2. Climate change adaptation and nature-based solutions

As part of Germany’s broader efforts to strengthen climate action (Chapter 1), the federal government is scaling up its engagement on climate change adaptation across all government levels. More particularly, it is working on a Federal Climate Adaptation Act, which is meant to guide the federal government and federal states in their joint implementation of the national adaptation strategy, including measurable goals. This chapter assesses Germany’s ongoing efforts and future plans in this regard.

At the same time, the federal government has initiated an ambitious programme to foster investments in nature-based solutions (NbS) through the Federal Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity (Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher Klimaschutz, ANK). The EUR 4 billion action plan could become a game changer and contribute massively to enhancing natural climate protection.

Germany is breaking new ground in both areas. Indeed, the outcomes of this experience could provide many interesting lessons and learning opportunities for other OECD countries and partners. By selecting adaptation and NbS as the focus of its fourth OECD Environmental Performance Review, Germany seeks an initial review of ongoing and planned engagements. At the same time, it hopes to inspire other countries to set out in similar directions.

In Germany, average temperature has increased faster than the global average. Annual mean temperatures rose by 1.2°C between 1979 and 2021, as compared to an average global temperature increase of 0.9°C (Figure 2.1). Since 1951, the number of hot days (at least 30°C) has more than doubled in terms of surface area mean from approximately four days to ten days per year (UBA, 2019[1]). Meanwhile, ice days have become more infrequent during the past 60 years. Climate change will drive temperature increases in the future.

Annual mean precipitation in terms of surface area increased by 8.7% between 1881 and 2020 (DWD, 2022[2]). Shifts in precipitation patterns vary distinctly by season and geographic location. While mean precipitation has remained predominantly unchanged during the summer months, mean surface area precipitation levels have increased by an average of 25% during the winter since 1881 (DWD, 2022[2]).

Rising temperatures and changes in average precipitation have contributed to the occurrence and the intensity of a number of extreme weather events. These, in turn, have caused significant loss and damage to the German population, its economy and ecosystems.

Floods are a particularly significant climate-related risk in Germany. Extreme flood events – notably in 2013, 2017 and 2021 – are estimated to have exceeded the once-in-400-years return mark for a very low likelihood, high impact flood (Mohr et al., 2022[3]). Between 2000 and 2021, flash floods, floods and extreme precipitation caused 230 fatalities and more than EUR 71 billion in total damages (Prognos, 2022[4]), with the 2021 floods being the most devastating disaster in Germany’s post-war period (Box 2.1). About 9% and 7% of Germany’s built-up and cropland areas, respectively, are considerably exposed to a 100-year return flood (Figure 2.2). These averages mask stark regional differences. For example, in the harbour city of Bremen, more than 40% of the population are exposed to a 100-year return flood. About 3.2 million people live in coastal areas at risk of flooding (UBA, 2021[5]).

In addition to floods, Germany is increasingly exposed to heat stress. The number of heat stress days increased by about 6% between 1981 and 20101. Heatwaves regularly cause high numbers of casualties. Between 2018 and 2020, Germany recorded nearly 20 000 heat-related deaths, affecting especially elderly people (Figure 2.3). Heatwaves also lead to disruptions in infrastructure services such as rail routes and affect the capacity to use cool water in power plants (UBA, 2021[5]).

Droughts are closely related to heatwaves. The 2022 drought was the worst on record for 500 years, causing water levels on the Rhine River to decrease up to 40 centimetres (cm). This, in turn, induced ship freight disruptions, which trickled through Germany’s broader supply chain structure (Hasselbach, 2022[8]). The previous droughts of 2018 and 2019 induced agricultural yield losses of EUR 9.9 billion and 11.4 billion,2 respectively (Prognos, 2022[9]). As a result of increasing temperatures and changing precipitation patterns (Figure 2.1), periods of extended and intensive droughts have been on the rise. Soil moisture in croplands, which can have a significant impact on plant growth and agricultural yields, decreased by 4% between 2017 and 2021 compared to the reference period of 1981-2010 (Maes, M. et al., 2022[10]). While cropland in all of Germany is becoming drier, eastern Germany and the Rhine-Main area are particularly affected (Figure 2.4). More frequent dry summers mean the need for irrigation in agriculture will increase.

Sea-level rise and storms also represent an important risk. Mean sea levels rose by about 15-20 cm since 1921, in line with global projections of sea-level rise of 40 cm to 2 m by 2100 (UBA, 2021[11]). This poses a high risk for the 3.2 million people (about 4% of the population) that live in areas at risk of coastal flooding. It also poses high risk for assets in the flood risk zone, estimated at EUR 46 billion (gross value added is EUR 8.3 billion), and approximately 85 000 jobs (UBA, 2021[5]). Related to that, Germany is exposed to storms, which affect the coastlines most strongly. At present, 25% of the German population and 26% of built-up area are exposed to storms (wind gust speed > 28.6 meter/second), compared to 5% and 9%, respectively, on average among OECD countries (OECD, 2022[12]). Whether climate change will cause storms to occur more frequently or more intensively in Germany is not clear (Prognos, 2022[13]).

Over the last two decades, Germany recorded major economic losses from extreme weather events compared to other European countries (Figure 2.5). The flash floods of 2021, combined with the drought events in 2018 and 2019, caused a total estimated damage of around EUR 80.5 billion alone (Prognos, 2022[14]). On average and since 2005, such damages have amounted to only 0.12% of Germany’s gross domestic product (GDP) annually (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2022[15]). However, this is expected to change significantly. By 2050, EUR 280-900 billion in damages are expected from the impacts of extreme weather events3 (Flaute, Reuschel and Stöver, 2022[16]). Without adaptation investments, this figure would translate to losses of up to 1.8% of annual GDP.

Climate impacts may also propagate across systems not directly affected. For instance, in 2018, transportation on the Rhine was down 27% year on year due to low water levels (Section 1.1.9). Consequently, industrial production in Germany fell by 1.5%, and the production of chemicals and pharmaceuticals dropped by 10% for three months (McKinsey, 2020[17]; Globalia Logistics Network, 2022[18]). This further exacerbated supply chain bottlenecks, impeding the post-pandemic rebound of industrial production (OECD, forthcoming[19]). Climate impacts also have cascading socio-economic effects. Inequality is expected to increase as a result of increasing prices caused, for instance, by climate-related supply chain disruptions and yield losses in agriculture, as well as higher unemployment rates (Flaute, Reuschel and Stöver, 2022[16]).

As an export country, Germany relies heavily on imported raw materials, intermediary products, sales markets and international transport infrastructure. Many of Germany’s trading partners such as the People’s Republic of China are vulnerable to climate change. The 2011 flood in Thailand caused disruption to the automotive industry, resulting in German car manufacturers temporarily closing their plants or reduce production. The costs of these disruptions to the German automotive industry, and to others around the world, were estimated at USD 45 billion (UBA, 2021[5]). Germany shows growing awareness and built a good understanding of its exposure to climate risks through global supply chains. To that end, it assessed particularly vulnerable products with a high share of imports and exports from and to climate-vulnerable countries (UBA, 2021[5]). A broader diversification of value chains could improve the resilience of Germany’s economy. The EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, including sustainability reporting standards, could help increase data availability and transparency of companies’ climate risks. It could also incentivise companies to adapt their strategic planning and operations to the risks they face (EU Council, 2022[20]).

Assessing climate risks and their expected change over time and across different jurisdictions is crucial to identify areas where adaptation efforts are most urgently needed. Climate risk is composed of the likelihood of a climate hazards to occur, as well as exposure and vulnerability to those hazards.

Overall, Germany has improved and developed a good understanding of climate risks. The 2021 comprehensive national climate risk assessment (Klimawirkungs- und Risikoanalyse – KWRA (UBA, 2021[5]) provides an integrated assessment of projected regionalised climate risks and how they affect key sectors, including land, water, infrastructure, economy and health and assesses adaptive capacity with regard to about 50 climate impacts as basis for the development of targeted adaptation measures. The KWRA selectively collates, processes and evaluates existing research results with regard to the significance of individual climate risks in a joint, consensus-oriented process. It maps out average temperature, and average and extreme precipitation changes, and identifies hot spots of areas most prone to climate hazards. The hazards covered by the KWRA include sea-level rise, heatwaves, droughts, wildfires, floods and storms. A national flood hazard map has been developed in addition to the KWRA (BfG, 2019[21]). In response to the 2021 flood disaster, the federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy is also working on nationwide, modelling-based extreme precipitation hazard maps (BMI & BMF, 2022[22]). Furthermore, the hazard distribution of storms has been calculated for 110 weather station locations. While different agencies have developed climate risk maps (e.g. German Weather Service, BfG and the Länder), Germany has difficulties synthesising them at the national level as they are not always comprehensive or transparent, and can be misleading.

The KWRA includes some information on hazard exposure.4 For flash floods, for example, it identifies that lower settlements, buildings on slopes or swales where water accumulates are particularly at risk. The same is true for coastal sections and roads close to rivers at risk of flooding (UBA, 2021[5]). For coastal floods, the KWRA identifies the number of people, as well as settlement and transport areas in high flood-risk zones. In its national flood risk map, Germany conducts geographical assessments based on data developed by each Land of the number of people exposed, and type of economic activity or nature conservation area (BfG, 2019[21]). Despite these considerable improvements over time, the 2021 floods largely exceeded model predictions. It would be useful to model further worst-case scenarios accounting for now known risk factors if possible, such as the entanglement of bridges by flotsam. This could also include a detailed analysis of exposure and vulnerability of critical infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, mobile phone masts, gas, electricity, and water supply and railways).

Densely populated urban areas are especially exposed to heat stress (UBA, 2021[5]). The KRWA, however, does not assess exposure to heat stress of buildings and critical infrastructure. For droughts, water levels are projected for Germany’s major rivers, inferring possible shipping load capacity. Exposure to forest fire risk (e.g. in wildland-urban interfaces) has not been evaluated to date. To develop targeted adaptation measures, it will be valuable to identify exposed groups and assets for the most important risks from all climate hazards of concern in Germany.

Besides exposure, vulnerability is a key indicator for where adaptation action is most urgently needed. The KRWA identifies particularly vulnerable sectors, ecosystems, species, assets or people for some climate hazards but not for all. It has not identified groups in society that are especially vulnerable to a certain climate impact and where these intersect with climate-hazard hotspots. While the KWRA has identified vulnerability to heat stress, it ignores floods or storms. The impacts of climate change on different social groups are, however, increasingly researched, including with support from government funds (Flaute, Reuschel and Stöver, 2022[16]). Identifying the location of high climate risks and of those exposed to them is key to protecting vulnerable groups. The federal government is developing more information on climate vulnerability with the preparation of “Regional information for climate action” (RegIKlim).

Awareness is growing of the cascading impacts that climate extreme events can trigger. The KWRA assesses cascading impact chains and how climate risks influence each other. It also identifies cross connections between all climate risks analysed. For instance, nuclear and coal energy depend on the availability of cooling water, which can be limited during droughts (UBA, 2020[23]).

Subnational climate risk assessments that downscale climate change projection models to the regional and municipal levels are essential to inform targeted adaptation measures at the local and regional levels. While 9 out of 16 Länder have developed downscaled climate change projections, comprehensive Land-level climate risk assessments are still scarce. Regional assessments tend to be less detailed than their national counterpart. Germany will need to scale up efforts to ensure country-wide coverage of local risk assessments.

To date, 13 Länder conducted regional projections of average annual temperature and precipitation. Nine Länder have developed state-level climate risk assessments. The state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) is a frontrunner in that regard. In support of implementing the Climate Adaptation Law in NRW, the state developed an online interactive climate atlas that maps different observed hazards (Klimaatlas, 2023[24]). The state of Hesse developed KLIMPRAX, a map identifying municipalities at risk from heavy rainfall (Hessen, 2016[25]). For its part, the state of Saxony-Anhalt developed hazard risk maps for heavy rain and hail (Saxon State Chancellery, 2022[26]). Each Land develops flood risk assessments in line with the EU Floods Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC). However, many Länder often fail to assess the frequency and intensity of other hazards such as heatwaves, droughts or wildfires.

The Länder flood risk assessments have established a good understanding of flood exposure. For example, they include exposure variables (i.e. those collated at the national level) (Figure 2.6). However, exposure assessments of other hazards such as droughts or wildfires are not always conducted. The climate atlas of NRW serves as a positive example. It maps hazard risk in relation to cropland (vulnerable to drought) and population density (Klimaatlas, 2023[24]). Overall, exposure assessments to other hazards are inconsistent across the Länder that do have climate hazard information.

Some Länder evaluate the vulnerability of individual sectors. For comprehensive vulnerability assessments, the city of Berlin – which also has the status of a federal state – is exemplary. The city assesses the vulnerability of nine sectors to the impacts of climate change by analysing how they have been affected in the past and which groups or assets are most at risk (UBA, 2016[27]). One example is Berlin’s sewage system, which due to its age, is at risk of flooding from heavy rain. In addition, Berlin’s climate change management strategy is based on an in-depth analysis of the ecological, economic and social aspects of climate vulnerability. This includes indirect impact such as climate refugees, negative effects on international trade and tourism, and damage to European energy grids (King, 2022[28]).

At the local level, some frontrunner cities have conducted comprehensive city-wide assessments. For example, the metropolitan region of Stuttgart assesses the vulnerability of its citizens to climate risks based on age, health status, access to green areas and so on. By analysing the vulnerability of ecosystems, such as the capacity of forest types to survive projected heat stress, it identifies hotspots for urgent adaptation action (Verband Region Stuttgart, 2015[29]). This type of local analysis could be scaled up to inform more comprehensive climate risk assessments at Länder level. However, local risk assessments are scarce due to limited resources of cities and municipalities.

With the expansion of an information system on regional climate risks (Regionale Informationen zum Klimahandeln – RegIKlim), which is set to include local-scale vulnerability data, the federal government is increasing its understanding of climate vulnerability. Other OECD countries, such as Chile and Greece, could serve as examples in the development of climate risk maps. Such maps identify the socio-economic vulnerability of population groups at municipal or household levels across some or all of countries’ most exposed territories. Chile, for instance, has developed a climate risk atlas in which it assesses socio-economic vulnerability indicators to 52 climate risks for each municipality (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, 2020[30]). Indicators include proportion of children and elderly, income poverty, housing conditions and number of health facilities.

Germany needs to ensure nationwide coverage of localised climate risk assessments, a process in which the Länder play a key role. Cities and municipalities are well placed to develop comprehensive assessments but need technical and financial support. It is especially important to have coverage in climate risk exposed municipalities. In France, for instance, the Territorial Organisation of the Republic (NOTRe) law imposes several requirements on municipalities with more than 20 000 inhabitants. They must assess the climate vulnerability of their territory and develop a strategy and action programme with quantified objectives, including on adaptation, including a monitoring and evaluation system to assess progress (Climate-ADAPT, 2021[31]). In Germany, according to the Basic Law, the federal government cannot oblige cities and municipalities to assess local climate risks. However, it could mandate the Länder to do so. Existing federal support programmes could be extended; however, Länder would also need to play a more active role in supporting local authorities in need. Regular stock-takes by the federal government and the Länder of local climate risk assessments would help target efforts more effectively.

To date, Germany has a broad range of different indicators, criteria and thresholds to analyse climate-related hazards and related risks. Federal agencies should pursue efforts to encourage use of common methods and data standard to enhance comparability and possibilities for aggregation. This could be similar to what the coalition agreement sets out in terms of unifying standards for land-level flood and extreme precipitation risk maps.

Communicating results of climate risk assessments is critical to trigger action. It allows relevant stakeholders to determine whether and to what extent their assets and activities are affected by climate change and to inform targeted measures to address them.

To date, climate risk information sits within different reports and websites across different government agencies at national and subnational level. Germany communicates results from climate risk assessments primarily through the KWRA, as well as its monitoring reports, which are publicly accessible on line. Land-level climate impact and risk assessments are published on Land-specific websites and collated on the UBA webpage. More detailed information and maps on some climate risk information is available on specific websites such as the German Weather Service. Information and maps on exposure and vulnerability in relation to the affected system examined are available at the Federal Institute for Building, Urban and Spatial Research (BBSR), the Federal Statistical Office or in different sectors and Länder.

The DAS Basic Service for Climate and Water (Basisdienst Klima und Wasser) and the KliVO portal provide general access to information on climate risk. Through the KliVO portal, for example, the Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUV) provides broad information and services related to climate change to local governments, and federal and state administrations (BMUV, 2022[32]). Regional climate portals have also been established for individual or groups of Länder. The states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, for example, have created their own regional climate information system (ReKis). These collate information on regional climate impacts, geared towards the requirements of municipal actors and administration (ReKIS, 2022[33]). The Centre for Climate Adaptation (Zentrum KlimaAnpassung, ZKA) provides a one-stop shop for information on climate adaptation. While these platforms provide a lot of useful information, they do not allow for user-friendly and easy-access maps of observed and projected climate hazards, or vulnerabilities and exposure. With easier and more user-friendly access to such information, targeted action could be easier to identify. Municipalities and businesses, and especially groups vulnerable to climate impacts, must be better informed and supported. An information gateway such as the research project RegKlim, which will act as a component for risk monitoring, could help address this issue (RegIKlim, 2021[34]).

Moreover, to date, it is impossible to assess to what extent climate risk information triggers relevant players to act. For example, evaluations of the 2021 flood catastrophe point to actors not being sufficiently informed about risk exposure. Early warnings about an imminent flood were also largely ignored and insufficiently communicated. Likewise, awareness and use of early warning systems for health-related risks is still low (WIdO, 2021[35]), highlighting major weaknesses in disaster management. With regards to health impacts, about a third of German citizens report they are insufficiently informed about their risk (WIdO, 2021[35]). To strengthen awareness, citizens must be better informed about the individual climate risks to which they are exposed and vulnerable. Interactive online platforms could allow users to view their exposure to hazards and offer guidelines on how to prepare and react to them.

Germany has progressively developed its adaptation policy framework over the past decade. The foundations were laid in the 2008 German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change (Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie – DAS), which continues to serve as the overarching policy framework.

The DAS lays out a strategy for the federal government’s engagement on adaptation and provides guidance for action to all relevant stakeholders (Bundesregierung, 2008[36]). The DAS intends to i) improve the available knowledge base to better define and communicate opportunities and risks; ii) create transparency and participation by communication and dialogue, as well as support stakeholders in decision making by providing information; iii) raise the awareness of stakeholders and that of the public regarding climate change adaptation; iv) develop strategies to tackle uncertainty factors; and v) identify ways to co-ordinate and define responsibilities and implement actions (Bundesregierung, 2008[36]).

The coalition government seeks to mark a step change in Germany’s adaptation engagement. In its Immediate Action Programme for Climate Change Adaptation (Sofortprogramm Klimaanpassung), it will develop a new climate adaptation strategy to steer action in all sectors at all governance levels. The strategy will be supported by a federal law on climate change adaptation (Klimaanpassungsgesetz) and include concrete, measurable targets in all action areas. In addition, the coalition agreement aims to create a coherent, nationwide funding mechanism for adaptation, jointly managed by federal and Länder levels in support of municipal adaptation investments (BMUV, 2022[37]). The law aims to give adaptation a legal basis as was done for climate mitigation through the Federal Climate Action Act 2021 (Klimaschutzgesetz) (Section 1.1.3).

Responsibility for climate change adaptation is shared between the federal, Länder and local levels; provisions are defined in the Basic Law of Germany (Grundgesetz). This shared responsibility led to the creation of a complex landscape of roles related to planning, implementing and financing adaptation measures (Figure 2.7).

While the federal agencies co-ordinate and steer national policies on adaptation, the Länder and municipalities build climate resilience. The Länder can legislate and regulate, requiring local governments to implement adaptation action (adelphi and Climate Chance, 2021[38]). The BMUV can only implement adaptation actions in areas that fall under federal control (e.g. federal properties and transport networks).

The federal government has developed many effective mechanisms to steer subnational government action in adaptation. The BMUV, in collaboration with the UBA, has provided technical support and policy recommendations (GIZ, 2014[39]). The federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN) provides scientific and administrative support for conservation and landscape management. The Zukunft-Umwelt-Gesellschaft (ZUG), a federally owned company, supports implementation and management of BMUV national funding programmes and projects. To assist Länder in formulating their adaptation policy and action, the federal state provides data, technical support and ad hoc financial instruments. Services include the KliVO portal (Section 2.1.2); the KomPass Competence Centre of the UBA; and the Expert Dialogue on Climate Impacts (Fachgespräch Klimafolgen) facilitated by the UBA; and the Guidelines for Climate Impact and Vulnerability Assessments.

Germany has created several vertical co-ordination platforms to enhance communication and co-operation. The Standing Committee for Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts (Ständiger Ausschuss zur Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels, StA AFK) has been in place since 2009. It encourages collaboration and exchange between the federal and Länder levels (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). In 2017, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change in the Health Sector was created, bringing together representatives from the federal government and Länder. The working group developed recommendations on how to design regional heat action plans (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). The working group has been transformed into a permanent body, facilitating inter-institutional dialogue on health and climate change. In addition, the federal government and the Länder developed the National Flood Protection Programme (NHWSP). This sets out urgent flood protection measures supra-regionally, contributing to adaptation measures (BMUV, n.d.[41]).

To complement the BMUV’s co-ordination role, different federal ministries contribute to adaptation action plans in six cluster areas (water, infrastructure, land, human health, economy, spatial planning and civil protection), as well as a cross-cutting cluster (Table 2.1). In addition, the Interministerial Working Group for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework co-ordinates Germany’s national disaster risk management framework (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). The country’s international collaboration efforts on adaptation at the ministerial level are mainly led by the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) and its implementation agencies (Section 2.4.3).

The Interministerial Working Group on Climate Change Adaptation (IMAA) has helped raise awareness, co-ordinate action and increase support for federal adaptation initiatives. The IMAA was established in 2009 under the leadership of the BMUV to facilitate dialogue on adaptation policy and to drive further sectoral action. It is composed of representatives of almost all federal ministries and meets at least twice a year to develop synergy in federal adaptation policies and actions. Evaluations found that participating ministries often defend their sectoral priorities in the IMAA and relegate adaptation priorities where they go against departmental interests (Radtke, Hustedt and Klinnert, 2016[42]). Furthermore, the evaluation of the DAS (Section 2.2.5.) indicated that IMAA work is regarded as overly formal. Deeper collaboration is necessary to ensure practical co-operation among ministries (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]).

Despite the well-structured sectoral responsibilities, the actual integration of adaptation into the work of sectoral ministries has been piecemeal (Section 2.2.4). Many ministries assign adaptation responsibilities to at least one department or have a specific thematic unit working on adaptation. However, in other ministries, such units are missing (UBA, 2019[43]). Overall, there is room for moving beyond dialogue to collaborate jointly and accelerate adaptation action in sectoral policies. The new adaptation strategy provides an opportunity to deepen sectoral adaptation engagement, especially by developing targets.

Given that subnational adaptation is voluntary rather than mandatory, adaptation engagement varies significantly across the Länder. Climate risk assessment, as well as adaptation policy and implementation, all take heterogenous approaches.

The DAS encourages Länder to develop their own adaptation strategies. These should consider regional specificities and ensure the federal and Länder levels share implementation of adaptation measures (King, 2022[28]). All Länder have developed strategies or recommendations on adaptation to climate change. The breadth of these strategies, however, varies greatly. Similar to the federal level, most Länder follow the sector-specific structure of the DAS, adjusting the sectors where adaptation measures are necessary based on regional needs. Overall, most strategies are loosely connected to sectoral actions (King, 2022[28]). Different adaptation strategies are coupled with varying levels of institutional co-ordination at the Land level. While working groups, councils or technical units can facilitate adaptation action, many Länder do not have such mechanisms (King, 2022[28]).

The Land level is progressively establishing legal mandates for adaptation, an encouraging sign for strengthening adaptation at subnational level. The state of NRW adopted the first Land-level Climate Change Adaptation Act in Germany in July 2021 (NRW, 2021[44]). The law mandates public authorities to consider climate impacts and adaptation in all planning and decision-making processes (NRW, 2021[44]). In addition, the law sets out the need to update the adaptation strategy, incorporating the ongoing scientific climate impact and risk assessment framework (NRW, 2021[44]). The state of Baden-Württemberg adopted a new Climate Change Action Act in 2023, covering mitigation and adaptation.

In the absence of legal requirements for adaptation action or reporting, a definitive understanding of local-level engagement is not possible, but it appears to be heterogeneous across the country. Only about one-third of German municipalities have an adaptation plan (King, 2022[28]). Based on an UBA survey, municipalities were most likely to take adaptation action if they have directly experienced extreme weather events and when political leaders supported adaptation action. However, a third of surveyed municipalities have not engaged in adaptation at all (UBA, 2019[45]). Other studies estimate that only about a third of German cities have adaptation policies in place, with medium and small cities less likely to have developed one (Otto et al., 2021[46]; King, 2022[28]). Certain German cities started taking adaptation measures several decades ago, whereas others are only now considering them. This leads to an uneven level of climate preparedness and may reinforce vulnerabilities to climate risks. Highly vulnerable communities may not necessarily be best placed or supported by their respective Land to build climate resilience.

Under the adaptation policy framework, the Länder are expected to provide funding, technical support, data and guidance for adaptation action at the local level. Several, but not all, Länder support municipalities with capacity building and/or information centres on climate change and adaptation. For example, the state of Bavaria supports municipalities via several instruments, including best practice guides on municipal adaptation (StMUV, 2021[47]); capacity building instruments, such as the Centre for Sustainable Community Development (Zentrum für Nachhaltige Kommunalentwicklung); and a complex array of funding opportunities. In the state of Hesse, municipalities can apply for funding implementation of adaptation measures via the Climate Funding Programme (Förderung Klimarichtlinie) for up to EUR 250 000 per municipality (Hessen, n.a.[48]). In addition, Hesse supports municipalities via the capacity building and information services of the Special Centre on Climate Change and Adaptation (Fachzentrum Klimawandel und Anpassung) (HLNUG, n.d.[49]).

The Federal Ministry for Housing, Urban Development and Building (Bundesministerium für Wohnen, Stadtentwicklung und Bauwesen, BMWSB) supports municipalities in adapting to climate change and climate protection with various funding programmes. For example, within its urban development programmes, municipalities are required to implement climate protection and adaptation measures in order to receive financial support. The Federal Programme on Adaptation of Urban Areas to Climate Change promotes, among others, climate-adapted development of parks and green spaces, unsealing of areas, measures for rainwater management, greening of open and traffic areas, and strengthening of biodiversity. The funded projects must demonstrate high quality in terms of their energy effects and adaptation to climate change. The Urban Energy Redevelopment – Climate Protection and Climate Adaptation in Neighbourhoods programme provides loans and reduced interest rates for green infrastructure, heating and cooling supply, energy-efficient wastewater disposal, and climate-friendly mobility.

While many local authorities engage in climate adaptation actions, several barriers make it challenging to scale them up. The UBA survey reveals that a lack of resources for preparation (55%) and implementation (49%) are the most important barriers to adaptation (UBA, 2019[45]). Around a third of surveyed municipalities had no dedicated staff focusing on adaptation issues. In addition, lack of experience, lack of good quality data and the unwillingness of municipal leaders to take adaptation action have equally inhibited progress. Several federal initiatives have sought to help bridge the local capacity gap to increase adaptation engagement (Box 2.2). While these initiatives contribute to raising awareness and encourage local capacity building, they may only reach local actors already committed to adaptation action. With a view to leaving no one behind, the Immediate Action Programme for Climate Adaptation (Sofortprogramm Klimaanpassung) could therefore provide more targeted support for lagging municipalities. The Federal Climate Change Act is an opportunity to manifest support for municipalities, where it is most needed. Furthermore, through innovative finance instruments, municipalities could be encouraged to jointly invest in adaptation measures that cross municipal borders. For highly climate-vulnerable municipalities, with limited adaptation capacities, the federal government could encourage Länder to play a stronger role through co-financing and implementation support. Co-funding instruments could lead subnational governments to accelerate action, and perhaps also result in sectoral investments in adaptation.

The need for integrating adaptation into sectoral strategies has been recognised in many areas. The agriculture, water and forestry sectors have been among the areas where adaptation has been streamlined in sectoral policies. Adaptation is considered in the Arable Farming Strategy 2035, the Future of Agriculture policy paper (Zukunft Landwirtschaft) and the BMEL’s agenda for adaptation in the agriculture, forest, fishery and aquaculture sectors (BMEL, 2021[51]). The Arable Farming Strategy 2035 acknowledges the need for region-specific strategies throughout Germany, but they have yet to be developed. (BMEL, 2021[52]). The Forest Strategy 2050 makes climate change adaptation a central component. It sets forest conversion plans for the 2.85 million hectares (ha) of forest that are threatened by climate-induced droughts (BMEL, 2021[53]).

Germany’s disaster risk reduction frameworks also increasingly consider climate change adaptation at the strategic level (Bundesregierung, 2022[54]) as does the tourism sector. The new work programme “Making Sustainable Tourism Competitive”, for example, recognises the need for tailor-made adaptation measures (BMWK, 2022[55]). It also foresees the development of a climate information system with indicators and an interactive mapping tool of past and future changes in climate (BMWK, 2022[55]).

While integration of adaptation at the strategic level is encouraging, the implementation of actual actions has remained more piecemeal. The DAS Adaptation Action Plans (APAs) clearly define responsibilities for implementation of each measure. However, although the third APA (APA III) was published in 2020, APAs have only been partially implemented. Of 147 measures identified in the previous APA, about three-quarters have been implemented (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). While the APA specifies funding for certain measures in the action plan, this is not always the case. Funding remains undetermined for about 80% of the measures within APA III. A systematic review of adaptation integration into different sectors, respective funding levels and impacts could help Germany identify gaps. Germany’s Council of Experts on Climate Change (Expertenrat für Klimafragen), for example, has a mandate to assess annual GHG emissions trends and the effectiveness of measures taken under the Federal Climate Change Act. It could be expanded to monitor sectoral mainstreaming of adaptation.

The federal government has worked to reinforce adaptation considerations in spatial and urban development, infrastructure investments as well as regulatory measures to promote the integration of adaptation into all key investments and economic activities. Climate adaptation has been integrated into federal and state urban development funding requirements. Each urban development investment must have a climate mitigation or adaptation element to be eligible for funding. Furthermore, the Federal Programme on Adaptation of Urban Areas to Climate Change supports cities in climate-resilient development. The programme supports around 300 projects, including the climate-adapted development of parks and green spaces, the unsealing of surfaces, storm water management measures, the greening of open spaces and traffic areas, and the strengthening of biodiversity.

In addition, Germany’s Environmental Impact Assessment Act requires consideration of the vulnerability of federal infrastructure investments (such as federal railways, roads, buildings) to climate change. Guidelines are available to help project evaluators in their work. The Federal Spatial Planning Instrument for Flood Protection (BRPH) established nationwide regulations on water and flood risk management, as well as development of settlements, transport and energy infrastructure. Current and future flood plains and retention areas have to be kept free or reclaimed, banning any new development in these areas (BMWSB, 2021[56]). The BRPH ensured the nationwide harmonisation of spatial planning standards. Proposed settlements must consider impacts of climate change on flood events. Such instruments can greatly foster climate resilience in new developments. However, appropriate monitoring and enforcement – such as linking compensation for loss and damage of assets to the integration of climate risk-proofing measures – are important to ensure their effectiveness.

While efforts are underway to understand climate risks and impacts at sectoral level, there is further room to plan and implement adaptation measures strategically. The expert network of the federal Ministry of Transport conducted several research projects to assess climate risks for transport infrastructure. However, adaptation measures addressing these risks are yet to follow. The experience of the Action Plan Low Water Rhine (Aktionsplan Niedrigwasser Rhein) could be instructive. The plan was released after the 2018 drought caused low water on the River Rhine and blocked transport on a major shipping route (Section 1.1.9). Despite the action plan, the drought in August 2022 caused continued difficulties on the Rhine, forcing ships to lighten their cargo, delaying deliveries and increasing freight cost (Muller, 2022[57]). The experience in the River Rhine shows that strategies and response measures to address climate risks and impacts often follow already observed climate impacts, instead of originating from forward planning.

Measuring progress on adaptation policies is vital to understand whether they contribute effectively to enhancing climate resilience. Findings can inform and improve policy development, as well as strengthen accountability. The federal government recognises the need to measure progress in implementing adaptation policies and regularly releases monitoring and evaluation reports to this end. The UBA publishes monitoring reports every four years with the latest report released in 2019 (UBA, 2019[1]).

Through the iterative process of publishing regular monitoring reports, Germany has improved the array and coverage of monitoring indicators. The monitoring reports summarise observed climate variability and extreme events and impacts (e.g. number of hot days and heat-related deaths) and discuss implementation of selected adaptation measures. Compared to the 2015 Monitoring Report, the 2019 edition made progress in the variety of indicators and ensuring that they provide information covering the entire country. However, the report does not analyse how these measures influence trends observed in climate impacts. In some cases, longer time series are required to draw statistically significant concluding statements, such as in the case of heavy precipitation events.

The federal government recognises the need to evaluate progress in implementing adaptation policies as to assess whether implemented actions have been effective in reducing climate risk. For the most recent DAS evaluation, Germany developed the “impact model” (Wirkungsmodell). This examined whether measures and instruments in the DAS are suitable for achieving its overall goal to reduce climate risks and increase resilience of natural, societal and economic systems (UBA, 2019[43]). Germany’s DAS evaluation has, however, predominantly been descriptive, providing limited understanding of which actions work – or not – in building resilience. Further development and use of the impact model could enhance the usefulness of adaptation measurement, going beyond tracking implementation and building a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of implemented actions. For example, it could help users better understand links between implemented adaptation measures and climate impacts; and apply the impact evaluation to an increasing number of measures.

To reinforce its ability to understand progress in climate resilience building, Germany is becoming one of a few leading countries in the OECD engaged in identifying measurable, sector-specific targets on adaptation, on the basis of indicators. The new adaptation law through its dedicated adaptation strategy, should integrate sector-specific measurable targets, verifiable actions and cyclical interventions that enable transparent adaptation monitoring, similar to the Federal Climate Change Act (BMUV, 2022[37]). Ministries are currently developing adaptation indicators and targets. With the guidance of the IMAA, goals are developed in the water, infrastructure, land, human health, economy, spatial planning and civil protection, as well as a cross-cutting cluster. While this is a complex task, indicators and measurable targets will allow Germany to better gauge progress in the implementation of adaptation policy, and enhance transparency and accountability. It is encouraging to see that Germany has started taking up this challenge through a broad-based consultation process, involving all sectors. Germany is breaking new ground in this area, an exercise that will be relevant for other OECD countries. Currently, seven OECD countries – Finland, Greece, Japan, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom – have a legislated mandate to report progress on implementation of adaptation set out in their national adaptation strategies and/or plans (OECD, forthcoming[58]). Legal frameworks can also enhance the goal setting, implementation and monitoring processes (Box 2.3).

In light of past observed and projected impacts of climate extreme events, Germany’s needs for adaptation funding are important and will grow significantly in the future. Given the mosaic of adaptation funding sources available among different entities across the government, it is difficult to assess the funding gap. Germany has mobilised significant federal resources for compensating for loss and damage in response to extreme events. It should consider leveraging these resources for greater ex ante protection from the impacts of extreme climate events.

In line with Germany’s federal system, those in charge of implementing adaptation actions – subnational governments and sectoral agencies at different government levels – are expected to fund investments. In addition to ex post disaster assistance, the federal government can only provide regular adaptation funding to subnational levels via “joint tasks” (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) set out in the German Basic Law. There are two such joint tasks, namely the Joint Task for the “Improvement of Agricultural Structures and Coastal Protection” (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe “Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und des Küstenschutzes”, GAK) and the Joint Task for “Improving Regional Economic Structures” (GemeinschaftsaufgabeVerbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur”, GRW). Commensurate with its role, the federal level finances adaptation lighthouse projects and measures linked to its facilitation role, such as the climate risk assessment, and the knowledge provision and capacity support programmes (e.g. ZKA, KliVO portal) (Section 2.2.3).

Länder do not have dedicated adaptation funds. To fund adaptation actions, some regions, cities and municipalities have made use of federal aid such as the Urban Development Support Programme or the BMUV Support Programme for Adaptation to Climate Change (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). Federal assistance is also provided through the Forest Climate Fund (under the GAK), part of which is dedicated to financing adaptation measures. The federal budget for water management of EUR 420 million (co-) finances flood protection investments, such as restoration of watercourses and floodplains. Länder can complement these federal sources with EU-level funding, such as at the European Social Fund (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]).

For municipalities, the funding landscape becomes complex to navigate. In addition to the multiple federal and Land-level support programmes that might fund their adaptation actions, municipalities also receive support from sectoral support programmes (UBA, 2019[45]). Three-quarters of surveyed municipalities also use their own budget to support adaptation action. Overall, demand for adaptation funding at the municipal level is increasing and likely outpacing available funding. This is demonstrated by the increases in the applications of municipalities to federal funding programmes (UBA, 2021[59]). Access to adaptation funding for municipalities needs to be easier. The ZKA focuses much of its efforts to help municipalities identify appropriate funding sources and support for applications to receive additional funding (Box 2.2). The federal government should streamline procedures and reporting mechanisms to make it easier for eligible actors to access funding. An effective funding system needs to provide targeted support to ensure that no one is left behind.

To understand adaptation funding gaps and to improve oversight, the BMUV has started to work with the Länder to identify and document regional adaptation funding needs. This is an important first step to inform building an effective funding architecture. The BMUV and the BMWK have also commissioned studies that assess the cost of climate change impact. The BMUV aims at introducing budget tagging mechanisms to better identify adaptation-relevant spending. The latter remains a difficult task as adaptation spending is often embedded in broader investments. A new initiative to develop a budgeting system for sustainable development is underway (Section 1.3.5).

In light of an observed and projected upward trend in extreme weather events, Germany’s adaptation funding needs are considerable and set to grow. Increasing adaptation spending is crucial to avoid more costly recovery and rehabilitation spending for public authorities. By 2050, the implementation of adaptation measures5 could reduce economic costs that arise from the impacts of climate change by 62 to 100% compared to a scenario without adaptation, considering a strong to weak climate change scenario (Flaute, Reuschel and Stöver, 2022[16]). Revenue-raising instruments could be introduced to cover increased budget needs. This could include local tax instruments or beneficiary contributions.

Overall, the federal post-disaster assistance (e.g. more than EUR 30 billion for reconstruction measures in relation to the 2021 flood disaster) is significantly higher than the total adaptation funding available by subnational governments and sectors combined. Knowing the federal government steps in to assume contingent liabilities after extreme events can significantly influence the readiness of public and private actors to invest in adaptation. The future adaptation policy framework should strongly consider increasing federal funding for adaptation and do so in a way that crowds in all other actors’ contributions.

In light of rapidly growing climate risks, private investment (e.g. businesses, households) in adaptation is indispensable to ensure effectiveness of public efforts and reduce reliance on state aid in response to a disaster. Insurance against loss and damage from natural hazards is an important element. In Germany, on average, about half of private households are insured against natural hazards (ifo Institut, 2021[60]), and insurance covers about a third of loss and damages from extreme events. Nevertheless, insurance coverage varies greatly. Concerning residential buildings, 94% are insured against storms and hail, whereas only 45% are insured against floods and extreme precipitation. Regional differences are large. For example, in the state of Baden-Württemberg, 94% of buildings are insured against floods and extreme precipitation, whereas in Bremen only 28% are covered (Prognos, 2022[4]). Overall, the average insurance density for natural hazard insurance for residential buildings increased from 19% in 2002 to 34% in 2013 (GDV, 2021[61]). The federal government should consider mandating insurance against natural hazards. In so doing, it would help protect assets to the expected increase in the exposure of buildings against extreme weather events.

For insurance to reduce the cost of the state, France has developed a solidarity mechanism called the CatNat. Every household and vehicle insurance policy holder contributes an annual flat rate to the CatNat. As a result, 98% of French households are covered against all types of natural hazard damage. The proceeds from CatNat are reinvested in adaptation measures. A state guarantee ensures that damages from extreme events can be covered (OECD, 2019[62]).

The federal government could reward, ex ante, adaptation investments and provide financial assistance for covering loss and damage from extreme weather events; for example, by considering them in the ex post allocation of recovery funding. In doing so, the funding architecture should also consider the role of private households and business in investing in adaptation. This should include how climate risk insurance could encourage private adaptation investments.

Germany experienced a marked acceleration in biodiversity degradation in the past decades, affecting different ecosystems, as well as species loss. The conservation status of species and habitats shows deteriorating trends. More than one-third of species are endangered (Figure 2.9), making Germany one of the lowest performing countries across the OECD. Species of agricultural landscapes, in particular, have declined significantly. For example, bird species typical of agricultural ecosystems (which cover nearly half of Germany) have declined by about 30% on average since 1990. Almost 13% of agricultural land with high nature value was lost in the six years between 2009 and 2015 (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2019[63]). Reptiles are particularly at risk, with almost 70% endangered (OECD, 2023[64]). About 41% of wild bee species, one of the most important pollinator groups in Germany, are endangered in their population (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2019[63]). Since 1990, 75% of insects have been lost.

Nevertheless, Germany has kept all species from risk of extinction. The Red List Index, a measure of change in aggregate extinction risk across groups of species, has remained high (low extinction risk) at 0.98 since 1991 compared to the global average, which has decreased from 0.81 to 0.73 since then (IUCN, 2022[65]). As regeneration of threatened species is not yet evident, Aichi target 5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is yet to be fulfilled, and almost 70% of species habitats are in an inadequate or poor condition (BMUV, 2021[66]).

Forest area has grown by 1 million ha (about 10%) in the past 40 years to 11.4 million ha in 2021. However, in a third of this area, the proportion of damage, tree death rates and tree crown defoliation of deciduous trees – a key indicator for tree vitality – has risen sharply since 1984 (BMEL, 2022[67]). This is mainly due to climate change, especially drought, which causes premature leaf fall and mass reproduction of bark beetles. Storms and wildfires brought on by climate change are another factor in tree loss and damage (BMEL, 2022[67]) only about one-third of Germany’s forests have near-natural conditions (BMUV, 2022[68]). The loss of around 0.5 million ha of mainly spruce-dominated forests opens unexplored possibilities to restock biodiverse forests.

Germany has 1.8 million ha of peatland soils, of which about 92% of peatland soils have been drained of water for agricultural use and due to increasing temperatures. Meanwhile, intact, hence near-natural, peatlands are damaged by extensive nutrient input from adjacent uses. Large parts of even protected peatlands are degraded (BfN, 2017[69]). Almost a third of floodplains are used as farmland, settlement, transport or commercial areas, leaving only 9% ecologically intact (BMUV, 2022[68]). Four of five grassland biotope types are endangered (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2019[63]).

Despite progress in implementing the National Strategy on Coastal and Marine Biodiversity, key goals have not yet been achieved. Species decline and habitat degradation continue (BMUV, 2021[66]). The conservation status of many habitats, such as overwashed sandbanks, or estuaries and reefs, remain in an unfavourable condition (BMUV, 2021[66]). The main pressures are commercial fishing, extractive uses and increasing noise pollution (Greenpeace, 2021[70]). Germany failed to achieve the objectives of the EU Natura 2000 directives and the European Marine Strategy Framework Directive, which aim to achieve a good or favourable conservation status of the marine environment and its protected goods.

About 44% of settlement and transport areas are sealed. Germany is not on track to achieve its objective to reduce land-take to less than 30 hectares (ha) by 2030. This has led to increased soil sealing, causing loss of soil functions, especially water permeability and fertility. This, in turn, increases the risk of flooding, higher vulnerability to heat stress and significant biodiversity loss in urban areas.

Another key driver of biodiversity loss is intensive agriculture and associated frequent and widespread use of plant protection products and fertilisers. Nitrate water pollution from agriculture remains a serious concern (Section 1.1.5). Additional causes are urban sprawl, landscape dissection, hydraulic engineering and watercourse maintenance, construction measures, gradual changes in temperature and precipitation, and extreme climatic events such as heavy rainfalls and long periods of drought (UBA, 2021[5]). Moreover, the loss of meadows and fallow land have contributed to biodiversity loss. The increased use of wind farms can also negatively affect bird populations (Section 1.2.2).

Germany has undertaken multiple efforts to increase and protect biodiversity. In 2007, the BMUV developed its National Biodiversity Strategy setting out 330 targets, which are the current reference. With the Federal Nature Conservation Act 2010, the government set the legislative competence for nature conservation (CBD, 2022[71]). The Länder are key actors in preserving biodiversity through their responsibility for nature conservation and landscape management. An increasing number of Länder have developed biodiversity-related plans and programmes. At the municipal level, an alliance for biodiversity was founded in 2012.

Despite all efforts to date, it has not yet been possible to reverse loss of biodiversity. Many national targets adopted under the CBD have not achieved sufficient progress. Less than 2% of German territory, for example, is developing undisturbed (Target 8). In addition, reduction of additional land-take due to settlement and transport is not sufficient to achieve target of 30 ha per day (Target 10). Moreover, only 25% of the German population have at least adequate awareness of biodiversity compared to the goal of 75% (part of national Target 1) (CBD, 2019[72]). Concomitantly, Germany has also failed to achieve several goals of the 2007 National Biodiversity Strategy. In line with calls under the CBD for the reform of incentives, Germany has identified and assessed the types and magnitudes of environmentally harmful incentives (UBA, 2021[73]; FOES, 2021[74]). It will be important to adjust key subsidies to prevent further harm to biodiversity.

Against the background of new target systems for the protection of biodiversity in the European Union and within the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, the National Biodiversity Strategy will be further developed to contain concise objectives for 2030. Each objective will contain at least one suitable quantitative indicator. With the new strategy, Germany intends to incorporate relevant fields of action that are not sufficiently addressed in the 2007 strategy. These include insect protection, energy transition, marine nature conservation, urban nature and plant protection (BfN, 2021[75]).

To give implementation of biodiversity goals stronger leverage, interdisciplinary co-operation will be crucial. This can be ensured through a new federal strategy that mainstreams biodiversity goals in relevant sectors (e.g. accounting for biodiversity in welfare indicators). Given strong agricultural pressures on biodiversity, agricultural and environmental policies should be more closely interwoven to avert biodiversity loss. In addition, the legal framework for nature conservation could be strengthened by including a habitat improvement imperative (German Council for Sustainable Development, 2022[76]).

Overall, more profound behavioural changes need to be incentivised. Notably, subsidy payments should be linked to the preservation and improvement of ecosystem services to make nature-friendly agriculture economically attractive. For example, to date, land users have few incentives to conserve areas and use them in a biodiversity-friendly way. The EU CAP will support German farmers to transform their businesses and apply more sustainable farming practices (Section 1.1.5).

An appropriate balance between sticks (making polluters pay such as through taxes on pollution or natural resource fees) and carrots (incentivising good behaviour such as through “good subsidies”) is required. However, an effective strategy incentivises behavioural change by reflecting the true values of biodiversity and hence the costs of its damage (e.g. pesticide use) across the entire economy through for instance, payments for ecosystem services (OECD, 2022[77]). The example of the Forest Strategy 2050, which envisions rewards for protecting ecosystem services, could also be applied to other ecosystems.

Germany fills important gaps in monitoring biodiversity trends by developing indicators for species biodiversity and landscape as part of the new strategy. Annual reporting on progress towards Germany’s biodiversity goals could be established to strengthen accountability and action to achieve national biodiversity targets and the goals agreed upon at COP15. Further, developing indicators to measure policy impacts can help ensure effective implementation through corrective action.

Germany protects 38% and 45% of its terrestrial and marine surface area, respectively,6 compared to OECD country averages of 15% and 21% (Figure 2.10). However, strict terrestrial nature reserves, wilderness areas and national parks, as defined by the European Union, comprise only 1% of the total surface area. They should be expanded to contribute to achieving the EU member states’ collective goal of achieving 10% of terrestrial surface area by 2030 in line with the EU Biodiversity Strategy (EC, 2022[78]). Between 2000 and 2016, Germany increased areas designated as nature reserves from about 3% to 4.4% of total surface area (UBA, 2019[79]). In these reserves, strict regulations ensure conservation and development of rare and endangered species and biotopes. About 60% of nature reserves are smaller than 50 ha (BfN, 2020[89]), which impacts their effectiveness in protecting biodiversity.

Protection alone does not guarantee nature conservation. It needs to go hand-in-hand with sustainable management of these areas and incentives to facilitate nature-friendly behaviour and ensure the effectiveness of protected areas (OECD, 2023[80]). Moreover, protected areas do not yet exist in coastal area management plans for Natura 2000 in the Baltic Sea; they have only existed since May 2020 in the North Sea (Greenpeace, 2021[70]). Furthermore, it is important to establish management plans that include clear objectives for their sustainable management. To date, the quality of protected areas and their management cannot be easily assessed because regulations governing many individual protected areas vary widely (UBA, 2021[81]). Common standards and requirements for sustainable management of protected areas can help assess the quality of these areas.

Land-use and landscape planning plays an essential role in nature and landscape conservation because it designates priority areas and sets requirements and measures to conserve nature. Nature and landscape conservation and requirements for biotope and species protection have been increasingly incorporated into landscape programmes at the regional and Land level (UBA, 2019[1]). Climate impacts, such as droughts, wildfires and extreme precipitation, pose a key risk for ecosystems (Section 2.1.1). Adapting ecosystems to the impacts of climate change is therefore key to conserve them sustainably. In land-use and landscape planning, most plans still show a lack of tangible objectives and measures for nature conservation to adapt to climate impacts. As of 2017, only 17% of landscape framework plans provided a rationale for nature conservation objectives and measures that address climate impacts (UBA, 2019[1]).

With the amendment of the Federal Climate Change Act in 2021, Germany increased its ambition for the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector to reduce carbon emissions and enhance its carbon sink capacity byabsorbing at the very least -25 MtCO2-eq by 2030, -35 MtCO2-eq by 2040 and -40 MtCO2-eq by 2045. However, emission balance projections expect Germany to fall short of these targets by about 7 MtCO2-eq in 2030 and 22 MtCO2-eq in 2040 (Figure 2.11).

These projections are based on already adopted LULUCF policies and expected land and land-use changes in the sector until 2040. It would be useful to update projections to include the expected impact of new climate and biodiversity measures.To reach its LULUCF emissions targets, Germany needs to significantly accelerate action. It has vast potential to sequester carbon by expanding and maintaining near-natural forests, which store 1.3 billion tonnes (Bt) of CO2-eq and sequester an additional 62 Mt annually (Thünen-Institut, 2017[82]). Rewetting drained peatlands could significantly reduce CO2 emissions, estimated at 53 MtCO2-eq in 2020, and enhance its carbon sink capacity (BMUV, 2022[83]). There is considerable potential to address climate change through nature-based solutions (NbS) in the LULUCF, as well as through spatial planning and coastal management.

The federal government has adopted various policies in support of NbS in response to Germany’s challenges in mitigating climate change, averting biodiversity loss and adapting to climate impacts. They include climate protection in the LULUCF sector; preserving forests and intact peatlands; increasing and restoring natural floodplains in water courses; protecting ecosystems to reduce climate-induced stressors for species and habitats; and increasing green spaces and fresh air corridors in urban areas (BfN, 2021[84]). Since 2022, the BMUV has been developing an ambitious NbS programme, which brings together existing and new instruments to facilitate implementation of NbS across all sectors (Section 2.3.4).

The protection and adaptation of forests is an effective nature-based approach to mitigate CO2 emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. It also provides a habitat for many animals and plants. Given that forests are increasingly under pressure from climate change, Germany has adopted several measures for forest protection and reforestation.

The Federal Forest Act, together with regional forest acts at Länder level, are key legal instruments to conserve forests. They protect the forest from improper treatment, clearance and conversion to other forms (BMJ, 2021[85]). Forest owners are legally obliged to reforest bare forest areas. So far, this has been effective, leaving forest surface area largely unaffected by land-take resulting from settlement and transport measures. However, the Act only provides framework regulations to preserve forests, which are not further defined. The Federal Nature Conservation Act also aims to protect and sustainably manage forests (BMUV, 2009[86]) Given the increasing degradation of forest habitats, the federal government should consider strengthening regulations to preserve and reinstate good forest condition. To that end, it could define sustainable forest management and commonly recognised conservation practices.

The German Forest Strategy 2020 comprises a number of NbS measures to support climate protection. The strategy notably aims to maintain forest as a CO2 sink by adapting forests to climate impacts and tapping into the CO2 abatement potential (BMEL, 2020[87]). German forests store an estimated 1.26 BtCO2-eq and sequester an additional 62 MtCO2-eq annually (Thünen-Institut, 2017[82]). Between 2017 and 2020, the amount of carbon sequestered by forests decreased by about 27% (from about 63 MtCO2-eq to 46 Mt CO2-eq) (EEA, 2021[88]). Germany could take additional measures to preserve forests by increasing forest resilience against climate impacts. This could include planting drought-tolerant tree species, improving water storage capacity of forest soils and establishing mixed tree species in forests. In so doing, these measures can also secure forests as a carbon sink.

Peatlands act as a carbon sink, regulate water and nutrient balance, reduce local air temperature and host a multitude of often endangered animal and plant species, such as bittern, cotton grass or sundew. About 92% of peatlands are drained and related net emissions have increased from 4.2% to 6.7% (Thünen Institut, 2012[89]). To date, emissions from peatland are estimated at 53 MtCO2-eq annually, representing about 6.7% of total national GHG emissions (BMUV, 2022[68]). Rewetting drained peatlands could significantly reduce these CO2 emissions.

With the 2022 National Peatland Protection Strategy, the government seeks to harness peatlands’ potential for climate protection. The carbon sequestration potential of restored peatlands is estimated at 3-8.5 MtCO2-eq annually (BMWK, 2022[90]). By focusing on the rewetting and renaturation of peatlands, the National Peatland Protection Strategy complements the strategic objectives of the national water dialogue (Box 1.11). Considering that all peatland biotopes are severely endangered due to drainage, the strategy also has a large potential to contribute to Germany’s biodiversity targets.

The National Peatland Protection Strategy is supplemented by the 2021 Federal-Länder target agreement on climate protection through peatland soil conservation. This envisages financial incentives for the rewetting of peat soils to reduce use of peat in growing media. Ultimately, this seeks to largely eliminate the use of peat in horticulture within this decade (BMWK, 2022[90]). On this basis, the BMEL also published the Peat Reduction Strategy 2022, which aims to reduce use of peat as a cultivation substrate and soil as a growing medium and soil conditioner. It aims to completely abandon use of peat when climate-friendly alternatives can be used. The federal government will provide around EUR 50 million over the next ten years for pilot projects on peatland soil protection (UBA, 2019[79]).

NbS offer vital means to address water-related challenges as they can enhance water availability (e.g. soil moisture retention, groundwater recharge), improve water quality (e.g. natural and constructed wetlands) and reduce risks associated with water‐related climate impacts (e.g. floodplain restoration, green roofs). In 2017, the federal government adopted Germany’s Blue Belt Programme (Blaues Band Deutschland) that aims to restore more than 2 800 km of federal waterways over the next 30 years (BMUV, 2020[91]). As part of Germany’s third River Basin Management Plan in support of WFD, Germany focuses on restoration measures to help create habitats in water bodies (27% of water bodies) and establish river continuity (26% of water bodies) and near-natural water supply (19% of surface waters) (UBA, 2021[92]). While water bodies are managed at local level, the government foresees investing EUR 1 billion of federal support over the next ten years. This aims to improve the ecological status of water bodies and help Länder and municipalities become more climate resilient.

Moreover, the federal government has developed a new National Water Strategy to improve the quality of surface waters and address current and future climate risks of Germany’s water sector (Box 1.11). Among other key measures, the strategy aims to make water infrastructure more climate resilient. In this way, it could address extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall, drought and sea-level rise, and maintain ecosystem services (e.g. self-purification of water bodies, retention, groundwater recharge and sink function). The strategy is a good example of mainstreaming adaptation and biodiversity in relevant sectoral policies (Section 2.4.1). However, clear operational and regulatory requirements to achieve the strategy’s objectives should correspondingly be set in the Federal Water Act. To date, the Act only sets general clauses for adapting the water sector to climate impacts to strengthen their implementation (UBA, 2019[79]).

The National Adaptation Strategy, as well as its subsequent action plans (Section 2.2.1), include the renaturation of wetlands and river courses to limit climate impacts through improved flow regulation during floods. They also aim to reduce heat stress on humans and urban ecosystems, and improve air quality and flood management (Bundesregierung, 2008[36]). They also set out to engage in forest conversion to climate-adapted mixed forests to increase forests’ ability to provide their ecosystem functions in the long-term, soil-conserving and conservation methods in agriculture. This, in turn, would help preserve natural soil functions and reduce erosion and compaction. A key result of these efforts can be seen in Germany’s floodplains. These have increased by about 4 000 ha since 1983, amounting to 480 000 ha in total floodplains available as retention area in the event of flooding (UBA, 2019[1]).

The implementation of NbS has also been increasingly promoted in urban areas. The Federal Concept on Green Infrastructure 2017, the city-nature master plan (Masterplan Stadtnatur) 2019 and the Federal Programme on Adaptation of Urban Areas to Climate Change (Bundesprogramm „Anpassung urbaner Räume an den Klimawandel“) 2020 as well as the urban development funding programmes (BMUV, 2020[93]; BMUV, 2019[94]; BBSR, 2022[95]) (BMWSB, 2022[96]); all aim at promoting urban NbS. With these programmes, Germany supports integrated urban development through the conservation and improvement of ecosystems and their services, unsealing soils and increasing green spaces in cities to reduce urban temperatures; manage excess rainwater; enhance the diversity of species and biotopes in cities; and support climate protection (BfN, 2017[97]). Municipalities have especially encouraged installation of green roofs and façades through provisions in local development plans (Box 2.4). NbS have been increasingly incorporated in urban development plans, emphasising “no-regret” solutions that are cost effective and also address other socio-economic challenges (ecologic, 2020[98]). However, challenges remain in addressing space and planning issues in cities, as well as in building technical capacity in the planning, implementation and maintenance of NbS. Building codes are a key regulatory lever that can foster use of NbS by integrating minimum requirements for green space areas on and around new buildings and permeable material in driveways to increase water absorption and retention capacities (OECD, 2021[99]). Urban development contracts pursuant to the Federal Building Code (BauGB) can be used to introduce rules for the safeguarding and development of NbS.

To address the interdependent crises of biodiversity loss and climate change, a new and ambitious programme, the Cabinet approved the Federal Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity (Aktionsprogramm Natürlicher Klimaschutz, ANK), in March 20237 (Box 2.5). With the ANK, the government aims to build synergy between climate protection and nature conservation measures (BMUV, 2022[68]). NbS directly protect, strengthen and restore natural ecosystems and reduce GHG emissions. The ANK views the strengthening of the resilience of ecosystems to the climate change impacts also as an important goal of NbS (BMUV, 2022[68]).

The ANK emphasises the LULUCF sector, which is important to reach Germany’s LULUCF emission targets (Section 2.3.2). It aims at significantly preventing emissions from dry and degraded peatlands to escape through rewetting, and enhancing carbon sink functions from all ecosystems, including through forest conservation and restoration.

Beyond the restoration and protection of natural ecosystems, Germany, through the ANK, also promotes implementation of NbS in urban areas. The ANK sets out to improve water retention, including in urban areas, and to strengthen the infiltration of rainwater by funding and financing unsealing projects (BMUV, 2022[68]). Additional measures are funded through the Programme on Adaptation of Urban Areas to Climate Change (BMWSB). In addition, the federal government plans to financially support 20 municipalities annually in near-natural green space management. Location-specific concepts will make inner-city federal properties more usable for urban green infrastructure and reduce new daily land use from around 54 ha to 30 ha to achieve net-zero land consumption by 2050 (BMUV, 2022[68]).

The ANK intends to increase climate resilience. Measures primarily seek to increase capacity of natural ecosystems to store more water. This can limit the impacts of extreme weather events, particularly extreme precipitation, as well as drought periods. NbS have a large potential to help adapt to climate impacts. Germany could more strongly consider building climate resilience as a key objective, rather than a valuable co-benefit of the measures. Framing NbS as such can help mobilise relevant stakeholders, increase funding and raise awareness of the need for adapting to the impacts of climate change.

The BMUV holds the main responsibility for developing measures set out in the ANK. In addition, the BMEL manages individual measures for peat-use reduction and forest monitoring. However, concrete delivery mechanisms and responsibilities have not been determined yet. To that end, Germany aims to co-operate closely with the Länder, which have key responsibilities in nature conservation. The Länder may already have a comprehensive understanding of the NbS potential in their regions and relevant networks of government and non-government agencies. As the Länder are closer to those who will be directly affected by the measures, such as municipalities, landowners and farmers, they are well positioned to identify and address potential implementation barriers. An innovative element of the ANK is the intended target audience for project leaders. Beyond government agencies, the ANK seeks to encourage citizens, companies and organisations to develop projects and apply for funding.

Given the short timeframe and large scope of the ANK, key priorities, concrete mechanisms of NbS implementation, timelines and responsible actors, especially related to the Länder, should be clear to ensure accountability. Germany will need to define rapidly delivery mechanisms for the ANK measures to deliver results within a short timeframe (2023-26). Besides identifying new measures, the programme builds on many policies such as the reconnection and renaturation of floodplains, increasing protected areas or afforestation. The ANK aims to secure enough funding to accelerate implementation of NbS for climate protection and biodiversity. At the same time, it seeks to remove policy and institutional barriers to advance those measures that have thus far not achieved their targets (e.g. biodiversity protection, forest health).

The BMUV co-ordinated broad public consultations, engaging citizens, community-based and non-profit organisations, and agencies across government to inform the design of the programme. The consultation helped raise awareness of ANK objectives among key stakeholders, and thus lays the ground for its implementation. In addition, the BMUV has started several pilot projects in 2022, which are valuable to demonstrate the effectiveness of NbS on the ground. These can raise awareness and improve understanding of NbS among policy makers, administrators, planners, engineers, private actors and citizens. Initial projects, such as peatland rewetting, have revealed barriers to implementation. These include approvals needed from neighbouring property owners, specialised non-market machinery to harvest crops from peatland, uncertain prospects of profit from paludiculture products or viability of solar panel installation. For implementation of the ANK, especially the rewetting of peatlands, it will be important for landowners and farmers to generate sustainable revenue from NbS.

While NbS are no-regret options, Germany should account for their long-term effectiveness and potential conflicting goals in implementation. The ability of ecosystems to act as a sink for CO2 emissions, reduce impacts of climate change and provide space for a range of species is directly affected by the exposure and vulnerability of the ecosystems themselves to climate change and resulting impacts. Continued warming and expected increases in climate impacts, combined with other stressors such as land-use change and pollution, can lead to a decline in the adaptive capacity and therewith the potential to store emissions of ecosystems. This can hamper the effectiveness of NbS in the long term and may discourage landowners, municipalities and other relevant actors from pursuing this approach. For example, rewetting of peatlands may become increasingly difficult under more frequent and intense heatwaves and droughts, reducing their effectiveness in storing carbon emissions. Depending on the ecosystem concerned, it is crucial to incentivise practices to reduce pressures on ecosystems such as pollution, invasive species, habitat loss and fragmentation and over-exploitation. It is equally vital to enhance genetic species and functional richness, which buffers the impacts of extreme weather and pests. In the context of a changing climate, it will also be important to model how the performance of NbS varies under climate change.

Subsidies, such as those provided by the EU and German agricultural and climate policies, used to hamper implementation of NbS. This is now slowly changing. (Wüstemann et al., 2017[101]). In this regard, Germany’s CAP Strategic Plan is a critical achievement in supporting NbS application on peatlands (Box 1.8). Compared to the former CAP funding criteria, which incentivised farmers to drain and fertilise peatland soils for biomass and energy maize production, the reformed CAP aims to protect peatlands. Moreover, three Länder have Agri-environment Climate Measures funded by the EU CAP for peatland rewetting, and two for paludiculture. To ensure an effective approach to facilitate NbS implementation, it will be important to set and regulate agricultural subsidies so that they incentivise peatland rewetting and improve management of drained peatlands.

Overall, the ANK needs to consider the complex landscape of regulations at the subnational, federal and EU levels and find ways to overcome potential barriers in delivery. Delivering parts of the programme directly through citizens, companies and organisations under public or private law is itself progressive and may lead to innovative suggestions in NbS. However, the size of the programme would not allow it to be fully deliverable through private stakeholders alone.

As NbS were often only indirectly integrated into a broad range of policy instruments, they have not been monitored as a coherent concept on their own. Nevertheless, the state of different ecosystems, and in some cases the implementation of individual policies that make use of NbS have been monitored.

Germany monitors ecosystems in part through the National Forest Inventory, in which the BMEL assesses the condition of trees and changes thereof between inventories. Since 2007, Germany has inventoried its forests every five years and is conducting its fourth one (BMEL, 2022[102]). For the LULUCF sector, the Thünen Institute monitors and analyses LULUCF emissions on behalf of the federal government. The UBA has monitored and reported annual changes in the national carbon budget resulting from changes in land use between 1990 and 2018 (UBA, 2020[103]). As concerns biodiversity, Germany monitors nature conservation, ecosystems, farmland, birds, insects and genetically modified organisms (BfN, 2022[104]). The country is bringing individual programmes together and gathering data for a more comprehensive, nationwide approach to biodiversity monitoring.

To improve monitoring the state of ecosystems, the ANK sets out several actions to connect data gathering more effectively and expand databases. This aims to measure progress towards the goals of the Climate Change Act. Within the BfN a co ordinating body for the ANK’s implementation and further development will be established. In addition to improving accuracy and informational value of emission data, the UBA will set up a soil monitoring centre to create the legal foundation for reporting GHG emissions in the land sector.

While these measures aim to fill data gaps and expand monitoring, modelling and projections of ecosystem developments, the effectiveness of NbS measures is rarely assessed. To some extent, the Monitoring Report and Evaluation of the DAS does assess NbS in the DAS and its subsequent action plans (Section 2.2.5). However, projects funded to implement the National Strategy on Biological Diversity 2007 have not yet been evaluated. The BfN commissioned adelphi, an EU think tank, to evaluate implemented projects, measuring their degree of target achievement and ultimately the success of the funded projects and the federal programme (adelphi, 2022[105]). For the ANK to deliver on its high ambitions, it will be crucial to gather information of NbS performance over time and their maintenance needs (OECD, 2021[99]). Ultimately, based on proposed improvements to databases, measuring progress in the ANK’s implementation will help evaluate whether NbS effectively contribute to achieving Germany’s goals. Germany can then take corrective action based on evolving socio-economic and climatic conditions (IPCC, 2022[106]). Specifically, it can ensure that resources earmarked for NbS are efficiently used and allocated where they can have the most impact, secure long-term government funding and potentially attract private sector finance, as well as incentivise landowners, cities and municipalities to take up NbS (IPCC, 2018[107]).

To evaluate NbS effectiveness, Germany should set clear objectives and targets and a measurement framework to assess progress against them before implementation. Further, compiling and communicating good practices, such as the pilot projects already initiated under the ANK, can significantly support the scale at which NbS are considered as part of the decision-making process. This could be accomplished through a repository, guidelines or other design tools.

The ANK marks a step-increase in funding made available for NbS. Germany is among the frontrunners by making NbS eligible for funding, which globally is not common practice. The unprecedented amount of EUR 4 billion provides an opportunity to greatly upscale NbS and change long-standing, harmful practices that have degraded Germany’s biodiversity. Total funding for NbS before the ANK is difficult to establish given their integration into a number of sectoral and subnational government budgets.

The budget for 2023 is EUR 590 million, compared to only 10 million in 2022. The currently planned budget envelope will further increase to EUR 1 billion in 2024 and EUR 1.2 billion in 2025 and 2026 respectively. In comparison, Scotland has committed to spend the equivalent of EUR 285 million on peatland restoration (25% of surface area is peatland) over the next ten years. Meanwhile, Canada is establishing the Natural Climate Solutions Fund, investing EUR 2.8 billion (CAD 4 billion) over the next ten years in nature conservation and restoration (Government of Canada, 2022[108]). Globally, although difficult to compare and estimate, investments in NbS are estimated at EUR 125 billion (UNEP, 2022[109]).

The ANK also includes existing measures funded through various programmes and other funding sources (Table 2.2). The former Energy and Climate Fund (now Climate and Transformation Fund), for example, finances climate protection policy programmes and includes individual components such as the Forest Climate Fund. Other financing mechanisms of NbS include carbon certificates offered to companies or individuals by the Länder Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein on the voluntary carbon market to finance the rewetting of peatlands (MoorFutures, 2019[110]).

Allocation of disbursement for ANK measures and corresponding recipients has not been determined. It will be important to set up appropriate funding mechanisms that make use of and co-ordinate with existing funding channels to Länder and sectors (e.g. GAK), within the constraints of the provisions of the Basic Law and related budgetary requirements. The short timeframe and the large scope of the ANK represent a major challenge for the BMUV. Furthermore, it will be key to agree upon eligibility criteria for funding, as well as accountability mechanisms. Germany plans to use specialised agencies for natural climate protection to inform interested parties about funding opportunities. Appropriate funding mechanisms for the maintenance of NbS and beyond the initial phase will have to be set up to sustain the ANK’s outcomes beyond 2026.

The BMUV actively considers synergies in strategies concerning climate mitigation, adaptation, biodiversity and water. For example, forest and water strategies increasingly identify synergies with climate mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity, but these need to be translated into practice. The Forest Strategy 2050 sets measures to enhance biodiversity and nature protection. It provides financial incentives for forest owners to foster biodiversity and nature protection and establishes a monitoring system for forest ecosystems. The impact of these synergies in practice should be monitored and evaluated.

Similarly, the National Water Strategy considers synergies between climate mitigation, adaptation and NbS measures. It sets out how development of water bodies through NbS and other measures can enhance flood protection, as well as foster biodiversity and preserve ecosystems. It also encourages urban land-use practices compatible with water and climate policy objectives (BMU, 2021[114]). In doing so, it acknowledges the strategy’s goals are not always free of conflict with other policy areas. For example, it is challenging to reach a semi-natural water balance in areas where water is withdrawn by different sectors (e.g. mining, energy) (BMU, 2021[114]).

The ANK is a unique opportunity to both foster synergies and demonstrate how this is done in practice. As it sets out to address climate change and biodiversity loss through NbS, the ANK can identify projects and demonstrate how they harness such synergies effectively. In doing so, the ANK’s monitoring system should identify indicators that evaluate each NbS impact on different objectives.

The envisaged measures under ANK could benefit from more explicit emphasis on adaptation synergies. NbS projects financed by the ANK need to demonstrate their contribution to climate mitigation. However, they must also show their own exposure and vulnerability – and contribution to building the resilience – to the impacts of climate change. For example, new trees planted through the ANK to increase carbon storage must be adapted to expected changes in temperature or precipitation. Failure to do so risks undermining their impact over time. Similarly, while the National Peatland Strategy emphasises mitigation, water and biodiversity objectives, it pays less attention to adaptative capacity. Adaptation objectives are, however, important to consider as climate change is likely to impact rewetted peatlands. It can take decades for biodiversity and soil processes to restore in rewetted peatlands, which may leave their climate resilience levels lower than those of intact peatlands.

Germany has contributed to – and benefited from – strong EU and international co-operation on adaptation. Its domestic efforts on adaptation and their importance are embedded within EU and international frameworks (e.g. Paris Agreement). At the EU level, the Green Deal, new Climate Law and Adaptation Strategy provide anchors for adaptation policy. In line with reporting requirements, Germany has increased efforts to measure adaptation as demonstrated by ongoing initiatives to quantify adaptation spending. Targeted EU funding has helped scale up implementation of adaptation initiatives, especially at subnational level. For example, the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation has the potential to scale up adaptation at local and regional levels via innovative solutions, a challenge many subnational actors face in Germany. Furthermore, Germany has been an active participant in, and initiator of, information and knowledge exchanges with other EU member states and the European Commission, including the development of measurable adaptation goals.

EU platforms have also facilitated collaboration with countries where cross-border adaptation planning and investments are required. While Germany participated actively in EU and international collaboration, the 2021 floods affecting the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany demonstrated the need for further steps to assess and address cross-border climate risks. The forthcoming EU Climate Risk Assessment in 2024 can serve as an important catalyst for Germany to enhance its understanding of such risks and increase co-operation to tackle them. Acknowledging existing gaps, Germany, alongside Switzerland (Nathani et al., 2019[115]) and the United Kingdom (Sturminski, 2022[116]), increased efforts to assess cross-border climate risks. To that end, they identified climate-related supply chain risks, being a forerunner in this area and thereby responding to a key priority of the EU Adaptation Strategy. For other cross-border climate risks, such as migration from climate-vulnerable countries, EU and international co-operation will also be a vital tool to take appropriate measures and help developing countries to become more climate resilient (JRC, 2021[117]).

Germany has promoted use and scaling up of NbS at international level, making it a key commitment under its G7 presidency in 2022 (G7, 2022[118]). As a result, the G7 committed to protecting at least 30% of land and 30% of the ocean nationally and globally by 2030. Mirroring Germany’s domestic policy objectives, the G7 also recognised the need to transform agriculture by creating synergies between biodiversity, climate change and food security (G7, 2022[119]). Conversely, as recognised by the ANK and the National Peatland Strategy, Germany’s own success in implementing the ANK programme will depend on certain pieces of international legislation. These include phasing out peat products’ horticulture in support of measures which, without an EU-wide ban, would lead to shifting peat extraction abroad.

Germany is strongly committed to supporting the implementation of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development in developing countries and emerging economies. German development co-operation has traditionally focused on environmental issues. Within the BMZ 2030 reform process launched in 2020, Germany further sharpened its commitment to tackle climate change and promote environmental protection. “Forging ahead with the Just Transition” is one of four priority areas of Germany’s development policy (BMZ, 2023[120]). In terms of geographic focus, the BMZ recently reduced the number of partner countries from 85 to 65, while maintaining a strong focus on Africa and Asia (OECD, 2022[121]).

Germany recognises that Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement are intrinsically linked. In response, with other members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), it committed to co-ordinate development approaches with international climate and environment objectives through a member-driven process. In line with the OECD-DAC Declaration of 2021, Germany aims to align its official development assistance (ODA) with the goals of the Paris Agreement (OECD, 2021[122]). It supports developing countries’ efforts to fight climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation by channelling a substantial part of its ODA to these purposes.

With total ODA (USD 32.2 billion, preliminary data) representing 0.74% of gross national income, Germany is the second largest bilateral provider of ODA (OECD, 2022[121]). This reflects a large increase in ODA, more than double the amount spent a decade ago (USD 12.7 billion in 2010) (OECD, 2012[123]). It also makes Germany the largest provider of environment- and biodiversity-focused ODA globally (Figure 2.12). According to the Rio Markers, about 37% of Germany’s bilateral ODA had an environmental focus in 2019-20, with about 16.8% spent on climate mitigation; 13.1% on climate change adaptation; and 10.8% on biodiversity (OECD, 2022[121]). Germany has also been the largest donor of the Adaptation Fund, a key multilateral instrument for climate adaptation financing. The OECD provides a comprehensive development co-operation profile of Germany, which is updated annually (OECD, 2022[121]).

The federal government aims to scale up its international climate finance to reach EUR 6 billion annually by 2025, contributing to fulfilling the collective USD 100 billion goal. The country also works towards increasing the amount of finance committed to nature. As part of its EUR 6 billion package, Germany has pledged to reach EUR 1.5 billion annually for international biodiversity conservation beginning in 2025. This commitment, made on the sidelines of the 77th General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2022, would amplify the upward trend for biodiversity funding. It would more than double the average amount provided between 2016 and 2021 (Figure 2.13). Apart from budgetary sources, Germany also mobilises capital market funds and private climate finance. Germany total contribution of climate finance is estimated at about EUR 8.1 billion in 2021 (Federal Foreign Office, 2022[124]).

While the BMZ develops strategic orientations of Germany’s development co-operation policy and oversees ODA reporting, two specialised agencies manage implementation of bilateral ODA. GIZ oversees technical co-operation and KfW (comprising KfW Development Bank and the DEG, the development finance institution) manage financial co-operation (OECD, 2022[121]). Together, the two institutions deliver most of the bilateral co-operation projects in collaboration with partner countries’ governments and other key stakeholders. In addition, Germany’s International Climate Initiative (IKI) (Box 2.6) plays a key role in funding international climate action and biodiversity conservation. To a lesser extent, other ministries, including BMUV or BMEL, also contribute to adaptation action in other countries through a mainstreaming approach (Bundesregierung, 2020[40]). Engaging with local partners and beneficiaries is also a key factor in many GIZ projects to ensure alignment and sustainability. Moreover, Germany supports a large number of multilateral organisations and initiatives, including the work of various OECD bodies (e.g. DAC, OECD Development Centre).

For many years until now, Germany has contributed to the implementation of the Paris Agreement by supporting partner countries in formulating and implementing Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), long-term strategies, resilience plans and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) under the umbrella of the NDC Partnership. It has supported the NAP Global Network for nearly one decade, and continues to do so. Germany also collaborates with the Vulnerable Twenty Group of countries (V20) and the Africa Adaptation Initiative. In addition, it is a member of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and the Adaptation Action Coalition. Many other projects and policy dialogue platforms contribute to advancing Germany’s global climate agenda, including the International Climate Club, which was initiated by Germany within its G7 presidency. Germany is committed to promoting a just energy transition and supports several long-term Just Energy Transition Partnerships to support the decarbonisation efforts of emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia, South Africa).

Within Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2022, G7 countries committed to establish the Global Shield against Climate Risks, in partnership with the V20. The initiative, launched at COP27, aims to scale up insurance availability to support developing countries in addressing climate-related loss and damage. It follows up on recommendations in “Managing climate risks, facing up to losses and damages”, an OECD study. The study, initiated by the BMZ, calls for enhancing global climate and disaster risk finance and insurance (OECD, 2021[126]). Moreover, Germany is the largest supporter of the precursor to the Global Shield, the InsuResilience Global Partnership (EUR 800 million), which aims to give 500 million poor people access to insurance against extreme weather impacts by 2025. InsuResilience also supports the African Risk Capacity, an insurance pool which offers financial risk protection against the financial effects of droughts for African countries.

In the area of NbS, the BMZ allocates funding through bilateral projects and supports international initiatives such as the Legacy Landscapes Fund, the Blue Action Fund, the Global Fund for Coral Reefs, the African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative (AFR100) and the Alliance for Development and Climate. In addition, it launched a new initiative on “Restoration of Ecosystems and Nature-based Solutions” in 2022.

In line with the “leaving no one behind” principle, Germany supports several initiatives for marginalised population groups (e.g. Indigenous peoples and local communities, Alliance of Small Island States, Sahel Alliance, early warning systems in least developed countries). Germany has been the biggest contributor of the Least Developed Countries Fund (World Bank, 2023[127]). Between 2001 and 2021, Germany pledged EUR 415 million to the Least Developed Countries Fund and is in absolute terms, the largest contributor to that fund. (Deutsche Klimafinanzierung, 2022[128]; World Bank, 2023[127]). The 2021 OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review recommended that Germany develop further guidance and monitor more closely the extent to which its investments contribute to reducing poverty and inequality (OECD, 2021[129]).

Within Germany’s Sustainable Development Strategy, national voluntary assessments measure progress towards achieving the SDGs abroad. They provide a detailed target-by-target analysis of the impact of Germany’s development co-operation. The 2021 OECD-DAC peer review suggests that Germany could be more systematic in addressing the spillover effects of its policies on developing countries (OECD, 2021[129]). This is particularly true for environmental impacts along the supply chain (Box 1.10).

Within the BMZ 2030 reform, Germany developed standardised indicators to measure the impact of its co-operation activities across various countries and sectors. They also cover climate and environment-related core areas, providing an overview on the achievement of different metrics towards climate change mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity conservation. For example, they measure the number of people trained to adapt to climate change impacts or the additional square kilometres of natural protection (OECD, 2021[130]). As of 2022, use of these indicators has become mandatory. It would be interesting to capitalise on this process and compare the indicators with ongoing work within the BMUV aimed at developing adaptation indicators for domestic policy implementation (Section 2.2.5). Several other initiatives are underway. For example, Germany’s Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) integrates climate-related aspects into its assessment of the German REDD+ and climate adaptation engagements. Results and recommendations are fed into new implementation processes, a formalised system for planning steps to implement evaluation findings (OECD, 2021[130]).

Despite progress, there is room for greater exchange of experience in the implementation of climate, biodiversity and NbS policies. This includes reciprocal knowledge exchanges between Germany’s sectoral agencies and its development co-operation agencies. So far, there has been no institutionalised process for learning from Germany’s international actions to facilitate domestic policy development due to capacity constraints and the separation of financing responsibilities. However, Germany is exploring the creation of dialogue platforms to encourage exchange of experience between Germany’s development practitioners and key stakeholders involved in national adaptation and NbS initiatives. This could be a positive development, facilitating incorporation of international lessons to enhance the impact and effectiveness of domestic policy. Other learning frameworks for South-South knowledge exchange (e.g. NAP Global Network) should also be further developed. There is a huge opportunity to improve the sharing of good practices and lessons learnt more systematically across different countries and regions.

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Notes

← 1. Heat stress exposure (UTCI > 32°C) over the period 2017-21 compared to the reference period 1981-2010.

← 2. Accounts for direct and indirect economic losses due to reduced yields of winter wheat, silage maize and field crops.

← 3. The exact amount is dependent on the climate scenario assumed (weak, medium, strong); numbers are measured in terms of cumulative changes in real GDP.

← 4. Exposure determines the degree to which a population, physical assets or ecosystems are exposed to climate hazards, while vulnerability refers to the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected by a climate hazard (IPCC, 2022[106]).

← 5. Measures included in the calculation are those set out in the latest Adaptation Action Plan (III) (assuming a “realistic” implementation) as well as potential adaptation opportunities identified for 29 key climate impacts assessed in the KWRA 2021.

← 6. Data is based on definition of protected area from the IUCN: “Data is based on World Database on Protected Areas” (WDPA).

← 7. Findings in this report were developed on the basis of a draft version of the ANK that was published in September 2022.

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