by respondents in the context of the sustainability of the gains made through the PBF. An important point on capacity is changing the government's approach to humanitarian aid, and the idea that the government needs only help displaced persons with short-term challenges. Respondents said that central government is not always receptive to such a shift.

- A major drawback facing **Ecuadorian** commitments is that in practice, certain programmes only target citizens and are not inclusive of displaced populations. The examples of the *Apoyo de desarollo humano* and *Economia violeta* prgrammes were cited as examples. A lack of capacity and knowledge in Ecuador also inhibits firm commitments being carried out. With regards to education, for example, refugee children have the right to go to school, but due to discriminatory processes, or a lack of documentation, are often unable to attend. Many have lost or could not bring their documents from Venezuela, so the school cannot integrate them. In addition, local authorities often do not know the law, leading to discrimination. For instance, Venezuelans under 9 years old do not need identification to go to school in Ecuador, but this is not implemented equally everywhere.

- The most significant challenge to the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in development planning and financing in **Lebanon** is the fact that the government and increasing sections of society, view the inclusion of Syrian refugees in development as an acceptance that they will permanently remain in the country. One of the main themes to emerge from the research was the idea of *anti-permanence* or *non-permanence*: the perception is that the stated aim is to keep the Syrians in a temporary or unsettled position in order that they will return. This response is largely a reflection of the history of Syrian occupation between 1976 and 2005 and well as more recent economic and political instability. This has significant implications for policy towards Syrians in Lebanon who are only allowed to work in three sectors (agriculture, construction and services) where wages are very low, and who are not allowed to build permanent structures or for their houses to be connected to mains water and electricity. Property which breaches these conditions is pulled down. Moreover, according to many of the research respondents, the Lebanese government will not accept development financing in the form of concessional loans if there is a requirement to include the Syrian population. There is also a perception amongst respondents that development finance is being used to keep Syrians in Lebanon and prevent their onward migration to Europe.

3 Measuring and assessing political will

This paper has examined the role of political will in fostering effective development responses to refugee and internal displacement situations in low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs). To do this, the paper has drawn on case studies from Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, Iraq and Lebanon to show how it is possible for countries to mobilise political will to improve development responses to forced displacement through four concrete tasks:

1. Identifying and mapping key stakeholders.
2. Undertaking an assessment of how the different stakeholders – including forcibly displaced populations and members of hosting communities – view the problem and potential solutions.
3. Developing a common understanding of the problem and possible solutions by strengthening familiarity and trust between relevant civil society and state actors.
4. Building clear, shared commitments to deliver existing and new policies and activities that address the shared understanding of the problem and develop meaningful mutual accountability among stakeholders for delivery.

As shown though the case studies, practice is affected by a set of challenges, including, among others:

- the existence of parallel processes in the humanitarian, development and peace dimensions of service delivery, financing, and resource allocation for refugees, IDPs and hosting communities
- a tendency towards short-termism
- the existence of adverse political narratives affecting refugees and IDPs
- the absence of mapping of key actors across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus at national and sub-national level
- the limited capacity of government and civil society actors
- gaps between the strategic aspirations of different actors
- an unwillingness of national, and sometimes also local, governments to engage in planning and delivery which is inclusive of refugees and IDPs.

3.1. Six Indicators for measuring progress in the mobilisation of political will for development responses to forced displacement

How is it possible to determine whether different actors have been effective in mobilising the political will needed for development responses to forced displacement? What indicators should be used to monitor the commitment of actors to undertake and sustain actions and progress in implementation?

The existence of statements, policies, or legislation are not enough to measure political will (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Rather, political will has to be manifested in concrete action. Conversely, the absence of concrete action – failure to pass legislation for example – cannot be taken as an indicator of lack of political will per

se, since, as noted above, those failures could have resulted from a variety of factors, notably low levels of capacity. Instead, an assessment of the commitment of actors to undertake and sustain actions over time to achieve certain policy objectives can be undertaken by disaggregating the definition of political will into six indicators that are observable and measurable (Brinkerhoff 2016). This paper concludes by synthesising the evidence from the case studies in relation to these six indicators, which should be measured over time when leveraging political for development responses to forced displacement:

1. Mobilisation of relevant stakeholders

Evidence from the case studies suggests that development actors and CSOs play an important role in mapping and mobilising actors at the local and national levels. There is also evidence of regional efforts to improve policy and programming approaches to improve policy and planning approaches for displacement affected communities. Such initiatives can enhance co-ordination efforts, as well as facilitating mapping and cross learning. They can also help local actors to translate governmental and institutional messaging into argumentation and communication that more closely resonates with other non-traditional actors such as the private sector.

2. Degree of government initiative

Some degree of initiative from country decision makers towards development responses to forced displacement must exist to talk meaningfully of political will. If the push for change comes totally from external actors, then political will cannot be said to exist. The existence of political will can be seen in in policies and practices that include the forcibly displaced in development planning, especially where this displacement has become protracted.

3. Evidence that policies and programmes are based on socio-economic data analysis and technically sound options

The case studies highlight the importance of gathering information of 'what works' in development responses to forced displacement, in a way that is inclusive and disaggregated for refugees, IDPs and host communities. They also provide examples of governments working with UN and other development actors including national NGOs and CSOs, many of which have extensive experience and technical expertise beyond humanitarian assistance, to embed development planning in responses to forced displacement. Governments, supported by UN Resident Coordinators, can play an important role in advocating for joint development and humanitarian projects, as well as in coordinating the UN response and providing technical expertise.

4. Evidence of public commitment and allocation of resources

An important stage in mobilising political involves building clear, shared commitments to deliver existing and new policies and activities which address a shared understanding of the problem and developing meaningful mutual accountability among stakeholders for their delivery. Explicit public commitments to the socio-economic inclusion of refugees and IDPs and their access to education and health services on a par with non-displaced nationals, as well as their inclusion in national and local development planning opens the possibility of mobilising the donor community and multilateral development banks in support of new initiatives and programmes.

5. Continuity and sustainability of effort

Mobilising political will for development responses to forced displacement is a long-term process which involves strengthening familiarity and trust between relevant civil society and state actors and identifying

potential areas of collaboration. Donors can be instrumental in providing technical support and the financial resources to displacement affected governments, that allow them to include the displaced in inclusive national and local service systems, and in related development planning. This support is also essential for enabling the creation of conditions for durable solutions for the displaced, either in areas of origin (voluntary return and reintegration), or in other locations where they can achieve durable solutions. Donors can also support monitoring and reporting efforts that contribute to continuity, as well as to learning and adaptation.

6. Learning and adaptation

Political will is demonstrated when country actors establish a process for tracking development responses to forced displacement, and for actively managing implementation by adapting to emerging circumstances. Learning can also apply to country policymakers observing policies, practices, and programmes from other countries, and selectively adopting them for their use in their own countries.

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Annex A. Differences and similarities between refugees and IDPs

	Refugees	Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
Differences	"Alien" (non-citizen) in the host country Specific legal status and international frameworks (1951 Refugee Convention; Global Compact on Refugees etc.) with specific rights Individual registration standard practice Refugee definition limited to conflict / persecution Drivers of refugees' forced displacement are external to the host country Drivers of refugees' forced displacement are limited to persecution and conflict, due to the legal refugee definition	Same legal status as all citizens of the country No legally binding international legal framework with specific legal rights and entitlements (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are soft law) Not consistently individually registered due to their forced displacement May have fled from natural disasters, generalised violence, human rights violations Drivers of IDPs' forced displacement are internal to the country. In the case of conflict/persecution, some IDPs may continue to face discrimination or persecution Drivers of IDPs' forced displacement include a wide range of possible causes, including natural disasters.
Similarities	Forcibly displaced: Specific protection needs and vulnerabilities due to persecution / violence / flight; Age, gender, diversity of forcibly displaced – vulnerabilities and needs differ significantly within populations; Same basic needs for housing and access to safe water supply, health, education and other social services; De-facto often affected by similar political economy (security problem / marginalisation/competition over limited resources / cultural, societal factors) Offer potential to contribute their agency, skills, education, and work experience towards economic growth and fiscal income; Often deliberately not included in national social services and local government administrative systems; Perceived primarily as a "humanitarian" and "temporary" issue, and often deliberately not included in regular fiscal resource allocation and development planning; Same impacts on municipal infrastructure and budgets; De-facto affected by protracted displacement, with few tangible "durable solutions" in sight; Often same areas of origin and nationality for IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries; Architecture of solutions similar: Resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding, including support to political dialogue in areas of origin; promotion of social cohesion; resolution of legal issues over house, land and property; access to documentation; re-establishment of the social contract between the state and persons on its territory in terms of inclusive social service delivery and basic infrastructure; access to jobs, economic opportunities, and financial services; area-based development support to local authorities and communities areas of origin, or in other areas where refugees or IDPs integrate.	
Solutions	**Options:** Voluntary repatriation Local integration, including naturalisation, in the host country Resettlement to a third country "interim" solutions: De-facto socio-economic inclusion in the host country **Accountability for solutions:** host country, country of origin international community, UNHCR	**Options:** Voluntary return Local settlement / socio-economic inclusion in the host area Settlement elsewhere in the country **Accountability for solutions:** Country where IDPs are citizens

Annex B. Questions for country case study key informant interviews

The semi-structured interview consisted of seven core questions, with additional follow-up questions if the context required it. The interviewer began each interview by introducing the objectives of the study as well as the authors and the institutions involved. The questions asked to each key informant were as follows:

1. Tell me a about your professional role.
   a. What do(es) you (your organisation) do in response to issues of forced displacement and the needs of refugees/IDPs in [country name]?
2. From your perspective, who are the main influencers shaping the way assistance is provided to refugees and IDPs, and the provision of financial resources for these populations? Who shapes policies related to the integration of refugees and IDPs, and their inclusion in national service systems (education, health, other systems)?
   a. Are there different levels, and who is most influential?
   b. Is anyone conducting a stakeholder mapping in this regard, and who coordinates stakeholders?
3. In [country name], to what extent are refugees/IDPs benefiting from regular national services (health, education, social protection, other services)?
   a. To what extent are refugees / IDPs included in sustainable development programmes, excluding humanitarian aid?
   b. Who is mapping/coordinating this landscape?
4. What is blocking/preventing, and driving inclusion in [country name]?
   a. Which successes or good practices are you aware of in [country name], in terms of overcoming challenges to the inclusion of refugees and IDPs in national systems and development programmes?
   b. What arguments or dynamics do you believe key decision makers are most receptive to in this regard?
   c. Who, if anyone, is coordinating a common understanding of this issue in [country name]?
5. What is your understanding of the term 'political will' and to what extent do you think political will is important in driving responses to refugees and IDPs in [country name]?
   a. How do you think political will can best be harnessed to promote improved policy responses to refugees and IDPs?
   b. Do you have any concrete examples where the mobilisation of political will has improved outcomes for refugees and IDPs?
6. Have any firm public commitments or laws been issued relating to the inclusion of refugees and IDPs, either in national services, or in international development programmes benefiting [country name]?
7. Would you like to mention anything else we should consider for this study?

The authors recorded each interview by manually writing down answers. Interviews were not recorded by video or audio.

Annex C. Guiding questions in mobilising political will for development responses to forced displacement

Steps to mobilise political will	Outcomes facilitating development approaches to forced displacement					
	Inclusive foundational policies	**Inclusive NDPs and sector plans**	**Inclusive country-level development support strategies**	**Inclusive, and displacement dedicated development finance**	**Inclusive fiscal and development finance allocations**	**Financing reaches displacement affected areas and local actors**
Stakeholder identification	Who influences, decides on, national policies related to social service provision, access to employment?	Who influences NDPs and sector plans, collects related data, decides on their finalisation?	Who are the main development partners, bilateral and multi-lateral?	Who are the main development partners, bilateral and multi-lateral, in terms of financial volumes? Who is interested/supportive of refugee/IDP issues?	Who decides on fiscal spending in the country, including development finance?	Which are the most displacement affected regions / municipalities in the country?
Assessment of problem and solution understanding	What are the main perceived problems, obstacles, solutions to inclusion?	What are the arguments in favour, and against inclusion?	What is the state of inclusion in dev. partners' country level strategies?	What is the current volume of development finance for forced displacement in the country, by donor?	What is the volume of fiscal allocations supporting refugees/IDPs?	Are the regions / municipalities costing services for refugees /IDPs? Are they asking for additional resources? Arguments in favour / against?
Developing a common understanding of the problem and solutions	What is the current state of policies? What arguments are stakeholders receptive to?	What data is needed? How can development priorities and inclusion objectives be aligned? Who coordinates NDPs/sector plans?	How is development co-operation coordinated in the country? How can refugees'/IDPs' concerns be included in planning?	For financial decisions, donors are receptive to which arguments?	What should the volume be? Which fiscal allocations should be inclusive?	Who coordinates regions / municipalities? Are they being asked to cost spending for refugees/IDPs? How can the process be strengthened?
Building firm commitments	How can solutions be formalised? Which policies / regulations can be adjusted / developed? Who decides on this?	When is the next revision of the NDP/ sector plans? How does the revision process take place? When is the window of engagement?	When are the next revisions of dev. partners' country level strategies? What is the process for revision?	Which ongoing programmes can be adjusted to include refugees / IDPs? Which donors design new programmes which could include refugees / IDPs from the start? When? Process?	What is the time and place to influence annual/multi-annual fiscal spending plans? How are they developed, and decided on, and by whom?	Are regions / municipalities being requested to include costing of refugees/IDPs, and are fiscal resource allocations made accordingly?

Notes

[1] *Refugee crisis requires political will, forward-looking solutions, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Global Forum on Migration and Development*, 14 October 2015, https://press.un.org/en/2015/dsgsm907.doc.htm

[2] *The migrant crisis: A reality check of political will, The Globe and Mail, 9 September 2015,* https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-migrant-crisis-a-reality-check-of-political-will/article26286461/

[3] *Without political will 'leave no one behind' will remain an empty slogan', Caritas International, 23 September 2022*, https://www.caritas.org/2022/09/caritas-internationalis-on-world-day-of-migrants-and-refugees-without-political-will-leave-no-one-behind-will-remain-an-empty-slogan/

[4] The EU's policy approach to arrival of millions of Ukrainian refugees following the Russian invasion in February 2022 is often cited as illustrative of the fact that where there is political will there is also capacity for humanitarianism and solidarity to follow. In contrast to previous large scale displacements, for example, from Afghanistan or Syria, EU Member States have shown a rapid and unified political will to host refugees, even if the massive and abrupt influx poses a logistic challenge for governments. "Political will" in this context has been driven by Ukraine's geographic position in Europe, a perception of shared European culture and history with Ukraine, and collective outrage at the Russian invasion. See, for example, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2022/05/03/what-ukraine-afghanistan-and-syria-have-taught-us-about-the-political-will-behind-international-refugee-law/

[5] https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2021/10/615dbdb34/political-needed-safeguard-824-million-displaced-unhcr-protection-chief.html

[6] With the exception of Lebanon, where interviews were carried-out in-person.

[7] More information available at https://cblt.org/prolac-project/

[8] The Coordination of Humanitarian International Non-Governmental Organizations (CHINGO) was formalized mid-2019 owing to a need for a collaborative platform for effective and principled INGO interaction, engagement and co-ordination of humanitarian plus early recovery interventions in Cameroon. Presently, CHINGO has a core membership of 20 members and 3 observers and is a critical platform for ensuring effective information sharing and analysis.

[9] More information at https://www.dsp-me.org/

[10] More information at https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/PBF%20Cameroon%20Country%20Brief%20-%20June%202021.pdf

[11] https://spherestandards.org/