

# TOWARDS MORE SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT:

WHAT MEASURES ARE DONOR COUNTRIES  
APPLYING TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

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## OECD DEVELOPMENT POLICY PAPERS

December 2020 **No. 34**





OECD Development Policy Papers  
December 2020 – No. 34

# **Towards more sustainable solutions to forced displacement**

What measures are donor countries applying to forced  
displacement in developing countries?

By Jason Gagnon and Mathilde Rodrigues

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This document was authorised for publication by Mario Pezzini, Director of the Development Centre and Special Advisor to the OECD Secretary-General on Development.

Keywords: refugees, forced displacement, international migration, foreign aid

JEL classification: F22; F35; J15; J60

## Abstract

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The majority of forcibly displaced people worldwide are hosted by developing countries. Alternative routes to sustainable solutions for the forcibly displaced, particularly in developing countries, are drying up, and the path towards and support for local integration and longer-term development is becoming urgent. Based on a questionnaire, this report delves into the question of how donor countries are addressing forced displacement and whether the shift towards a focus incorporating the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in addressing forced displacement is tangible. It highlights lessons learned so far and proposes recommendations on broadening the current approach to addressing forced displacement in developing economies.

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## Acknowledgements

This project and report was managed by Jason Gagnon, Lead Economist on Migration and Skills at the OECD Development Centre, under the overall guidance of Federico Bonaglia, Deputy Director of the OECD Development Centre. It was prepared by Jason Gagnon and Mathilde Rodrigues, Junior Policy Analyst at the OECD Development Centre and carried out in collaboration with the Sector Project on Forced Displacement at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

The report drew crucial knowledge from several key informants from the OECD Development Centre's Governing Board Members as well as Australia and Canada, who answered the questionnaire and participated in follow-up interviews.

The authors are grateful for insightful comments by Mona Ahmed and Federico Bonaglia from the OECD Development Centre and Yasmine Rockenfeller from the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, as well as Myriam Andrieux, Delphine Grandrieux, Elizabeth Nash and Irit Perry regarding publication assistance.

The OECD Development Centre and the authors are also particularly grateful to the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for its financial support and close collaboration in carrying out this project.

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AICS	Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo
AUD	Australian Dollar
BMZ	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
BMWi	Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie
CEFORD	Community Empowerment for Rural Development
CHF	Swiss Franc
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CZK	Czech Koruna
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate
DFID	Department for International Development
Enabel	Belgian Development Agency
EU	European Union
GBP	British Pound Sterling
GCM	Global Compact for Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees



GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPMD	Global Programme Migration and Development
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
HAO	Humanitarian Action Office
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HIC	High Income Country
ICM	International Cooperation on Migration
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMD	International Migration Division
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LIC	Low Income Country
LMIC	Lower Middle-Income Country
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
REC	Regional Economic Community
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

START	Spanish Technical Aid Response Team
TIKA	Turkey Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UMIC	Upper Middle-Income Country
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNWOMEN	UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank

## Executive summary

Sustainable development is the core foundation of our shared global agenda since 2015. The 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have shifted the focus towards making our contributions to development longer-lasting, more equitable and healthier while ensuring no one is left behind. The shift has implied broadening the set of tools and partnerships relied on in the past, incorporating lessons learned on who to target, who to invite at the policy table and how to make outcomes in the best interest of all. The importance of sustainability in the 2030 Agenda has carried over into the realm of migration, specifically in ensuring that migration is well-managed and contributing to development.

Developing countries must deal with important flows of both voluntary migration and forced displacement. Protracted conflict, natural disasters and increasing persecution targeting specific groups, have brought the numbers of forcibly displaced, including those internally displaced, to an all-time high. The unfolding COVID-19 pandemic is highlighting the dire situation of displaced persons living in over-crowded settlements, lacking basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. Moreover, the global economic crisis may result in even greater displacement in the near future. Unlike many other fields of intervention, however, forced displacement has largely remained a humanitarian issue, addressed with humanitarian means and policy, rather than a development issue (OECD, 2016<sup>[1]</sup>); (OECD, 2019<sup>[2]</sup>). The adoption of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus principles by the donor community has been a response to this gap.

Many cases of forced displacement do indeed primarily warrant a humanitarian approach, focused on reducing conflict, attending to first needs and ensuring the security of everyone involved. But as alternative routes to sustainable solutions for the forcibly displaced, particularly in developing countries, are drying up, the path towards and support for local integration and inclusion, and longer-term development is becoming urgent. As protracted crises are on the rise, addressing forced displacement through a humanitarian approach is not sufficient, and development efforts supporting hosting communities and forcibly displaced persons, thus embracing the HDP nexus paradigm, are necessary. Sustainable development calls for greater efforts by development partners, the private sector, hosting societies and civil society organisations (CSOs) to provide the possibility for forcibly displaced persons to become self-reliant and for hosting societies to become more resilient to such flows, while not dropping the responsibility of ensuring first needs. This forms the basis of the 2018 Global Compact for Refugees (GCR), whose objective is to establish a more equitable responsibility sharing, recognising that a sustainable solution to forced displacement cannot be achieved without international co-operation. It also means greater efforts on leveraging such flows for the benefit of origin and hosting countries and refugees themselves, by using the skills and social connections and eventually contributing to the development of their countries of origin in the longer term. Such is an objective of the Global Compact on Migration (GCM).

As an independent platform for knowledge sharing and policy dialogue between Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries and developing economies, the OECD Development Centre has long been forging dialogue and policy recommendations to link migration, including forced displacement, with development. This report seeks to measure the extent to which countries have shifted their approach to addressing forced displacement in developing countries, by

incorporating more development-oriented objectives. To this means, it administered a questionnaire to its Governing Board members, as well as other OECD countries in November 2019.

Based on desk reviews and questionnaire responses, the takeaways accumulated from 17 donor countries are the following:

**1. A humanitarian-first approach to forced displacement continues to be pervasive**

Despite a shift towards a more development-oriented central international policy agenda on forced displacement, this has not translated into specific instruments or policies in many donor countries. Most countries still favour forced displacement instruments with an overarching humanitarian objective.

**2. New emerging approaches in addressing forced displacement need to be shared and evaluated**

Despite the pervasive humanitarian approach to forced displacement, a handful of countries have explicitly created instruments and initiatives aiming at incorporating more development-oriented objectives in their approach to forced displacement in developing countries, coupled with a variety of interpretations of development needs.

**3. An effective approach towards addressing forced displacement requires a broad approach to development and a balance between short and long-term objectives**

Addressing forced displacement is not a singular policy issue. It requires multifaceted expertise and views from several different perspectives, as well as for both short and longer-term possibilities. Moreover, balancing long-term support and short-term flexibility is difficult to maintain in contexts that can change in a matter of weeks. By addressing forced displacement within silos, support in tackling its causes and outcomes may be less nimble than what is optimal.

**4. To fully foster the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, better reporting and more co-ordination is necessary across engaged donors**

There are a variety of approaches across development partners, which do not always complement each other. Gaps and blind spots prevail in addressing forced displacement, which could be minimised with better co-ordination between and within other partner and hosting countries and with non-governmental partners.

# 1. Forced displacement and sustainable development

This report sets out to investigate whether and how donor countries are incorporating more development-oriented objectives in their instruments targeting forced displacement in developing countries. It focuses on who manages such programmes and initiatives, and how they are managed, as well as their scope, budget and whether they are carried out jointly with other actors. Programmes and initiatives are compared according to their specific target groups and their policy focus. The report reflects on the growing phenomena of co-operation on forced displacement across OECD and OECD Development Centre members. It aims to help build a co-ordination tool for development agencies, forced displacement hosting countries, stakeholders and researchers.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced persons at the close of 2019, the highest the UNHCR had ever recorded. Amongst these, 45.7 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs), 26 million were international refugees, 3.6 million were internationally displaced Venezuelans and an additional 4.2 million were international asylum seekers awaiting a response on their asylum claim, making a total of 33.8 million internationally displaced. Annual asylum requests suggest that such numbers are on the rise. During 2019 alone, there were an estimated 2 million claims for asylum made with states or with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>).

The policy response to forced displacement has typically been viewed through a humanitarian lens – providing for first needs and ensuring the safety of both refugees and hosting communities. However, forced displacement situations in developing countries have tended to be long-lasting; 78% of refugees are in protracted refugee situations of more than five years (OECD, 2019<sup>[2]</sup>), and the trend is worsening. In 2015 the average length of stay for refugees in protracted crises was 26 years, up from an average of nine years in the early 1990s (OECD, 2016<sup>[1]</sup>).

As developing countries have limited fiscal space and capacity to deal with not only humanitarian assistance but also longer-term solutions, their capacity to deal with such flows has become a major global development challenge, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of people across several regions of the world. Moreover, the growing frequency of natural disasters and environmental degradation brought on by climate change will likely increase the number of displaced persons in developing countries in the coming years, creating a new category of migrants currently unprotected under international law if forced to cross borders. In the first half of 2019 alone, for instance, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that a record 7 million people were displaced from their home due to extreme weather (IDMC, 2019<sup>[4]</sup>). Finding a more sustainable solution to forced displacement has therefore become paramount (OECD, 2016<sup>[1]</sup>).

This report focuses on current programmes and initiatives by donor countries to address forced displacement in developing countries, while building on the OECD's review on the lessons learned from past programmes on forced displacement (OECD, 2017<sup>[5]</sup>). It builds on several work streams at the OECD Development Centre on migration, public policies, policy coherence and development, as well as at the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) and the International Migration Division (IMD) in the Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (ELS) Directorate.

Drawing from a questionnaire specifically prepared for this study and sent to OECD Development Centre member countries<sup>1</sup> in November 2019, the report seeks to answer:

1. Who within donor country governments is responsible for addressing forced displacement in developing countries and which initiatives have been developed;
2. What is the size of the budget allocated for such initiatives;
3. Where are such initiatives taking place, and who and what do they target;
4. Who implements such initiatives;
5. How are such initiatives co-ordinated;
6. What changes have occurred in the approach to forced displacement over recent years; and
7. How are states engaged at the multilateral level on forced displacement.

The rest of the report is organised as follows. The remainder of Section 1 outlines the current context surrounding forced displacement and the need for a broader development angle, while also providing the report's methodology, Section 2 presents an analysis of the findings from the questionnaire from the point of view of donor countries, and Section 3 answers the question as to what, if anything, has changed since 2015, while providing broad lessons, conclusions and recommendations drawn from the analysis.

## 1.1 Why has a greater emphasis on development in forced displacement contexts become urgent?

Developing economies bear the biggest burden of hosting refugees across the world, largely because forced displacement flows tend to originate from developing countries and remain regional. The figures on forced displacement are both global and staggering. By the end of 2018, sub-Saharan Africa and Western Asia were not only the regions from which originated the highest numbers of refugees but also the highest hosting countries, primarily driven by on-going conflict in Syria, Yemen and the Horn of Africa. This is closely followed by high numbers of refugees in Asian countries, due to conflict in Afghanistan, and the more recent Rohingya crisis Table 1.1.<sup>2</sup>

A major challenge when facing forced displacement in developing countries has therefore been that of providing sustainable solutions to forcibly displaced persons and their hosting communities. The sustainable solutions the UNHCR refers to are threefold: (1) voluntary repatriation, (2) resettlement (or third country solutions) and (3) local integration. The prospects of voluntary repatriation, in most cases, have not been possible, as crises have been protracted and have been lasting many years. Returning home for many forcibly displaced persons would require a positive change in the outlook of their country of origin and an assurance that their lives would not be endangered – which has not been the case. The decline of resettlement rates is another cause of concern. In 2018, it was estimated that at the current pace of resettlement to third countries, it would take 18 years to resettle the currently already identified refugees (OECD, ILO, IOM & UNHCR, 2019<sup>[6]</sup>). Furthermore, although the UNHCR submitted a total of 81 671 refugees for resettlement consideration to 29 countries; only 4.5% of the global resettlement needs were met (UNHCR, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>).


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<sup>1</sup> As well as Australia and Canada.

<sup>2</sup> In the figures available, South America displays low numbers, but with the increase of refugees from Venezuela, it is possible to say that international forced displacement is truly a global phenomenon.

**Table 1.1 Developing economies bear the biggest burden of refugee hosting across the world**

Region	Number of refugees as origin	Number of refugees as host
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.2 million	6.4 million
South America	0.17 million	0.19 million
South and South-eastern Asia	4.6 million	3.8 million
Western Asia	7.3 million	6.0 million



Notes: Figures represent total of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, as at end of December 2018. Regions are defined according to the United Nations Geoscheme. Income groups defined as per the World Bank (calendar year 2018). Developing countries defined as being LIC, LMIC or UMIC.

Source: Calculated by authors using UNHCR Population Statistics Database, <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

Much political interest has therefore turned towards creating possibilities for refugees to become part of their hosting communities, mainly through inclusion and local integration, although this is seldom stated as an explicit policy objective in hosting countries and support on this has been slow. In most cases, support has taken the form of humanitarian aid, as policy makers and practitioners have tended to overlook the longevity of displacement (OECD, 2017<sup>[5]</sup>). While donor countries have and will continue to support programmes targeting IDPs, refugees and their hosting communities, the majority of such programmes heavily support short-term project and humanitarian assistance.<sup>3</sup> One particularly promising area of action on the integration of refugees is local employment. Local employment integration is a promising avenue for several reasons as it fulfils the promise of a sustainable solution for both refugees and hosting communities. The skills of refugees can represent significant economic potential for destination countries, as refugees can be entrepreneurs, investors and innovators in the hosting country (OECD, ILO, IOM & UNHCR, 2018<sup>[8]</sup>) (OECD/UNHCR, 2018<sup>[9]</sup>). Moreover, how well immigrants are integrated into the hosting country's labour market is directly linked with their economic contribution to the country, measured through economic growth or through their fiscal impact (OECD/ILO, 2018<sup>[10]</sup>).

<sup>3</sup> According to an OECD survey, DAC members provided USD 25.98 billion in ODA from 2015 to 2017 in support of refugees and their hosting communities (Forichon, 2018<sup>[15]</sup>).

## 1.2 Have approaches targeting forced displacement in developing countries shifted?

The May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit brought important change in the way the international community sought to engage on forced displacement, by formally introducing the concept of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. The aim of the HDP nexus is to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable groups while ensuring longer-term investments that address the underlying causes of conflict and vulnerability, thus reducing recurrent shocks. While the general concept of the HDP nexus is not new, it has taken on greater importance since the 2016 summit, in establishing a “new way of working” for humanitarian and development actors. The concept largely reflects and builds on the core principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in unblocking negative cycles of vulnerability and building resilience. For forced displacement, this translates into working coherently on both humanitarian and development objectives before, during and after crises. In 2019, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members agreed on a legal document outlining the DAC’s Recommendation on the HDPnexus, aiming to promote more coherent action among the world’s leading donors of humanitarian, development and peace programmes in fragile and conflict contexts (OECD, 2019<sup>[11]</sup>).

In addition and partly in response to emerging forced displacement flows and their sustainable policy challenges, the DAC also created a Temporary Working Group on Refugees and Migration in 2016. The OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a specific network of the DAC, drafted a Common Position on supporting comprehensive responses in refugee situations in 2019. The INCAF principles notably highlight the importance of incorporating a humanitarian-development-peace intervention from the outset of a crisis and the support of refugee self-reliance (OECD, 2019<sup>[12]</sup>). Other institutions have also been raising the global profile of the refugee integration agenda. In 2017, under the German Presidency, the G20 adopted a framework on Policy Practices for the Fair and Effective Labour Market Integration of Regular Migrants and Recognised Refugees.

A second significant change came in 2016, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) agreed on a Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (the “New York Declaration”), and the “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)”. The CRRF provided a platform to rollout co-ordinated responses on the challenges of forced displacement, and an eventual endorsement of the GCR in December 2018, by 181 countries. The GCR has been a crucial step in establishing better international co-operative frameworks on addressing forced displacement, including sharing the responsibility for hosting refugees more equitably amongst wealthier and poorer nations. The GCR has four overarching objectives, with the second objective particularly directed at the longer-term integration of refugees.

1. Ease the pressure on hosting countries;
2. Enhance refugee self-reliance;
3. Expand access to third-country solutions;
4. Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

The GCR stresses the importance of long-term local integration, but also highlights various measures that are relevant for local integration into labour markets and societies from the outset of a refugee crisis.

The latest development has been a collection of concrete pledges made by countries during the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in December 2019, on new long-term support for refugee inclusion; around 1400 pledges were made, amounting to at least USD 3 billion from states, and an additional USD 250 million from the private sector (Sewell, 2019<sup>[13]</sup>); (UNHCR, 2020<sup>[14]</sup>). Most of the pledges were made in the form of financial support and targeted a wide range of domains including employment, education, children, clean energy and infrastructure. A stock-taking event is planned in 2021.

The elements described above have aligned to slowly uncover a paradigm shift on the adequate response to today’s forced displacement contexts. In a 2018 survey commissioned by the OECD in partnership with UNHCR, DAC donors were found to be making efforts to integrate programmes related to refugees into



their development strategies (Forichon, 2018<sup>[15]</sup>). The question now is whether countries have progressed in making development objectives a bigger part of the approach to tackling forced displacement. To adequately collect information on whether such a shift has been tangible, the OECD Development Centre turned to its governing board members, as well as a few other key countries, by administering a questionnaire on instruments targeting forced displacement in developing countries.

### 1.3 Methodology used for this report

This report reviews governmental responses to addressing forced displacement. In order to gather as comprehensive information as possible, while obtaining validation from individual countries, the methodology adapted for this report follows a three-tier approach, with each tier leading into the next:

- A complete analytical desk review;
- A questionnaire;
- Phone and email interviews.

All three tiers were left to the discretion of the targeted countries, which were approached as participants on the basis of their membership in the OECD Development Centre (56 member countries).<sup>4</sup> Countries were divided according to their status as partner and donor countries on one side, and hosting developing countries on the other; this report focuses on responses from donor countries.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, 17 countries are fully covered in this report, as well as some additional basic information collected on the EU and the United States. Complementary information was also collected through a literature review and official governmental websites.

The following table summarises the response rates for donor countries, with respect to each tier of the methodology.

**Table 1.2. Three-tiered methodology response rate by donor country**

	Country	Desk review	Questionnaire	Follow-up interview
1	Australia	X	X	X
2	Belgium	X		
3	Canada	X	X	X
4	Czech Republic	X	X	X
5	France	X	X	
6	Germany	X	X	
7	Italy	X	X	X
8	Japan	X	X	X
9	Korea	X	X	
10	Netherlands	X	X	
11	Portugal	X	X	
12	Slovenia	X	X	X
13	Spain	X	X	X
14	Sweden	X	X	X
15	Switzerland	X	X	X
16	Turkey	X		X
17	United Kingdom	X	X	X

<sup>4</sup> Australia, Canada and the United States are also discussed in this report, despite not being members of the OECD Development Centre.

<sup>5</sup> A second report will be published providing a full description of the methodology as well as detailing and analysing responses from developing hosting countries.

## 2. Addressing forced displacement in developing countries: A donor perspective

### 2.1 Who manages forced displacement instruments?

The management of forced displacement instruments is mostly a reflection of the institutional framework of the donor country and of the recency of the forced displacement policy matter for that country. No state has a dedicated governmental structure managing forced displacement instruments. The management of forced displacement programmes is typically either overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for general policy towards forced displacement in collaboration with a semi-autonomous aid agency that manages the implementation of forced displacement instruments, or through a specific department or Agency, operating within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The exceptions are notably with Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), where addressing forced displacement in developing economies is overseen by ministries managing development co-operation.<sup>6</sup> Table 2.1 below summarises the primary bodies managing forced displacement across 18 selected donor countries.

**Table 2.1. Institutions managing forced displacement programmes in developing countries as development partners**

Country	Overarching ministry managing forced displacement programmes	Specific department managing forced displacement programmes	Other related institutions
Australia	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Humanitarian & Refugee Policy Branch (HUB)	
Belgium	Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs	The Directorate-General - Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD)	Enabel (Belgian development agency)
Canada	Global Affairs Canada	International Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (MHD)	
Czech Republic	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Department of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance	
France	Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs	Direction Générale de la Mondialisation, de la Culture, de l'Enseignement et du Développement International (DGM)	Agence Française de développement (AFD) and associated agencies

<sup>6</sup> In Germany, the development co-operation approach towards forced displacement in developing economies is overseen by BMZ, but the humanitarian responses are overseen by the Federal Foreign Office.

		(General Directorate for Globalisation, Culture, Education and International Development) and the Centre de Crise et de Soutien (CDCS) (Centre for Crisis and Support)	
<b>Germany</b>	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Foreign Office (AA)	Directorate 22 (Displacement and migration; crisis prevention and management; Commissioner for refugee policy)	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) (German Corporation for International Cooperation) and KfW (German state-owned development bank)
<b>Italy</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGCS) – Office VI Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency	Office VII Emergency and Fragile States of the Italian Agency for Development Co-operation (AICS)
<b>Japan</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
<b>Korea</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Multilateral Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance Division	Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
<b>The Netherlands</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Department of Migration and Development	
<b>Portugal</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs		Camões Institute (IP) – Department of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Society Unit
<b>Slovenia</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Directorate for Multilateral Affairs, Development Cooperation and International Law (Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance)	
<b>Spain</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation	Humanitarian Action Office	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID)
<b>Switzerland</b>	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs	Human Security Division	SDC (Swiss Agency for cooperation and development) and State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) part of the federal Department of Justice and Police
<b>Sweden</b>	Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well as Sweden's diplomatic missions	In part by the Department for Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs (UD KH)	Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)
<b>Turkey</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture and Tourism	The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), managed by MCT	
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Secretary of State for International Development and Department for International Development (DFID)	Humanitarian and Protracted Crisis Policy Group (CHASE)	
<b>United States</b>	US Department of State	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The main differences in the way donor countries are structured in addressing forced displacement is whether such programmes are directly managed by the ministry, through a dedicated development agency or through a combination of the two, which depends on larger foreign policy governance structure questions in the country. For instance, forced displacement programmes are managed at the ministerial level in countries like Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the United States,


but they are managed in tandem with development agencies, mostly as implementation partners, in countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. In France, Turkey and the UK, development agencies largely have the managerial lead on forced displacement programmes.

Another difference is the type of division or department that manages such programmes, and whether they are humanitarian, development or migration-oriented in nature. Several departments managing forced displacement are humanitarian in nature, at least in name, such as in Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Italy, Korea, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland, Spain and Turkey. Whereas in the UK, forced displacement is addressed by the department dealing with crisis management, in the United States, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Germany, forced displacement is addressed in broader migration and development terms. There is no explicit focus on either humanitarian or migratory aspects in departments managing forced displacement in Sweden or France. In the case of Sweden, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) objectives related to migration are managed across its geographical strategies (country-specific, regional and global). Strategies have general objectives and apply a broad definition of migration (forced and voluntary).

## 2.2 What specific instruments have been created to integrate more development-oriented objectives in forced displacement programmes?

Instruments used by countries to address forced displacement in developing countries range from very specific, on forced displacement, to very broad, on development. What determines this is whether forced displacement is treated as a separate thematic area, or whether it is mainstreamed across several instruments. The typology depicted in Figure 2.1, provides a better understanding of the different approaches in addressing forced displacement, ranging from a specific instrument, to general policy and finally to a mainstreamed approach on forced displacement:

**Figure 2.1. The various approaches towards addressing the HDP nexus and forced displacement by donor countries**



### ***A. Specific instruments addressing forced displacement***

Two instruments fall clearly in the explicit and separate thematic category: the German Special Initiative on Forced Displacement (since 2014) and the Netherlands' Prospects Partnership instrument (2019-23).

The **Special Initiative on Forced Displacement** is Germany's main development co-operation instrument targeting forced displacement, established in 2014 by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and

Development.<sup>7</sup> The instrument was created to address the root causes of displacement and focuses its efforts towards forcibly displaced persons and the communities that host them. It provides very broad support towards addressing forced displacement, through financial and technical support, specifically for refugees and IDPs, while contributing to the stability of hosting communities and in mitigation of further causes of forced displacement. The initiative has been constantly evolving, focusing on infrastructure, education, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), employment and training, and how to integrate more long-term job support. In 2016, it launched its flagship programme, “Partnership for Prospects” in the Middle-East, which provides refugees with local cash-for-work opportunities.

More recently, the Netherlands launched the Prospects Partnership, a four-year partnership with five international institutions (World Bank, IFC, ILO, UNICEF and UNHCR), with the explicit goal of incorporating a stronger development perspective in forced displacement crises. The instrument brings together partners with different thematic expertise, to tackle the challenges of forced displacement crisis in three ways: strengthening hosting country and community resilience, enabling local socio-economic inclusion and improving access to education and protection for children. The partnership cites the GCR as the foundation of its approach.

### ***B. General overarching forced displacement policy***

Other instruments are less explicit in name and objective, but remain heavily focused on forced displacement, and constitute the main instruments guiding the country's actions on forced displacement in developing countries. There are two primary examples of this type of approach. The first is the UK's **Humanitarian Reform Policy** (2017), which altered the country's approach on forced displacement in three different ways: (1) a stronger focus on building resilience and resolving conflicts before crises strike, (2) bringing together humanitarian and development funding and (3) reforming the international humanitarian system; including greater collaboration with the private sector. The second is Switzerland's general **migration and development policy**, where forced displacement is part of a larger policy on migration and development, including its partnership instrument (since 2008) and its Protection in the Region instrument (since 2018) as well as Switzerland's Global Programme on Migration and Development (GPMD) Division (2018-22), managed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

### ***C. Forced displacement mainstreamed into development co-operation or humanitarian assistance***

Most countries address forced displacement through their pre-existing humanitarian or development programmes. This mainly pertains to mainstreaming forced displacement instruments through broader humanitarian programmes, such as Australia's Foreign Policy White paper (2017), France's MINKA instrument (since 2017), the Turkey Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) (since 2008), the Humanitarian Action Office (HAO) in Spain (since 2007) as well the Spanish Technical Aid Response Team (START) project (since 2016), Japan's Disaster Relief Teams (since 1987) and its Emergency Grant Aid programme (since 1973), the Czech Republic's Assistance-on-the-Spot (2015) and MEDEVAC (1993) programmes and Canada's 2016 Middle East Strategy. These programmes have primarily humanitarian objectives, such as food and health concerns, and most have little explicit focus on bringing in a greater development angle to forced displacement.

In other countries, forced displacement instruments are mainstreamed into pre-existing national, regional or global strategies on development, where addressing issues of forced displacement is one of the main objectives. In Sweden, bilateral development cooperation with individual countries and regions is governed

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<sup>7</sup> At the time, increases in BMZ's budget were channelled through three special initiatives, prioritising “tackling the root causes of displacement, reintegrating refugees”, “stability and development in the MENA region”, and “ONE WORLD – No hunger”.

by geographical strategies, as well as thematic strategies with an overarching strategic focus – although none explicitly targeting forced displacement. For Sweden, development strategies are the starting point in addressing forced displacement, such through its Regional Cooperation Strategy in Africa (2016-20) and its Bilateral Strategy of Development Cooperation in Bangladesh (2014-20). In addition, Sweden's 2016 Policy framework for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Government of Sweden, 2016<sup>[16]</sup>) has a dedicated chapter devoted to migration, including forced displacement, but the framework outlines the general direction of Swedish co-operation rather than sets policy with funds and implementation goals.

Other examples include Switzerland's bilateral co-operation initiatives supporting transition and addressing migration as a cross cutting theme in Egypt (2017-20) and its in-country out of camp support in Ethiopia (since 2018), Canada's 2018 Strategy to Respond to the Rohingya Crisis and Australia's instruments through the Humanitarian and Resilience Package to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (2016), the Afghanistan–Pakistan Regional Humanitarian Strategy (2018) and its 2017 three-year package to the Iraqi crisis.

Finally, small ad hoc initiatives are often created by countries as a result of demand or to meet humanitarian co-operation objectives. These smaller programmes tend to have a broader development perspective in contrast to the big humanitarian forced displacement instruments mentioned above. This is the case for Slovenia's two programmes in Lebanon, "Assistance to Syrian refugees, victims of gender-based violence" and "For her future", which run from 2020 to 2022, Portugal's Talk2Me initiative in Uganda (2019), Korea's specific programmes on forced displacement in Colombia and Jordan (2017-20), Belgium's bilateral programmes in Niger (2017-20) and Morocco (2016-20) and Italy's Emergency Initiative Supporting Environmental Displaced Persons and Host Communities to Strengthen Resilience (2019-20).

## 2.3 What are the general objectives of instruments addressing forced displacement in developing countries?

The core objectives of instruments addressing forced displacement largely reflect the mode in which they were created as elaborated above. The overarching objective of several programmes and instruments targeting forced displacement in developing countries remains primarily humanitarian and security-oriented in nature. This is explicitly communicated by Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Japan and Korea for instance. Objectives include alleviating crises, humanitarian assistance, addressing immediate needs, preventing violence, disaster relief and any other type of emergency response. In some countries, the focus is more on the protection of vulnerable populations, such as in Australia and Italy. In Australia, the focus is on women girls and people with disabilities. In Italy, strengthening the resilience of vulnerable groups is a main objective.

Objectives borrow strongly from the agenda of the Valetta Summit on Migration Action Plan, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the GCM in addressing the "root causes of migration". This is explicitly the case for Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, and although less explicitly stated, Spain. Spain aims to contribute by generating opportunity and improving livelihoods in the countries of origin.

The development component of many humanitarian-based instruments is mainly through local state resilience and peace building, for example for Australia, France, Italy and Japan. For France, the main objective is prevention, resilience and sustainable peace for instance and for Italy, the focus is at the community and local resilience level.

The specific instruments created by the Netherlands and Germany, as well as the UK White paper explicitly highlight the need to bring in a greater development angle to addressing forced displacement. What they have in common in their aims is a shift in paradigm from a humanitarian to a more development focus,

building resilience of the hosting society and providing a greater enabling and inclusive environment for refugees, thus fostering the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

The Netherlands' programme has a core objective of bringing in a co-ordinated multi-stakeholder and expertise angle to specific forced displacement situations, with a particular focus on children. It cites the following broad objectives: Protection and legal status; Access to education and vocational training; and Opportunities for work and income.

Notably, Germany includes emphasis on tackling the root causes of displacement, while stabilising hosting countries and supporting refugees, in strong coherence with the EU's discourse around the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (2015), but also with a number of German initiatives by other federal ministries, such as the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) and Germany's Marshall Plan for Africa (Schraven, 2019<sup>[17]</sup>). While the issue of "tackling the root causes of displacement" has a long history in Germany<sup>8</sup>, its current objectives date from 2014, when the Special Initiative was launched, and target improving conditions in countries of origin, supporting refugees in hosting countries through labour and training measures and creating opportunity for return.

The UK White paper places particular emphasis on preparing for humanitarian crises, rather than only responding to them, as well as broader objectives of reform in the international humanitarian system on forced displacement.

Switzerland aims to provide prompt and effective protection for refugees, support countries of first refuge and reduce dangerous onward migration, and places particular emphasis on an interdepartmental approach to refugee situations. This approach is ensured through an Interdepartmental Structure for International Cooperation on Migration (ICM), and involves several federal agencies including the Federal Department of Justice and Police, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research.

Local integration of refugees is not as pervasive an objective across instruments as the global agenda on forced displacement has warranted. The UK's Humanitarian Reform Policy includes objectives of investing in the sustained livelihoods of refugees, including job-creation in the hosting society. In Germany and the Netherlands, the integration objectives for refugees is the most explicit, by helping refugees to better integrate into their new country, when possible, and strengthening social cohesion. For Japan, focus is on the self-reliance of refugees, but there is no explicit mention of local integration.

Sweden rarely differentiates forced displacement from other migratory flows, and mainstreams objectives related to migration into its general regional and thematic development strategies and projects. In specific cases and strategies, forced displacement is targeted, such as in the case of its strategy in Bangladesh and the Rohingya refugees. Sweden's 2016 Policy framework for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Government of Sweden, 2016<sup>[16]</sup>) outlines long-term direction on migration and development, including strengthening the link between long-term development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Notably it highlights improving livelihoods of vulnerable populations to reduce the risk of humanitarian crises, and improving the capacity of hosting countries, to safeguard the rights of refugees and migrants and promote the hosting countries development.

While not pervasive, objectives of voluntary return and re-integration to countries of origin is mentioned in Australia, Germany and the Netherlands. For Australia this is done by supporting displaced persons as close to their homes as possible, so they can return when conditions allow. For the Netherlands, it is one of three main area focuses of their Prospects Partnership instrument.

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<sup>8</sup> The concept of "tackling the root causes of displacement" first appeared in a 1980 draft UN resolution by the German Foreign Office (Schraven, 2019<sup>[17]</sup>).



## 2.4 Who and what do forced displacement instruments target?

The groups and thematic areas forced displacement instruments target vary widely, but many are humanitarian in nature. Instruments targeting longer-term self-reliance and inclusion and hosting society resilience exist, but many instruments are ad hoc and mainstreamed into larger humanitarian programmes. Gaps therefore remain with respect to fully fostering the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Short-term relief and medical assistance***

Several programme targets include short-term relief and medical assistance, for instance, for Australia, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain (START programme) and Korea. Several development partners specifically focus on health and WASH programmes, such as Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic and Belgium, in their specific programme in Niger. Switzerland (in Egypt) and the UK implement financial aid cash transfer programmes. Italy, Japan and Germany stress food security as a target area. In addition to these programmes, countries also target humanitarian assistance, with longer-term benefits.

### ***Mental health and psychosocial support***

Psychosocial assistance is particularly implemented in the Middle-East, as Japan reported carrying out such programmes in Jordan and Slovenia in Gaza. In fact, 15 out of the 18 development partner countries reviewed reported including mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) as part of their response to forced displacement in developing countries. Multilateral programmes also support MHPSS, such as the "No Lost Generation Initiative" led jointly by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and World Vision, providing mental health and psychosocial support for displaced children. Among them, the Netherlands has been a forerunner in this field, funding many initiatives and using its position to call for improvements. It hosted an international conference in October 2019 to create greater awareness of the needs for more MHPSS in crises and share good practices.

### ***Vulnerable groups***

There is also much focus on protecting and providing short and long-term livelihood solutions to vulnerable groups. This includes targeting women, where Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Slovenia and Sweden (specifically in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh) are active. Germany, for instance, places particular emphasis on gender equality, while Slovenia is working at ending violence against women and girls in Lebanon and promoting good practice in sexual reproductive health in Uganda. Switzerland focuses on protecting refugee domestic workers. In June 2019, Sweden began supporting a UN Women-led Centre in Kigeme Refugee Camp in Rwanda that provides women with a safe space, training and a showroom for their products to improve their livelihoods at the camp and beyond.

The focus on women is consistent with the importance given to women in the GCR. Some countries have feminist foreign policies that extend to how they address forced displacement. Canada has mainstreamed gender-sensitive forced displacement programmes, in relation to its feminist International Assistance Policy launched in 2017. The policy adopts an integrated approach to development, humanitarian, and peace and security assistance through several action areas like human dignity, inclusive growth, environment action and inclusive governance, among others. In the Charlevoix Declaration on Quality Education for Girls and Women in Developing countries, Canada pledged a contribution of USD 400 million through investments in 44 projects among which at least five target the education of forcibly displaced women and girls. An example of this policy in practice is in Canada's international assistance in Jordan, where objectives regarding women and girls are mainstreamed in efforts to support the needs of citizens

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<sup>9</sup> The following descriptions represent a set of examples, and are not meant to be comprehensive.



and refugees, such as access to public schools, formal labour market participation, entrepreneurship and skilled work in renewable energy.

Sweden's feminist foreign policy for peace, security and sustainable development, established in 2014, strives to strengthen the enjoyment of human rights of migrant and refugee women and girls (Government of Sweden, 2019<sup>[18]</sup>). Gender equality is explicitly referenced in Sweden's 2016-2020 Regional Strategy for the Syria Crisis, where gender-based violence towards refugees is a focus of policy, as well as in the 2014-2020 Bangladesh Strategy, where resilience of vulnerable women in refugee reception areas is a focus of policy.

Addressing the needs of refugee women has been a priority at the regional level as well. The Latin American and Caribbean-based "Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan" for 2020 expanded specific targeted initiatives to provide technical guidance for both hosting government and humanitarian organisations to implement strategies to enhance protection for women and girls.

Children and youth are also another common targeted vulnerable group. In Slovenia, programmes are working on raising awareness on child marriages among refugees in Lebanon. Assisting and promoting long-term solutions for people with disabilities is an objective in Australia and Japan. Japan runs Disability Equality Training, in Jordan for instance.

### ***Building refugee self-reliance and longer-term inclusion***

Legal aid is one area where instruments target longer-term self-reliance. Belgium carries out specific legal aid programmes for refugees in Morocco. For the Netherlands, legal aid consists of assisting forcibly displaced persons obtain personal documents, such as birth certificates, which are crucial for access to justice, education and employment.

Several programmes primarily take the form of training and education. Australia, Belgium (specifically in Niger), Germany, the UK, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Korea all have explicit programmes on training or education. Germany, for instance, has helped one million children and youth refugees obtain access to education.

Other programmes offer specific training and job-creation opportunities targeting refugees, and sometimes hosting country residents. Local employment objectives for refugees often closely tie in to the broader agenda on local refugee integration. Germany's Partnership for Prospects programme, which trains and creates work for refugees in cash-for-work programmes, is an example. Several programmes offer support for access to labour markets and public education. Training takes the form of business and agricultural skills in Kenya in a UK-based programme. Korea also offers training in business skills in Colombia. Japan provides electrical training in Jordan. Other programmes explicitly focus on creating employment-generating environments, such as Switzerland and its programmes on promoting entrepreneurship in Egypt. Switzerland also explicitly aims to increase the quality of jobs for refugees, through programmes such as its "Decent Work for Migrants in the Middle East" programme.

Some employment-generating programmes have other or broader strategic objectives, such as ensuring food security for forcibly displaced persons, while also transferring useful skills. France, for instance, generally supports small-scale agricultural economic activity. Japan has a programme providing training to refugees for rice cultivation in Uganda. Germany's Partnership for Prospects programme in the Middle East targets resilience building by cash-for-work programmes. Canada's efforts in Jordan support the creation of women and youth entrepreneurs, while targeting environmental goals through employment and businesses on renewable energy.

### ***Host society resilience***

More broadly speaking, several countries aim at improving infrastructure, empowering local governments and building capacity in partner institutions to better manage and integrate forcibly displaced persons. This is the case for Australia, Belgium (in Niger), Germany, Korea, Japan (in Uganda), the Netherlands and Switzerland. Germany's Partnership for Prospects cash-for-work programme has the additional objective of providing opportunities for refugees to help build resilience of the hosting community through waste disposal, repair and maintenance of public infrastructure for instance. Germany also underlined the importance of including refugee inclusion in national and local development plans and policy dialogue. In Switzerland, particular emphasis is placed on urban settings, as urban Syrian refugees make up 80% to 90% of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. It will soon launch a project on building regional and national capacities for improved migration governance in the IGAD region, which includes refugees. There are also endeavours, for instance in France, Germany and Korea, to increase hosting country or community resilience to climate change by incorporating the protection of the environment as a target. In France, better management of natural resources is explicitly cited as a target.

## **2.5 What developing regions and countries are typically targeted in forced displacement instruments?**

Given the global nature of forced displacement, development partners operate in a wide array of countries, requiring more co-ordination across donor countries. A notable difference across countries is the breadth of geographical scope, and whether they are very concentrated on a specific region, or in many crisis zones in the world. This division is not always driven by the size of development partner budgets, like for Germany, which is heavily concentrated in the Middle East, in relative terms to their endowment. Countries like Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Portugal and Turkey are particularly concentrated in a few hotspots, while countries like Japan, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, the UK, Korea and Sweden are spread across several regions. Some countries are relatively concentrated, but then have several smaller engagements (relative to their overall budgets) elsewhere, such as Germany and the Netherlands.

Another important point on donor co-ordination is that context typically drives donors to operate in specific areas of certain countries. For instance, Italy is focused in the regions of Oromia and Somali in Ethiopia. Belgium operates specifically in the regions of Tahoua, Dosso and Tillabery in Niger, the Czech Republic, in the specific refugee camp of Azrak in Jordan. Germany and Japan have specific local programmes in the West Nile region of Uganda and Germany also has programmes in the Nigerian cities of Yobe, Borno and Adamaoua. Portugal's Talk2Me programme runs specifically in Northern Uganda and Spain has a specific focus in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps in Algeria.

The one region where nearly all development partners are present is in the Middle East, with a focus on the fallout from the on-going Syrian crisis and the Iraq war of 2003, which has led to a protracted crisis. It is notably the case for Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Slovenia and Turkey. Countries in the region work directly in Syria and Iraq, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Yemen. For many countries, such as Canada, Germany and Turkey, it is the main region of intervention.

Another sub-region where many countries are engaged is the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. This is an important target region for Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Japan and Spain. Generally, countries are also heavily engaged in the Horn of Africa and East Africa (Switzerland, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey). Portugal mainly focuses on Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. North Africa (Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt) is another hotspot where many partners are engaged on forced displacement, including Switzerland, Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Spain.

Several European donor countries focus their initiatives on forced displacement situations in Europe, particularly the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia), such as the Czech Republic, Switzerland and Slovenia.

In Asia, engagement is divided. There are countries more heavily engaged in forced displacement in South and Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal (East Timor) and Sweden. Targets of intervention here include the Rohingya crisis, in both Bangladesh and Myanmar, and to a lesser extent engagements in Sri Lanka. On the other end, there are many countries engaged in Eurasia and Central Asia, including Switzerland, the Czech Republic and Turkey. Forced displacement situations included here are those in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Northern and Southern Caucasus. The UK is particularly present in Asia, across several regions.

Despite a rapid rise and large numbers of forcibly displaced populations spanning the entire continent, few partners have explicit or substantial focus on Latin America and more specifically the fallout from the Venezuelan crisis, which began around 2010. Some partners, however, have increased their engagement there, including Canada, Japan, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

## 2.6 How big are the budgets that target forced displacement in developing countries?

Information on forced displacement budgets is difficult to collect and identify as countries rarely have standalone instruments targeting forcibly displaced persons. There are a few reasons for this.

- First, tackling forced displacement, separate from pure emergency and short-term humanitarian needs, has never been viewed as a specific thematic area until recently. Most countries do not have specific budget lines to record instruments targeting forced displacement and these expenditures rather cut across the areas of humanitarian aid, economic development, human development, climate and environment, governance, and conflict.
- Second, forced displacement is mainstreamed across instruments or included as part of donor country portfolios when needed, making explicit financial information on such forced displacement difficult or unavailable. Countries do not always make a distinction between instruments that target migrants more generally from those that specifically target forcibly displaced persons. In Sweden for example, forced displacement instruments are integrated directly into wider strategies and not costed explicitly. In addition, Sida applies a broad definition of migration for their development programming, which includes forced and voluntary migration. In that sense, the Swedish Regional Development Cooperation Strategy with sub-Saharan Africa (2016-21), supports migrant rights, including those of refugees as well as the capacity of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to implement commitments in the areas of migration and asylum.<sup>10</sup>
- Third, general development programmes may allow refugees to benefit from projects that are not explicitly directed at them. The United States (USAID) and the UK (Department for International Development, DFID) fund a multi-year programme to improve the quality of early education for children in Jordan regardless of their nationality, with the added aim of also benefiting the numerous Syrian child refugees. Broader development assistance instruments may also address issues that can influence displacement. For example, Sweden's strategy for development co-operation on sustainable development includes guidance related to climate-induced forcibly displaced persons, as climate change increases the risk of poverty and conflict, and therefore forced displacement. However, these approaches make it challenging to collect data on budgets with regard to the assistance explicitly provided to forcibly displaced persons.

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<sup>10</sup> As a frame of reference, the entire strategy has a budget of SEK 2.7 billion (approximately EUR 260 million).

For all of these reasons, it is difficult to get a complete picture of what exactly is being spent on development-oriented forced displacement projects. It is indeed difficult for countries to separate out purely humanitarian instruments from those that are more development-oriented. Many humanitarian-oriented budgets include development-oriented projects targeting forced displacement. This is generally the case for Australia (AUD 500 million, about EUR 301 million), France (the Minka instrument has an annual budget of EUR 250 million), the Czech Republic (CZK 150 000 000, approximately EUR 6 million in 2018), the UK, Italy (EUR 95 million), Spain (the HAO's budget in 2018 was EUR 43 million) and Slovenia (EUR 2.3 million). Some of the instruments, such as Minka in France, explicitly mention among their objectives the prevention of violent conflicts and crisis resolution beyond the short-term. On these more general instruments, countries can often provide more financial details, such as overall costing. Spain's HAO has disbursed EUR 950 million from 2007 to 2018 for instance. Similarly, the UK contributed roughly EUR 52 million to the Venezuela crisis in 2019. The UK support to the fallout of the Syrian conflict is the UK's largest ever response to a humanitarian crisis, with more than GBP 2.8 billion in funding (approximately EUR 3.3 billion) from 2012 to 2018.

Switzerland runs many of its forced displacement projects through its GPMD instrument, which had an indicative annual budget for 2018 of CHF 17 million (approximately EUR 16 million) and will grow to CHF 21 million (approximately EUR 20 million) by 2021.

Germany and the Netherlands are the only countries therefore to have created a specific budget line for forced displacement, coinciding with the fact that both countries have set up instruments specifically dedicated to this issue in 2014 and 2018 respectively. In 2018 alone, the budget allocated for forced displacement for Germany was approximately EUR 900 million. The Special Initiative on Forced Displacement instrument's total budget since its inception has been EUR 2.4 billion with a 2018 budget of EUR 0.5 billion. In the Netherlands, the Prospects Partnership instrument has a budget of EUR 500 million over four years.

Australia's Afghanistan–Pakistan Regional Humanitarian Strategy, which includes objectives of bolstering Bangladesh's response to the Rohingya crisis has a budget of AUD 60 million over the 2018-20 period. Its 2017 three-year package to the Iraqi crisis is worth AUD 100 million (approximately EUR 60 million). Many of these programmes contain longer-term objectives. For instance, Australia replaced its annual funding with a Humanitarian and Resilience Package (2016-19) of USD 220 million to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The package includes components such as "humanitarian assistance and protection" as well as "improved access to education and livelihood opportunities" for refugees and the local population.

While national budgets were not always possible to calculate, several country examples of how specific forced displacement initiatives incorporating longer-term objectives are costed were provided.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> These include Belgium's bilateral migration programme in Niger (EUR 33 million) over the 2017-20 period, Canada's strategy to respond to the Rohingya crisis (CAD 300 million, approximately EUR 197 million) for 2018-21, Switzerland's bilateral support for addressing migration as a cross-cutting theme in Egypt (CHF 7 million, approximately EUR 6.6 million over 2017-20) and its out-of-camp policy programme in Ethiopia (EUR 1 million), the UK's Education Cannot Wait initiative (GBP 90 million; approximately EUR 103 million), Italy's Emergency Initiative Supporting Environmental Displaced Persons and Host Communities to Strengthen Resilience (EUR 2 million) (2019-20), Korea's humanitarian assistance in Colombia (USD 5 million – approximately EUR 4.6 million) for 2018-20 and Jordan (EUR 10.3 million) for 2017-20, Portugal's Talk2Me initiative (EUR 1 million) for 2019-20 and Slovenia's forced displacement gender programmes in Lebanon (EUR 440 000) for 2020-22 and its psychosocial programme in Palestine (EUR 145 000) for 2019-20.

## 2.7 Who implements forced displacement instruments?

There is a wide range of arrangements for implementing forced displacement instruments. They can be separated into the following groups:

- international organisations
- development agencies
- local governments
- international and local civil society organisations.

The Special Initiative on Forced Displacement developed by Germany relies on a wide range of actors, including UNICEF, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM, UN WOMEN, depending on the context and specific concerns. The Dutch Prospects Partnership instrument relies on a network of international organisations in the field, each with different expertise: UNICEF, WB, IFC, ILO and UNHCR. Outside of the specific instruments on forced displacement, most instruments collaborate in some way with UN agencies. The Czech Republic's Assistance-on-the-Spot instrument is in partnership with several international organisations, including the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA) often carries out its in-country programmes in collaboration with the UNHCR.

For smaller targeted initiatives, development agencies may implement programmes themselves, as is the case for Enabel (Belgian Development Agency) and JICA. Development agencies also tend to implement EU-funded initiatives as well, such as Enabel and Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECID). Enabel, for example, implemented the EU project "Legal Empowerment of Migrants in Morocco". Co-operation also occurs between development agencies. The Danish International Development Agency (Danida), for instance, implemented the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, French Development Agency)–funded "SHABAKE" project in Lebanon. A range of different ministries and other public authorities, may also have a hand in implementation, such as the case of the Ministry of Interior in the Czech Republic, which implements the Czech MEDEVAC programme. Germany's Special Initiative on Forced Displacement is implemented in part by German state-owned implementers such as the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the German state-owned development bank, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

Co-operation with local actors, including local governments and civil society organisations, is particularly important and frequent when feasible, and when local contexts are more fragile. The Dutch Prospects Partnership works with a variety of non-governmental organisations such as Terre des Hommes, Finn Church Aid and Save the Children. Germany's Special Initiative on Forced Displacement also collaborates with a combination of local public and non-governmental actors. Other examples include the Czech Republic's Assistance-on-the-Spot instrument, which co-operates locally with large international civil society organisations such as the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), CARE International, Caritas Internationalis and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), Switzerland's in-country support for forced displacement in Ethiopia, done in partnership with the local Norwegian Refugee Council office and Portugal's Talk2Me programme in Uganda, which is implemented by AMI (Assistência Médica Internacional), an international non-governmental organisation (NGO), as well as the Community Empowerment for Rural Development (CEFORD) NGO.

## 2.8 How do governments co-ordinate internally on their instruments and co-operate with other governments?

Most governments use ad-hoc methods to co-ordinate within their structures on forced displacement. Germany, the UK, Korea, Portugal, Spain and Slovenia all explained that steps are taken for co-ordination

and coherence across not only migration and development matters, but also in terms of linkages between matters of forced displacement and the broader realm of policy. Inter-ministerial meetings are common across countries, but the ministries that are involved differ from country to country. Apart from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Interior and national aid agencies, other ministries called on for such co-ordination meetings include the Ministries of Defence, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (for example in Korea), the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Social Welfare (for example in Spain).

Beyond ad-hoc meetings, other countries organise more regular and formalised co-ordination meetings, a certain number of times per year. In the Czech Republic, such meetings occur two to four times per year and cover many ministries, including foreign affairs, interior, labour and social affairs, education, health, industry and trade and defence, as well as the UN Information Centre in Prague. In Sweden, formal meetings are organised twice a year, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida.

Switzerland and France have dedicated structures to ensure policy co-ordination. In Switzerland, the International Cooperation on Migration (ICM) Structure was created in 2011 to co-ordinate various migration-related activities and ensure coherence in foreign policy. The ICM structure includes 12 thematic and geographical working groups that ensure regular exchange among the federal agencies concerned. In France, the Inter-ministerial Committee for Cooperation and Development (CICID) as well as the National Council for Development and International Solidarity (CNDSI) are responsible for policy co-ordination on development, which spans beyond issues of forced displacement. The CICID co-ordinates cross-ministerial meetings, but frequent meetings are organised between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and the AFD.

Outside of governmental structures, non-governmental structures may be invited to co-ordination meetings on forced displacement, particularly when they are implementers of instruments. This is the case in the Czech Republic (the Czech adhoc NGO network), Portugal (Portuguese NGDO Platform) and Slovenia (Sloga). In France, The CNDSI ensures co-ordination by providing a twice-yearly forum for dialogue between representatives of NGOs, the private sector, higher education and research institutions, local authorities and parliamentarians on the objectives and significant issues relating to the coherence of public policies for development.

On a bilateral scale, very little exists, with the exception of Switzerland, which implemented the principle of migration partnerships to strengthen co-operation on migration with other countries. To carry out these partnerships, bilateral meetings are organised every six months, with development being a central element of such partnerships.

### 3. Are national instruments meeting international commitments on addressing forced displacement?

As elaborated in Section 1, there have been many changes to the way forced displacement is addressed in developing countries at the global level. Such changes have transpired to individual country approaches, but for a diverse set of reasons. The impetus for change ranges from the shifts in the global agenda on forced displacement, either taking a cue from broader agendas such as the 2030 agenda, or from specific events such as the 2011 Arab Spring protests, the Syrian crisis and the peak in inflows of refugees in Europe in 2015/16 and more recently calls to action specifically targeting forced displacement, such as the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, the New York Declaration or the GCR.

#### ***Forced displacement and broader development co-operation reforms***

In a few cases, sweeping changes paved the way for a more precise targeting on forced displacement initiatives. In Australia and Canada, for instance, gender has recently taken a greater importance in their approach to forced displacement. In Australia, the most significant recent policy development, particularly since the GCR signing, has been the emergence of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, spearheaded by Foreign Affairs Minister Marise Payne, reflecting a perceived lack of adequate coverage for women and children in global forced displacement support.

In Canada, broad changes in its development and co-operation policy brought a strengthened focus on the specific needs of women and girls and gender equality. This focus is highlighted in Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, launched in June 2017, which also brought change to its policy on forced displacement.

In 2014 the Italian international co-operation underwent a significant reform providing Italian co-operation with a new legal and organisational, operational framework regarding migration and development, and the creation of the Agenzia italiana per la cooperazione allo sviluppo (AICS, Italian Agency for Development Co-operation) and the National Development Cooperation Council, a council that brings together different public and private stakeholders, including two representatives of diaspora communities.

#### ***A small shift towards HDP nexus principles***

Regardless of whether an HDP nexus approach to forced displacement is explicitly stated as an objective or not, the recency of many instruments is notable, signalling at the very least a general shift towards greater focus on forced displacement. Several instruments have been created since 2017, for instance with France's MINKA instrument in 2017, Switzerland's Protection in the Region instrument in 2018, Australia's Foreign Policy White Paper in 2017, and to a lesser extent, Italy's Emergency Initiative Supporting Environmental Displaced Persons and Host Communities to Strengthen Resilience in 2019.

Not only is the emergence notable, but the financial resources allocated to forced displacement are on the rise. To cite a few examples, the German government increased its budget allocation for forced displacement instruments in developing countries, from an average annual budget allocated for the 2010-14 period of approximately EUR 200 million, to an average annual budget of about EUR 700 million for the 2015-18 period. The Czech government has also significantly increased its budget allocation for forced displacement instruments in developing countries, from CZK 25 million (approximately EUR 1 million) in 2010-14 to an average annual budget of CZK 250 million (about EUR 10 million) over the 2015-18 period. In recent years, Turkey has increased its humanitarian aid budget from around USD 3.2 billion in 2015 to USD 8.2 billion in 2019.

Explicit reference to the HDP nexus is also on the rise. The instruments that specifically target forced displacement, such as the Dutch Prospects Partnership instrument, Germany's Special Initiative on Forced Displacement, and the UK's White paper on foreign policy, explicitly mention the New York Declaration and the GCR. The German Special Initiative, while conceived in 2014, changed its path towards greater focus on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus once this became an essential part of the global agenda. A major component of the shift taken by the German Special Initiative was indeed a greater focus on refugee self-reliance and resilience by hosting communities.

Sweden's Policy framework for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Government of Sweden, 2016<sup>[16]</sup>), developed in 2016, states that Sweden will strengthen the link between long-term development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, in a chapter devoted to migration. Specifically, the framework calls for broad-based long-term development initiatives to strengthen the resilience of individuals and societies, in order to reduce the risk and consequences of humanitarian crises. Such efforts should be carried out in parallel across humanitarian and development actors.

Even amongst smaller donors, some of which do not have explicit instruments targeting forced displacement but rather have mainstreamed forced displacement in their strategies, the HDP nexus principles are clearly cited. In 2019, Korea revised its humanitarian assistance strategy to reflect its will to strengthen the efforts in ensuring the HDP nexus while also increasing its humanitarian assistance. In 2018, Slovenia changed its legislative and strategic framework of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, to one focused on long-term planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance co-operation.

### ***Including and co-ordinating new actors***

Another significant change since 2015 is the emergence of engagement by new actors, including new development actors and the private sector. This largely reflects the spirit of the GCR on greater responsibility sharing.

Turkey (TIKA) for example, became an important global humanitarian actor, widely engaged in crisis hotspots such as Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria. In July 2018, TIKA became a public legal entity with its own budget and has since been bolstering its assistance abroad by drawing on its experience and lessons learned as a hosting country. In Jordan for example, TIKA conducted the "Street Arrangement Project" in the Marka Refugee Camp in 2017, which contributed to the improvement of the infrastructures of a camp hosting around 95 000 Palestinian refugees.

While the development community is increasingly concerned by skills training and access to financial products and services for refugees, private sector actors have emerged as viable and strategic partners. Given the importance of private financial flows and initiatives for refugees' livelihoods, countries are increasingly expanding public-private partnerships and working on addressing the gap that has kept the private sector out of forced displacement initiatives for many years.

There are several examples of countries that have made it easier to collaborate with the private sector. The sweeping 2014 Italian law reform that established AICS, for instance, strongly encourages the involvement of private actors in development co-operation. In South Korea also, KOICA expanded and



improved the support for public-private partnership in the area of humanitarian assistance by expanding assistance to five areas, including refugees. In February 2018, Canada launched the Development Finance Institute Canada (FinDev), to foster its collaboration with private sector actors to support international development, while also developing the *Partnerships Programming*, where private sector actors are listed as possible partners. In Argentina, the “Special Humanitarian Visa Programme for People Affected by the Conflict in the Arab Republic of Syria” programme is on-going since 2014 and financed by private sector sponsors, amongst others.

### 3.1 What co-ordination exists across countries and with global institutions?

#### ***Support for the role of international institutions***

Several countries have increased their collaboration with the UNHCR in recent years, the primary organisation that most countries collaborate with when rolling out their instruments addressing forced displacement. The UNHCR has also been central in organising donor missions in the context of the CRRF, for instance, to Djibouti and Ethiopia, the initial pilot countries. Several countries also made substantial pledges at the recent December 2019 GRF, mentioning greater support and collaboration with the UNHCR.

However, as the HDP nexus takes a firmer role, new international governance actors are being called on for specific roles, in order to bring in a broader thematic reach. This is the starting point for the recent Dutch Prospects Partnership instrument, which brings together several international organisations with specific roles to bring a development dimension towards addressing forced displacement. The German Special Initiative on Forced Displacement also heavily relies on multilateral governance actors to carry out its programmes, including UNICEF, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM and UNWOMEN.

In addition to the Dutch and German instruments, many smaller programmes also support or heavily rely on international organisations for implementation. In 2019, Italy contributed EUR 2 million to UNICEF’s WASH programme for child refugees living in Lebanon. Canada is also collaborating with UNICEF in Lebanon, on issues of education, access and learning, through a CAD 15 million project intending to improve the learning environment, including for Syrian refugees. Korea supports the UNDP-led project in Uganda on “Host and Refugee Community Empowerment Project” (2019-2022), a development-focused project promoting transformative livelihoods and economic recovery for refugees and the hosting communities in West Nile and Acholi sub-regions. Switzerland makes experts from its Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit available to the UNHCR. The UK collaborated with the World Bank in creating the Global Concessional Financing Facility and the Refugee Sub-Window. Portugal supports the United Nations (UN) Mission in the Republic of South Sudan where it creates protection and delivers humanitarian assistance to millions of displaced people.

#### ***National leadership on forced displacement and support for regional initiatives***

In addition to UN-led initiatives, states also highlighted the support they bring to regional processes and to the EU specifically. These include the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the European Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, the EUTF Syria instrument (MADAD Fund) and the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT). In addition to these broader schemes, the Netherlands leads the EU “Regional Development and Protection Programme” (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa that addresses protection and development challenges related to forced and protracted displacement, and along with DG ECHO, Portugal is supporting the European Instrument of External Assignment Revenue for Venezuela.

In very specific cases, countries have taken the lead in organising or developing multilateral initiatives. On the GCR specifically, Canada has also been active in ensuring that the Global Compact on Refugees is gender-responsive. In 2017-18, Canada actively championed measures in the compact to advance gender equality and address needs and risks faced by women and girl refugees. The actions included co-hosting

an expert-level meeting on gender in the Refugee Compact. It also worked with partner states to ensure that the compact reflects best practices for gender equality in refugee responses. After two years of lobbying by states, led by Norway, alongside the UK, the UN Secretary-General announced the establishment of a High-Level Panel (HLP) on Internal Displacement to focus on finding solutions to internal displacement situations in October 2019. Regarding persons forcibly displaced by natural disasters, Switzerland has been an actor in the creation of the Swiss-Norwegian Nansen Initiative, concluded in 2015. It has created the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) that seeks to improve the protection of people displaced across borders due to natural disasters and climate change. The platform has implemented an agenda offering ways of improving protection for affected populations through measures in various relevant areas, such as disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and development efforts to strengthen the resilience of affected communities.

International conferences are a common method to lead and influence the agenda on forced displacement. As co-hosts of the London Conference on Syria and the Region in 2016, the UK played a substantial role in developing the Refugee Compact approach agreed there, most notably the Jordan Compact, and subsequently the Ethiopia Jobs Compact. The compact approach aims to leverage aid and non-aid instruments in return for better protection for refugees and their greater access to the labour market. This approach was subsequently embedded in the CRRF and the GCR. Other examples include Belgium, which hosted the “Global Conference on Cities and Migration” in the city of Mechelen in November 2017, and Turkey, which hosted the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.

### ***The need for greater co-ordination across countries – where are the gaps?***

The current context on forced displacement calls for major support for international organisations and governance, in an effort of co-ordination, collaboration and providing standards. At the same time, several countries are providing leadership in a variety of ways and spearheading new approaches. This will mean not only co-ordinating globally and regionally, through initiatives like the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) as well as the contributions from different donors to EU-led programmes, but also across countries, as it is not always clear how countries interpret the HDP nexus and forced displacement. Objectives may also differ with respect to the priority given to the humanitarian or development dimension as well as geographical targets.

As several initiatives and instruments are being created and developed, it is becoming clear that greater co-ordination is essential. With the emergence of new actors and initiatives by hosting societies, a reinforced co-ordination mechanism would enable a better understanding of what works best – instruments explicitly targeting forced displacement, or general policies mainstreaming the HDP nexus principles across all development co-operation initiatives. There is no clear answer on this yet, as very little is still known on current instruments, including their budgets and the importance allocated to humanitarian vs. development objectives. Clearly both are important, but a successful outcome for the HDP nexus requires that humanitarian efforts are accompanied by development objectives. Countries more focused on humanitarian responses must be balanced out by countries with a greater focus on development objectives. For this to occur there needs to be more peer-learning dialogue and more reporting, and for that reason, specialised instruments addressing forced displacement are essential, as they seem to be the only way for countries to be able to provide financial, geographic and activity reporting on addressing forced displacement.

## **3.2 What lessons can be learned so far?**

The current prevalent approach to forced displacement by donors is generally lacking a broader development perspective. By instead viewing the issue of forced displacement in developing countries from a sustainable development perspective, rather than from a narrower humanitarian forced

displacement perspective, opportunities for common solutions would be revealed. The opportunities are there, as there is now ample evidence and experience on linking forced displacement and development and the integration of forcibly displaced persons. The current view has led to missed opportunities, due to development programmes not reaching refugees. Indeed, part of the challenge is the fact that many hosting developing countries dealing with forced displacement flows are new to the issue. They are often ill-equipped with tools, experience and expertise.

These are the main lessons that transpire from the OECD Development Centre questionnaire:

### **1. A humanitarian-first approach to forced displacement continues to be pervasive**

Despite the main international policy agenda shifting towards being more development-oriented, this has not translated into specific instruments or policies in many donor countries. Most countries have an overarching humanitarian objective to their forced displacement instruments. This is most evident in department and unit names, which typically adorn titles such as humanitarian aid, security and emergency assistance, while separating out migration and development issues in other departments and units. It is also evident in the types of initiatives that are most common in forced displacement, including emerging fields such as food security, WASH and psycho-social support. It was also difficult for most countries to provide explicit and specific information on forced displacement and development initiatives (such as budgets), as they are typically mainstreamed across several humanitarian instruments, objectives and strategies, and not necessarily separated out or viewed within a silo itself. Instruments targeting forced displacement may benefit from lessons learned on migration and development policies, as well as those on the socio-economic integration of migrants. While there are important reasons to address forced displacement differently, including legal aspects and a minimum amount of prospects for development in the country of origin, separating out forced displacement from the migration and development agenda typically yields an approach limited to short-term humanitarian relief, not sustainable solutions. The approach requires careful balancing between the two.

Many countries were also unable to provide budget details on instruments targeting forced displacement, although there is hope that this may change in the future. In 2017, the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics began discussing a new purpose code to better capture ODA (Official Development Assistance)-eligible migration activities, including forced displacement in developing countries, which may increase interest by donors to better track budgets allocated to addressing forced displacement. Specific budgets for forced displacement are also difficult to identify as countries rarely have standalone instruments targeting forcibly displaced persons. Most countries do not have specific budget lines to record instruments targeting forced displacement and related expenditures rather cut across humanitarian aid, economic development, human development, climate and environment, governance, and conflict. Moreover, some countries do not always make a distinction between instruments that target forcibly displaced persons from those that target migrants more generally.

### **2. New approaches in addressing forced displacement need to be shared and evaluated**

Despite the pervasive humanitarian approach to forced displacement, a handful of countries have explicitly created instruments and initiatives aiming at incorporating more development-oriented objectives in their approach to forced displacement in developing countries, coupled with a variety of interpretations of development needs. Support ranges from skills transfers, employment generation and capacity development for hosting societies. While most of the evidence on this stems from including development objectives into humanitarian initiatives, some countries have opted for the creation of new tools from scratch, rethinking their approach on forced displacement. The approach adopted in Germany (Special Initiative on Forced Displacement) and the Netherlands (Prospects Partnership), and to a lesser extent the UK (White Paper on Forced Displacement) are unique in their own right, but together spell an effort to mainstream the objectives of the humanitarian-development nexus (HDN) and explicitly forced displacement, as a thematic intervention field on its own.

Beyond these specific instruments, occasional development-oriented initiatives have emerged as part of humanitarian packages to addressing forced displacement, but they appear to be *ad hoc* and inconsistent. They primarily take the form of training, education and employment, and tie in closely to the broader agenda on local refugee integration, training or education. Several programmes offer support for access to labour markets and public education. Other programmes offer specific training and job-creation opportunities targeted at refugees, and sometimes at hosting country residents. Other programmes explicitly focus on creating employment-generating environments. Notably for some countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, forced displacement is firmly integrated into their broader migration and development instruments, incorporating a development angle from the outset, without necessarily separating out forced displacement.

### **3. An effective approach towards addressing forced displacement requires a broad approach to development and an effective balance between short and long-term objectives**

Addressing forced displacement is not a singular policy issue. It requires multifaceted expertise and perspectives from several different angles, with a view for short- and longer-term possibilities. Moreover, balancing long-term support and short-term flexibility is difficult to maintain in contexts that can change in a matter of weeks. By addressing forced displacement within silos, support may be less nimble than what is optimal. Forced displacement contexts can change or degenerate quickly, which adheres well when administering humanitarian support. Development-oriented projects require long-term planning and may be difficult to administer in a changing landscape. On the other hand, the percentage of protracted crises are considerably high and that favours an early integration of development-oriented measures. Therefore, instruments addressing forced displacement need to become more flexible and adaptable to specific contexts, in order to fully incorporate the principles laid out in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

### **4. To fully foster the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, better reporting and more co-ordination is necessary across engaged donors**

There are a variety of approaches across development partners, which only sometimes complement each other. Moreover, emerging approaches on addressing forced displacement raise a major question as to whether new and expanded instruments match the objectives laid out in international frameworks, such as the HDP nexus, the CRRF and the GCR. Gaps and blind spots prevail in addressing forced displacement, which could be minimised with better co-ordination between and within other partner and hosting countries and with non-governmental partners. While most donors have a focus on the Syrian crisis region, the rest of the regions are dispersed across the Lake Chad basin, Cox' Bazar (Bangladesh), Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and to a much lesser extent, Venezuela. Some countries specifically target the support of women and children, while others put emphasis on generally transferring skills and increasing employability. Others focus on strengthening institutions in the hosting society. These are typically driven by the broader development objectives of donors, but also the involvement of new players, such as the private sector and new donors.

There are co-ordination mechanisms already in place, but often not with a development-oriented view or in partnership with other ministries that could help transfer capacity (labour, education). In light of several new key actors in addressing forced displacement, such as emerging donors, local governments and the private sector, more needs to be done to ensure better co-ordination. Managing development and humanitarian needs is a difficult balancing act that requires close knowledge of the local context, one which traditional partners do not always have access to.

### 3.3 Policy recommendations

Based on these lessons, here are a number of policy recommendations, which will help further leverage the shift towards more development-oriented objectives already in place and strengthen and help fulfil the global instruments and objectives of the GCR, the HDP nexus and more broadly, the GCM:

#### **1. Create platforms for peer learning on how to integrate the HDP nexus into addressing forced displacement**

Better co-ordination is required in a field of action that is new and emerging, with new actors and methods on what to do, who to target and where. Countries have a prerogative on placing more emphasis on humanitarian or development goals, and that is why co-ordination is key – to ensure that the end result is moving the HDP nexus agenda forward. This requires a better peer-learning mechanism and specific development instruments to address it, as well as a combination of fast and flexible funding on one side, and long-term planning on the other.

#### **2. Make the agenda more than a humanitarian agenda, but also a social and economic one**

Countries need to generally boost their support to more development-oriented objectives and instruments in addressing forced displacement in developing countries, which may help them reach other development-oriented objectives in the country. This should be done in tandem and in coherence with humanitarian assistance and existing instruments should be adapted accordingly.

#### **3. Cross-pollinate and leverage already existing development efforts**

Donor countries often treat forced displacement in a silo. Yet donors support hosting countries in various other ways, many of which could generally help integrate more development-oriented objectives in addressing forced displacement, while also equipping refugees with skills and fostering their integration into their hosting country. Such cross-pollination should reach beyond the donors' own support and connect with hosting country strategies, and with other partner countries, and non-governmental actors.

#### **4. Broaden the boundaries for dealing with forced displacement**

While it is important to incorporate specific budgets and objectives for forced displacement in countries, making them coherent and integrating them with other broader humanitarian and development objectives will pave the way for a wider approach to addressing forced displacement. Forced displacement is about the broader set of policies shaping the hosting country, including outside of refugee camps. Mind-sets need to shift away from the traditional approach of running camps until most refugees are resettled – that model is fading. One way to do this is by ensuring that humanitarian, development and peace actors work together in forced displacement initiatives on the ground.

#### **5. Incorporate more actors, learn from them and ensure they are at the policy table**

Several new players, notably those from the private sector and from new donor countries, are engaging more in addressing forced displacement in developing countries. Moreover, ensuring relevant actors around the policy table is fundamental. This includes broadening national policy makers involved in decision making, beyond ministries charged with justice, migration, development, foreign affairs and interior affairs, and ensuring that sectoral ministries and local governments have a voice on forced displacement matters.

### 3.4 An agenda for the way forward

The report's analysis and policy conclusions further clarify the foundations and path for future research and the need for policy dialogue on forced displacement. It argues for a greater development focus on forced displacement, but also highlights the knowledge gaps on forced displacement for which there is currently little information. The OECD Development Centre suggests the following areas of research for consideration in the future:

#### 1. Regular monitoring:

Create a monitoring framework on HDP nexus approaches, including innovative instruments that specifically address the challenges of forced displacement. This could take the shape of monitoring the implementation of the GCR or the DAC's recommendations on the HDN with respect to forced displacement. The survey developed for this project could become a recurrent tool, completed by countries regularly, while expanding the breadth of countries that have access to it. The monitoring would provide longitudinal data to assess how instruments addressing forced displacement are evolving, highlight areas of the GCR that need more support and provide the impetus to improve the tracking of resources allocated to forced displacement.

#### 2. Policy dialogue and co-ordination mechanisms:

Generate cross-country dialogue and mutual learning specifically on lessons learned from incorporating more development objectives into addressing forced displacement. This could be done within already existing platforms created through the GCR, the GRF, regional support platforms and 3RP conferences. The OECD Development Centre could also make forced displacement a recurring and pillar theme of its annual Policy Dialogue on Migration and Development (PDMD).

#### 3. Research and analysis:

- a. More in-depth research on understanding what circumstances and what type of programmes determine whether initiatives are implemented through international and multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations or through national actors, such as development agencies.
- b. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the GRF pledges by countries, in terms of their likelihood of contributing to long-term vs. short-term development objectives;
- c. A comprehensive review of how countries address forced displacement in developing countries according to forced displacement groups (IDPs, asylum-seekers, refugees, hosting communities); sharing of evaluation, lessons learnt and best practices regarding innovative development instruments that specifically address forced displacement;
- d. A deeper quantitative dive into ODA and the DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), and specifically an investigation on how budgets addressing forced displacement with long-term development objectives in developing countries can be more systematically tracked;
- e. A deep dive and comparative analysis between more comprehensive development strategies and instruments specifically addressing the HDP nexus and forced displacement;
- f. Research on how forced displacement is specifically communicated and perceived by national instruments and policy, in relation to other migration flows and broader development objectives. In particular, an analysis on identifying what the objectives

are regarding addressing forced displacement, by observing how it is communicated in policy documents, is warranted.

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