1. Fragility in an age of crises
This chapter presents the main findings from the 2022 edition of the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework, including the state of global fragility today and the key characteristics of the 60 fragile contexts in terms of their income levels, geography, political natures and conflict status. It concludes with an analysis of illustrative trends in fragile contexts related to violence, inequality, food insecurity and forced displacement. These trends demonstrate the severity and scale of the fragility that is overwhelming the progress made on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in fragile contexts, in addition to posing new questions about the future of development co-operation in an age of crises.
Fragility is complex and multidimensional, and it occurs in a spectrum of intensity across six dimensions. This report focuses on the 60 fragile contexts in this year’s multidimensional fragility framework, 15 of which are extremely fragile. The total number of fragile contexts is the highest out of any States of Fragility report, now in its fifth edition.
The scale and severity of today’s crises are putting the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at risk at its halfway point. Fragility increased worldwide from 2020 to 2021, highlighting the systemic and multidimensional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. This increase reversed a declining trend from 2019 to 2020. No fragile context is on track to achieve critical Sustainable Development Goals related to hunger, health and gender equality – all of which are expected to be affected negatively by the downstream impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Trends related to violence, inequality, food insecurity and forced displacement illustrate the channels through which the root causes of multidimensional fragility affect livelihoods and prosperity in fragile contexts. Addressing these challenges requires multidimensional approaches.
Fragility is incentivising violent conflict and other forms of political violence such as civil unrest and military coups. These forms of violence in fragile contexts increased in 2020 and 2021. At the same time, 51 of the 60 fragile contexts were not in a state of war in 2021. These findings reflect the nuanced and diverse relationship between fragility and conflict.
An intensification and diversification of drivers – among others, poverty, digitalisation and access to justice – have contributed to growing inequality between fragile contexts and the rest of the world. For example, fragile contexts account for 24% of the world’s population but 73% of the world’s extreme poor in 2022, a share that is projected to increase to 86% of the world’s extreme poor by 2030.
Fragile contexts are at the centre of the current global food security crisis. Of the 26 hunger hotspots in June 2022, 22 were in fragile contexts, and the 10 contexts with the largest number of people facing acute food insecurity were all fragile.
Fragile contexts generate and host the majority of the world’s forcibly displaced. More than three out of four refugees and internally displaced people originated from fragile contexts in 2021, and more than three out of five of them were hosted in fragile contexts.
Three systemic shocks – COVID-19, climate change and Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine – are the predominant forces moulding today’s states of fragility. The resulting crises affect the entire world and also shape collective prospects for prosperity and peace, especially in the 60 fragile contexts on the 2022 edition of the OECD multidimensional fragility framework. These fragile contexts are home to 24% of the world’s population – 1.9 billion people – but 73% of the world’s extreme poor in 2022. Fragile contexts’ share of the world’s extreme poor could surge to 86% by 2030, according to calculations for this report (Gerszon Mahler et al., 2021[1]; UN DESA, 2019[2]). The impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are still unfolding (Box 1.1). But, like other global crises, the conflict is expected to take a disproportionate toll on fragile contexts.
In States of Fragility 2020, under the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic, the OECD warned that fragile contexts were at a critical juncture in delivering on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. With support from their development partners, they could build forward better from COVID-19 and be at the heart of a renewed agenda for a sustainable and peaceful future. Or, alternatively, they could fall even further behind in their aspirations to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially without sufficient resources mobilised by the international community. This critical juncture has since become an age of crises, with the possibility of an equitable and inclusive recovery receding across a dramatically shifting landscape. The pandemic, prolonged with multiple variants and waves, was just one of a number of concurrent challenges facing fragile contexts. By the end of June 2022, only one in three people in fragile contexts had received a dose of a COVID-19 vaccine compared to three in four people in OECD countries (Ritchie et al., 2022[3]). In another example, the pandemic has caused unprecedented reversals in poverty reduction that are further exacerbated by rising inflation and the effects of the war in Ukraine: an additional 33 million people are expected to be living in extreme poverty in fragile contexts, 1.8 percentage points higher than was otherwise expected1 (Gerszon Mahler et al., 2022[4]). This increase is two and a half times greater than the expected increase in the rest of the world.
Each edition of the States of Fragility report series since its inception in 2015 is built around a theme. This year’s theme, fragility in an age of crises, refers both to the alarming state of fragility amid today’s crises and to the implications of these crises for how the international community understands and analyses the concept of fragility. As they grapple with the increasing frequency, severity and scale of challenges, a central question for development partners is how to prioritise when everything is a priority. This report argues that a multidimensional approach to addressing fragility is the answer. It frames this approach by 1) exploring the key attributes of fragility in 2022 and the main trends in fragile contexts, 2) assessing the state of financing to address fragility as well as development co-operation providers’ policy and programming in fragile contexts, and 3) outlining the options and ambitions for effective responses to crises and fragility.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have a significant and disproportionate effect on fragile contexts, according to OECD estimates based on the latest data available from the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other organisations. While estimates are very preliminary and subject to change as more evidence becomes available, the direct and indirect impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine can be summarised as follows:
Socioeconomic development. Based on estimates produced by the IMF (2022[5]) in April 2022, growth in extremely fragile contexts is projected to be 0.45 percentage points lower for 2023 than was projected in October 2021; by comparison, growth in other developing countries and territories is projected to be 0.08 percentage points lower for 2023 than the earlier estimate. Additionally, the combined effects of COVID-19 and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are likely to have ramifications on economic and human development over the short and long term, for example through impacts on learning from COVID-related restrictions and the developmental implications of food shortages.
Extreme poverty and cost of living. Of the 52 countries and territories facing a high impact on extreme poverty, 35 are on the multidimensional fragility framework, according to recent estimates published by the UN Development Programme. Haiti and Sudan, both extremely fragile contexts, are expected to face significant impacts along all three international poverty lines of USD 1.90 per day, USD 3.20 per day and USD 5.50 per day (Gray Molina, Montoya-Aguirre and Ortiz-Juarez, 2022[6]).
Humanitarian assistance. According to information from the Financial Tracking Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 86% of humanitarian funding requirements for the Ukraine Flash Appeal were met as of mid-July 2022. This is in sharp contrast to the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plans of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Haiti, all extremely fragile contexts: Only 22%, 21% and 11% of their funding requirements, respectively, have been met. It is imperative that the response to the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is supplemental to other humanitarian funding and that it does not divert attention and resources from other pressing crises, especially amid budget constraints in donor countries (Ahmad and Carey, 2022[7]).
Food imports. Of the 77 net food-importing developing countries, as defined by the World Trade Organization, 44 are on the fragility framework. People living in these contexts are particularly at risk from the war’s effects on food systems worldwide, given the prominence of Russia and Ukraine as producers and exporters of wheat and other staple crops.
Beyond its direct effects, Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is an illustration of what Marc and Jones (2021[8]) call the “new geopolitics of fragility”, reflected not only in the increased Russian footprint in developing countries but especially in fragile contexts. This can also be seen in the more autonomous and non-aligned positioning of Global South countries as “geopolitical tensions rise between the West and Russia (and China)” (Sidiropoulos, 2022[9]). Several factors contribute to this dynamic: the evolution of historical ties with global powers, recent arms trade, security sector assistance and agreements on natural resource extraction. In the case of Russia, these connections belie its disruptive approach in fragile contexts such as the Central African Republic and Mali, where its promotion of patronage networks that benefit local and Russian elites is often in conflict with bilateral and multilateral agendas (Thompson, Doxsee and Bermudez, 2022[10]; Marley, Stasieluk and Hesemann, 2022[11]; Marc and Jones, 2021[8]). Though it is too early to say how these connections will evolve over time, Russia has established a significant presence in many fragile contexts that will require careful monitoring for its impact on fragility as well as its geopolitical significance.
Sources: IMF (2022[5]), World Economic Outlook, April 2022: War Sets Back The Global Recovery, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/04/19/world-economic-outlook-april-2022; Gray Molina, Montoya-Aguirre and Ortiz-Juarez (2022[6]), Addressing the Cost of Living Crisis in Vulnerable Countries, https://www.undp.org/publications/addressing-cost-living-crisis-developing-countries-poverty-and-vulnerability-projections-and-policy-responses; Marc and Jones (2021[8]), The New Geopolitics of State Fragility: Russia, China, and the Mounting Challenge for Peacebuilding, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/FP_20211015_new_geopolitics_fragility_marc_jones_v2.pdf; Thompson, Doxsee and Bermudez (2022[10]), Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali; Marley, Stasieluk and Hesemann (2022[11]), “Fragility in focus: Half way on Agenda 2030”.
The core message of every States of Fragility report is that fragility is a global phenomenon, felt across multiple dimensions to varying degrees in all contexts. This widespread sense of fragility has never been more acutely felt than it is today, when multiple crises and uncertainty abound. From 2020 to 2021, fragility increased on average worldwide, reversing a declining trend in fragility from 2019 to 2020, and reached record highs in extremely fragile contexts2 (Figure 1.1). The OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework provides a rigorous, analytical tool that allows policy makers and practitioners to analyse the multidimensionality, complexity and universality of fragility (Box 1.2). This year, the framework identifies a record number of fragile contexts: 60 of the 176 contexts analysed. Since the last edition, there have been systematic increases in fragility across all dimensions of varying degrees of intensity. Fragile contexts also are diverse in terms of income, region and governance, underscoring the futility of one-size-fits-all approaches to address the root causes and drivers of multidimensional fragility. This section elaborates on the findings of the analysis in detail.
An overview of fragility
Fragility is the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacities of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb and mitigate those risks (OECD, 2016[12]). The OECD assesses fragility worldwide through its multidimensional fragility framework, first introduced in States of Fragility 2016 and now in its fifth edition. The framework is an independent, data-driven resource that assesses fragility in a spectrum of intensity across six dimensions: economic, environmental, human, political, security and societal. Using 8 to 10 quantitative indicators in each dimension and 57 in total for all six dimensions, the framework analyses risks and capacities to cope with fragility across the 176 contexts for which sufficient data are available. Based on the assessment of the respective balance between risk and coping capacities, contexts are categorised as extremely fragile, fragile or in the rest of the world. This classification acknowledges that, while every context experiences fragility, not every context can be reasonably classified as fragile. It also reflects the intention that the States of Fragility reports and therefore development partners should focus on the contexts that are the most fragile.
An updated framework: Introducing the human dimension and upgrading existing dimensions
After States of Fragility 2020, the OECD undertook a formal review of the methodology for its fragility framework. The objective was to ensure that the concepts, indicators and measures in the framework kept pace with the latest innovations emerging in the literature and in terms of data availability. This review led to several notable improvements. First, the OECD added a sixth dimension of fragility to the framework, the human dimension, to assess risks and coping capacities that affect people’s well-being and their ability to live long, healthy and prosperous lives – a significant step forward in making the framework more people-centred. The human dimension monitors global progress on the provision of basic services and links such progress to existing assessments of fragility. Its addition is the culmination of a years-long process, informed by a range of consultations and workshops with OECD partners, to strengthen the framework’s ability to guide better policies for better lives in anticipation of and in response to current challenges.
Second, the OECD updated the concepts and measures in the other five dimensions. The result is a framework that analyses 176 contexts, the most ever analysed. For the first time, it also features a gender-focused indicator in each dimension, and it incorporates a greater number of official SDG indicators, underscoring the interlinkages between fragility and the 2030 Agenda.
Further information on the methodology of the multidimensional fragility framework, including the indicators and measures, is available on the OECD States of Fragility data platform, a one-stop shop for evidence and analysis on multidimensional fragility and resource flows to fragile contexts at oe.cd/states-of-fragility-platform.
Source: OECD (2016[12]), States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267213-en.
The findings from the analysis undertaken for this report (Figure 1.1) substantiate early estimates in States of Fragility 2020 of the impact of COVID-19 that were based on data available at that time. The findings also serve as a warning of the anticipated effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and call for a redoubled effort from the international community and fragile contexts themselves to effectively address the root causes of fragility, particularly in extremely fragile contexts that are the furthest behind in achieving sustainable development and peace.
Note: Each coloured line represents a population-weighted mean of the fragility score of the contexts within each group. There are 15 contexts in the extremely fragile group, 45 in the other fragile contexts group and 82 in the rest of the world (denoting the 82 contexts that are on the DAC List of ODA Recipients for reporting on aid in 2021 and for which there are data available for an assessment of fragility).
Source: Source: UN DESA (2019[2]), 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects (database), https://population.un.org/wpp/.
Fragility is severe, reflecting complex and overlapping risks and shocks
The increasing fragility reflects, in large part, the impact of what this report calls the “3 Cs” – COVID-19, conflict in the form of Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine and climate change. These shocks will continue to be felt most acutely in fragile contexts, where they are layered onto risks and shocks that are becoming more severe, frequent and complex. A record 274 million people need humanitarian assistance and protection in 2022, according to the latest UN Global Humanitarian Overview (UN OCHA, 2022[13]), and an astounding 95% of them, or 260.2 million people, live in fragile contexts. The scale of the challenge is indicated by the UN’s appeal for USD 4.4 billion for the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan – the largest-ever (humanitarian) appeal for a single country (UN, 2022[14]). Other measures paint an equally troubling picture of the state of fragility. The Horn of Africa – home to four fragile contexts including Somalia, the most fragile context in this report – is facing its worst drought in more than four decades (UN OCHA, 2022[15]). In Yemen, also one of the most fragile contexts, 19 million people, or 63% of the population, is projected to be food insecure by December 2022 (World Food Programme, 2022[16]). The anticipated impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on food availability could deepen Yemen’s food insecurity, with real incomes in the country expected to decline on average by 3.1% due to increased corn and wheat prices versus a global average decline of 1.6% in real incomes (Government of Yemen/UNICEF, 2022[17]; Artuc et al., 2022[18]).
At the same time, peacefulness has declined globally to its lowest level in 15 years (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2022[19]), while deaths from organised violence increased from 2020 to 2021, driven by conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Yemen, all of which are on the OECD’s fragility framework. This trend in fatalities marked a reversal of the decline observed from 2014 to 2019. In fragile contexts, the number of fatalities from armed conflict increased by 104% from 2020 to 2021 (Figure 1.2) (Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, 2022[20]). The prevalence of political violence against women is also increasing and was at a historic high in 2020 in West Africa, a subregion that is home to 13 fragile contexts (Kishi, 2022[21]).
Note: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program definitions of state-based, one-sided and non-state violent conflict are available at https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.
Sources: Davies, Pettersson and Öberg (2022[20]), “Organized violence 1989-2021 and drone warfare”, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221108428; Sundberg and Melander (2013[22]), "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343313484347.
Fragile contexts face relatively higher levels of risks across all six dimensions of fragility and lack the necessary coping capacities to address these risks relative to their counterparts in the rest of the world (Figure 1.3). From 2019 to 2021, coinciding with the period between States of Fragility 2020 and this report, fragility increased systematically on average across the dimensions in both the 15 extremely fragile and the 45 other fragile contexts (Figure 1.4). The relatively small magnitude of change in certain dimensions, most notably the human dimension, is partly an artefact of data availability. But the findings overall suggest that the crises of the past two years have had multidimensional impacts on fragility, with significant consequences especially for the economic dimension.
Note: For further information on the methodology for clustering countries and contexts according to their degree of fragility, see oe.cd/states-of-fragility-platform.
Note: The fragility score for each dimension is calculated using a weighted average (by population) of the fragility scores of the countries and territories in each grouping. Dimensions are ordered by the magnitude of change within each grouping of fragile contexts, by descending order.
Source: UN DESA (2019[2]), 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects (database), https://population.un.org/wpp/.
While the severity of fragility has shifted across dimensions, no context exited fragility in the past two years
Moving beyond a broad overview of fragility, this subsection identifies and examines shifts in the degree of fragility at the context level as well as movements onto and off the fragility framework since the 2020 edition. For the first time since the States of Fragility report series began, no context exited the framework. Three contexts – Benin, Timor-Leste and Turkmenistan – moved onto it, and Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea became extremely fragile. Box 1.3 reviews the analytical findings of the framework, further discussed in Desai and Yabe (2022[23]), to outline the reasons for these movements.
No context exited the framework since the last edition in 2020, and three contexts entered the framework: Benin, Timor-Leste and Turkmenistan. Additionally, two formerly fragile contexts – Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea – became extremely fragile. Further analysis of each of these contexts can be found in Desai and Yabe (2022[23]), a background paper to this report.
Contexts that moved onto the fragility framework in 2022
Different factors across the dimensions of fragility contributed to the movement of the three contexts onto the fragility framework in the 2022 edition.
Benin: Increased fragility across all six dimensions from 2019 to 2021, and especially its poor performance in the human dimension, explain Benin’s entrance.
Timor-Leste: An increase in fragility in the economic, environmental and security dimensions is the main reason Timor-Leste moved back onto the fragility framework after its notable exit in States of Fragility 2020.
Turkmenistan: High levels of political and societal fragility contributed to the inclusion of Turkmenistan on the fragility framework for the first time.
Contexts that became extremely fragile in 2022
No context that was extremely fragile in the 2020 edition moved out of this category in 2022. Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea became newly classified as extremely fragile, reflecting deteriorating fragility across multiple dimensions.
Equatorial Guinea: Severe fragility in its economic, human, political and societal dimensions explain Equatorial Guinea’s movement into the category of extremely fragile contexts.
Eritrea: Its poor performance across all dimensions and the deterioration particularly in the security dimension shifted Eritrea to the category of extremely fragile contexts.
Fragility trends in the rest of the world
Fragility is not exclusive to the 60 fragile contexts on the fragility framework. The analysis of risks and coping capacities reveals contexts that are not on the fragility framework but display warning signs that merit closer attention to prevent their fall into deeper fragility.
Lebanon: While it is not on the fragility framework, Lebanon has been grappling with compounding crises (International Crisis Group, 2021[24]), and its fragility increased in five of the six dimensions between 2019 and 2021, most markedly in the economic and political dimensions. Lebanon is not categorised as fragile in the 2022 edition due to its still-relatively strong performance in the environmental, human and societal dimensions.
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka is dealing with an economic crisis and political turmoil (UN, 2022[25]). Though the results of the fragility framework do not yet reflect the extent of these challenges due to time lags, various indicators show warning signs of today’s crises such as the country’s high ratio of debt to gross domestic product (GDP), exchange rate volatility and low tax revenue.
Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA): Trends in the NTCA, comprised of El Salvador (which is not on the fragility framework), Guatemala and Honduras show that subregional fragility can have transnational impacts. In the case of the NTCA, rising gang violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and conflict-related displacement contribute to rising fragility, which increased in 2021 to its highest level since 2011. These findings suggest the potential for El Salvador to be on the fragility framework in the future.
Sources: International Crisis Group (2021[24]), Managing Lebanon’s Compounding Crises, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon/228-managing-lebanons-compounding-crises; UN (2022[25]), “Sri Lanka: UN experts sound alarm on economic crisis”, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/sri-lanka-un-experts-sound-alarm-economic-crisis.
While fragility increased on average across the 15 extremely fragile contexts between 2019 and 2021, the context-by-context shifts in fragility across dimensions varied meaningfully (Figure 1.5). For example, political and societal fragility in Afghanistan increased significantly in this period, and economic fragility increased substantially in South Sudan and Iraq. Haiti, meanwhile, experienced an increase in its environmental fragility in this period. At the same time, political fragility declined meaningfully in South Sudan, whereas environmental fragility declined in the Republic of Congo. In addition to illustrating important trends within contexts, context-level analysis shows the potential of the fragility framework to offer a nuanced and disaggregated perspective on fragility to guide differentiated action. The OECD’s States of Fragility data and visualisation platform elaborates on these findings and offers a more granular perspective that can inform specific avenues for intervention in these fragile contexts.
Note: This figure depicts the change in the fragility score across all dimensions of the 15 extremely fragile contexts on the 2022 edition of the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework. A meaningful increase/decline represents an increase/decline in the fragility score from 2019 to 2021 of 0.5 points or more.
Fragility spans contexts of differing incomes, levels of violence and political natures
The OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework, depicted in Infographic 1.1, offers unique insight into the diversity of characteristics among the 60 fragile contexts across the dimensions of fragility. The different shadings of the colours used for dimensions represent various degrees of severity of fragility experienced by each context in a particular dimension. By showcasing this diversity, the framework helps reconcile the complexity of fragility with the simplicity needed to guide effective and differentiated action in fragile contexts. Such effective action involves challenging long-standing assumptions about the nature of fragility and its role in shaping prospects for prosperity and peace. One of these assumptions is that fragile contexts are homogenous. Another is that they are synonymous with under-developed or conflict-affected settings, which is an assumption that tends to confuse the symptoms of fragility with its root causes. The States of Fragility report series has continued to challenge these generalisations about fragile contexts by highlighting the multidimensionality and complexity of fragility, which are two of its most important attributes. Another key attribute is its interconnectedness, with fragility manifesting across different geographic levels and altering over time.
The findings of the OECD’s fragility framework push back on broadly held assumptions on where fragility is concentrated, whom it affects and how. Fragile contexts are highly diverse in their geography, their incomes, their political natures, and the presence and intensity of conflicts. While 36 of the 48 contexts in sub-Saharan Africa are on the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework, fragility is hardly exclusive to the African sub-continent (Desai and Yabe, 2022[23]). Clear examples are Afghanistan and Myanmar: From 2019 to 2021, the two fragile contexts experienced the largest intensification in political fragility of any context, worldwide. Similarly, while fragility and economic development are strongly linked, there are currently more middle-income (33) than low-income (26) fragile contexts.3 The diversity that characterises fragile contexts is also visible in the nature of the state: 38 of the 60 fragile contexts are considered authoritarian, 3 flawed democracies, and 16 hybrid regimes. Roughly half of the total population of fragile contexts, or 900 million people, are currently living in an authoritarian fragile context (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021[26]; UN DESA, 2019[2]).4 Another example of how fragile contexts challenge familiar generalisations about fragility is that 51 of the 60 fragile contexts were not in a state of war in 2021. Indeed, from 2010 to 2020, 23 fragile contexts did not experience any forms of violent conflict recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, 2022[20]; Sundberg and Melander, 2013[22]). These trends illustrate the need for development partners to address fragility in a multidimensional way that is tailored to the individual context. This report explores further trends in fragility and what they mean for responses to fragility and the role of development co-operation.
The shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and conflict (in the form of Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine) have been increasing pressures on the coping capacities of fragile contexts. Interacting with existing fragilities and crises, these shocks are also undermining the contexts’ progress on sustainable development and peace. This section examines five major trends in fragile contexts that are affecting their prospects for prosperity. While these trends are by no means the only pressures on fragile contexts, they exemplify how multidimensionality fragility impacts communities, states and systems and undermine progress on sustainable development and peace in the 60 fragile contexts on the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework. They further show the link between fragility and the global challenges affecting people, planet, prosperity and peace.
Amid these challenges, the UN Secretary-General and others have issued calls to action to rejuvenate a fragmented multilateral system, especially in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Our Common Agenda, the Secretary-General’s recent report, includes commitments ranging from leaving no one behind to ensuring that the world is prepared for future crises (UN, 2022[27]). It provides an important frame of reference for the discussion in this section around trends that demand a concerted, coherent and multidimensional approach in fragile contexts by the international community. To help address these trends and their disproportionate impact on fragile contexts, it is important for development partners to move beyond siloed and sector-specific interventions (Chapter 2) and towards approaches based on a whole-of-context understanding (Chapter 3).
Prospects for achieving the 2030 Agenda in fragile contexts are particularly grim
The SDGs are the unifying framework for sustainable development (Ingram and Pipa, 2022[28]). Achieving them is a core priority of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and their partners in fragile contexts. As of July 2022, 56 of the 60 fragile contexts had presented a voluntary national review at the UN High-Level Political Forum, 11 of them in 2021 for the first time and 6 in 2022 for the first time. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity to use the SDGs as a shared roadmap for recovery (OECD, 2021[29]).
Despite this engagement in the voluntary national review process, progress in achieving the SDGs has been stagnating or declining in more than half of fragile contexts on 11 of 15 goals5 (Sachs et al., 2022[30]). Additionally, there are still persistent gaps in the availability of data and evidence to track progress on the SDGs (Box 1.4). Such gaps raise questions about the extent to which it is possible to track progress accurately and comprehensively on the goals. With this caveat in mind, this report provides preliminary reflections using existing sources (Sachs et al., 2022[30]). No fragile contexts are on track to achieve SDGs related to hunger, good health or gender equality – all of which have been critically affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate crisis and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, more than 85% of fragile contexts for which data are available are on track to achieve SDGs 12 (responsible consumption and production) and 13 (climate action). This likely reflects their low levels of economic growth and consumption and their low climate emissions. In the rest of the world, progress is accelerating or on track to achieve 13 of the 17 SDGs, further underscoring that fragile contexts are the ones being left behind in today’s international landscape. This is especially the case for extremely fragile contexts: The 15 extremely fragile contexts are on track to achieve only four of the goals (Sachs et al., 2022[30]), though none are on track to meet SDG 1 (no poverty). Figure 1.6 illustrates the varied progress on the SDGs of the three groups of contexts.
Notes: Only SDGs for which sufficient data are available (i.e. with country coverage of more than half in each group) are included. Bars are in descending order, starting with the SDGs where progress is decreasing or stagnating among the highest proportion of contexts. ‘Rest of the world’ refers to countries and territories that are on the DAC List of ODA Recipients for reporting on aid in 2021.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data in Sachs et al. (2022[30]), Sustainable Development Report 2022, https://s3.amazonaws.com/sustainabledevelopment.report/2022/2022-sustainable-development-report.pdf.
There are well-known gaps in the availability, timeliness and quality of data to track progress on the SDGs worldwide (Kitzmueller, Stacy and Gerszon Mahler, 2021[31]). For example, only 48% of the data needed to monitor targets for SDG 5 (gender equality) are available (UN, 2022[32]). The gaps are more pronounced in fragile contexts, where statistical systems are comparatively weaker than in the rest of the world due in part to a lack of capacity and funding for data and statistics (PARIS21, 2016[33]). Based on the World Bank’s Statistical Performance Indicators, fragile contexts on average improved their reporting on SDG indicators in 10 of 16 goals from 2015 to 2019, in line with the global trend noted by Kitzmueller, Stacy and Gerszon Mahler (2021[31]). However, only a third of the indicators had available data for SDG 5 in fragile contexts in 2019, and the rate of reporting has declined for critical goals such as SDGs 1 (no poverty) and 2 (zero hunger) (Figure 1.7). These gaps not only affect reporting on national progress towards the SDGs. They also impact the poorest and most vulnerable in society, thereby exacerbating inequalities in the provision of basic services (World Bank, 2021[34]).
Notes: The formal review of the OECD’s fragility framework, discussed in Box 1.2, also highlighted gaps in data availability that are relevant to the assessment of risks and capacities to cope with multidimensional fragility. For example, data are particularly scarce for key indicators for small island developing states, especially in the security and societal dimensions of fragility. As a result, only 3 of the 11 Pacific Island small states were among the 176 contexts analysed in this edition. Additionally, up-to-date and global indicators were relatively unavailable on informality, access to financial services, the climate-gender nexus and the strength of security sector institutions, to name just a few thematic issues across various dimensions. This imposed a constraint to the analysis of fragility worldwide. Moving forward, the OECD will build on the lessons from its formal review to continue identifying and developing measures to correct blind spots in the assessment of global fragility.
Sources: Kitzmueller, Stacy and Gerszon Mahler (2021[31]), “Are we there yet? Many countries don't report progress on all SDGs according to the World Bank's new Statistical Performance Indicators”, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/are-we-there-yet-many-countries-dont-report-progress-all-sdgs-according-world-banks-new; PARIS21 (2016[33]), Statistical Capacity Building in Fragile and Conflict-affected States, https://www.paris21.org/sites/default/files/Fragile%20States%20Strategy-March2016-final.pdf; World Bank (2021[34]), World Development Report 2021: Data for Better Lives, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35218.
The next subsections focus on trends that impact the progress of fragile contexts towards specific SDGs and targets. These trends were selected to highlight the interconnected dynamics of the different dimensions of fragility and the cross-cutting nature of the 2030 Agenda. The four trends analysed relate to conflict and violence, inequality, food insecurity, and forced displacement.
Multidimensional fragility is driving increased violence and civil unrest
Analysis shows that the relationship between fragility and conflict is bidirectional (Infographic 1.2). How people in fragile contexts perceive their insecurity and security is another piece of this nuanced picture. As shown in Figure 1.8, a majority of people surveyed in Afghanistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) and Zambia, for instance, reported they felt less safe in 2019 than they did in 2014 (Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 2019[35]), attitudes that mirror underlying trends in fragility in the political, security and societal dimensions in all three contexts. At the other end of the spectrum, most respondents to the 2019 World Risk Poll in the fragile contexts of Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Tajikistan said they feel safer than they did five years ago, confirming that fragility and perceptions of insecurity, while related, are not synonymous.
Notes: Estimates are based on the Lloyd’s Register Foundation survey of over 150 000 people across 142 countries in 2019. The figure only shows fragile contexts for which sufficient data were available for analysis.
Source: Lloyd’s Register Foundation (2019[35]), The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll: Full report and analysis of the 2019 poll, https://wrp.lrfoundation.org.uk/data-resources/.
A sample of four developments further shows the relationship between violence and fragility: the increase in non-state violence and violence perpetrated by the state against its citizens; the increased prevalence of protest movements; the significant rise in the number of coups events in 2021; and the scale and severity of violence against women and girls in fragile contexts.
Notes: ‘Higher gender inequality’ refers to a score of 0.5 or higher in the UNDP’s Gender inequality index. Conflict-affected contexts are those that experienced 25 or more battle-related deaths in 2021, while contexts in a state of war experienced 1000 or more battle-related deaths in 2021. Contexts highly exposed to climate change are those that rank > 144 on ND-GAIN Exposure in the Notre Dame - Global Adaptation Initiative Country Index. ODA to conflict prevention refers to ODA to sector 152, “Conflict, peace & security”.
Sources: Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg (2022[36]), “Organized violence 1989-2021 and drone warfare”, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221108428; Sundberg and Melander (2013[22]), "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset”, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343313484347; FAO/WFP (2022[37]), “Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP Early Warnings on Acute Food Insecurity, June to September 2022 Outlook”, https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-june-september-2022; Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (2022[38]), “Notre Dame - Global Adaptation Initiative Country Index”, https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/; UNDP (2022[39]), “Gender inequality index (GII), database”, https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII; UNCTAD (2021[40]), “State of commodity dependence 2021”, https://unctad.org/webflyer/state-commodity-dependence-2021; OECD (2022[41]), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, 10.1787/data-00061-en; World Bank (2022[42]), “Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)”, https://data.worldbank.org/region/heavily-indebted-poor-countries-hipc; IPC (2022[43]), “The IPC Population Tracking Tool”, https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/population-tracking-tool/en/.
Episodes of non-state violence increased by 48% from 2011 to 2021, peaking in 2017. Fatalities from this category of violence increased every year from 2018 to 2021, and fatalities from non-state violence in 2021 were the highest since 2015. At the same time, episodes of government repression and targeting of citizens were at a historical high in the two-year period of 2020 and 2021 (Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, 2022[36]; Sundberg and Melander, 2013[22]). These trends in violence correlate with the intensification of economic, political and societal fragility over time (Desai and Yabe, 2022[23]). Especially in the case of political fragility, the growing trend towards autocratisation in recent years – including the uptick in dictatorships from 25 to 30 closed autocracies between 2020 and 2021 – has been accompanied by increased government repression and violence (ACLED, 2022[44]; Boese et al., 2022[45]).
While citizens’ protests in fragile contexts are a reflection of their political engagement, they also mirror the state of multidimensional fragility. Greater political violence reflects a weakening social contract between the state and its citizens and growing dissatisfaction with exclusionary elite bargains that benefit the few at the expense of the many (Cloutier et al., 2022[46]). COVID-19 added to existing socioeconomic challenges that contributed to protest events from 2019 to 2022 and, through the restrictions placed on movement to contain the virus, the pandemic also affected the timing and frequency of protests (Figure 1.9) (ACLED, 2022[44]). Higher food prices resulting from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine could also trigger civil unrest, as the director-general of the World Trade Organization warned in March 2022 (Elliott, 2022[47]). Additionally, the recent increase in coup events can be seen as the expression of grievances arising from the intensification of the root causes of multidimensional fragility, particularly in the political, security and societal dimensions (Box 1.5).
Note: For further information on the definitions of the categories of protests, see https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2020/10/ACLED_USA-Methodology_v2-Feb2021.pdf.
Source: Raleigh et al. (2010[48]), “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data”, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310378914.
Coups, successful and attempted, take place in environments affected by fragility and are therefore shaped by fragility. This highlights the need for DAC members to apply a whole-of-context analysis and approach to address fragility, and thereby reduce incentives for coup events. Of the 17 coup events since 2019, 12 took place in fragile contexts (Figure 1.10) (Peyton et al., 2021[49]).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Peyton et al. (2021[49]), Cline Center Coup D’état Project Dataset, https://doi.org/10.13012/B2IDB-9651987_V3.
Recent coup events in fragile contexts demonstrate how causes of fragility can influence opportunities and incentives for military-led political change. The character of protests that take place before and after coup events can serve as a useful barometer of the substance of a changing political settlement – that is, military leaders can respond to popular protests to justify coup events or manipulate and manufacture protests to maintain their own power (Hammou, 2022[50]). In pursuit of their own socioeconomic objectives, civilians can be equally active, if often unseen, participants in coup events (Kinney, 2021[51]). For civilian supporters, coup events can be an expression of popular dissatisfaction with the quality of governance and an opportunity to call for regime change through the most expedient means available, particularly after democratic means have been exhausted (Sävström, 2021[52]). On the other hand, coup leaders can also instrumentalise civil unrest to justify seizing power, especially where it is the culmination of long-standing grievances and frustrations that tip over into political violence – often suddenly, as demonstrated by the Arab Spring (UN/World Bank, 2018[53]). Mali, which has experienced four coup events since 2010, epitomises the interconnectedness of drivers that shape environments within which coups can occur, blending grievance and external influence (Elischer, 2022[54]) in a context that has experienced concurrent increases in fragility in the political, security and societal dimensions between 2011 and 2021.
Sources: Hammou (2022[50]), “When civilian protests facilitate coups d’etat: Reflecting on revolution and counter-revolution in Sudan”, https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2022/04/14/when-civilian-protests-facilitate-coups-detat-reflecting-on-revolution-and-counter-revolution-in-sudan/; Kinney (2021[51]), Civilian Coup Advocacy, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.2043; Sävström (2021[52]), “Commentary: Constitutional coups have often preceded military ones”, https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2021-10-07-constitutional-coups-have-often-preceded-military-ones.html; UN/World Bank (2018[53]), Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337; Elischer (2022[54]), “Populist civil society, the Wagner Group and post-coup politics in Mali”, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6249de6-en.
Beyond its physical and mental toll, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) curtails women and girls’ opportunity to enhance their own livelihoods and ability to contribute to the economy and society at large. Therefore, SGBV has implications for efforts to address broader gender inequalities in fragile contexts, especially given that, as shown by Loudon, Goemans and Koester (2021[55]), inequality and fragility are inextricably linked (Infographic 1.3).
Discriminatory norms and attitudes towards violence are a root cause of SGBV, which partly explains their prominence as an indicator in the security dimension of the fragility framework (World Health Organization, 2021[56]). In fragile contexts, 32% of ever-partnered women between the ages of 15 and 49 reported having suffered physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence in their lifetime compared to 26% worldwide, and all contexts where more than 50% of girls are married by the age of 18 are fragile (Stasieluk, 2022[57]). These norms and attitudes, alongside other factors such as movement restrictions and broader socioeconomic consequences, partly explain the increased prevalence of SGBV during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (Vahedi, Anania and Kelly, 2021[58]). According to OECD research (2019[59]), norms related to masculinities are another relevant factor in explaining SGBV, as are broader trends in gender inequality within society.
Gender inequalities remain considerable at the global level, and progress to address them is particularly slow in fragile contexts (Chancel et al., 2022[60]). Nine of the ten countries with the widest gender gap are on the fragility framework (World Economic Forum, 2021[61]). Women and girls experience a diverse range of inequalities in the provision of basic services such as health, education and justice, especially in fragile contexts (Stasieluk, 2022[57]). For example, despite progress in expanding girls’ access to education globally, girls in fragile contexts leave school more often and sooner than boys. This dynamic is acute in the extremely fragile contexts of Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and Yemen, where women’s relative gain in education (compared to men’s) is the lowest among 126 countries studied (Evans, Akmal and Jakiela, 2021, p. 5[62]). This finding connects to broader concerns about education systems that are struggling to cope with rapidly expanding populations, conflict, climate shocks and a lack of basic services – pressures compounded by critical gaps in political support, policy making and implementation (Hickey, Hossain and Jackman, 2019[63]).
The lack of progress in addressing gender inequality is at odds with the significant and sustained increase in the volume of DAC members’ (ODA) that has as a principal or significant objective gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE). Such ODA amounted to USD 22.1 billion in 2020, or 47% of total DAC ODA commitments to fragile contexts. This is the highest share since 2009, though only 5% is targeted to GEWE as a principal objective.
Despite the persistence of gender inequalities, there are positive developments to highlight. For example, female genital mutilation has been declining over the past 30 years, though nearly all contexts where its prevalence is above 1% are on the fragility framework (UNICEF, 2022[64]). The incidence of child marriage is also slowly declining globally. Such progress is being threatened by conflict, climate change and other crises (UNICEF, 2022[65]). For example, in Ethiopia, where the median age for marriage had increased from 16 years in 1985 to 19 years in 2010, child marriage rose by 119% between the period January to April 2022 and the same period in 2021 across the regions worst hit by drought. This increase, in the case of Ethiopia and more broadly in the Horn of Africa, is driven by families’ greater need for dowries for sustenance in drought-affected communities.
Notes: Values for ‘female-to-male labour force participation rate’ and ‘Women’s employment in the non-agricultural sector’ are based on an arithmetic mean of all countries and territories within each grouping.
Sources: UNDP (2022[39]), “Gender inequality index (GII), database”, https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII; World Bank (2022[66]), Educational attainment, at least completed lower secondary, population 25+, male (%) (cumulative) (database), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CUAT.LO.MA.ZS; World Bank (2022[67]), Educational attainment, at least completed lower secondary, population 25+, female (%) (cumulative) (database), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CUAT.LO.FE.ZS; World Bank (2022[68]), Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%) (modeled ILO estimate) (database), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FM.ZS; UNDP (2022[69]), Dashboard 2. Life-course gender gap (database), https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads; UN DESA (2019[2]), 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects (database), https://population.un.org/wpp/; OECD (2022[41]), Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities, 10.1787/data-00061-en.
COVID-19, digitalisation, access to justice and other drivers have contributed to rising inequality and showcased the relationship between inequality and fragility
An intensification and diversification of drivers are contributing to inequality within and across fragile contexts and between fragile contexts and the rest of the world. This subsection looks at three of these compounding risks: the COVID-19 pandemic, digitalisation and access to justice.
The pandemic had a significant and disproportionate impact in fragile contexts, particularly on livelihoods, well-being, and human development
The socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a global reversal in human development in 2020 for the first time since the concept was first measured in 1990 (UNDP, 2020[70]). It also halted and reversed the declining trend of the number of people in extreme poverty (Kharas and Dooley, 2021[71]), and between-country inequality was observed to have increased (Adarov, 2022[72]). It is estimated that by the start of 2022, fragile contexts were home to almost a quarter of the world’s population (24%) (Figure 1.11) but also to almost three-quarters (73%) of those living in extreme poverty (Figure 1.12). By 2030, 86% of the world’s extreme poor are expected to be living in fragile contexts (Gerszon Mahler et al., 2021[1]). Additionally, the geography of extreme poverty is expected to shift towards extremely fragile contexts, which will account for one in three of the world’s extreme poor by 2030 (Figure 1.12). Such a concentration of extreme poverty has exposed people living in fragile contexts to a range of compounding risks that affect their livelihoods and resilience. These risks are transnational and highly political and shape diverse aspects of multidimensional fragility. The extent of these risks is reflected in how many of the people living in fragile contexts view their situations: Unemployment and livelihood crises are chief among their concerns, followed by debt, state collapse and inflation (World Economic Forum, 2022, pp. 96-108[73]). Infographic 1.4 illustrates the impact of the pandemic in fragile contexts and some of the various responses to it in the form of policy actions such as vaccination campaigns.
Note: In the figure, the rest of the world is divided between high-income contexts and low- and middle-income contexts to account for potential outliers and differentiate ODA-eligible and non-ODA-eligible countries and territories. The figure also assumes the same cohort of 60 fragile contexts on the latest edition of the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework.
Source: UN DESA (2019[2]), 2019 Revision of World Population Prospects (database), https://population.un.org/wpp/.
Note: Estimates after 2022 are projections from the source data. This figure assumes the same cohort of 60 fragile contexts on the latest edition of the OECD’s multidimensional fragility framework.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimates in Gerszon Mahler et al. (2021[1]), “Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Turning the corner on the pandemic in 2021?”, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-global-poverty-turning-corner-pandemic-2021.
Sources: Ritchie et al. (2022[3]), Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19) (database), https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus; World Bank (2022[74]), COVID-19 Household Monitoring Dashboard (database), https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2020/11/11/covid-19-high-frequency-monitoring-dashboard; UNDP (2022[75]), COVID-19 Global Gender Response Tracker (database), https://data.undp.org/gendertracker/; Gentilini et al. (2022[76]), Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country Measures, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37186.
Responses to the pandemic highlight emerging digital inequalities in fragile contexts that have long-term implications for livelihoods and well-being
The digital transformation happening worldwide is a double-edged sword (OECD, 2021[77]). Though access to digital technology can yield significant benefits for achieving sustainable development, the lack of it can entrench existing inequality and contribute to new forms of inequality (UNDP, 2019[78]). This digital divide is particularly acute in fragile contexts, where access to digital services such as the Internet, a fixed telephone subscription and fixed broadband varies significantly. From 2002 to 2019, Gambia, Kenya and Nigeria had some of the highest rates of digitalisation and growth of information communication technologies in sub-Saharan Africa, while the lowest growth rates were in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad and Niger (Kouladoum, Wirajing and Nchofoung, 2022[79]). In Latin America and the Caribbean, only 35% of Haiti’s population had access to the Internet in 2020, negatively affecting prospects for the country’s growth and resilience to the impacts of COVID-19 (World Bank, 2020[80]). The digital divide also has an urban-rural dynamic: In Central and West Africa, only 26% of households in rural areas own a television versus 73% in urban areas, an important gap given that school closures made broadcast media an essential part of remote learning (World Bank/UNESCO/UNICEF, 2021, p. 23[81]). Before the pandemic, people living in fragile contexts in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa had cited the digital divide as a significant short-term risk (World Economic Forum, 2022, p. 20[73]).
The digital divide has far-reaching consequences across the dimensions of fragility. For example, digital technology is an important enabler of financial inclusion, especially for women and other disadvantaged groups in society (Davico et al., 2022[82]). In Bangladesh, the government’s push to make payments digital during the COVID-19 pandemic led to 2 million people owning digital accounts within just 25 days, with many of these people being first-time users (Poutiainen and Rees, 2021[83]). Digital financial inclusion, in turn, can accelerate economic growth (Khera et al., 2021[84]). Access to digital technology has also broadened people’s awareness of global issues, while this brings many positives it can also exacerbate grievances on such issues as wealth disparity and inequality, and catalyse momentum for political demonstrations and violence (UN/World Bank, 2018, p. 51[53]). Finally, digital technology has significant implications for educational outcomes (Vincent-Lancrin, 2022[85]), a central element of the human dimension of fragility analysed for the first time in this edition of the OECD fragility framework.
The gender digital divide across some fragile contexts (Figure 1.13) reinforced existing gender inequalities during the COVID-19 pandemic while also exposing the various challenges such as affordability, lack of technological literacy and broader societal norms that played a part in creating the divide (OECD, 2018[86]). In Kenya, only 22% of children had access to digital learning during school closures, and children in private schools were twice as likely to learn remotely as their counterparts in public schools. Survey data further suggest that school closures in Kenya disproportionately affected girls and children from poorer and less educated households (Cameron et al., 2022[87]). Similar findings are evident in Uganda, with a notable deterioration in learning outcomes for poorer pupils in the lowest levels of education (Sandefur, 2022[88]).
Note: In Cambodia, the proportions of the male and female populations using the Internet were both 65%. Only fragile contexts for which data were available for both men and women are included.
Source: ITU (2022[89]), ITU Datahub (database), https://datahub.itu.int/.
Entire groups are systematically excluded from access to justice in fragile contexts
The gap in access to justice is a third important expression of the link between fragility and inequality (Desai, forthcoming[90]). The OECD’s Good Practice Principles for People-Centred Justice outline essential attributes of people-centred justice, such as its focus on the legal needs of various vulnerable parts of the population (OECD, 2021[91]). People are excluded from access to justice every day in diverse ways ranging from being denied the right to their land, labour or bodily autonomy to being unable to address grievances through available formal dispute resolution mechanisms. Such exclusions tend to entrench inequalities to the benefit of the ruling elite, especially in fragile contexts where customary and informal justice systems are prevalent due to limits in the state’s capacity to provide justice services (International Development Law Organization, 2019[92]). For example, in Somalia, 80% to 90% of people seeking justice use informal systems because they are faster and more effective and accessible than the formal system (International Development Law Organization, 2022[93]). Entire groups are excluded systematically from access to justice in fragile contexts: One in three people lacks proof of a legal identity, and two in five children do not have birth records (Desai, forthcoming[90]). These people do not exist officially in formal legal systems, which precludes their ability to access basic rights. For groups that do have access to these systems in some manner, there is a quality deficit in the provision of justice.
Civil and administrative legal problems are widespread in fragile contexts. The World Justice Project, based on the findings of its 2019 global survey of perceptions of access to justice, estimates that 1.4 billion people round the world had unmet legal needs of a civil or administrative nature in the previous two years (World Justice Project, 2019[94]). More than 800 million people in fragile contexts, extrapolating from these estimates, have such unmet legal needs (Desai, forthcoming[90]).
Despite the wide gap in access to justice, the volume of DAC ODA to support justice declined in fragile contexts by 64% from 2010 to 2020 (OECD, 2022[41]). This lack of financial and programmatic attention is emblematic of various issues with the provision of legal and judicial development in fragile contexts. One such issue is the lack of attention to the politics of reform in the justice sector, particularly at different levels of the state and society. As is the case in many other sectors of development co-operation, justice reform is treated as a technical exercise focused on processes or individual institutions rather than as a means to address the multidimensionality of factors such as social norms and behaviours towards certain groups that contribute to gaps in access to justice (Stewart, 2022[95]). In environments where these factors exist, there is value in supporting policy processes at the national level alongside community-based organisations and paralegals as they aim to offer basic legal advice to vulnerable groups and thus are well positioned to address deficits in the availability of legal formal services (International Development Law Organization, 2021[96]). Efforts to better target existing development assistance and co-ordinate among various partners in this space could offer an opportunity to scale up the provision of justice services in a way that is cost effective and impactful (Manuel and Manuel, 2021[97]).
Infographic 1.5 explores the relationship between fragility and inequality across various measures related to gender, health, education, and income. All of these themes are prominent in the new human dimension.
Notes: Group values are based on an arithmetic mean of the countries and territories within each group. In the graph on the sub-components of human inequality, ‘Rest of the world’ refers to countries and territories that are on the DAC List of ODA Recipients for reporting on aid in 2021.
Sources: Authors’ calculations (e.g. averages) based on countries and territories with available data in UNDP (2022[98]), Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, https://hdr.undp.org/inequality-adjusted-human-development-index#/indicies/IHDI; UNDP (2022[39]), “Gender inequality index (GII), database”, https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII.
Food systems in many fragile contexts are at a breaking point even without the unfolding impacts of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine
Food systems globally are under immense pressure. In many fragile contexts, they are at a breaking point as needs escalate, due especially to the inflation of food prices over the past two years and compounded further by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Baffes and Temaj, 2022[99]). According to the Food Security Information Network, there are 193 million people who are acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance across 53 countries and territories, of which 48 are on the OECD’s fragility framework. This is an increase of nearly 40 million people over the previous high in 2020 (Food Security Information Network, 2022, pp. 6, 30-33[100]; Tschunkert and Delgado, 2022, p. 2[101]). Fragile contexts account for all top ten countries with the highest number of people facing acute food insecurity in 2021, including 17.5 million children assessed as wasted (Food Security Information Network, 2022, p. 7[100]). In 2022, fragile contexts accounted for 22 of 23 food insecure “hotspots” (FAO/WFP, 2022, p. 11[37]). Should these trends continue, fragile contexts will be at the centre of a critical failure to achieve progress on SDG 2 (zero hunger).
Food insecurity was already increasing in fragile contexts prior to the pandemic (OECD, 2020, p. 38[102]). The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weaknesses, inequalities and inequities in the food systems of fragile contexts that are manifesting in loss of income, inflation, disrupted supply chains and decreased purchasing power (Figure 1.14). In certain fragile contexts, the pandemic’s impact combined with other causes of fragility to degrade these systems even more. For example, the number of acutely food insecure people has increased significantly in South Sudan, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, which were experiencing high food inflation prior to the pandemic (Townsend et al., 2021, p. 9[103]). Social safety nets developed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic have proved inadequate in many cases in fragile contexts, leaving many people without the means to absorb higher food prices (CARE, 2022[104]).
Analysis of food insecurity alongside other causes of fragility points to a heightened risk of a rapid increase in the number of contexts categorised as in an emergency or catastrophe according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.6 In Ethiopia alone, the number of people categorised as in emergency increased from about 1.4 million in late 2020 to 4.3 million by May-June 2021 due to a combination of war and drought (Food Security Information Network, 2022, p. 42[100]). The total numbers of people categorised as in an emergency (39.2 million across 36 fragile contexts) and crisis (131.1 million across 41 fragile contexts) point to the potential for compounding risks to drive more severe fragility in many contexts. These contexts include the DRC (27.3 million), Haiti (4.4 million), Guatemala (3.73 million), Zimbabwe (3.4 million) and Mozambique (2.9 million) – contexts that are also experiencing severe environmental, political, security and societal fragility (Food Security Information Network, 2022, pp. 35-55[100]). West Africa and the Sahel, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa are all experiencing significant increases of people at or above the food crisis level over the last six years (Food Security Information Network, 2022, pp. 48-49[100]).
Note: For the methodology for calculating the cost of a healthy diet and the share of a population unable to afford a healthy diet, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp/brief/foodpricesfornutrition#3.
Source: World Bank (2022[105]), Food Prices for Nutrition DataHub, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp/brief/foodpricesfornutrition#1.
Environmental and political fragility are interconnected, and this affects food systems
Environmental fragility is common to all contexts experiencing food insecurity. But its impact varies by context. For example, five of the top ten hunger hotspots are fragile contexts experiencing severe environmental fragility: Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Haiti and the DRC (in descending order of the number of people in acute food insecurity). For Ethiopia, the Syrian Arab Republic and other fragile contexts in the top ten, environmental fragility is classified as very high but with risk more closely associated with a subset of issues such as water (OECD, 2022[106]). Climate change and biodiversity loss are two of the most important factors influencing global food security, but they are not the only environmental concerns. This is especially true in nature-dependent developing countries, where most of the GDP derives from agriculture, forestry or fishing. In Ethiopia, there are regional political and security risks associated with the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as the Ethiopian highlands supply more than 85% of the water that flows into the Nile River (Mbaku, 2020[107]). These risks are compounded by a combination of environmental, societal and economic fragility in the DRC, where the scale of deforestation is affecting regional hydrological cycles and contributing to a reduction in water flows in Ethiopia. Biodiversity loss and environmental degradation due to pollution or mismanagement are equally if not more important in some fragile contexts. Where the connections between causes of fragility are not attended to, natural hazards such as droughts, floods and cyclones can set societies back even when some progress on resilient food systems has been made (Townsend et al., 2021[103]). The situation in the Middle East and North Africa region highlights the interplay of dimensions that produce negatively compounding effects on already weakened states, linking severe environmental, political and security fragility (Box 1.6).
Decision making on food and water security will be central to the region’s short- to medium-term fragility. Syria and Yemen account for more than half of the people in the region facing acute food insecurity, and Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are struggling. The rapid increase in exposure to food insecurity is one of the defining trends in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where the number of people exposed increased from 45.4 million in 2020 to 60.5 million in 2021 (Food Security Information Network, 2022, pp. 60-62[100]).
The fragile contexts of the region face a highly charged political environment that makes progress on environmental fragility and food security extremely challenging. The degradation of water sources is a feature in many fragile contexts and is primarily a reflection of environmental fragility. Access to water has emerged as one of the most significant issues facing MENA contexts, which account for 12 of the 17 most water-stressed countries in the world. In 2021, Iraq had a 60% water loss due to drought, high temperatures and external restrictions on water flows (Khashan, 2022[108]).
The political economy of access to water in MENA contexts is increasingly contentious: Even before the impact of the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, over 70% of the region’s GDP was generated in areas with high to very high surface water stress (World Bank, 2018, p. xxv[109]). Water supplies in Iraq and Syria are vulnerable to upstream dam construction projects and delicate transboundary water arrangements, with regional geopolitical implications (Golmohammadi, 2021[110]). Antiquated and poorly designed water systems are adding to risks, as irrigation systems are ill equipped to deal with rising demand and deteriorating and erratic rainfall. Indeed, half of Syria’s water treatment facilities are inoperable because of war damage, which has reduced available drinking water by 40% over the past decade, and with dire consequences for local and regional ecosystems (Khashan, 2022[108]). Modern alternatives for water management have not been introduced, and partnerships and co-operation among affected communities, sectors and governments have not materialised at a scale sufficient to meet the challenges (Khashan, 2022[108]). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic, overlapping with issues such as war and forced displacement, has resulted in increased food insecurity since 2020 (Food Security Information Network, 2022, p. 61[100]). The impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has compounded this regional fragility even further by affecting food supplies and prices in fragile contexts like Syria and Yemen and in contexts on their periphery such as Lebanon (UNICEF, 2022[111]).
Food insecurity is a regional challenge requiring solutions that balance multidimensional fragility and regional needs with the critical dependencies – Arab countries import more than half of their food supplies. Thus far, a regional response remains compromised by issues of corruption and governance and caught in the intractability of political grievances reflected in the wars in Syria and Yemen, violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a host of frozen conflicts that link almost every country in the region. Despite the strength of the evidence and its stark implications for MENA, water and food insecurity have not featured prominently in peace discussions for the region.
Sources: Food Security Information Network (2022[100]), 2022 Global Report on Food Crises, https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%202022%20Final%20Report.pdf; Khashan (2022[108]), “Arab food insecurity and political failure”, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/arab-food-insecurity-and-political-failure/?tpa=OGQ5OTZjODBhODc5MjJiYzc0NmQxOTE2NTI5NzQ1MTVhYjg5ZTQ&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=https://geopoliticalfutures.com/arab-food-insecurity-and-political-failure/; World Bank (2018[109]), Beyond Scarcity: Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27659; Golmohammadi (2021[110]), Water Scarcity in the Middle East: Beyond an Environmental Risk, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/water-scarcity-middle-east-beyond-environmental-risk/#_edn3; UNICEF (2022[111]), “As the war in Ukraine continues, millions of children in the Middle East and North Africa at increased risk of malnutrition amid food price hikes”, https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/war-ukraine-continues-millions-children-middle-east-and-north-africa-increased-risk
Coping capacities are particularly undermined in conflict-affected fragile contexts where land cultivation, infrastructure and access to markets are often severely compromised. Food insecurity is a driver of conflict, and conflict acts as a barrier to the recovery and resilience of food systems. Land and maritime disputes and unequal distribution of natural resources are common drivers of violence and conflict in many fragile contexts (Sturgess and Flower, 2013[112]). Conflict-affected fragile contexts account for all ten of the worst food security crises in 2020 (Tschunkert and Delgado, 2022, p. 4[101]). In conflict-affected contexts, fighting often targets infrastructure, places severe limitations on transportation, disrupts or halts agriculture, and disrupts local access to depleted food supplies. Food systems can be manipulated to exacerbate fragility, conflict and violence by causing food shortages, limiting access to production, or fostering grievances related to social issues and food prices.
Fragile contexts generate and host the majority of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons
Fragile contexts are central to the global forced displacement situation (Infographic 1.6). Even before Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, forced displacement worldwide had reached unprecedented levels, with over 95 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2021,7 including internal displacement due to conflict and natural disasters (UNHCR, 2022[113]; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022[114]). Fragile contexts generate most forced displacement movements. Over 70 million refugees and IDPs originate from fragile contexts, representing 75% of all refugees fleeing from fragile contexts and over 78% of all forcibly displaced worldwide. Fragile contexts also host the vast majority of the world’s refugees and IDPs: 61 million forcibly displaced persons are residing in fragile contexts, representing 64% of the global forcibly displaced population. The phenomenon of fragile contexts as hosts is particularly pronounced when it comes to internal displacement, as over 80% of all IDPs live in fragile contexts compared to some 39% of all refugees (Figure 1.15). The vast majority of all refugees and IDPs face protracted displacement of longer than five years.
Note: Forced displacement refers to the totality of IDPs and refugees at the end of 2021, including the following population groups: refugees, asylum seekers, Venezuelans displaced abroad, refugees under the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East mandate, conflict IDPs and disaster-related IDPs.
Sources: International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2022[115]), Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data; UNHCR (2022[116]), Refugee Data Finder, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=2z1B08.
The mutually reinforcing relationship between fragility and forced displacement leaves a profound impact in three areas:
Multidimensional interconnected fragility has contributed to driving forced displacement to unprecedented levels. This affects the immediate region around fragile contexts most, as the vast majority of forcibly displaced are either internally displaced or flee as refugees to neighbouring countries.
Hosting forcibly displaced individuals can reinforce pre-existing fragilities and has an economic cost. The short-term economic impact, which disproportionally affects the subnational areas and communities hosting the displaced, includes a sizable pressure on social service systems and natural resources. In the medium to long term, the right distribution and inclusion-oriented policies can reduce fiscal costs and possibly offer positive socioeconomic integration opportunities for both the displaced and host communities.
Fragility is an obstacle for refugees and IDPs to attain durable solutions. Due to the negative economic, environmental, political, security or societal prospects in fragile areas of origin, forcibly displaced are often either unable or unwilling to return. At the same time, forcibly displaced individuals often face a capability trap in the fragile contexts hosting them when the state or host community does not offer social or economic opportunities. Even with the right policies, a fragile context limits realistic opportunities for practical solutions to end forced displacement, such as socioeconomic empowerment of the displaced (Marley, Stasieluk and Hesemann, 2022[11]).
Note: Forced displacement refers to the totality of IDPs and refugees at the end of 2021, including the following population groups: refugees, asylum seekers, Venezuelans displaced abroad, refugees under the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East mandate, conflict IDPs and disaster-related IDPs.
Sources: International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2022[115]), Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data; UNHCR (2022[116]), Refugee Data Finder, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=2z1B08.
The trends discussed in this section by no means represent all the challenges that fragile contexts are facing in their progress towards sustainable development and peace. Rather, they illustrate the need for a multidimensional approach to address their root causes and bolster fragile contexts’ resilience to them. Such an approach calls for an emphasis on systems over infrastructure, especially in contexts where direct causal effect between action and output is difficult to establish and where the character of a political settlement can limit entry points and opportunities for planning development responses. Chapter 2 looks at finance and policy responses to the complex causes and consequences of fragility. Chapter 3 outlines how development partners can chart a path forward to navigate fragility and support fragile contexts to cope with the age of crises.
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Notes
← 1. Based on authors’ calculations of the estimates presented in Gerszon Mahler et al. (2021[1]). The authors thank Daniel Gerszon Mahler and Nishant Yonzan for their advice on the use of these data.
← 2. Due to the timing of the data collection, the most recent year of data available is 2021. These data were used to develop the findings of the fragility framework for States of Fragility 2022. Comparisons in this report from 2019 to 2021 illustrate the change in fragility from the time of the findings of States of Fragility 2020 to States of Fragility 2022.
← 3. This total is based on the July 2022 World Bank income classifications. Missing from these figures is the 60th fragile context, Venezuela, which was previously classified as upper middle-income but is now unclassified due to an absence of data through its ongoing economic and political crisis.
← 4. The diversity that characterises fragile contexts is also visible based on V-DEM’s “Regimes of the World” classification: 35 of the 60 fragile contexts are electoral autocracies, while 15 are closed autocracies and 9 are electoral democracies.” A classification for the West Bank and Gaza Strip was not available in the source data.
← 5. There are 17 SDGs. The 15 mentioned here are the SDGs for which sufficient data are available for this assessment.
← 6. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification defines five phases of acute food insecurity ranging from Phase 1 (none/minimal) to Phase 5 (catastrophe/famine). Phase 3, or the crisis phase, is when households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis coping strategies. In this phase, urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps. For further information, see https://www.ipcinfo.org/.
← 7. For the purpose of analysing the relationship between fragility and international forced displacement, the term “refugee” is not limited to its specific legal definition but also includes asylum seekers who may or may not be refugees; refugees under the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East mandate; and individuals in refugee-like situations such as Venezuelans displaced abroad and individuals benefiting from temporary protection measures. The specific data for all aforementioned population categories are based on the UN Refugee Agency’s Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2021. For IDP population statistics, the data are sourced from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022, which refers to IDP statistics for 2021.