1. Institutional and legal framework

Abstract

This section will provide an overview of the institutional and legal framework of competition law in the Dominican Republic. After describing the main features of the country, it will analyse the origin of the Competition Act and its scope of application, as well as how Pro-Competencia is structured, including its internal set-up, resources, and staff. Finally, it will cover regulators with powers to enforce competition law within their sectors, as well as specificities related to the area of intellectual property (IP) rights.

1.1. Country context

The Dominican Republic is the second largest country in the Caribbean with a surface of 48 671 km2, and the third largest by population, with approximately 10.7 million people. It occupies the eastern two thirds of the island of Hispaniola, situated between Puerto Rico and Cuba. Haiti, an independent republic, covers the other third part of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Caribbean Sea to the south. The Capital city, Santo Domingo, became the site of the first permanent European settlement in the Americas and the first seat of Spanish colonial rule in 1492. The Dominican Republic became an independent state on 27 February 1844.

The Dominican Republic is a representative democracy. The executive power is exercised by the government and the legislative power is vested in the bicameral National Congress, composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The judiciary exercises its supervisory power independently from the executive and the legislature.

The Constitution of the Dominican Republic (Constitución de la República Dominicana) was promulgated on 6 November 1844 and amended 39 times since then. It consists of a preamble and fifteen titles, which are divided into chapters and sections comprising 277 articles, as well as twenty transitory provisions. The latest version of the Constitution dates back from 13 June 2015.

In the last decade, the Dominican Republic was the third fastest growing economy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 2013 and 2019, the country grew at an average annual rate of around 6% (IDB, 2021[1]). Economic expansion was largely driven by macroeconomic stability and a deeper integration in the global economy, with substantial foreign direct investment flows, the development of free trade zones 1 and the growth of tourism and mining (OECD, 2022[2]).

In 2022, GDP grew 4.9%, mainly driven by services. In particular, the tourism sector grew 24% in 2022, supported by an active government vaccination campaign during the Covid-19 pandemic, and a recovery in global tourism. Expansionary fiscal policy also contributed to growth (World Bank, 2023[3]).

Despite the strong and sustained economic growth and social improvements in the two last decades, the Dominican Republic still faces challenges related to poverty and inequality. For example, poverty was reduced between 2004 and 2019, but was aggravated due to the pandemic (Figure 1.1), even though the Dominican Republic has increased its capacity to protect the most vulnerable and strengthened social protection tools (OECD, 2022[2]).

Figure ‎1.1. Fast growth in income per capita vs. slow decline of poverty and inequality

Labour informality is also a critical and lasting challenge in the Dominican Republic. Informal employment rate was 59% in 2021, slightly above the average level observed in Latin America and the Caribbean of 56.5% (OECD, 2022[2]).

As in most economies worldwide, inflation is also a major challenge in the coming years. End-of-year inflation reached 7.8% in 2022, bypassing the Central Bank’s target range of 4.1%. The cost of the family consumption basket increased 23.5% in 2022, compared to 2019, with the poorest being the most affected. To face price increases, the country has adopted subsidies for fuels, energy, transport, and basic food products, widening the fiscal deficit (World Bank, 2023[3]). Since the beginning of 2023, inflation has been reduced, and July’s result (i.e. 3.95%) marked the lower rate since June 2020, within the Central Bank’s target range (Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 2023[4]).

Moreover, trust in public institutions has been relatively low and volatile. Confidence in national government was particularly low in 2011 (41%), 2015 (45%) and 2019 (41%), but reached higher levels more recently, with 63% and 57% of the population having confidence in the government in 2020 and 2021, respectively. Current levels of confidence remain above the LAC (38%) and the OECD (47%) averages (OECD, 2022[2]).

Finally, the market concentration in the country is above the regional average, being more prominent in food processing industries, fuel production, constructions materials, as well as in the telecommunications, ports, domestic transport, electricity, and financial sectors (OECD, 2022[2]). As explained in Sections 1.5 and 2.1 below, competition law in some of these sectors is enforced by sector regulators and has not been effectively applied.

1.2. Origins and foundations

As in many other Latin American and Caribbean countries, free and fair competition is a constitutional right in the Dominican Republic, although the Dominican Constitution has an unusual provision that prohibits monopolies except for those established by law to benefit the state and protect the national security (Article 50 of Dominican Constitution). So far, legal monopolies have been established in the following areas: drinking water, sewage, radio spectrum, mining, postal service, electricity transmission and distribution, and highways. The State must encourage and ensure free and fair competition by adopting the necessary measures to prevent the harmful and restrictive effects of the legal monopolies and abuses of a dominant position. It should be noted that in practice the interpretation of this constitutional provision is that holding a monopoly (or dominant) position is not itself illegal and only its abuse can be sanctioned.2

Discussions on a draft competition act started in 1996 as part of a project to develop a Market Order Code (Código de Ordenamiento del Mercado), compiling rules on several economic areas, including competition. In 2005, after long and unsuccessful debates in Congress, the Executive Branch decided to extract the draft competition act from the Market Order Code and propose a stand-alone text. The Dominican Competition Act was finally adopted in 2008, providing for the creation of the Dominican competition authority, Pro-Competencia (National Commission for the Defence of Competition, Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia),3 to be led by the Board of Directors (Consejo Directivo), the decision-making body, and the Executive Director (Director Ejecutivo), the head of the investigatory body. During the legislative process, some important elements of competition policy, particularly a merger control regime, were removed from the legal text (Pagán, 2017[5]).

Although the Competition Act has been enacted in 2008, Pro-Competencia’s first Board of Directors was appointed in 2011. The first Executive Director was only appointed in 2017, when the Competition Act became fully operational, as per Article 67 of the Competition Act. Between 2011 and 2017, Pro-Competencia worked to prepare the institution for the fully operation of the Competition Act, focusing mostly on advocacy initiatives.4 The first investigations against anti-competitive practices were launched by Pro-Competencia’s in 2017 and the first competition infringement decision was issued in 2018.

The Dominican Competition Act focuses on the need for regulating the competitive process to achieve economic efficiency with the ultimate goal of protecting consumer welfare. The preambles of the Competition Act also refer to the competition regime as a condition for the Dominican Republic to be active in the globalised economy, as well as to be part of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement.5

On 15 June 2020, the government adopted the Implementing Regulation,6 which details the procedures for the effective application of the Competition Act, in particular as regards Pro-Competencia’s competition enforcement powers.

Competition policy is part of the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development’s Strategic Development Plan 2030, which includes among its initiatives the promotion of competition, aiming at reducing costs and prices, as well as raising the competitiveness of the Dominican economy (Ministerio de Economia, 2012[6]).

1.3. Scope of application

Article 3 of the Competition Act provides for a broad substantive scope of application (i.e. the persons and entities to whom the legislation is applied). Accordingly, competition law applies to all economic agents that carry out economic activities in the Dominican Republic (including legal entities, whether public or private, for- or non-profit, national or foreign, as well as individuals when directly developing economic activities). It also applies to trade associations, state-owned companies and state authorities. Moreover, competition law applies to individuals who have participated in anti-competitive practices, either directly, as accomplices or concealers, personally or as an employee, or on behalf of a legal entity.7

The Competition Act has also extra-territorial scope, applying to economic players that operate outside the Dominican territory if the effects of their behaviour restrict competition within the national territory.

Furthermore, the Competition Act establishes that it applies to the entire economy, but only as complementary law to economic agents regulated by sectoral laws with competition law provisions (Article 2). As further explained in section 1.5, specific legislations derogate from the general competition regime established by the Competition Act and provides for special regimes in the telecommunications, financial and banking, electricity and inland transport sectors, as well as for intellectual property rights.8 In those cases, the competition enforcement powers have been granted to the respective regulators, and Pro-Competencia has no jurisdiction to apply competition law, but can engage in advocacy initiatives with the regulators (see section 3.1.1). In sum, certain sectors are subject to specific competition provisions, although the Competition Act remains applicable to fill the legal gaps of the specific competition regimes.9

Finally, there is no general competition merger control regime applied to the entire economy. Indeed, as will be discussed in section 2.1, the Competition Act does not establish a merger review system, although there exist certain merger control mechanisms enforced by regulators in the telecommunications, electricity, and financial sectors.

1.4. Pro-Competencia

As mentioned above, Pro-Competencia is the Dominican competition authority. It was created by the Competition Act in 2008 and became fully operational in 2017, as described in section 1.2.

Pro-Competencia is a decentralised and autonomous body, reporting to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and SMEs. It is a legally independent entity, with legal status and administrative, budgetary, and organisational autonomy. Pro-Competencia has competition enforcement powers, including to conduct investigations and sanction anti-competitive agreements, abuses of dominant position and unfair competition practices. Furthermore, it is responsible for promoting competition within the Dominican Republic.

Competition enforcement of Pro-Competencia is still in its early stages. Since 2017 when it became fully operational, it had opened 14 investigations against anti-competitive practices 10 and adopted two competition infringement decisions (see Section 2.2).11 In the advocacy front, Pro-Competencia has been more active both domestically and internationally (see Section 3.1).

1.4.1. Internal Structure

Like several other jurisdictions, the Dominican Republic has adopted an institutional model with a separation between adjudication and investigation functions (Jenny, 2016[7]; OECD, 2015[8]). The investigation function has been allocated to the Executive Directorate, while the decision-making power belongs to the Board of Directors.

The Executive Directorate’s main task consists of receiving and responding to complaints and conducting investigations into possible anti-competitive and unfair competition practices. The Executive Directorate also carries out market studies, drafts opinions and organises advocacy activities. In addition, the Executive Director participates as a secretary in the meetings of the Board of Directors, drafts the minutes of the meetings and prepares the Board’s draft administrative decisions.

In charge of investigations, the Executive Directorate is led by an Executive Director and composed of the following technical departments: (i) Competition Defence Unit, responsible for conducting the investigation phase and handling cases against anti-competitive and unfair competition conduct; (ii) Anti-Competitive Practices Investigations Unit, in charge of gathering evidence for the Competition Defence Unit by using the different investigations tools available, in particular dawn raids; (iii) Competition Advocacy and Promotion Unit, responsible for assessing the anti-competitive nature of national laws, state support measures, and acts of regulators, carrying out outreach activities and promoting competition in the country; (iv) Economic and Market Studies Unit, in charge of conducting market studies, providing support with economic expertise to the Competition Defence Unit, the Competition Advocacy and Promotion Unit and the Board of Directors, as well as carrying out the Observatory of Market Conditions (see section 3.1.2). In addition, the Financial Unit, the Legal Department 12 and the Planning and Development Unit provide administrative support to the Executive Directorate.

The Board of Directors’ is composed of five Directors. Its main functions include adopting infringement decisions, after the investigation phase has been concluded, as well as conducting hearings of the investigated and affected parties, witnesses, and experts. Hearing and judgement sessions are public, as well as Pro-Competencia’s infringement decisions.13 The Board of Directors is also responsible for authorising the dawn raids organised by the Executive Directorate and requesting the adoption of interim measures to the competent courts (see Section 2.3). Moreover, the Board of Directors has the power to set internal rules,14 as well as to promote competition before other government entities.15 Decisions of the Board are adopted by simple majority and all Members of the Board are required to vote and must explain the legal grounds and the reasoning behind dissenting votes.16

To support the activities of the Board of Directors, in May 2023 the Technical Management Unit was established to provide assistance with the legal and economic analysis of the decisions to be taken by the Board.17 The Board of Directors is also composed of the following support units: (i) Human Resources Unit; (ii) Institutional Relations Unit; (iii) Communications Unit; and (iv) IT Unit.

Figure ‎1.2. Pro-Competencia's organigram

1.4.2. Appointments and dismissals

The Board of Directors is composed of five members appointed for a non-renewable term of five years. Staggered rotation of Directors every three years allows for partial renewals and continuity within the Board. Members of the Board are appointed by the National Congress from a list of 10 candidates proposed by the President of the Dominican Republic. Three members are elected by the Senate and two by the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Board of Directors is elected by its members.18 The Executive Director is appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic from a list of three candidates proposed by the Board of Directors.19

Members of the Board of Directors and the Executive Director are required to meet the following eligibility criteria: (i) they must be Dominican national in possession of full civil and political rights; (ii) they must be over the age of 25; (iii) they must be a professional in law, economics, administrative sciences or finance, with specialised studies in any of the following disciplines: competition law, economic regulation, law and economics, corporate finance, alternative dispute resolution or international arbitration; (iv) they must have a credible experience of more than five years in any of the above areas or in the business practice; and, (v) they must not hold any position or employment of any nature while in office, with the exception of lecturing.20

Directors can only be removed if: (i) they have unjustifiably failed to attend six ordinary sessions per year; (ii) due to physical disability they have been unable to perform their duties for six months; (iii) they have been criminally convicted; (iv) they have been negligent in the performance of their duties; (v) they have committed fraud, illegal activities or have acted contrary to the objectives and interest of the institution.21 The National Congress has the powers for any removal.22

The technical personnel at second and third management level are appointed and removed by the Board of Directors upon proposal of the Executive Director.23

1.4.3. Incompatibilities

According to Article 28 of the Competition Act, the following individuals may not be appointed as member of the Board of Directors or as Executive Director:

a) Members of the National Congress.
b) Active members of the Judicial Branch.
c) Those who hold remunerated positions or jobs in any of the agencies of the State or municipalities, whether by election or by appointment, except for lecturing.
d) Those with a family link (by blood up to the fourth degree or by affinity up to the second degree, inclusive) to the President or Vice President of the Dominican Republic, the members of the Supreme Court of Justice or directors of sector-specific regulators.
e) Those having an active political militancy.
f) Persons who have been declared in cessation of payment or in bankruptcy, as well as those against whom bankruptcy proceedings are pending.
g) Persons declared legally or judicially incapable; or
h) Persons who are in a situation of conflict of interest due to their professional or economic activities.

Conflict of interest has only been established as an impediment for members of the Board of Directors and the Executive Director and may be invoked either by them or the investigated parties. Cases of conflict of interest are decided by the Board of Directors.24

1.4.4. Resources

The proper functioning and independence of a competition authority rely on adequate staff and budget. While competition authorities worldwide face resource constraints in some form, it is necessary to ensure that the funds are used in the most efficient way (OECD, 2009[12]).

Budget

As mentioned above, Pro-Competencia has budgetary and spending autonomy.25 Pro-Competencia is mainly financed by a budget line from the annual public budget of the government (Presupuesto de Ingresos y Ley de Gastos Públicos).26 The annual budget of the competition authority is calculated by Pro-Competencia and authorised by the General Direction for Budget (Dirección General de Prespuesto, Digepres), the government entity overseeing the budget system processes, the quality and efficiency of spending, the fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability of the Dominican Republic. Pro-Competencia may also receive funds from administrative fees, resources from international technical co-operation (e.g. agreements with foreign countries or international organisations) and the sanctions imposed on economic agents. Budget expenditure is audited by the Comptroller General of the Dominican Republic (Contraloría General de la República).27

Pro-Competencia’s budget for 2022 was approximately USD 3 million (DOP 167.4 million).28 The budget has remained nearly the same since 2018 and was frozen in 2022 due to budgetary restrictions imposed by the government after the Covid-19 pandemic (see Figure 1.3).

Figure ‎1.3. Pro-Competencia's budget 2017-2022

Pro-Competencia’s budget is considerably low for international and regional standards. Figure 1.4 below compares Pro-Competencia’s annual budget per capita for 2016 to 2021 with the budget per capita of certain groups of countries that provided data to the OECD CompStats Database,29 in particular (i) OECD countries, (ii) countries in the Latin American region; (iii) countries with GDP per capita similar to the Dominican Republic; and (iv) countries with similar number of inhabitants to the Dominican Republic. Pro-Competencia’s budget appear below in all these situations when compared to any of the indicated categories.

Figure ‎1.4. Budget per capita (2015 EUR exchange rate), 2016-2021

An important part of Pro-Competencia’s budget is allocated to salary expenses. In addition to human resources, Pro-Competencia’s budget is spent on office space, technological devices and proprietary, licensed or purchased softwares. At the time of writing, economists at the authority had requested the purchase of powerful computers that are able to run sophisticated software for data analytics. Furthermore, Pro-Competencia did not have a digital case management system. The case file was on paper format and staff from the Competition Defence Unit spent many of their working hours registering, recording and scanning case documents. Pro-Competencia had not invested on IT forensics either.

At the time of writing, Pro-Competencia had never received funds from sanctions,30 administrative fees or resources from international technical co-operation.31

Sources of funding which are not entirely dependent on the governments’ discretion may help limit political interference and, thus, reinforce the authority’s independence. As described above, in the Dominican Republic, such sources could be obtained through administrative fees (e.g. if a merger regime with filing fees is established), international technical co-operation and sanctions imposed on economic agents.

Relying entirely on these mechanisms, however, has limitations and may create other difficulties for the authorities. For instance, collecting and retaining (all or part of) the fines can be problematic as it may create perverse incentives for an agency to impose more fines (OECD, 2016[15]). The best approach is a combination of different sources of funding to reduce the risk of a single source.

Human resources

At the time of writing, Pro-Competencia’s staff was made up of 70 full-time employees. However, only around a third (35%) were assigned to the authority’s core competition activities; the rest (65%) were administrative support staff. Employees dedicated to substantive enforcement and advocacy work include: the 5 members of the Board of Directors; the Executive Director; and 19 technical staff working at the Competition Defence Unit, the Anti-Competitive Practices Investigations Unit, the Competition Advocacy and Promotion Unit and the Economic and Market Studies Unit. Except for those working at the Economic and Market Studies Unit, who have an economic and business administration background, the rest of the technical staff are lawyers. Investigations are led by lawyers with the support of economists who carry out the economic analysis of cases. Pro-Competencia has been progressively transforming administrative positions into technical ones. Indeed, the administrative support staff leaving the competition authority has not been replaced aiming to create new positions for competition activities.

The number of employees at Pro-Competencia is significantly lower than in other comparable jurisdictions, especially if support staff is not taken into account. As shown in Figure ‎1.5., the number of staff per million inhabitants for the years 2016 to 2021 in the Dominican Republic was lower than in: (i) OECD countries, (ii) countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region; (iii) countries with GDP per capita similar to the Dominican Republic; and (iv) countries with similar number of inhabitants to the Dominican Republic.

Figure ‎1.5. Number of staff per million inhabitants, 2016-2021

Except for the members of the Board of Directors and the Executive Director, employees at Pro-Competencia must go through a recruitment process carried out by the authority’s Human Resources Unit. Staff can be hired: (i) as public officials or (ii) as employees under a temporary contract. All personnel are formally hired by the Board of Directors upon recommendation of the Executive Directorate.

Only public officials can be promoted. Promotions are granted based on criteria established by the Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio de Administración Pública).32 At the time of writing, from the total number of employees at Pro-Competencia (i.e. 70 workers), there were only 10 administrative public officials, the remaining staff being temporary employees.

Pro-Competencia has expressed the need to hire more technical staff to deliver its mandate. In fact, at the time of writing, there were 18 vacant positions for technical staff at Pro-Competencia. However, these vacancies could not be filled in because the budget was spent on other items and there were no resources available to hire additional staff.

Competition law and economics are highly technical, specialised fields. To attract and retain highly skilled, staff competitive salaries and fulfilling career paths matter. Indeed, the Competition Act requires that salaries at Pro-Competencia are competitive in relation to the private sector and at the same level as the average salaries offered at other decentralised bodies.33 This, however, does not seem to be the case in practice. Salaries at Pro-Competencia are not as attractive as in the private sector and are lower than salaries offered for similar responsibility in some of the other government entities (see Table 1.1).

Table ‎1.1. Comparison of salaries of equivalent positions in different government entities
Type of position	Government entity/Monthly salary
Type of position	Pro-Competencia	Dominican Institute of Telecommunications (INDOTEL)	Superintendency of Banks
Head of the entity	USD 9 100 (DOP 500 000) (President of the Board of Directors)	USD 9 387 (DOP 515 506) (President of the Board of Directors	USD 20 874 (DOP1,145,184) (Superintendent)
Members of the decision-making body	USD 7 595 (DOP 416 667) (Members of The Board of Directors)	USD 5 859 (DOP 321 463 (Members of The Board of Directors)	N/A
Head of investigation/supervision	USD 6 749 (DOP 370 000) (Executive Director)	USD 8 178 (DOP 448,494) (Executive Director)	USD 10 962 (DOP 601 240) (Submanager of supervision)
Chief economist	USD 3 463 (DOP 190 000) (Director of Market Studies Unit)	USD 3 682 (DOP 201 999) (Head of Economic Analysis)	USD 7 828 (DOP 429 458) (Director Dept. of Economic Studies)
Source: OECD based on Pro-Competencia’s data.

Pro-Competencia’s ability to increase salary offers for public officials is limited. The level of compensation is set by the government according to grade and scale. The competition authority needs a special authorisation from the Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio de Administración Pública) and the General Directorate of Budget (Dirección Nacional de Presupuesto) to improve those salary conditions, which has never occurred in practice.

Pro-Competencia has more leeway regarding salaries of temporary staff, who are, in general, better paid than public officials. However, career development for temporary employees is uncertain as there are no clear rules regarding promotion opportunities. The turnover rate of employees at Pro-Competencia was 30% in 2022. Most technical staff have left the competition authority to work in law firms and other regulators offering better salaries.

1.4.5. Priority-setting

Strategic planning at Pro-competencia has been limited to its internal organisation. Every three years, Pro-Competencia carries out an evaluation and an internal consultation to set up its Institutional Strategic Plan (Planificación Estrátegica Institucional, PEI). This tool defines Pro-Competencia’s objectives and establishes indicators and goals for their monitoring and evaluation. These objectives must be in line with the National Development Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo), which establishes the government’s commitments, objectives and projects for the country in the next 20 years (Ministerio de Economia, 2012[6]).

Pro-Competencia’s 2021-2024 PEI (Pro-Competencia, 2021[16]) identifies two strategic lines: i) the effective creation and promotion of a culture of competition among economic agents, the State and citizens; and ii) the strengthening and effective promotion of an organisational culture among Pro-Competencia’s employees, fostering the sense of belonging through individual, group and leadership development.34 As shown in Table 1.2, under each strategic line, Pro-Competencia identifies different objectives:

Table ‎1.2. Pro-Competencia's strategic lines and objectives
Strategic line 1. Create and promote a culture of competition	Strategic line 2. Strengthen and promote organisational culture within the authority
Objective 1.1. Strengthen competition enforcement tools for the detection of anti-competitive practices and instruction of procedures.	Objective 2.1. Complete the structural needs of human resources for the promotion of institutional identity and belonging.
Objective 1.2. Raise competition awareness of key groups through active participation in the national agenda.	Objective 2.2. Improve the working environment to improve work performance and institutional activities.
Objective 1.3. Design, develop and promote economic analysis and competition intelligence reports.	Objective 2.3. Strengthen technical and cross-cutting capabilities in leadership management and target occupational groups through development programs.
Objective 1.4. Promotion of inter-institutional technical assistance on competition issues.
Source: OECD based on Pro-Competencia (2021[16]), Plan Estrategico Institucional 2021-2024, https://procompetencia.gob.do/transparencia/plan-estrategico-institucional/#44-45-wpfd-planificacion-estrategica-institucional.

Indicators to measure the attainment of those objectives are based on the number of actions undertaken. For example, the indicator to measure whether Pro-Competencia has met objective 1.1 (i.e. strengthen competition enforcement tools for the detection of anti-competitive practices and instruction of procedures) is the number of investigations rejected in relation to the number of investigations opened.

The Competition Act does not allow Pro-Competencia to set its own priorities regarding enforcement actions, namely as regards the complaints received. Indeed, the authority is required to investigate, at least preliminarily, all complaints and cannot reject them based on priority grounds.35 The lack of clear priorities is also favouring a trend within Pro-Competencia to be reactive rather than proactive in its ex-officio investigations (see section 2.4.1). In fact, investigations are often opened in response to news in the media or a punctual government action. This affects the investigations team’s case-planning, which often has to suspend on-going investigations to focus on the new urgent cases. According to some stakeholders, this reactive approach has negatively impacted the effectiveness of competition enforcement in the Dominican Republic.

The large amount of complaints competition authorities receive can create a heavy workload. For that reason, it is relevant that competition authorities are able to decide which cases will be investigated and which cases can be dropped based on pre-established priorities. The level of discretion enjoyed by competition authorities in setting priorities varies from one jurisdiction to another. Likewise, the criteria used by competition authorities to set priorities diverge. Some examples of those criteria include: the nature of the case, the geographic impact, the relevance of the evidence, the importance of the sector affected by the infringement, the size of the market or if the claim deals with a novel issue or a new type of infringement. Overall, competition authorities set their priorities focusing on strategically important sectors from a competition law perspective. Other public interests and the views of other public institutions may be taken into consideration during the priority-setting process, but competition authorities safeguard the right to set its own criteria independently (OECD, 2015[17]).

Box ‎1.1. Prioritisation criteria for competition enforcement and advocacy in Mexico

Every three years, the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Commission (Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, COFECE), makes public its priority-setting criteria and the economic sectors and areas it will prioritise.

Thanks to the priority-setting exercise, COFECE can focus the use of resources on actions that produce impactful results rendering its operations more effective.

COFECE’s 2022-2025 Strategic Plan sets the following criteria for prioritisation of competition work: (i) contribution to economic growth; (ii) generalised consumption; (iii) transversality; (iv) impact on lower-income population; (v) regulated sectors; (vi) prevalence of anti-competitive conducts; and (vii) international trends in competition matters.

By applying these criteria, COFECE has identified eight priority sectors for 2022-2025: (i) food and beverages sector; (ii) transport and logistics sector; (iii) financial sector; (iv) construction and real-estate services sector; (v) energy sector; (vi) health sector; (vii) public procurement; and (viii) digital markets.

COFECE also promotes accountability of its priority-setting agenda, by being transparent on the criteria used for this purpose and submitting its Strategic Plan for public consultation, which allows relevant stakeholders to participate in the priority setting process.

Source: COFECE (2022[18]), Strategic Plan 2022-2025, https://www.cofece.mx/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/PE2022-2025-ing-VF.pdf.

1.5. Regulators with competition powers

As previously mentioned, a few specific legislations establish their own competition law provisions, derogating some sectors (i.e. telecommunications, electricity, financial and banking, as well as inland transport) and intellectual property rights from the general competition law regime.

However, the way specific competition provisions were drafted are divergent, resulting in a patchwork of different competition regimes, with different sets of competition rules. For instance, while some of them only prohibit unfair competition practices, others also cover anti-competitive behaviour and/or ex-ante merger control. The powers to enforce those competition provisions have been granted to the respective regulators, who shall apply the Competition Act as a complementary law to fill the gaps of the specific competition regimes.36 Pro-Competencia has no jurisdiction to apply competition law in relation to conducts taking place in these sectors, although it may be consulted and issue non-binding opinions to sector regulators in relation to their competition enforcement actions (see section 3.1.1).

The institutional set-up of the Dominican Republic can deliver some benefits (e.g. it may allow the regulators to use a variety of tools to address a competition concern and foster a competition culture in sector regulation), but it raises a number of challenges, such as the risk of inconsistent enforcement of competition law across different sectors, legal uncertainty and duplication of resources to develop competition policy expertise in each sector regulator. For those reasons, this model is unusual in OECD countries. Indeed, the most widespread institutional model is the one where the competition authority is a stand-alone agency with responsibilities for applying competition in all sectors, which ensure a uniform approach to competition enforcement throughout the economy and reduce the risk of regulatory capture (OECD, 2022[19]).

In addition, certain stakeholders in the Dominican Republic have expressed concerns during the fact-finding mission about possible conflicting interests between sector regulation and competition enforcement, as well as the lack of competition expertise within some regulatory entities that have the powers to enforce competition law.

Co-ordination between the competition authority and the sector regulators enforcing competition provisions is regulated by the Competition Act. As further explained in Section 3.2.1, the Competition Act requires Pro-Competencia and the regulators to jointly establish a competition framework that will apply uniformly across all sectors with specific competition regimes. Nevertheless, the deadline to finalise this common competition framework (i.e. 2019) was never met.37 Instead of developing this uniform competition regime, Pro-Competencia and the sector regulators have signed bilateral institutional agreements aiming at: (i) regulating the consultation mechanism about competition enforcement actions provided for in Article 20 of the Competition Act; (ii) setting the framework for the exchange of information; and (iii) adopting joint capacity building initiatives (see Section 3.2.1).

1.5.1. Telecommunications sector

The General Telecommunications Law (Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, LGT) regulates the telecommunications sector in the Dominican Republic.38 The LGT created the Dominican Institute of Telecommunications (Instituto Dominicano de las Telecomunicaciones, INDOTEL), an autonomous and decentralised entity in charge of overseeing the telecommunications sector. The decision-making body of INDOTEL, the Board of Directors, consist of five members appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic (i.e. the President; the Minister of Economy, Planning and Development; two representatives of the regulated undertakings, being one representing the broadcasters and another representing the telecommunications service providers; and one representative of the end users). The Executive Director of INDOTEL, the authority in charge of investigations, also participates in the discussions of the Executive Board without voting rights. The presence of regulated agents’ representatives (i.e. broadcasters and telecommunication service providers) in the governing body of INDOTEL may facilitate policy capture compromising the independence of the institution.

INDOTEL is responsible for (i) promoting the development of the telecommunications infrastructure and services in the country through the implementation of the universal service principle; (ii) ensuring effective competition in the telecommunications markets; (iii) protecting consumer and end-users’ rights; and (iv) warranting the efficient use of the radio spectrum.

INDOTEL ensures effective competition in the sector as a sector regulator, by adopting regulation to establish and protect fair and free competition in the telecommunications market (ex-ante regulatory intervention).39 Furthermore, INDOTEL also operates as a competition authority, (i) controlling mergers prior to their implementation (ex-ante competition intervention) and (ii) sanctioning anti-competitive and unfair competition practices (ex-post competition intervention).40

In 2005, INDOTEL adopted a regulation to establish more detailed procedures for the enforcement of competition law in in the telecommunications sector (INDOTEL Competition Regulation).41

INDOTEL has enforcement powers in relation to both unfair competition practices and anti-competitive conduct. According to the LGT, unfair competition practice is all deliberate action aimed at harming or eliminating competitors, misleading the end user and/or gaining an unfair advantage. Unfair competition practice includes misleading or false advertising; denigration of competitors’ products or services; industrial bribery; violation of trade secrets; or acquisition of sensitive information by non-legitimate means.42

Anti-competitive practices are defined by the LGT and the INDOTEL Competition Regulation as agreements between companies or abuses of dominant position that could restrict or distort free competition in all or part of the national telecommunications market, to the detriment of suppliers and end users. The following conducts are listed in the LGT as anti-competitive practices:43

a) Discriminatory practices against third parties;
b) Limitation and impediment of the users’ right to freely choose the telecommunications provider;
c) Abuse of market power, in particular regarding essential infrastructures;
d) Predatory practices that tend to impair or effectively limit sustainable, fair and effective competition;
e) Refusal to negotiate in good faith or unjustifiably delaying negotiations.

This is a non-exhaustive list, and INDOTEL can investigate and sanction other anti-competitive practices not listed in the LGT. Anti-competitive conducts are considered as a very serious infringement by the LGT and can be sanctioned with a fine of up to approximately USD 373 000. However, this is lower than the maximum fine provided for in the Competition Act, based on the weighted average minimum wage (i.e. USD 954 000), as discussed in Section 2.4.5.44

As further explained in Section 2.1.1, INDOTEL is also in charge of reviewing mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications sector.

In addition, INDOTEL can conduct, ex officio or at the request of an interested party, market studies to assess the competition conditions of the telecommunications markets. The purpose of the market studies is to detect barriers to entry, abuses of dominant position and unfair competition practices.45

The Unit in charge of investigating anti-competitive and unfair competition conduct in INDOTEL is composed of three lawyers and two economists. Since 1998, INDOTEL has only adopted one enforcement decision related to competition law (see Box 1.2 below) and approved two mergers with conditions (see Section 2.1.1) (INDOTEL, 2016[20]; 2017[21]; 2017[22]). At the time of writing, INDOTEL had conducted one market study related to competition issues.46

Box ‎1.2. Cable TV operators’ case

In 2004, INDOTEL sanctioned 23 cable TV operators for having broadcasted content without the authorisation of the authors. According to INDOTEL, this conduct violated the Copyright Law No. 65-00 and the general principles of fair competition provided for in the LGT.

INDOTEL considered that the wrongdoing violated general competition law principles because other cable operators that had complied with the Copyright Law, obtained authorisation, and paid royalties to authors were operating under disadvantageous conditions.

According to INDOTEL, cable TV operators’ misbehaviour constituted a minor infringement of the LGT, and each economic agent was sanctioned to pay a fine of approximately USD 1 300 (DOP 72 000).

Source: INDOTEL (2004[23]), Decision No. 012-04 of 30 January 2004, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/resolucion-no-012-04.pdf.

1.5.2. Electricity sector

The General Electricity Law (Ley General de Electricidad, LGE)47 and its implementing regulation 48 govern the electricity market in the Dominican Republic. The LGE creates two governing bodies: the National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energia, CNE) and the Superintendency of Electricity (Superintendencia de Electricidad, SE).

The CNE reports to the Executive branch through the Ministry of Energy and is responsible for advising the government in relation to energy markets, preparing and co-ordinating the drafting of legal and regulatory texts, as well as proposing and adopting energy policies and standards. The SE, the sector regulator, reports to the CNE, supporting the latter in the implementation and attainment of its policy objectives, for instance by set prices subject to regulation, monitoring compliance with regulation and sanctioning those who do not follow regulation.

The CNE is composed of a Board of Directors (i.e. Minister of Industry, Commerce and SMEs, Minister of the Presidency, Minister of Finance, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Governor of the Central Bank and Director of INDOTEL) and an Executive Director, appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic.49 The SE consists of a President (also known as Superintendent of Electricity) and two members, appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic following the National Congress approval.50

In the Dominican Republic, the distribution and commercialisation of electricity are state legal monopolies, and their prices are regulated by SE. The electricity generation is the only activity in the energy sector that has been liberalised. The long-term sale of electricity to distributors are subject to public procurement and should follow the prices established therein.51 Electricity generation companies with long term contracts with distributors must sell 40% of their production in the spot market.52 Competition law enforcement in the electricity sector is in the remit of the CNE and the SE and is limited to the liberalised activity (i.e. electricity generation).

The LGE establishes that the CNE must ensure the proper functioning of the markets in the electricity sector and avoid monopolistic practices in the liberalised sector.53 The SE monitors the behaviour of the economic agents in order to avoid monopolistic practices, and sanctions those that infringes the LGE.54

According to the LGE, a monopolistic practice is any action that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the electricity market, for instance fixing of the purchase or sale prices or other transaction conditions; limiting or controlling the energy production; allocating markets; or applying unequal conditions to third parties for equivalent services.55

Monopolistic practices are considered as very serious infringements under the LGE and can be sanctioned with a fine of up to almost USD 2 million and USD 4 million in case of recidivism. These numbers are higher than the maximum fine provided for in the Competition Act (i.e. USD 954 000).56

Neither the LGE nor its implementing regulation establish a procedure to monitor or investigate potential anti-competitive practices. At the time of writing, no significant experience in enforcing competition law by the SE was identified.

The LGE and the implementing Electricity Regulation set up a mandatory notification system to monitor economic concentrations in the electricity sector (see Section 2.1.2).

1.5.3. Financial and banking sector

The financial and banking sector is regulated by the Monetary and Financial Law (Ley Monetaria y Financiera, LMF),57 which created the governing bodies of the monetary and financial system of the Dominican Republic: the Central Bank (Banco Central), the Monetary Board (Junta Monetaria) and the Superintendency of Banks (Superintendencia de Bancos). The Central Bank is at the top of the Dominican financial and banking system and oversees the monetary policy, acting as bank to the Government and other bankers and monitoring the domestic banking system. The Monetary Board sets up the concrete monetary and financial policies of the Dominican Republic. The Superintendency of Banks monitors the activity of the financial intermediation entities and their compliance with the relevant regulation.

The Monetary Board consists of 3 ex officio members (the Governor of the Central Bank, the Minister of Finance and the Superintendent of Banks) and 6 members appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic.58 The Central Bank is led by a Governor (appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic), with the support of an Executive Committee.59 The Superintendency of Banks is led by a Superintendent, appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic.60

As discussed in Section 2.1.3, the Monetary Board, upon proposal of the Superintendency of Banks, reviews mergers and acquisitions between financial intermediation entities. However, the merger review in these cases does not analyse the competition effects of the transaction, but rather focuses on other aspects, such as financial stability, digitalisation and innovation, financial inclusion, institutional efficiency and strength, consumer protection and integrity of the financial system.

The Superintendency of Banks can also investigate and sanction financial intermediation entities for engaging in misleading advertising or unfair competition practices. Sanctions for such conducts include fines of up to approximately USD 45 500 (DOP 2 500 000).61 No relevant experience in this regard had been identified at the time of writing.

Anti-competitive conduct in the financial sector, such as horizontal or vertical agreements and abuses of dominant position, fall outside the scope of the LMF and could, therefore, be investigated by Pro-Competencia. However, at the time of writing, Pro-Competencia had not taken any competition enforcement or advocacy initiative in this sector.

1.5.4. Inland transport sector

The inland transport sector is regulated by the Law on Mobility, Land Transport, Traffic and Road Safety (Ley de Movilidad, Transporte Terrestre, Tránsito y Seguridad Vial, the “Inland Transport Law”).62 The Inland Transport Law created the National Institute of Inland Transport (Instituto Nacional de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre, INTRANT), led by an Executive Director, appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic.63 The INTRANT is in charge of managing mobility, inland public and private transport, and road safety in the Dominican Republic. It is also responsible for fighting against monopolistic practices and market dominance in the sector, ensuring market entry, as well as contributing to market transparency by publishing statistics and information about prices, demand and supply.64

Despite having competition enforcement powers within the inland transport sector, the INTRANT does not have a unit or team dedicated to investigating anti-competitive practices. Since its creation, INTRANT has not launched any investigation or adopted any sanctioning decision against anti-competitive practices.

1.5.5. Intellectual property rights

Industrial Property in the Dominican Republic is regulated by the Industrial Property Law (Ley de Propiedad Industrial, LPI).65 The National Office of Industrial Property (Oficina Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial, ONAPI) is the institution responsible for enforcing the LPI and ensuring the protection of inventions by managing Industrial Property (IP) rights. ONAPI is under the direction of a Directorate, composed of five members (Minister of Industry, Commerce and SMEs, Minister of the Presidency, Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, Ministry of Culture and Education and Director of the Dominican Institute for Industrial Technology), who appoints a General Director, in charge of leading the institution.66

ONAPI has also competition enforcement powers, which includes ensuring that IP licensing contracts do not contain anti-competitive clauses 67 and granting compulsory licenses where it has determined that the patent owner had engaged in anti-competitive practices.68 According to the LPI, anti-competitive practices consist of: (i) setting the prices of the patented products at an excessive or discriminatory level; (ii) licensing IP rights under unreasonable commercial terms; (iii) using IP rights to limit the commercial or productive activities of the licensee; and (iv) any other action that the national legislation qualifies as anti-competitive conduct.69

Thus, provisions of the Competition Act defining concerted practices and agreements, as well as abuses of dominant position, should be enforced by ONAPI if they relate to IP rights, regardless of the sector in which the practices occur.

In addition, the LPI refers to unfair competition practices, which are similar to the provisions of the Competition Act. Some of the unfair competition practices contained in the LPI include the misuse of designation of origin,70 commercial or professional acts contrary to honest customs and practices;71 misuse of distinctive elements of an undertaking causing confusion or risk of association; and use of denigrating statements.72 According to the LPI, the competent authority to deal with unfair practices related to IP rights is the judicial authority, and ONAPI has no enforcement function therein.73

Main findings

The main findings on the institutional and legal framework of competition law and policy in the Dominican Republic include:

The competition law framework includes a general competition law regime (enforced by Pro-Competencia) and sector-specific competition law regimes (enforced by key sector regulators). The existing legal framework is not always consistent, resulting in a patchwork of different competition rules applicable throughout the economy.
Absence of a wide competition merger control regime applied to the entire economy, although certain merger control mechanisms exist in the telecommunications, electricity and financial sectors (only the telecommunications regulator analyses the competition effects of the transactions, while the electricity and financial sectors focus on regulatory aspects).
Pro-Competencia’s annual budget is considerably low for international and regional standards. Pro-Competencia’s staff is also lower than comparable jurisdictions and only a third of its employees are assigned to competition activities (and the rest work in other activities mainly administrative support).

References

[4] Banco Central de la República Dominicana (2023), Precios, https://www.bancentral.gov.do/a/d/2534-precios (accessed on 17 August 2023).

[18] COFECE (2022), “Strategic Plan 2022-2025”, https://www.cofece.mx/strategic-plan-2022-2025/.

[1] IDB (2021), Dominican Republic, IDB Group Country Strategy 2021-2024.

[21] INDOTEL (2017), “Decision No. 056-17”, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/res-no-056-17.pdf.

[22] INDOTEL (2017), “Decision No. 077-17”, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/res-077-17-fusion-altice-recurso-de-reconsideracion-contra-la-056-17.pdf.

[20] INDOTEL (2016), “Resolución No. 001-16”, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/resolucion-no-001-16.pdf.

[23] INDOTEL (2004), “Decision No. 012-04”, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/resolucion-no-012-04.pdf.

[7] Jenny, F. (2016), “The Institutional Design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends”, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2894893.

[6] Ministerio de Economia, P. (2012), “Ley 1-12: Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo 2030”, https://mepyd.gob.do/mepyd/wp-content/uploads/archivos/end/marco-legal/ley-estrategia-nacional-de-desarrollo.pdf.

[13] OECD (2023), OECD Competition Trends 2023, https://www.oecd.org/competition/oecd-competition-trends.htm.

[14] OECD (2023), OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index: Policy trends up to 2023, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/services-trade/.

[19] OECD (2022), “Interactions between competition authorities and sector regulators: OECD Competition Policy Roundtable Background Note”, https://www.oecd.org/competition/interactions-between-competition-authorities-and-sector-regulators.htm.

[2] OECD (2022), Multi-dimensional Review of the Dominican Republic: Towards Greater Well-being for All, OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/560c12bf-en.

[15] OECD (2016), Participation in Global Value Chains in Latin America: Implications for Trade and Trade-Related Policy, Working Party of the Trade Committee, https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/TC/WP(2015)28/FINAL&docLanguage=En.

[17] OECD (2015), OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Lithuania, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Lithuania_SOE_Review.pdf.

[8] OECD (2015), Summary Record: Annex to the Summary Record of the 123rd Meeting of the Competition Committee held on 15-19 June 2015. Key points of the Roundtables on Changes in Institutional Design, OECD Publishing, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN9/FINAL/En/pdf.

[12] OECD (2009), “OECD Global Forum on Competition: Challenges Faced by Young Competition Authorities”, https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/GFC2009-Challenges-faced-by-young-competition-authorities.pdf.

[5] Pagán, A. (2017), “Origen de la Ley de Defensa a la Competencia de la República Dominicana”, https://lalibrecompetencia.com/2017/01/17/origen-de-la-ley-de-defensa-a-la-competencia-de-la-republica-dominicana-1-de-2/.

[16] Pro-Competencia (2021), “Plan Estratégico Institucional 2021-2024”, https://procompetencia.gob.do/transparencia/plan-estrategico-institucional/#44-45-wpfd-planificacion-estrategica-institucional.

[11] Pro-Competencia (2021), Decision No. 014-2021 from 22 July 2021, https://procompetencia.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/resolucion-014-2021-firmada-y-sellada.pdf.

[9] Pro-Competencia (2021), “Organigrama”, https://procompetencia.gob.do/sobre-nosotros/organigrama/.

[10] Pro-Competencia (2020), Manual de Organización y Funciones de la Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia, https://procompetencia.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/cd-010-2020-anexo.pdf.

[3] World Bank (2023), Macro Poverty Outlook for Dominican Republic : April 2023 (English), https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e408a7e21ba62d843bdd90dc37e61b57-0500032021/related/mpo-dom.pdf.

Notes

← 1. For instance, the Dominican Republic is part of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement.

← 2. See Article 50, item 1 of the Dominican Constitution and Article 7, paragraph IV of the Competition Act.

← 3. General Law for the Defence of Competition No. 42-08 (Ley No. 42-08 sobre la Defensa de la Competencia) of 16 January 2008, https://www.micm.gob.do/images/pdf/transparencia/base-legal-de-la-institucion/leyes/Ley_No._42-08_Sobre_la_Defensa_de_la_Competencia.pdf. The Dominican Constitutional Court has assessed Article 50 of the Dominican Constitution on some occasions, e.g. Decisions No. TC/0267/13 (19 December 2013) and No. TC/0137/20 (13 May 2020).

← 4. For instance, Pro-Competencia has issued guidelines and carried out market studies (see section 3.1). In 2012, Pro-Competencia has also hosted the 10^th meeting of the IDB/OECD Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum (LACCF).

← 5. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) encompasses the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.

← 6. Regulation No. 252-20 implementing the Competition Act (Reglamento No. 252-20 de aplicación de la Ley General de Denfensa de la Competencia) of 15 July 2020, https://micm.gob.do/images/pdf/transparencia/base-legal-de-la-institucion/resoluciones/decretos/2020/Decreto-252-20.pdf.

← 7. Article 60, paragraph I of the Competition Act.

← 8. Article 69 of the Competition Act and Article 16, sole paragraph of the Implementing Regulation also mention other regulated sectors: energy, hydrocarbons, air and maritime transport, health, education, insurance, pension and stock market), but according to Pro-Competencia their sectoral legislations do not have provisions related to competition law enforcement.

← 9. Article 2 of the Competition Act.

← 10. Moreover, Pro-Compentencia has opened a number of investigations against unfair competition practices.

← 11. In addition, Pro-Competencia has sanctioned a legal entity for providing the Executive Directorate with false information during an investigation (Decision No. 001-2022 from 4 January 2022, https://procompetencia.gob.do/resoluciones-procompetencia/resolucion-numero-001-2022/).

← 12. Article 34 of the Competition Act.

← 13. Articles 47, 48 and 50, sole paragraph of the Competition Act.

← 14. Article 31, item “j” of the Competition Act.

← 15. Articles 14, 15 and 31, item “n” of the Competition Act.

← 16. Article 50 of the Competition Act.

← 17. Decision No 014-2021, from 22 July 2021, https://procompetencia.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/resolucion-014-2021-firmada-y-sellada.pdf.

← 18. Article 26 of the Competition Act.

← 19. Article 33 of the Competition Act.

← 20. Articles 27 and 34, paragraph II of the Competition Act.

← 21. Article 29 of the Competition Act.

← 22. Article 83, item 1 of the Dominican Constitution.

← 23. Article 31, “y” of the Competition Act.

← 24. Article 39 of the Implementing Regulation.

← 25. Article 16 of the Competition Act.

← 26. Article 21 of the Competition Act.

← 27. Article 16 of the Competition Act.

← 28. Conversion made on 19 April 2023.

← 29. The OECD CompStats database compiles general statistics relating to 79 jurisdictions, including the Dominican Republic. Information of CompStats database is compiled in the publication OECD Competition Trends (OECD, 2023[13]).

← 30. Although Pro-Competencia has already sanctioned three cases, the funds from the fines will only be transferred to Pro-Competencia when there is a final judicial ruling confirming the administrative decision, which had not yet occurred at the time of writing.

← 31. Nevertheless, Pro-Competencia has benefited from technical co-operation provided by foreign jurisdictions or international organisations, such as the United States Authority for International Development (USAID), the European Union and the Inter-American Development Bank.

← 32. Decision 230-2021 of the Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio de Administración Pública) establishes the criteria for considering an institutional promotion, including (i) having obtained "Above Average" or "Outstanding" performance evaluation in at least the last two consecutive evaluations; (ii) not having been subject to disciplinary sanctions in the last two years; (iii) not being subject to any disciplinary process pending decision; and (iv) having completed the required training programs.

← 33. Article 22 of the Competition Act.

← 34. At the time of writing, Pro-Competencia was developing the Institutional Strategic Plan for 2024-2027, with the support of the European Union through a technical co-operation agreement.

← 35. Articles 36, 37 and 38 of the Competition Act.

← 36. Articles 2 and 20 of the Competition Act.

← 37. Article 69 of the Competition Act.

← 38. Ley General de Telecomunicaciones (LGT) No. 153/98 of 15 April 1998, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ley-no-153-98.pdf.

← 39. Article 92.1 of LGT.

← 40. Articles 1 and 8 of LGT and Chapter IV of the Regulation of fair and free competition for the public telecommunication services, adopted by Decision No. 022-05, https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/36-resolucion-no-022-05-actualizada-con-derogaciones-modf-078-19.pdf.

← 41. Regulation of fair and free competition for the public telecommunication services, adopted by Decision No. 022-05.

← 42. Article 1 of the LGT.

← 43. Article 8 of the LGT.

← 44. This is equivalent to 200 times the charge for infringement (cargo por incumplimiento) in 2021, which equals DOP 21 424 400. See Article 109 of the LGT.

← 45. Article 18 of Regulation of fair and free competition for the public telecommunication services, adopted by Decision No. 022-05.

← 46. Decision No. 047-2020 from 29 July 2020, https://www.indotel.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/res_signed_047-2020_estudios_consultoria_cowi_signed.pdf.

← 47. Ley General de Electricidad No. 125-01, https://www.sie.gob.do/images/sie-documentos-pdf/leyes/LeyGeneraldeElecctricidadNo.125-01.pdf.

← 48. Reglamento para la aplicación de la Ley General de Electricidad 125-01 aprobado por Decreto No. 555-02 https://www.cne.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Reglamento.Ley_.No_.125-01.pdf.

← 49. Articles 16 and 18 of LGE.

← 50. Article 31 of LGE.

← 51. Article 110 of LGE and Article 44 of the implementing regulation.

← 52. Article 44 of the implementing regulation.

← 53. Item “e” of Article 14 of the LGE.

← 54. Item “d” of Article 24 of the LGE.

← 55. Article 2 of the LGE.

← 56. Articles 126-1, item “c”, and 126-4 of the LGE.

← 57. Ley Monetaria y Financiera No. 183-02 del 21 de noviembre del 2002, https://sb.gob.do/media/c3hhtvb1/ley-no-183-02-monetaria-y-financiera.pdf.

← 58. Articles 10 and 11 of the LMF.

← 59. Article 17 of the LMF.

← 60. Article 21 of the LMF.

← 61. See Article 68, paragraph B, item 7 of the LMF and Articles 6 and 18 of the Sanctions Regulation of the Monetary Board (Reglamento de Sanciones Administración Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria), https://www.sb.gob.do/media/hjybfkcn/reglamento-de-sanciones.pdf.

← 62. Ley No. 63-17, de Movilidad, Transporte Terrestre, Tránsito y Seguridad Vial de la República Dominicana. G. O. No. 10875 del 24 de febrero de 2017, https://intrant.gob.do/phocadownload/SobreNosotros/MarcoLegal/Leyes/MARCO%20LEGAL-LEY%2063-17%20SOBRE%20TRANSITO,%20TRANSPORTE,%20Y%20SEGURIDAD%20VIAL.pdf.

← 63. Article 13 of the Inland Transport Law.

← 64. Article 9 and 10 of the Inland Transport Law.

← 65. Ley de Propiedad Industrial No. 20-00, https://www.aduanas.gob.do/media/2214/20-00_sobre_propiedad_industrial.pdf.

← 66. Articles 141 and 143 of the LPI.

← 67. Article 33 of the LPI.

← 68. Articles 42 and 43 of the LPI.

← 69. Ibid.

← 70. Article 133, number 1 of the LPI.

← 71. Article 176.1 of the LPI.

← 72. Article 177 of the LPI.

← 73. Article 182 of the LPI.

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