4. How triangular co-operation contributes to biodiversity and climate change goals

Climate change and biodiversity loss are ranked as among the most pertinent threats to humanity and form a twin crisis (Pörtner et al., 2021[1]). The public and private resources needed to address climate change, biodiversity loss and land degradation are estimated to be between USD 103 billion to USD 824 billion annually – a stark reminder of the scale of the effort required (Díaz et al., 2019[2]; Achampong, 2023[3]; OECD, 2023[4]; IPCC, 2023[5]).

Key global conventions recognise triangular co-operation (TrC) as an important co-operation modality for addressing climate change and biodiversity. Available data show that partners frequently engage in triangular co-operation to address green and climate-related issues. While still relatively small, the volume of development finance committed to green projects and programmes is increasing and makes up a significant share of total triangular co-operation. Green triangular co-operation offers great potential especially for small island developing states (SIDS), which are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and depend on strong global alliances to advocate for their needs and interests. The modality’s ability to deliver technical diplomacy (Chapter 1), support multi-sectoral approaches and engage numerous stakeholders including local communities is also highly valued in the context of environmental challenges. But there is a need to enhance understanding of TrC; improve reporting, monitoring and evaluation of TrC engagements; and raise awareness of the added value of the modality to scale up its use in addressing environmental, climate and biodiversity challenges.

According to the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), OECD DAC members committed USD185.9 million to climate-related triangular co-operation between 2016-21. This is official development assistance (ODA) that is focused on climate adaptation and/or mitigation. While the volumes are relatively small, climate-related triangular co-operation commitments have increased from USD 56 000 in 2016, when the CRS reporting code for triangular co-operation was introduced, to USD 67 million in 2021. It also makes up a relatively large share of all triangular co-operation: 40% on average of all DAC members reported triangular co-operation between 2016-21 was climate-related1 (Figure 4.1).

Thirteen DAC members reported engaging in climate-focused triangular co-operation in the six years between 2016-21. In volume terms, the largest provider of climate-focused triangular co-operation was the European Union (EU), which committed USD 89 million: 89% of the EU’s triangular co-operation commitments were climate-focused.2 The next-largest providers in terms of volume over this period were Canada (USD 34 million) and Norway (USD 31 million). Three DAC members committed all or nearly all of their triangular co-operation to climate-focused activities: Italy committed 100%, of its triangular co-operation commitments to climate-focused activities, Korea 99% and Austria 98%.

CRS data also show that DAC members committed 45% of their climate-related triangular co-operation between 2016-21 to activities that supported both climate adaptation and mitigation; 36% to adaptation-only activities; and 19% to mitigation-only activities.3 Most climate-focused triangular co-operation projects (59%) had tackling climate change as their principal objective; 41% had this as a significant objective.4

According to CRS data, USD 13.8 million or 3% of DAC members’ triangular co-operation between 2016-21 was biodiversity-related.5 Most of this TrC (64%) was also focused on climate adaptation and/or mitigation activities. Eight DAC donors reported biodiversity-focused triangular co-operation between 2016-21.6

The OECD project repository, open to a wider set of countries than the CRS, also suggests that partners often engage in triangular co-operation to address environmental issues. Of the more than 1 000 triangular co-operation projects reported to this voluntary database between 2000-22, 30% focused on environmental issues, a category that includes more than climate adaptation and mitigation. The repository shows 72 countries and 60 international organisations engaged in environment-focused triangular co-operation projects over this period. It is not possible to disaggregate the data to determine how many were climate-related versus biodiversity-related projects.

The largest share of climate-related triangular co-operation between 2016-21 engaged partners in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (48%), according to the CRS data, followed by sub-Saharan Africa (35%) and Asia-Pacific (16%) (Figure 4.2). Climate-focused triangular co-operation activities made up 64% of all triangular co-operation commitments to LAC, with the largest volume focused on activities that target both adaptation and mitigation. The Asia-Pacific region had the highest volume of commitments targeting mitigation-only activities while sub-Saharan Africa had the largest volume of commitments targeting adaptation-only activities.

On the other hand, the largest share of biodiversity-focused triangular co-operation went to the Asia-Pacific region (42%) followed by LAC (22%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (21%).

Data from the project repository show that the largest share of environment-related triangular co-operation projects engaged partners in LAC (42%) followed by multi-regional (29%) and sub-Saharan Africa (16%).

According to the CRS, general environment protection is the main focus for climate-related triangular co-operation, accounting for 42% of DAC donor commitments. This sector includes multi-sector and cross-cutting environmental programmes and activities such as environmental policy and administration and environmental education, training and research. The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector received 20% of commitments, followed by education (16%) and energy (12%) (Figure 4.3).

The focus of environment-related triangular co-operation projects registered in the OECD project repository is similar, though the sector categories differ slightly from those used in the CRS. The largest share of environment-related projects in the repository focused on environmental protection (22%), followed by agriculture and food security (15%) and government and civil society (14%) (Figure 4.4).

The 2015 Paris Agreement emphasises the importance of international co-operation to jointly combat climate change but does not mention triangular co-operation explicitly. However, in 2018, the Technology Executive Committee of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledged the key role that South-South and triangular co-operation can play in combating climate change (UN, 2018[8]). Earlier, in its 2011-20 strategic plan, the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2012[9]) had recognised triangular co-operation as an important instrument.

Ahead of the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) in 2021, some international partnerships pursued in the context of the UNFCCC – for instance, the 2021 Green Partnership on energy, climate and the environment between the EU and Morocco – also mentioned triangular co-operation as a lever to encourage stronger commitment to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and collectively advance the global climate agenda (European Commission, 2021[10]). And more recently, Target 20 of the Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022, formally calls for South-South, North-South and triangular co-operation (UNEP, 2022[11]).

Many green triangular projects take a strong cross-sectoral approach, addressing climate change, biodiversity and often other Sustainable Development Goals simultaneously. The cross-sectoral approach is in line with current strategic approaches within the biodiversity and climate community to foster action across sectors and avoid sector silos. It is also an added value of green triangular co-operation. Partners are engaging in green triangular co-operation projects to tackle a wide array of environmental issues (OECD, 2023[7]). Examples of projects with a primary focus on climate mitigation include:

  • technological innovations in the area of energy efficiency (India, Malawi, United Kingdom)

  • micro and mini hydropower plants for rural electrification (Indonesia, Tanzania, United Nations Industrial Development Organization)

  • renewable energy technology transfer (China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Zambia, UN Development Programme)

  • decarbonisation of the economy through sustainable urban mobility, transport electrification, waste management and energy efficiency (Costa Rica, Germany, Spain).

Examples of triangular projects with a primary focus on climate adaptation include:

  • climate risk planning and strategies covering multiple sectors (Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, United States, Zimbabwe)

  • disaster risk management and early warning systems (Brazil, Germany, Mozambique)

  • strengthening geospatial information infrastructure in the Association of Caribbean States (Chile, China, Mexico and the UN Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Information Management)

  • community-based disaster management in Asia covering multiple sectors (Bangladesh, China, Nepal, United Kingdom)

  • assisting small-scale farmers to adapt to climate change through sustainable agriculture techniques and appropriate technology (Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Norway, Sri Lanka, Thailand)

  • increased cotton production on less-productive agricultural land (Bangladesh, Türkiye, Islamic Development Bank). Box 4.1 discusses this last project.

Biodiversity, with a specifically strong cross-sectoral approach, is often part of green triangular projects. Examples of such projects include:

  • alternative practices to the use of fire in the Amazon (Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Italy, Development Bank of Latin America)

  • enhanced management and conservation of forests in the Andes while improving adaptation and mitigation strategies (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Switzerland, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

  • evergreen revolution to address global food security (Africa, India, United States)

  • ecosystem-based adaptation (China, Mauritania, Nepal, Seychelles, Green Environmental Fund)

  • natural resource management and clean technology solutions (India, Malawi, United Kingdom)

  • improved environmental, social and labour standards for the textile industry (China, Ethiopia, Germany, UN Industrial Development Organization)

  • competitiveness of small and medium enterprise suppliers in value chains, including environmental sustainability practices (ANTAD.biz platform, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico)

  • sustainable coffee production in Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique (Brazil, Mozambique, Portugal)

  • effective agricultural policies aligned with climate change policies that enhance food security and adaptation and mitigation co-benefits (Malawi, Viet Nam, the EU, Food and Agriculture Organization)

  • strengthened capacities for the application of the principles of Access and Benefit Sharing (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Germany)

  • handling marine litter from the fishing industry (Sri Lanka, India, Norway)

  • recovery and protection of reefs (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Germany, Honduras). (Box 4.2)

Another added value of triangular co-operation is that it enables multiple stakeholders to collaborate effectively, building trust and sharing vital knowledge, experiences and resources. As is the case for triangular co-operation in general, a large portion (40%) of the green triangular co-operation projects involve one or more non-state actors, according to data from the OECD repository (OECD, 2023[7]). These partners may be subnational actors, civil society, philanthropic organisations, or actors from academia, research institutions and the private sector (Figure 4.5). The participation of sector expert organisations and local actor organisations can ensure effective implementation as they may share similar contexts and challenges and/or may have worked together before.

The private sector, whose expertise and resources give it a pivotal role in achieving environmental goals, has been engaged in 38 of the 298 (13%) green triangular co-operation projects (i.e., those with primary or secondary green objectives) documented in the OECD repository between 2000-22.

Achieving global climate and biodiversity goals depends heavily on local actors. Indigenous traditional knowledge systems, for example, contribute to enhanced understanding of how to preserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems (UN, 2007[18]; Thaman et al., 2013[19]; Reyes-García et al., 2022[20]). Moreover, representative or community-based organisations are accountable to their communities (Ali, 2023[21]).

The collaborative working spirit of triangular co-operation closely aligns with the concept of locally led development (or localisation) in the green sector and beyond. Increasingly, many development and environmental organisations are supporting important global initiatives to shift ownership and benefits towards local stakeholders (Vij, 2023[22]; USAID, 2022[23]; FAO, 2016[24]). There are no available statistics on how many triangular co-operation projects foster or build on locally led development schemes. The project examples highlighted in this chapter, however, indicate that local stakeholders are frequently considered and included stakeholders in green triangular co-operation projects. For example, in Principe, the autonomous and ultra-peripheral region of the Sao Tome and Principe, a carbon sustainability roadmap with over 39 mitigation measures was created that involved 70 local actors (Box 4.3).

One of the most important added values of triangular co-operation is its ability to build trust. This modality can help to solidify political ties between partners, which in turn can assist in strengthening the delivery of international agreements on biodiversity as well as climate goals and further align development and green agendas. A recurring question in the framework of the Conferences of Parties for biodiversity and climate is how different actors, with potentially incompatible agendas and procedures, can best make decisions together and align to common goals.

In triangular co-operation, a wide variety of (new) partnerships between countries from all regions work together for concrete impacts, as illustrated by the many examples in this chapter of existing green partnerships and exchanges. Triangular engagement is a form of technical diplomacy (Chapter 1), with the technical collaboration often strengthening political ties between partners beyond the development projects. As highlighted in Chapter 3, several countries have established governmental bodies and national strategies for South-South and triangular co-operation and see triangular engagement as an important part of their foreign policy. Thus, green triangular co-operation projects and activities generate ground-level green impacts and also potentially contribute to political alignment between parties to the climate (UNFCCC) and biodiversity conventions.

Green triangular co-operation with SIDS7 is gaining importance within triangular co-operation partner networks. The data in the OECD CRS show that 49% of screened triangular co-operation with SIDS was environment-focused between 2016-2021, 16% was climate-related and 13% biodiversity-focused.8

The OECD repository data on triangular co-operation shows that almost 20% of all environment-related triangular co-operation projects registered since 2010 have engaged with SIDS as partners (58 out of 298 registered green projects). The Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and Fiji were among the SIDS most frequently involved in green triangular co-operation projects (Figure 4.6). The environment-related triangular co-operation projects with SIDS covered diverse sectors (Figure 4.7), with environmental protection, agriculture and food security as well as energy accounting for over 50%.

Green triangular co-operation can respond to the need of SIDS for strong global alliances to advocate for their needs and legitimate interests in the context of climate change. Among all developing country groupings, SIDS suffer the most from the impacts of climate change but are responsible for only 0.2% of the global carbon emissions (UN, 2023[25]). They are more likely to experience the most intense tropical cyclones, storm surges, droughts, changing precipitation patterns, sea level rise, coral bleaching and invasive species, all of which are already detectable across both natural and human systems. Ecosystems degradation will amplify the vulnerability of island peoples to climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projects an 18 to 40 centimetre sea level rise by 2050 and an extinction risk of up to 100% for endemic species within insular biodiversity hotspots by 2100 (IPCC, 2022[26]). SIDS are typically highly dependent on a single nature-dependent economic structure to thrive such as agriculture, tourism or fishing, making environmental degradation a potentially grave risk to economies and well-being. As such, SIDS are among those countries that are most directly exposed to the risk of a collapse in the ecosystem services provided by biodiversity (Nori et al., 2022[27]; Lee et al., 2022[28]; OECD, 2023[29]).

Due to their vulnerabilities, SIDS often take a lead on the world stage to raise awareness about the climate crisis. For three decades, leaders of SIDS have been at the forefront of advocacy for a new measurement that truly recognises countries’ ecological and economic vulnerability (UN, 2023[25]). As triangular co-operation fosters new political alliances at the project level, this modality can potentially also benefit the climate agenda of SIDS at the global level. An example is outlined in Box 4.3.

With their small populations and often extremely peripherical locations, SIDS also face specific challenges of connection and connectivity. Triangular co-operation provides an opportunity for SIDS to overcome isolation and be part of collaborative activities beyond mere advocacy for SIDS needs. The triangular setting provides a broader range of contacts than bilateral partnerships, in many cases connecting regional and global networks and contacts (Box 4.3 and Box 4.4).

Finally, triangular co-operation is a vital modality for transferring knowledge and technology to SIDS to help with climate mitigation and adaptation and biodiversity loss. Thanks to a triangular co-operation project, for instance, Indonesia was able to transfer its technology on solar-powered boats to Fiji, transforming the islands’ fishing practices.9

Regional co-operation of SIDS in the Caribbean is mainly fostered by Caricom and in the Pacific by the Pacific Island Forum, both established in the beginning of the 1970s to strengthen collective voices and political and economic co-operation. No comparative structure with SIDS members exists in Africa.

Caricom has been involved in several triangular co-operation projects and activities over the last decade. Most recently, in December 2022, the group affirmed the importance of strengthening South-South, bilateral, regional and triangular co-operation and programmes for development in the Bridgetown Declaration of the 8th Caricom-Cuba Summit in Barbados (Caricom, 2022[31]). For monitoring and reporting on triangular co-operation in the region, the Ibero-American General Secretariat plays a very important role (SEGIB, 2023[32]).

The Pacific Island Forum 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (Pacific Islands Forum, 2022[33]) includes climate change and disasters as well as ocean and environment as two out of seven thematic areas. Strategic pathways include partnerships and co-operation in general. The Pacific Islands Development Forum, a multipartite platform for Pacific leaders and representatives, has a strategic plan 2019 to 2030 in which South-South co-operation as well as green and blue projects are important pillars (Pacific Islands Development Forum, 2019[34]). In the region, triangular co-operation is mainly conceptualised as a tool to support South-South co-operation in which Pacific Islands member countries often engage with bigger countries such as China and India as providers of South-South co-operation through South-South Trust Funds managed by the UN Office for South-South Cooperation10 (Borg, 2019[35]). Several triangular activities address biodiversity and climate challenges, among them the project presented in Box 4.4).

To further exploit the potential for green and blue triangular co-operation for SIDS, especially in Africa and the Pacific regions, there is a need for more systematic reporting on triangular co-operation with SIDS and monitoring and evaluation of its impacts in order to raise awareness of the modality. Strong and sustainable regional co-ordination as well as efforts to further conceptualise, formalise and operationalise the triangular co-operation modality could be highly beneficial for all SIDS (Anderson and Swanepoel, 2022[36]).

Climate change and biodiversity loss rank among the most significant threats to humanity and require broad whole-of-government, multi-stakeholder, and cross-sectoral strategies and genuine collaboration.

A wide range of governments, international organisations and other stakeholders are already deploying triangular co-operation to tackle environmental, climate and biodiversity challenges. The modality fosters co-ownership and co-leadership that can enable local action. It often supports cross-sectoral approaches and can help build greater political trust among diverse partners, which is key to collaborative global action to achieve climate and biodiversity goals. To fully capitalise on the strengths of triangular co-operation and scale up its use for addressing environmental, climate and biodiversity challenges, there is a need for the following:

  • Guidance is needed on what constitutes (green) triangular co-operation as well as improved reporting processes by all stakeholders at the national, regional and global levels (Chapter 2).

  • There should be greater use of monitoring and evaluation of triangular co-operation’s impacts on climate and biodiversity to encourage greater use of the modality by the green community. Such monitoring and reporting could specifically focus on capturing measurable achievements in the areas of cross-sectoral action, multi-actor engagement, private and financial sector action, specific needs of SIDS, and ownership and leadership of local actors for biodiversity and climate governance.

  • Greater efforts are required to raise awareness among a wider range of stakeholders about the added value of green triangular co-operation, especially for building political trust to further align green agendas across sectors, countries and regions. At the national level, stakeholders include environment and international development ministries as well as agriculture, trade, economy, energy and finance ministries. At the global level, awareness should be enhanced within high-level green platforms and initiatives such as the implementation of the roadmap of the Global Biodiversity Framework; the upcoming UNFCCC meetings (COP28 and following); and the Group of Twenty meetings to be held in Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025.

References

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Notes

← 1. Since 1998, the DAC has monitored development finance flows targeting the objectives of the Rio Conventions on biodiversity, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity and desertification. For purposes of this report, climate-related commitments refer to the Rio Markers for climate adaptation and climate mitigation. The formula applied avoids double counting by discounting all commitments marked as contributing to both climate adaptation and mitigation. More information on the Rio Markers can be found https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Revised%20climate%20marker%20handbook_FINAL.pdf.

← 2. The EU Euroclima+ programme includes triangular co-operation activities as one mode of delivery in its workstreams on national Paris Agreement commitments in Latin America and the Caribbean in multiple sectors.

← 3. In comparison, DAC members as a whole allocated on average 22% of their total bilateral allocable ODA to activities that supported both climate adaptation and mitigation, 42% to adaptation-only and 33% to mitigation-only activities.

← 4. In the CRS, an activity can be marked as contributing to one of the Rio Markers in a principal or significant way. In the former, the objective (climate change mitigation or adaptation) is explicitly stated as fundamental in the design of or the motivation for the activity. In the latter, the objective (climate change mitigation or adaptation) is explicitly stated but is not the fundamental driver or motivation for undertaking the activity, which has other prime objectives but has been formulated or adjusted to help meet the relevant climate concerns. See https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Revised%20climate%20marker%20handbook_FINAL.pdf.

← 5. To avoid double counting, biodiversity commitments are not added with climate-related commitments.

← 6. The eight are Austria, EU institutions, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Portugal.

← 7. This report considers 35 SIDS that are or were recently included in the DAC list of ODA recipients. Of these 31 contexts were still on the list in 2022 (Belize, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Montserrat, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). The remaining four graduated from the DAC list of in 2018, 2020 and 2022 but are nonetheless considered in this analysis (Seychelles, Cook Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and Palau).

← 8. As noted, the percentages should not be added together as this may lead to double counting.

← 9. Information based on stakeholder interview with the Pacific Islands Development Forum, June 2023

← 10. Information was confirmed through interviews with the Pacific Islands Development Forum.

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