5. Women’s political voice, leadership and agency
This chapter focuses on women’s political voice, leadership and agency in Africa. It provides an overview of the political representation and participation of women both at local and national levels, as well as their engagement and leadership in conflict settings and peacebuilding efforts. The chapter also highlights the impact of formal and informal laws, social norms and practices on women’s political voice, leadership and agency, specifically within the public sphere. It analyses how such norms – including traditional gender roles, sexist discourse and political gender-based violence – prevent women from accessing information and participating safely in electoral and political processes. Based on this analysis, the chapter provides policy recommendations for women’s political empowerment and increased agency in all spheres of public life.
Since the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action1 in 1995, women’s involvement in wider social life in Africa has expanded significantly. However, persistent gaps remain in women’s representation at all levels of decision making (AfDB and UNECA, 2020[1]). These gaps are rooted in discriminatory laws, social norms and customary practices that continue to hinder women’s political voice, leadership and agency. Women constitute approximately half of the population, and thus their engagement in public and political life is a prerequisite for representative governance. Moreover, growing evidence suggests that women’s participation in decision making improves governance as well as political processes (Pikramenou and Mahajan, 2019[2]; AfDB and UNECA, 2020[1]; OECD, 2014[3]). The importance of women’s participation in this sphere is recognised in international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as in the Maputo Protocol which calls on states to promote women’s equal participation in political life, specifically in elections and at all levels of electoral processes (see Annex A) (African Union, 2003[4]).
The present chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section looks at outcome-based indicators related to women’s political voice, leadership and agency in Africa. The section provides a broad overview of the situation of African women, specifically in reference to their political representation, participation and role in peace and security processes. The second section explores the underlying factors that explain the inequalities observed between women and men in terms of political representation and participation. This section uncovers the role played by discriminatory social institutions and, specifically, discriminatory social norms and attitudes in explaining women’s underrepresentation in political positions at all levels. It also examines women’s limited political voice as citizens, insecurity in the face of politically motivated gender-based violence, limited access to resources and information, and restricted civil liberties. A table summarising the key indicators for women’s political voice, leadership and agency in Africa can be found in Annex 5.A at the end of the chapter.
Representation of women in political positions has increased since 2000, but remains low
Since 2000, the representation of women in politics has increased globally with specific gains in Africa. For example, the number of seats held by women in lower houses of parliaments worldwide increased from 12% to 26% between 2000 and 2021, while the number of women holding seats in lower houses of parliaments in Africa rose from 8% to 25% over the same period (IPU, 2000[5]; IPU Parline, 2021[6]). However, despite this impressive 17 percentage point increase, progress in Africa has slowed over the last five years as a result of numerous factors, including discriminatory social institutions (Figure 5.1). This aggregate figure also hides considerable variation among the continent’s sub-regions. In 2021, Southern Africa is the sub-region with the highest share of women in its single/lower houses (32%), followed closely by East Africa (31%). Just below the continental average of 25% is North Africa (24%), followed by Central Africa (18%) and West Africa (16%). There is even greater variation in women’s level of representation at the country level, ranging from 61% in Rwanda to 6% in Nigeria. In upper houses of parliament, inequalities in women’s representation are even greater than those in lower houses. For example, in 2021, women held just 20% of the seats in upper houses of parliament in Africa. Among the 23 countries2 with upper houses of parliament, the proportion of seats held by women ranges from 44% in Zimbabwe to just 3% in Liberia (IPU Parline, 2021[6]).
Source: (IPU, 2000[5]); (IPU, 2005[7]); (IPU, 2010[8]); (IPU, 2015[9]); (IPU Parline, 2021[6]) Women in National Parliament – Statistical Archive, http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm.
In 2018, women held 29% of positions in local government in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 71% for men (UN Statistics, 2021[10]). Women’s representation in these posts ranged from 67% in Tunisia to 4% in Ghana (UN Women, n.d.[11]). Similarly, women accounted for just 19% of mayors of capital cities in Africa (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). Central Africa is the sub-region with the highest share of women mayors of capital cities at 33%, followed by Southern Africa (30%), West Africa (20%), East Africa (7%) and North Africa (0%) (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). Women are also underrepresented in Africa’s election management bodies, holding 28% of these posts in countries that have such bodies.3 In Southern Africa, women have the highest level of representation in election management bodies at 41%, followed by East Africa (35%), North Africa (25%), West Africa (24%) and Central Africa (22%) (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). Election management bodies can play a significant role in facilitating or hindering women’s meaningful political participation as these bodies’ responsibilities include disseminating information on elections, determining voters’ eligibility, receiving and validating nominations and conducting polling, as well as counting and tabulating votes. In the context of elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, these bodies have been instrumental in ensuring that elections continue within the framework of national health and safety guidelines.
Women’s underrepresentation is most acute in executive and ministerial positions. Only 7% of those who serve in executive positions – president, vice president and prime minister – are women (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). In terms of ministerial positions, the share held by women varies significantly among the 53 countries4 with available data, ranging from 54% in Rwanda and 50% in Guinea-Bissau to 7% in Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea and Lesotho in 2020 (IPU/UN Women, 2020[13]). Despite some progress, ministerial positions, like occupations and sectors in the labour force (see Chapter 4), remain segregated along gender lines, with women often assigned to lead “softer” portfolios on gender, children’s issues and education, while men dominate portfolios overseeing national defence, foreign affairs and finance (Krook and O’Brien, 2012[14]; Tripp, 2013[15]).
Gender gaps in political participation vary in size across the region
While the 1990s brought significant change to many of Africa’s political systems, good governance and democratisation remain uneven (African Union, 2019[16]). In order to strengthen governance, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) calls on states to hold regular, free, fair and transparent elections (see Annex A). In so doing, African countries are encouraged to take to steps to ensure that all of their citizens have a meaningful political voice, encompassing the freedoms and practice of active engagement in public and political life as voters, citizens and participants in political processes. While performance is relatively good in this regard, there is a need to address discriminatory social institutions that hinder women’s decision-making power and access to tools and resources, in order to strengthen their political voice, placing it on an equal footing with that of men. Such room for improvement is evident in the gender gaps in voting for national elections, attendance to rallies and campaign events, work for political campaigns, discussion of politics with friends and family, and other activities that constitute political participation.
Across the region, both women and men engage in political participation in the form of voting. On average, 66% of African women and 70% of African men reported voting in their countries’ most recent national elections (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). At the sub-regional level, East Africa has the highest proportion of women who report voting in the most recent national election (70%), but also presents the largest gender gap (seven percentage points). The share of women who voted is similarly high in West Africa (69%), which is followed by Southern Africa (64%), Central Africa (63%) and North Africa (50%). Sub-regional averages, however, hide significant variations across countries. Sierra Leone is home to the highest percentage of respondents who reported voting in the last national elections – 90% of men and 88% of women. In Morocco, only 42% of women reported voting, but the percentage of men who reported doing the same was similarly low at 46%. Gender gaps in voting also vary in Africa. In five countries,5 a higher percentage of women than men reported voting, and in three countries6 there was no gender gap (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]).
Beyond voting, there are many ways in which individuals may engage in the political process. These include working for a political campaign, attending political rallies or contacting their representatives to share ideas or knowledge of problems. A smaller share of women than men in Africa engaged in these activities. The gender gap in working for a candidate or political party ranged from 12 percentage points in West Africa to five percentage points in North Africa and Southern Africa. At the national level, 54% of women in Sao Tome and Principe reported working for a candidate or party, while less than 3% of women in Tunisia reported the same (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Similarly, the percentage of men who reported attending a campaign rally was ten percentage points higher than the share of women who reported doing the same. Finally, women in all of the 36 countries with data were more likely than men to report never having contacted a member of parliament (MP) to discuss issues or ideas (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]).
In Africa, women hold diverse, informal, leadership roles (Poltera, 2019[18]). While data cannot capture the full scope of this picture, information on attendance at community meetings and discussions about politics with family and friends may serve as an imperfect proxy. In all of the five sub-regions, a higher share of men than women reported attending a community meeting, with the gender gap ranging from five percentage points in Southern Africa to 15 percentage points in West Africa (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Among the same respondents, a greater percentage of women than men indicated that they would attend a community meeting if given the opportunity. This proportion was as high as 20% of women in Liberia and 14% in Burkina Faso (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). A greater share of women than men reported never having discussed political matters with family or friends in all of the 36 countries with data. At the continental level, 46% of women and 30% of men reported never discussing politics with family or friends (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]).
More work is needed to increase women’s active involvement in peace and security processes
The gendered dimensions of peace and security are of particular significance in Africa, given the contemporary and historical importance of conflicts across the region. Conflicts in North and West Africa have intensified over the past decade, spilling across national borders and increasing in violence, with civilians often targeted especially in rural and border areas (OECD/SWAC, 2021[19]). Terrorism and violent extremism are also on the rise, affecting the whole continent from the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa to West Africa’s coastal states and Central and Southern Africa (Faleg and Mustasilta, 2021[20]). Women are among the first to suffer from such conflicts, notably from gender-based violence, sexual violence and kidnapping (Walther, 2020[21]). They also represent a significant proportion of refugees. There are 8.2 million internally displaced women and girls in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 40% of the global total (Bell et al., 2021[22]). Given that fragile and conflict-affected contexts undergo deep political and social changes during transitions from conflict, peace negotiations, political transitions or constitution-making processes, they also provide windows of opportunity to address gender inequalities, empower women and girls, and to integrate women’s rights fully into newly formed institutional landscapes (Loudon, Goemans and Koester, 2021[23]). It is therefore crucial to empower women and girls to take an active role in these processes (OECD, 2020[24]).
While regional commitments7 to the Women, Peace and Security agenda are relatively well developed, insufficient commitments at the national level reflect a need to further promote women’s meaningful participation in peace and security processes, a key pillar of the above agenda. As of 2021, 29 of Africa’s 54 countries have enacted at least one National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. These action plans are thus essential because they demonstrate national commitments and actions to link government policies on security with gender priorities. For example, the development of Mali’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 in 2019 involved a collaboration with UN Women and a comprehensive consultation process with a variety of stakeholders including women’s rights organisations (Lorentzen, 2021[25]) (for more on such processes, see Box 5.1). However, while the adoption of a National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 may be considered an outcome reflecting the mobilisation of political will and resources for its development and implementation, the content of these action plans also matters. In practical terms, the impact of these plans is hindered by a lack of specific budgeting, systematic monitoring procedures, and co-ordination among government bodies and civil society organisations (UN Women, 2015[26]).
The political liberalisation processes that unfolded in the 1990s were accompanied by a proliferation of women’s rights organisations, which played a crucial role in constitutional, legal and cultural changes in favour of women’s rights, and political participation in particular (Abdennebi-Abderrahim, n.d.[27]). Today, civil society and women’s rights organisations continue to promote women’s political participation and to catalyse the women, peace and security agenda (OECD, 2020[24]). Many organisations provide capacity-building services such as training and networking opportunities for women involved in politics, while simultaneously facilitating voter registration. They also undertake crucial work to foster democratic processes and reinforce good governance through human rights advocacy and involvement in electoral accountability efforts (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). In Southern Africa, for example, a number of civil society organisations collect, analyse and disseminate data on women’s political participation, a process that is invaluable to efforts designed to promote accountability and raise awareness. Yet, in many cases both women’s rights and civil society organisations face obstacles such as lack of freedom of speech and/or association, many of which have been amplified in the context of the recent pandemic and government measures (CIPESA, 2020[28]).
Over the last three decades a growing share of peace agreements concluded in Africa have acknowledged issues related to women, girls and/or gender-related considerations. Yet, only 174 out of the 611 peace agreements that have been concluded between 1990 and 2019 in the region include issues related to women, girls and/or gender (Bell et al., 2021[22]) (Figure 5.2). For example, out of 12 peace agreements concluded in the Central African Republic between 2018 and 2019, five make reference to gender considerations. A peace agreement signed in Bangui in 2019 (“Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation en République centrafricaine”) includes, as part of its implementation mechanism, the participation of civil society, including specifically women (MINUSCA, n.d.[29]). Gender considerations can be integrated into peace agreements in a number of ways. A notable example is the Sudan Peace Agreement (“The Juba Agreement”), which features gender-sensitive language and various provisions for the promotion of gender equality, including recognition by signatories of “the importance of fair and effective representation of women at all levels of power and decision-making positions, at a rate of not less than 40%” (Transitional Government of Sudan, 2020[30]). The inclusion of gender-related provisions such as these can play a significant role in cementing women’s role in governance and in maintaining peace. Indeed, countries with a peace accord that accounts for women’s rights adopt electoral quotas more than five times faster than countries with no peace accords (Anderson and Swiss, 2014[31]).
Note: Reference to gender includes mentions of girls, lactating women, widows, mothers, sexual violence and gender-based violence, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 or CEDAW.
Source: (Bell et al., 2021[22]), PA-X Peace Agreements Database, www.peaceagreements.org/wsearch.
Deeply entrenched discriminatory social institutions are at the root of gender inequalities in political representation and participation in electoral processes as well as peace and security efforts. These social institutions include laws, social norms and customary practices that govern women’s and men’s roles as leaders, citizens and stakeholders in governance and decision-making processes. The effect on legal frameworks is assessed in Chapter 2; this section sheds light on discriminatory social norms and practices that directly and indirectly hinder women’s engagement in political processes as well as processes related to peace and security. Specifically, it addresses social norms around leadership, norms and practices regarding decision making at the household level and, finally, the pervasive practice of political violence.
Traditional gender roles and gendered conceptions of leadership hinder women’s political leadership
Deeply rooted traditional gender norms limit women’s engagement in public and political life both at the global level and in Africa. Traditional gender norms assign men the role of household heads, including responsibility for supporting the family financially, often through paid work (OECD, 2021[32]). Conversely, these traditional gender norms assign women roles within the household as caretakers and domestic workers, often with limited decision-making power compared to men. As such, traditional gender norms clearly establish the public and political sphere as the domain of men, and send a clear message that women’s reproductive and care roles take priority over their civic engagement (Kivoi, 2014[33]; Mlambo and Kapingura, 2019[34]). These social norms, internalised by society as a whole, guide social conceptions of public leadership, which has important implications for women’s representation in leadership roles.
Socially valued conceptions of leadership often prioritise masculine leadership styles over those more often exhibited by women (OECD, 2021[32]; Lumby and Azaola, 2013[35]). Gender differences in leadership style do not originate from any biological differences, but rather from the processes by which girls and boys as well as women and men are socialised (OECD, 2021[32]). While men and boys are often rewarded for toughness and aggressive competitiveness, this is not the case for women and girls. As societies often expect their leaders to be competitive and tough with the capacity to confront situations of conflict, such highly masculinised conceptions of leadership lead a significant percentage of people to believe that men make better political leaders than women, and should be preferred in elections (Oduol, 2011[36]). Such discriminatory attitudes negatively correlate with women’s political representation (Figure 5.3). In Africa, this belief is held by 28% of the population, and at the sub-regional level prevalence of this attitude ranges from 40% in West Africa to 24% in Central Africa (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Furthermore, proverbs in certain African countries, such as “a man is the head of a woman” or “a team of ox is never led by females, otherwise the oxen will fall into a ditch’’ reveal deeply rooted conceptions of leadership as a characteristic only exhibited by men (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). These social norms make it more difficult for women to be elected, as voters may believe these stereotypes (Pikramenou and Mahajan, 2019[2]; OECD, 2019[37]). Furthermore, political parties will not field women candidates for winnable seats if they believe they cannot win (Oduol, 2011[36]) (Box 5.2).
Note: Negative attitudes towards women’s political representation are measured as the share of the population declaring that men make better political leaders than women. Data are included for 16 African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Source: (IPU Parline, 2021[38]), Monthly ranking of women in national parliaments, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=9&year=2021; (OECD, 2019[39]), Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB), https://oe.cd/ds/GIDDB2019; (Haerpfer et al., 2020[40]), World Values Survey: Round Seven – Country-Pooled Datafile, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV7.jsp.
Attitudes that distinguish leadership as a masculine trait also discourage and prevent women from assuming leadership roles. On the one hand, women may consider leadership to be an essentially masculine trait, leading them to doubt their own abilities and qualifications and as a result impose limits on themselves (Lumby and Azaola, 2013[35]). On the other hand, as a result of socialisation, women tend to avoid competitive environments such as political campaigns (Milazzo, Goldstein and Markus, 2019[41]). In both cases, discriminatory social norms are an important driver of women’s underrepresentation among candidates for public and political office. These same norms have a similar impact on women’s entrepreneurship and employment (see Chapter 4 for more details).
Discriminatory social institutions undermine women’s political voice in political and electoral systems
In broad terms, there are three kinds of electoral system, each of which has its own set of implications for women’s political representation (Abdennebi-Abderrahim, n.d.[27]).
In plurality systems, the candidate with the highest number of votes wins. Under this system, voters choose the candidates, and by extension the parties, which they would like to see represent their constituency (Tremblay, 2007[42]). Plurality systems entail a particular focus on candidates, rather than parties, implying that women candidates under this system may face greater scrutiny and lower chances of being elected than under other systems (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]).
Under proportional representation (PR), the electorate votes for political parties rather than individual candidates. Candidates are then allocated the seats won by the party by their position on a party list. In practice, PR systems have yielded higher levels of representation of women (Abdennebi-Abderrahim, n.d.[27]; IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). However, an important element of the PR system from a gender perspective is the manner in which party lists are constructed. For example, if women candidates occupy positions at the end of lists, it is unlikely that they will be allocated seats.
Mixed systems combine elements of both PR and plurality systems. Typically, this means that an initial set of candidates is elected using the plurality approach, while the remaining seats are filled using party lists. However, there are multiple variations of this process (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]).
The specific features of temporary special measures can determine their success or failure in enhancing women’s political representation
Electoral systems play a fundamental role in the use and effectiveness of temporary special measures such as quotas to promote women’s political representation (Tremblay, 2007[42]). In general, there are two types of quotas: those for allocation of seats and those for candidates. The former set aside a share of seats for women, while the latter require political parties to put forth a share of women candidates. Each type of quota can be used in any of the three political systems described above, but is subject to its own benefits and drawbacks (Table 5.1).
Finally, the status of temporary special measures – voluntary or compulsory – is another factor in their effectiveness. Voluntary quotas are adopted by political parties that commit to fielding a certain percentage of women candidates and are typically more effective in PR and mixed systems than in plurality systems. In practice, some voluntary quotas have proven very effective, particularly in Southern Africa, where women account for at least 40% of MPs in Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa (IPU Parline, 2021[6]). While voluntary quotas can have an impact, they are subject to at least two drawbacks: first, in the absence of public accountability, political parties are not beholden to these commitments and may choose not to follow them; and second, if political parties with quotas lose seats, women lose seats (Sadie, 2021[43]). In short, voluntary political party quotas may not be a sustainable measure to promote women’s representation.
Compulsory quotas are enshrined in legislation, and in some cases, constitutions. Due to their legal status, legislated quotas are lasting and are not subject to the commitment or will of political parties. Many post-conflict countries in the region have adopted this approach to temporary special measures, with notable impacts, for example in Rwanda, which has the highest level of representation of women among MPs in the world (Anderson and Swiss, 2014[31]). In practice, legislated quotas can be effective; however, in some countries gaps in implementation result from an absence of enforcement mechanisms and complementary policies, inadequate political will or a lack of clarity in the wording of the legislation/provision. In some countries, such as Eswatini, no enforcement mechanisms exist to penalise failure to meet legislated or constitutional quotas. In other countries, such as Mali and Niger, candidates may be rejected by the Constitutional Court in order to ensure quotas are met. The electoral management body of Mauritania also has this power (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]).
Discriminatory social norms promoting unequal decision-making power at home limit women’s opportunities for meaningful political participation
In the family sphere, discriminatory social institutions are particularly strong and challenging to address (OECD, 2019[44]). At the global level and in Africa, men are traditionally the heads of the household, a position which entails significant sway, if not the final say, over decisions concerning both the household and its members (Spindler et al., 2019[45]; Voices4Change, 2015[46]). In Africa, only 25% of women report being the head of household, while the percentage for men is 70% (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Furthermore, 45% of women report that their husband is the head of household, while only 2% of men identified their wife as the head (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Although household decision making is a complex process, the unequal influence of men and women in these decisions is a core factor contributing to inequalities in both private and public life. A lack of decision-making power over resources and how they are used as well as over women’s own time and movement can seriously impede women’s ability to participate in community governance, political processes, civil society organisations and more.
Restrictions on women’s access to financial resources seriously undermine their ability to run successful political campaigns. In many African countries, political campaigns have high associated costs, meaning that access to and ability to mobilise financial resources is an important determining factor in women’s ability to run for political office (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]). One channel through which individuals may mobilise financial resources is accessing credit at a financial institution. However, legal and customary restrictions on women’s ownership of land and property prevent them from accessing credit through many formal financial institutions that require collateral (Kivoi, 2014[33]) (see Chapter 4). Individuals also may fund political campaigns through the use of personal or household financial resources; however, women often lack decision-making power over how these assets are used. While funding a campaign is not considered a purchase, data on decision making over household purchases may offer insights into this area. In the eight African countries with available data for 2017-18, men appear to be the main decision makers for such financial matters. Indeed, 32% of women in Zambia and 77% of women in Mali reported that their husband is the decision maker for major household purchases (ICF, n.d.[47]). Furthermore, the fact that access to finance is a prerequisite for launching a political campaign favours socio-economically privileged women, while further marginalising poor women from political decision making (Pikramenou and Mahajan, 2019[2]).
The demands of unpaid care and domestic work which disproportionately fall on women can deprive them of the time and opportunity to participate fully in political life (Steady, 2011[48]; OECD, 2014[3]). In Africa, women spend over four times more time than men on unpaid care and domestic work (OECD, 2019[39]). The driving force behind such unequal responsibilities for unpaid care and domestic work between men and women is social norms. As a consequence, women lack time to devote to community organising, campaigning and even voting. In 26 of the 37 African countries with data, a greater share of women than men reported not voting because they did not have sufficient time to do so (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Even when women do participate in political life, they are forced to balance this activity with household and family responsibilities, in many cases without the support of their partner and family, a restriction that does not apply to their male counterparts.
Political violence and sexist discourse actively discourage women’s participation in politics
Discriminatory social norms and the associated sexist discourse constitute a significant barrier to women’s participation in politics. Sexist discourse focuses on gender stereotypes that portray women negatively and argue that they should be excluded from the political arena. This discourse is grounded in the view that women belong to the private sphere and should stay at home and take care of the family. Sexist discourse can promote political violence which at its core aims to deter women’s participation in political and decision-making processes. Politically motivated gender-based violence can take the form of physical, sexual as well as verbal and psychological violence, and functions to amplify women’s insecurity in the public space, diminishing their self-esteem and deterring them from pursuing public and political leadership (Krook, 2017[49]). Working with men and boys, in particular to achieve a better understanding of masculinities in fragile and conflict-affected settings, has been recognised as an enabler for changing gendered power dynamics, and is deemed as important as working with women and girls (OECD, 2019[50]).
Political violence is a serious issue in the region. Large shares of women (50%) and men (47%) in Africa fear being victims of political intimidation and violence. Indeed, fear of political violence is widespread in some countries – in Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe more than 70% of women feared becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). Moreover, survey data from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission reveal that young people and women were most affected by political violence, and 58% of all people who did not participate in elections cited violence as the primary reason (ZEC, 2017[51]). While political violence affects an entire population, during electoral campaigns it tends to be directed towards independent women candidates. In Egypt, for example, violent methods were used to disrupt rallies, intimidate female candidates or defame their character (OECD, 2018[52]). Such forms of violence underline the importance of support from political parties, which can minimise personal attacks and give women a platform that can grant a degree of protection.
Gender-based political violence takes place not only in person, but increasingly online. With the same aims at its core as offline attacks, online violence includes trolling, sexualised and gendered insults and threats, as well as disinformation, which can include the spread of false or inaccurate information and inappropriate images of women political leaders and public figures (Di Meco, 2020[53]). For example, in Zimbabwe a study found that from 2013 to 2018, 60% of violent discourse and related content in the online political space was directed at women (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2018[54]). Furthermore, in Uganda, high-level women political figures were more likely to be targets of online harassment than their male counterparts. Indeed, 18% of these women experienced online sexual violence compared to 8% of men. The same study showed that such treatment led these women to be less active on social media platforms, which is of particular concern given the increasing importance of these channels as a campaign tool (Pollicy, 2021[55]). Online-based political violence thus threatens women’s ability to benefit equally from the potential of information and communication technologies (ICTs) as a tool of political participation (Box 5.3).
ICTs have taken on an increasingly important role in Africa’s political processes in the context of growing digitalisation and health crises requiring social distancing practices
As digitalisation increases and online spaces emerge as fora for political discussions, campaigning and information sharing, access to ICTs is becoming increasingly crucial. During the COVID-19 pandemic, ICTs have also played a vital role in enabling people to stay connected and access information critical to their participation in election and political processes, which went ahead in spite of the health crisis and associated social distancing measures (IDEA, 2021[56]). This was particularly the case in countries such as Benin, where physical campaign activities were suspended, and the dissemination of information on campaign issues and platforms shifted to media and online channels (Asplund and Akinduro, 2020[57]).
However, persistent digital divides across the continent prevent women from benefiting from ICTs in the same manner as their male counterparts. In Africa, 65% of women never use the Internet, with the share of women reporting non-usage reaching 90% or higher in four countries,8 (Afrobarometer, 2016-18[17]). In addition, among youth – the age group with the highest internet usage rate – the share of women who use the Internet regularly (30%) was nearly 15 percentage points lower than the share of men (44%) (AUC/OECD, 2021[58]). As such, the digital divide and associated barriers to women’s ability to access ICTs serve to further marginalise women’s political voice.
Support women’s political representation at all levels
Consider the enactment of quotas and/or temporary special measures with enforcement mechanisms to increase women’s representation in politics at the local and national levels.
The Constitution of Rwanda grants 30% of posts in decision-making bodies to women, and a number of supporting laws outline the implementation procedures to ensure these quotas are met, for example at the district council level (Government of Rwanda, 2015[59]; Government of Rwanda, 2010[60]).
Enact legislation that creates financial incentives and financial support mechanisms for gender balance on party lists.
For example, the laws of Guinea, Mali and Mauritania include financial incentives for political parties that elect women candidates (IDEA and Gender Links, 2021[12]).
Provide information, networking, mentoring and training for aspiring women leaders on electoral and political processes, candidacy procedures, access to media, campaign finance and assembling a strong network of supporters, in order to build their confidence and capacity to run for elected office.
Strengthen accountability and oversight mechanisms for policies and strategies to promote gender equality in decision making in line with the 2015 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Gender Equality in Public Life (OECD, 2016[61]).
Develop and implement programmes aimed at addressing gendered divisions of unpaid care and domestic work, and support the development of infrastructure that can reduce the time required for care and domestic work-related tasks.
Develop and circulate rosters of women qualified for appointed positions to facilitate the identification and promotion of women leaders.
The Compendium of Women’s Skills of Côte d'Ivoire (“Compendium des Compétences Féminines de Côte d’Ivoire”) was developed at the request of the President in order to facilitate the identification of qualified women for leadership positions. It currently includes 12 000 women and the share of women in the government has increased significantly since the creation of the Compendium (17% in 2010 to 25% in 2016 and 21% in 2017) (Government of Côte d'Ivoire, n.d.[62]).
Work with the media and other key stakeholders – including men and boys – to eliminate sexist discourse, unfair practices and gender-based political violence, by enacting and upholding gender-sensitive broadcasting standards. This work should strive to improve awareness of the importance of gender-balanced political participation through the promotion of positive examples of women leaders and campaigns.
Lesotho’s Gender and Development Policy 2018-2030 includes working with media and ICTs to promote the “involvement and representation of women and men, boys and girls in order to ensure gender sensitive reporting” as a key priority. It outlines 12 specific actions to address this priority, including building the capacity of the media to engage in gender-responsive reporting through specific trainings, and creating and enforcing regulations on eliminating “degrading and violent portrayals of girls, women and other groups” (Government of Lesotho, 2018[63]).
Burkina Faso has adopted several laws to better regulate how women are portrayed in advertising and to make violations punishable under the Penal Code, in view of reducing gender bias and negative views towards women and girls in the media (FEMNET, 2019[64]).
Promote women’s full and equal political participation
Strengthen legislation by defining and prohibiting online harassment, and adapting laws on gender-based violence and violence against women to include political violence. In order to support the implementation of laws in this area, develop inter-ministerial policies that create a context for co-ordination of among the police and other relevant authorities.
There are multiple examples of legislation that prohibit political violence, although there are not yet any legal frameworks in the region that explicitly acknowledge the gendered dimensions of this violence. For example, in Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act (2018) creates the responsibilities for political parties to take measures against politically-motivated violence and creates a special police position tasked with overseeing investigations of political violence (Government of Zimbabwe, 2018[65]).
Work with ICT providers to improve access for women and girls to ICTs, especially given their importance for accessing governance-related information and services.
Develop programmes promoting digital literacy that specifically target women and girls from a young age, with a view to narrowing the digital divide.
Create awareness-raising and public education campaigns on gender-equal roles in the household, related specifically to joint decision making, the allocation of household tasks, and masculinities that are supportive of women’s engagement in the public and political sphere.
Invest in gender-disaggregated data on mobile and Internet access and use, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a view to informing policy measures to address digital gaps.
Strengthen gender- and age-disaggregated data collection efforts on political participation and representation.
Improve the meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes
Enhance collaborations with various actors to address the main drivers of inequalities and fragility in line with the 2019 OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (OECD, 2021[66]).
Support the development and enhancement of conflict prevention efforts and survivor/victim-centred responses and support mechanisms in alignment with the OECD DAC Recommendations on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (SEAH) (OECD, 2019[67]).
Promote and enforce women’s leadership in peace and security through the development and adoption of National Action Plans to implement UNSCR 1325.
In 2017, Nigeria launched its revised National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 which enabled the development of a training manual in 2018, which aims to strengthen the skills of women community leaders, traditional leaders and women peace mentors in peacebuilding processes (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2019[68]).
Ensure the comprehensiveness of National Action Plans by integrating specific and measurable targets, as well as a long-term vision that is gender-transformative, clear structures of responsibility and accountability (with greater implementation power granted to civil society organisations) and budgetary commitments to implement UNSCR 1325.
Mali launched its National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 in 2019, which included a comprehensive process of multi-stakeholder consultations. Furthermore, the Plan recognises women not only as victims of conflict but also as builders of peace (Lorentzen, 2021[25]).
Liberia’s revised National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 for 2019-2023 includes women as active agents in peace and security issues in Liberia, and includes a detailed monitoring and implementation plan with an allocated budget: output 5.5, for example, refers to “Annual government budgets to implement NAP activities are allocated using a gender-responsive budgeting approach” (Government of Liberia, 2019[69]).
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Notes
← 1. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) together form the basis of a global agenda for women’s rights. For more information on the contents of these texts, see Chapter 2 and Annex A.
← 2. The countries are Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.
← 3. 41 African countries have election management bodies and data on their composition.
← 4. No data are available for Libya.
← 5. The countries are Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Niger and South Africa.
← 6. The countries are Algeria, Egypt and Eswatini.
← 7. Regional action plans on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 exist in the Great Lakes Region and the Economic Community of Central African States. Moreover, the African Union has developed a continental results framework for reporting on and monitoring the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and the Southern African Development Community has put in place a regional strategy on Women Peace and Security.
← 8. The countries are Niger, Benin, Madagascar and Mali.