1. Policies for agricultural adaptation to a changing climate

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2023[1]), global temperatures averaged 1.1°C higher over the previous decade than preindustrial levels and are rising by 0.2 degrees per decade. Agriculture is among the sectors that is most exposed to the resulting changes in weather patterns and extreme events, such as drought and flooding. Adapting to this changing environment is imperative to tackle the triple challenge of providing food for a growing population, providing livelihoods all along the food value chain and increasing the sustainability of the agricultural sector.

The effects of climate change have already had noticeable impacts on yield and the quality of agricultural products. Although yields of staple crops have risen by 2.5 to 3-fold since 1960 due to improved technology and management practices, global yields for crops such as maize and soybean are between 4% and 6% lower than they would have been in the absence of warming trends (IPCC, 2022[2]; Moore, 2020[3]; Iizumi et al., 2018[4]). Growth in the productivity of the sector has also significantly slowed: since 1961, climate change has reduced total factor productivity – a measure of how much output can be produced from a given quantity of inputs – by an estimated 21% (Ortiz-Bobea et al., 2021[5]).

Agriculture is also particularly vulnerable to weather extremes given its intrinsic dependence on the natural environment. Among the events most damaging to agricultural production, the frequency of droughts has roughly doubled (from 8 per year in 1971-80 compared to 16 per year in 2011-20), storms have more than tripled (from 29 to 103 per year), and floods have become nearly six times as prevalent (from 27 to 155 per year) (CRED, 2023[6]).1 In total, the number of natural disasters globally has increased since the 1970s, from an average of 92 events per year between 1971-80 to 372 events per year between 2011-20 (Figure 1.1). The economic cost of disasters has risen from USD 1.63 trillion in 1980-99 to USD 2.97 trillion in 2000-19, driven by a combination of factors including increased frequency of some types of events, increased exposure, and increased vulnerability (CRED and UNDRR, 2020[7]).2 While the economic losses are greatest in absolute terms in developed countries, the impacts of natural disasters are particularly pronounced in developing countries, where the most vulnerable are less able to cope with and recover from their impacts (OECD/FAO, 2021[8]).

The risks to agriculture from climate change are considerable, but there are also potential positive effects in some regions, such as the geographic migration of agricultural production and resulting new opportunities.3 For example, northern regions of Europe and North America are likely to become increasingly suitable for agricultural production as warmer temperatures extend the length of the growing season. Some regions may become more suitable for growing different types of crops. For example, some parts of Spain have reported becoming increasingly favourable for growing tropical fruits. Wine production has already extended northward, into the United Kingdom, for example, and into high-altitude growing regions, such as mountainous areas of Italy. Countries in northern latitudes anticipate improved growing conditions broadly for staple crops, such as sugar beets and maize. Even in countries with warmer climates where increased temperatures are expected to be detrimental, a decrease in frost is expected to benefit certain crops (Cobourn, 2023[9]).

Regionally, climate change has had varied effects on agriculture. Europe has faced earlier onset of growing seasons, as well as warming and precipitation changes (IPCC, 2022[10]). Estimates suggest that this positively affects maize and sugar beet yields, but negatively affects those of wheat and barley. Crop losses due to droughts and heat waves in Europe have tripled over the past five decades (Brás et al., 2021[11]). In recent years, cold winters, excessive autumn and spring rain, and summer droughts have combined to reduce yields from expected levels based on historical trends. Warmer temperatures have also led to poleward incursions of pests, diseases and invasive species. For example, the European corn borer has moved over 1 000 km northward, and the Diamondback moth has moved 800 km farther northward in Scandinavia than its former range in Russia. These trends are expected to continue with the spread of the olive fly into northern areas of Italy (Skendžić et al., 2021[12]).

In Asia, climate change has been associated with changing monsoonal rains, extreme temperatures and oceanic oscillations (IPCC, 2022[13]; Thirumalai et al., 2017[14]). For agricultural production, climate change has delayed crop harvesting, reduced crop yields and quality, increased the incidence of pests and diseases, stunted livestock growth and increased animal mortality. Climate change influences the magnitude, timing and pattern of El Niño events, with adverse impacts on agricultural productivity and food security in middle- and lower-income countries in Southeast and South Asia (Cai et al., 2014[15]). This is particularly salient for rice production, which depends heavily on monsoon rainfall that declines with a stronger El Niño. According to a recent study, El Niño negatively affects 13.4% of global rice harvesting areas, including those located in India, Viet Nam, the Philippines, northeast People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), and Japan (Cao et al., 2023[16]). Australasia has been affected by a number of drought, heat and frost events in recent decades that have had strongly negative effects on agriculture (IPCC, 2022[17]). Northern Australia’s agricultural output losses are estimated to average 19% each year due to drought. In New Zealand, reduced winter chill has led to earlier harvesting of kiwifruits (Cobourn, 2023[9]).

North America has faced shifting growing seasons, as well as extreme heat and precipitation (IPCC, 2022[18]). The share of land area in the United States that experienced extreme precipitation has risen significantly since the 1980s which bring with it increased risk of surface runoff, soil erosion and loss of soil carbon (Gowda et al., 2018[19]). Agricultural total factor productivity growth across North America has generally declined as a direct result of climate change, with growing regions at lower latitudes more affected (Ortiz-Bobea et al., 2021[5]).

Most subregions of South America have experienced increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes and decreases in those of cold extremes (IPCC, 2022[20]). Drought duration and intensity is also increasing with events such as the “Central Chile Mega Drought”, representing the longest drought in the region in one thousand years, and the multi-year drought in the Parana-La Plata Basin, the most severe since 1944. In South America overall, drought conditions reduced cereal harvests in 2020-2021 by 2.6% relative to the prior year (WMO, 2022[21]). Drought in the Mexican state of Zacatecas reduced the bean harvest in 2020 to its lowest level in 20 years. Central America and Northern South America have experienced increases in magnitude and frequency of extreme precipitation events as well as fire. In Argentina, fire destroyed critical pasture in the Gran Chaco region in 2022, decreasing pasture and livestock productivity.

Against this backdrop, the need for adaptation measures to limit and anticipate the effects of climate change is ever increasing. IPCC scenarios project rising temperatures, elevated levels of CO2 and more frequent and extreme weather events (IPCC, 2023[1]). These effects will continue to challenge agriculture over the coming decades. For example, rising temperatures could reduce soil carbon and nitrogen levels, which in turn will reduce the yield potential of crops (IPCC, 2022[2]; Basso et al., 2018[22]). Further yield losses are expected to be realised from changes in insect pest populations and metabolic processes, which are sensitive to rising temperatures (Deutsch et al., 2018[23]; IPCC, 2022[2]). Higher temperatures will also increase the number of extreme stress days per year for livestock and could cause large production losses, particularly for beef and dairy (Nardone et al., 2006[24]; IPCC, 2022[2]). Increasing CO2 levels are projected to affect the establishment, competition, distribution, and management of weeds, reducing herbicide efficacy (IPCC, 2022[2]). Increasing temperatures will reduce available water resources as a result of changes in river flows, basin storage and decreased rates of groundwater recharge. This will have negative consequences for the roughly 40% of global crops which are irrigated and could have even more important impact in regions where agriculture faces increased competition from other sectors (OECD, 2017[25]).

The frequency and intensity of extreme events are also expected to worsen (IPCC, 2021[26]). More frequent and damaging extreme weather events such as droughts, storms and floods will lead to more crop failures, increase aflatoxin contamination, and affect the economic viability of grassland-based livestock production in some regions. Floods and storms may increase the spread of water-borne diseases, microorganisms and algae which negatively affect livestock health. They may also damage critical infrastructure required for the harvest, transport, and processing of farm produce. Although some tipping points have already been crossed, or are close to being crossed, warming beyond 1.5°C is more likely to induce climate tipping points, irreversibly affecting agriculture in certain regions. For instance, the slowdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), is predicted to lead to abrupt and irreversible impacts, including changes in monsoon systems and widespread drought with detrimental impacts for current agricultural systems (OECD, 2022[27]).

Along with risks to individual growers, there are also risks to global food systems. There is growing evidence that rising temperatures increase the probability of simultaneous yield losses in major food producing regions (IPCC, 2022[2]; Gaupp et al., 2019[28]; Cai et al., 2014[15]; Perry et al., 2017[29]). These concurrent yield loss events could lead to significant price spikes on international markets due to reduced global supplies. This will impair the ability of importing countries to secure supplies and could increase the risks to global food security.

The magnitude of the impacts of climate change on agriculture rise substantially with every additional degree of warming, stressing the importance of mitigation efforts to limit emissions (IPCC, 2022[2]). Adverse changes in precipitation, temperature and aridity could see as much as one third of current agricultural land become unsuitable for major crop or livestock production by the end of the century under the IPCC’s most pessimistic emissions scenario (Kummu et al., 2021[30]; IPCC, 2022[31]). However, even under more optimistic climate change scenarios, large impacts on agricultural production are projected. For instance, under a low-emissions scenario, up to 8% of current agricultural land is expected to become unsuitable for major crop or livestock production by the end of the century.

The IPCC defines climate change adaptation in human systems as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (Ara Begum et al., 2022[32]). Adaptation in the agricultural sector may be autonomous or planned. Autonomous adaptation is defined as a process undertaken without explicit planning or guidance and in response to changes in the environment or market (Malik, Qin and Smith, 2010[33]). This form of adaptation often occurs when farmers adjust their practices in response to observed changes in climatic conditions, such as changing livestock or farm management practices, switching varieties or species, or altering the timing of planting, stocking and other key activities. In contrast, planned adaptation follows from an intentional and deliberative decision making process. Planned adaptations are often, but not exclusively, undertaken by groups of actors or public entities in anticipation of or in response to a change. Examples include investments in more resilient seeds or technologies to improve irrigation efficiency (Ignaciuk and Mason-D’Croz, 2014[34]).

Farmers are often best positioned to determine the adaptation measures needed to mitigate climate risk on their farms, provided that they have sufficient resources, access to knowledge, and financial and technical capacity to adapt (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). In many cases, on-farm adaptation occurs without the need for policy interventions, or in spite of policies that hinder adaptation, as farmers react to observed or projected changes in climatic conditions. In these instances, the benefits of adaptation are derived locally and directly captured by farmers. This means that self-interest is a sufficient incentive for the adaptation action to occur (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]).

However, even when there is a private benefit, farmers may choose not to engage in climate adaptation actions due to information gaps, financial constraints or misaligned incentives (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). In other instances, climate adaptation cannot be adequately implemented on farm due to market failures, externalities and information asymmetries or if more radical transformation is required (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]). The IPCC (2022[2]) predicts that because of limited adaptive capacities and non-climatic compounding drivers of food insecurity, autonomous adaptation will be insufficient to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goal 2 of ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. Thus, more pro-active planned adaptation, supported by public policy, will be essential.

Given that farmers undertake their decisions within the context of social and economic institutions that constrain, or facilitate, their ability to adapt, there is a clear role for public policy to play in creating an enabling environment. The types of adaptation actions that may be justified for public interventions from an economic perspective include, for example, actions that generate or transfer knowledge, correct for externalities, allow for sharing extreme risk, and correct for institutional, regulatory or financial barriers to adaptation (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]).

Planning adaptation strategies comes with a great deal of uncertainty and adaptation strategies can fail. In some circumstances strategies may actually increase vulnerability to climate change, a phenomenon known as maladaptation. Maladaptation refers to actions or inactions which lead to increased risk of adverse outcomes, increased vulnerability, or diminished welfare as a result of climate change, now or in the future (IPCC, 2022[2]). For example, subsidies for water efficient irrigation measures may lead to greater extraction of groundwater and planting of more water-intensive crops, increasing the likelihood and magnitude of losses due to future drought (OECD, 2017, p. 166[25]). Government support to specific practices or technologies that do not fully respond to local needs can also generate harmful incentives or simply reinforce existing production profiles and techniques, undermining the incentives for autonomous adaptation. Even well-intentioned adaptation policies implemented today can turn out to be a driver of maladaptation in the future because of significant uncertainty in climate projections. To minimise the risk of maladaptation, “no regret” policies should be prioritised, alongside adaptation policies that are flexible and suitably robust across a range of climate scenario outcomes with a view to improving long-term productivity (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]; Antón et al., 2013[37]).

It is difficult for a policymaker to determine the specific adaptation actions suited for local conditions, thus is generally accepted that policy should focus on developing the capacity of a system to adapt, rather than prioritising specific adaptation strategies (OECD, 2014[38]). As a result, adaptation policies often focus on increasing resilience, defined as “the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt and transform in response to adverse events” (OECD, 2020[39]). This definition incorporates preparation and three core capacities – absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacity – which correspond to action over the short, medium, and long run, respectively.

Following OECD (2020[39]), absorptive capacity refers to the ability of a system to cope with the impacts of a shock in the short run, e.g. by establishing early warning systems that allow farmers to adjust their operations, or crop insurance schemes that compensate farmers for damages. Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust in the medium-term through incremental changes in behaviour, but without structural change. Examples of such incremental changes in behaviour include changes in farm operations, adjustments to planting dates or crop mix, or changing irrigation systems. Transformative capacity corresponds to the ability of a system to undergo structural change, such as moving crops into new production regions, developing new infrastructure, creating new market opportunities, or leaving farming altogether which could be supported by compensation for exiting the sector.4

It is essential that policy for climate change adaptation supports each of these three capacities in order to facilitate effective adaptation and to avoid maladaptive outcomes in the long run. Actions that focus only on countering short-term impacts of climate change can become maladaptive over time if the situation does not improve (Lankoski, Ignaciuk and Jésus, 2018[40]; Schipper, 2020[41]). For example, ex-post disaster compensation may support farmers through a season of drought, but increasing instances of drought attributable to climate change may mean that better tools to assist farmers plan for and manage risks or potentially even more transformative change may be necessary in the long-term. Similarly, focusing on medium-run capacity may supplant investments in transformative capacity that are necessary in the long run. For example, investing in the development of new cultivars may delay the need to shift to a new crop or new producing region, even if structural change will be necessary in the long run.

While agricultural and climate policies and investments are the main vehicles to progress towards enhanced resilience capacity for agriculture, water policy can also play an important role to foster climate change adaptation particular in regions subject to high water risks (Box 1.1).

Both adaptation and mitigation actions are critical in the face of a worsening climate and there are important synergies to be realised from integrated responses that encompass both (Bezner Kerr et al., 2022[45]). Mitigation refers to actions or activities that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from entering the atmosphere or reduce their levels in the atmosphere (e.g. through carbon sinks) (Grubb et al., 2022[46]). Even with progress on mitigation, some climate impacts are already unavoidable and adaptation efforts will be necessary to address further losses and damages. In this context, an integrated approach to climate policy that includes both mitigation and adaptation components is necessary to develop long-term resilience. To transition towards net-zero emissions, leveraging synergies between the two is essential to generating effective and efficient policies (OECD, 2023[47]).

Adaptation and mitigation actions often have different drivers, benefits and barriers to adoption (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). In particular, adaptation actions can generate direct benefits for farmers and local communities, whereas mitigation actions tend to result in public rather than private benefits. As a result, policy intervention is often required to incentivise mitigation actions. The use of incentives such as well-designed payments for environmental and climate services, land retirement policies, afforestation and R&D incentives are examples of policies that may encourage emissions reductions, although care must be taken in their design and implementation (OECD, 2022[48]). Reform of agricultural support policies, in particular the phase out of market price support and payments with strong potential to harm the environment and to distort markets and trade, is among the priority actions for climate change mitigation (OECD, 2022[48]).

Although adaptation actions may sometimes be socially optimal, there are many cases in which adaptation fails due to a lack of financial, knowledge or technical resources. In these cases, the role for policy predominantly lies in the provision of information, access to credit and engagement (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). In other cases where structural changes are required, or where there are considerable public benefits, there is a clear economic rationale for policy intervention. Adaptation policies should consider long-term risks, but factor in future uncertainty and build in flexibility so that well-intentioned policies do not lead to maladaptation (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]). Policy coherence is imperative along with monitoring the effectiveness of policy approaches.

Although the role of policy in mitigation and adaptation differs, it is often the case that a single policy instrument simultaneously contributes to both objectives, providing mitigation-adaptation co-benefits (Bustamante et al., 2014[49]). For example, measures to increase soil organic carbon may contribute to both mitigation and to improving the yields of crops and pasture.

In practice, policies for mitigation and adaptation can be misaligned with each other, and with other objectives (Lankoski, Ignaciuk and Jésus, 2018[40]). For instance, Lankoski, Ignaciuk and Jésus (2018[40]) found that a green set-aside payment may have positive effects on productivity and mitigation but negative effects on adaptation. The impacts of any policy will be highly context-specific. Countries will thus need to make specific assessments of likely policy effects on the three objectives and adopt a holistic approach in order to tackle the triple challenge.

What importance do governments convey to agriculture in their overall adaptation strategies? Following Cobourn (2023[9]) and the related literature, international reporting documents submitted by each of the countries included in this report (henceforth referred to as the “M&E countries”) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) yield some insight into how the attention paid by governments to climate change adaptation in agriculture has evolved over nearly four decades, from the mid-1990s through early 2023.5 These include periodic national communications submitted by Parties to the Convention, as well as reporting documents under the Paris Agreement, namely required nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and optional adaptation communications.6

All of the documents submitted to the UNFCCC refer to agriculture, though the national communications are the most comprehensive source of information spanning the M&E countries in terms of frequency with which agriculture is discussed (Figures 1.2 and 1.3).7 Adaptation communications also address issues related to agriculture but have been submitted by only 17 of the 54 M&E countries to date. A keyword frequency analysis was conducted of all reporting documents (see the chapter Annex for more details), which showed that there are large differences between countries in terms of how extensively agriculture is discussed. Among OECD members, for example, words related to agriculture appear 3.3 times more often in the national communications of Türkiye than of Luxembourg. In general, the national communications of emerging economies more heavily emphasise agriculture than those of OECD countries, with a mean frequency of references that is 1.5 times greater. This difference may be driven by the relatively greater importance of agriculture to their overall economies or it may capture differences in predicted climate risks arising from changing growing conditions and extreme events. However, it may also be driven by reporting differences that arise because emerging economies rely on UNFCCC documents to justify their needs for adaptation financing (Pauw, Mbeva and van Asselt, 2019[50]).

Since the mid-1990s, the UNFCCC documents have grown in length nearly four-fold as reporting on climate change, including adaptation, has become more developed. The frequency of references to agriculture within these documents has been relatively constant across reporting rounds for OECD members and for the emerging economies, but the total amount of text relevant to agriculture has increased over time, indicating an increased depth of reporting on the sector (Annex Figure 1.A.1).

References to agriculture discuss different topics, including the role of agriculture in mitigation, agricultural vulnerabilities to climate change, and adaptation of agricultural and food systems. The vast majority of the discussion of agriculture in the UNFCCC documents focuses on mitigation, though OECD countries emphasise mitigation more than the emerging economies, which focus more heavily on identifying agricultural vulnerabilities and on adaptation (Figure 1.4).

Over time, agricultural mitigation, in terms of textual references, has declined in relative importance, falling by 27% among OECD countries between the mid-1990s and 2023. Discussion has also focused less on identifying climate change vulnerabilities and more on adaptation, a trend that is particularly evident among emerging economies. Between the first and most recent reporting round for OECD countries, references to agricultural adaptation increased by a factor of 4.9, compared to 6.3 for emerging economies. Notably, discussion of the mitigation-adaptation co-benefits associated with agriculture has increased substantially in the nationally determined contributions of all M&E countries, though the growth in discussion of these co-benefits has been most pronounced among OECD countries.

Governments of M&E countries have undertaken a wide range of climate change adaptation programmes and activities that may not all be described in the UNFCCC reports. This section analyses these efforts, based on reporting from the M&E countries, as described in the country chapters.

More specifically, this section assesses and classifies adaptation responses using the following four categories: (1) infrastructure and technological measures (INT); (2) behavioural and cultural measures (BHC); (3) ecosystem or nature-based measures (ECO); and (4) social, economic, and institutional measures (SEI). These categories are based on the classification scheme of the Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative (GAMI), used in the 6th IPCC report to link agricultural adaptation options with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Bezner Kerr et al., 2022[45]).8 The sub-categories presented in Table 1.1 were developed by the Secretariat to reflect the range of programmes and activities implemented and reported by the M&E countries (see the chapter Annex for more details).

In total, 599 adaptation programmes and activities across the M&E countries were identified by the Secretariat based on each country’s self-reported activities. The majority fall into the SEI category, which account for 60.6% (363) of the total, shown in blue in Figure 1.5. Following that is ECO at 18.7% (112) shown in green; INT at 11.4% (68) shown in grey; and BHC at 9.3% (56) shown in orange. When reported programmes or activities included components or elements spanning multiple categories or sub-categories, they were included in each of them for completeness.9 The following sub-sections discuss the programmes and activities in each category, with examples from member countries included for illustrative purposes.

The majority of activities reported by national governments fall within the realm of social, economic and institutional (SEI) approaches. This is not surprising as the category covers the key functions of governments, including developing strategic planning documents; the development of capacity via governance changes, education and outreach; and the provision of information to support decision making. Also included in this category is the provision of insurance programmes targeted to climate risks and the establishment of other financial mechanisms, such as ex post disaster relief.

Within the SEI category, activities predominantly fall into the categories of planning (20.7% of all activities reported), capacity building (18.0%) and climate services (11.4%). Over three-quarters of the countries covered in this monitoring report reported 124 planning activities relevant to agricultural adaptation. These include general, high-level planning documents that address agriculture, such as Argentina’s National Plan for Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change by 2030, the European Union’s New Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change: Forging a Climate-Resilient Europe, and the publication by the New Zealand Government in August 2022 of its first National Adaptation Plan, which sets out actions to address the priority and significant risks the country faces from the impacts of climate change.10 A number of countries report regional-scale planning efforts, such as Australia’s Regional Drought Resilience Planning Program, which supports the development of community led resilience plans, and Greece’s efforts to incorporate consideration of climate change adaptation issues into regions’ rural development programmes.

Planning also includes region-, sector-, resource- and event-specific guidance documents. Sector-specific plans include Brazil’s Agricultural Policy for Climate Adaptation and Low Carbon Emissions (ABC+ Plan), the Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries (MAFF) Climate Change Adaptation Plan and Germany’s Agenda for Climate-change Adaptation in Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture. Resource-specific guidance covers soil health, e.g. Mexico’s National Soil Strategy for Sustainable Agriculture (ENASAS), water resources, e.g. Hungary’s Watershed Management Plan, and the development of organic agriculture, e.g. Croatia’s National Action Plan for the Development of Organic Agriculture for the period 2023-2030.11 Event specific guidance includes the Netherlands’ Action Plan for Heat Stress in Livestock, Poland’s Drought Counteraction Plan and France’s Wildfire Programme.

Efforts to track adaptation progress or plan implementation are also included in the planning category, although there are relatively few examples. One is Ireland’s Adaptation Scorecard, which assesses adaptation progress across sectors overall and with respect to three criteria: 1) risk, prioritisation and adaptive capacity; 2) resourcing and mainstreaming; and 3) governance, co-ordination and cross-cutting aspects. France also conducted an evaluation of the implementation of its National Climate Change Adaptation Plan for the period 2011-2015, finding that the five actions related to agriculture were finished or in process at the time of the assessment.12

Capacity building, cited in 108 activities, includes a broad range of investments and measures that strengthen the capacity of farmers or institutions to adapt to climate change. Investments in agricultural research and development (R&D) and knowledge transfer are critical for driving productivity improvements and supporting the development of new cultivars, livestock breeds, and production technologies. Community-based adaptation strategies involve building adaptive capacity through locally driven and place-based approaches. Examples include community seed, feed or fodder banks, and community forest management. Leveraging indigenous and local knowledge through participatory plant breeding can support adaptation by facilitating interactions between indigenous knowledge systems and scientific research. In livestock systems, pastoralists’ local knowledge can complement scientific research and help to inform decision making.

The majority of activities in capacity building reported target investments in research or research funding programmes, such as Israel’s Center for Agricultural Adaptation, which supports research on field crops and vegetables, fruit trees, plant protection and animal sciences, and activities related to extension and outreach, such as India’s National Mission on Agricultural Extension and Technology. New Zealand’s new Centre for Climate Action on Agricultural Emissions was also established to achieve the objectives of accelerating the development of high-impact technologies and practices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.13 This category also includes developing partnerships and promoting knowledge sharing, such as Belgium’s Flemish Resilience Plan, which allocates EUR 2.8 million (USD 2.9 million) to improve co-operation between the agricultural sector and entrepreneurship, digitalisation and knowledge sharing. Programmes in this category also support extension and outreach, such as the Chile Conscious Origin (Chile Origen Consciente) programme, established in 2022, to provide a framework for farmers to incorporate sustainability standards in their operations and to verify compliance through self-assessments and independent audits. Several countries also reported participating in international efforts on R&D and knowledge sharing. One such example is the Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases, launched in 2009, which brings together leading scientists, researchers and policymakers from over 60 countries to share knowledge and improve agricultural productivity while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Another example is the OECD’s Co-operative Research Programme, a programme joined by Israel in 2022, which contributes to climate change adaptation (Box 1.2).

Climate services, in 68 reported programmes, can contribute to adaptation via the production, translation, communication, and use of climate information in decision-making. The provision of tailored information to decision makers can increase yields and promote changes in farmers’ practices. Improvements to weather forecasting, crop monitoring and early warning systems can help farmers to prepare for extreme weather events, manage risks and reduce losses.

Activities reported involve the collection and dissemination of data to support decision making. This includes forecasts, such as the United States’ National Significant Wildland Fire Potential Outlook, which features a monthly and 7-day fire potential outlook, and decision support tools, such as Australia’s My Climate View online platform, which enables farmers, industry and regional communities to anticipate future climate conditions, draw comparisons with recent weather, consider the implications for production and prepare for future drought. In addition to addressing climate and adaptation possibilities, tools developed by countries support enhanced sustainability in production, such as Estonia’s Big Data Project, launched in 2022 to provide a free and publicly accessible tool to support precision fertilisation and nutrient balancing, and Switzerland’s national Soil Mapping Implementation Strategy, which seeks to support sustainable land use in a changing climate.

Insurance mechanisms developed to target climate-related risks are cited as part of 26 programmes by 24 of the countries covered in this report. Indonesia, for example, has implemented insurance products in collaboration with the insurance company PT Jasindo, rice farming insurance (AUTP) and cattle/buffalo insurance (AUTS/K) to protect farmers against flood, drought, pests and disease outbreaks. Slovenia’s Ministry of Agriculture co-finances insurance premiums at a rate of 55% with the goal of encouraging farmers to insure crops against natural disasters as well as the risk of animal deaths due to disease. Switzerland likewise promotes the market penetration of crop insurance through federal contributions to protect against large-scale crop risks.

Other financial mechanisms include disaster recovery funding or payments for environmental services. Market-based mechanisms that pay farmers for the preservation of biodiversity or other environmental improvements can support transformative capacity by encouraging the development of new and diversified income streams for farmers. Other financial mechanisms, cited as part of 32 programmes, most frequently refer to financial support to recover from climatic events, such as Canada’s AgriRecovery framework and the United States’ Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP) or Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-raised Fish Program (ELAP). Between mid-2021 and early 2023, New Zealand endured a record six climate events that required a response under the Primary Sector Recovery Policy: government funding allocated by the Ministry for Primary Industries in the amount of NZD 1.5 million (USD 0.95 million) in the fiscal year ending June 2022 enabled rural support trusts (RSTs) to increase psychosocial support, run information sessions and co-ordinate local recovery efforts. This category also includes instruments such as the Netherlands’ Transition Fund (Transitiefonds landelijk gebied en natuur), which anticipates spending EUR 24.3 billion (USD 25.6 billion) from 2022-2034 to reduce the negative environmental impacts of farming operations, with a focus on ammonia emissions, but also targeting other environmental concerns.

Although ecosystem-based approaches (ECO) are cited in far fewer programmes, this is the second-most frequently cited type of action or programme, with 112 references to efforts that seek to broadly advance agro-ecology (7.0% of all references) or target specific ecosystem services, by improving soil health (5.5%), diversification (3.8%) or water quality (2.3%).

Agroecology, a sub-category defined by the GAMI, includes actions or programmes that aim to advance agro-ecological systems, such as organic production, land conservation or land retirement, among other possibilities.14 Agroecology can help to improve resilience while providing important co-benefits through climate change mitigation and ecosystem services, by increasing soil organic matter, enhancing soil and water conservation, and diversifying food systems. Consistent with this reasoning, France has adopted a holistic approach to reinforcing agricultural resilience by investing in soils, diversification, and agro-ecologic infrastructure. The United States Farm Service Agency’s Soil Health and Income Protection Program (SHIPP) seeks to enhance soil and water conservation. An area of focus within the category of agro-ecological systems is on advancing organic production methods. Examples include Costa Rica’s support payments for producers during the transition period toward certified organic and sustainable agriculture, and India’s Organic Value Chain Development project for the Northeast Region, which supports the purchase of inputs, including seeds, organic fertilisers, and liquid organic pesticides.

Soil health measures promote practices to limit soil erosion, improve soil fertility and enhance carbon storage. This sub-category also includes programmes targeting soil erosion, land reclamation or desertification. For example, Kazakhstan’s Republican Scientific and Methodological Center of Agrochemical Activities provides landowners with soil testing to determine nutrient levels and provide targeted recommendations for increasing soil fertility. The European Union’s Soil Observatory (EUSO) synthesises evidence on soils to identify areas that are vulnerable to soil degradation.15

Diversification of agricultural systems can strengthen resilience to climate change, while providing important synergies with socio-economic and environmental objectives. Examples include expanding the genetic diversity of crops or livestock or altering the mix of crop and livestock production. It also encompasses variations to spatial and temporal arrangements through mixed planting, crop rotations, and integrated crop, livestock and agroforestry systems. Diversification can help to strengthen ecosystem services such as pest control, soil fertility and pollination, and regulate water and temperature extremes, resulting in more stable yields and reduced risk of losses (Tibi et al., 2022[51]). Some practices such as agroforestry can mitigate GHG emissions while improving food security and yield stability.

These measures most frequently target the adoption of agroforestry or integrated production systems or greater landscape diversity. Brazil’s ABC+ programme seeks to move away from conventional cropping and toward integrated crop-livestock-forestry systems (ILPF). The United Kingdom’s Countryside Stewardship (CS) scheme provides incentives to increase biodiversity, improve habitat and expand woodland areas. A small number of references seek to specifically address water quality degradation, such as the introduction in Spain of regulation governing nutrient inputs to reduce greenhouse gas and ammonia emissions and prevent water pollution, while maintaining soil fertility and agricultural productivity. Switzerland’s programme for the enhanced use of land and water includes a component specifically focused on diversification, including the experimental design and testing of integrated management systems that combine crop rotation, choice of varieties, tillage and other measures.

With 68 references to actions or programmes, the category of infrastructure and technological approaches accounts for 11.4% of all programmes referenced. The majority of programmes in this area target either irrigation and drainage (5.2% of all references) or crop and livestock technology (4.0%). A relatively small number discuss regional water infrastructure (2.2%).

Irrigation and drainage infrastructure can improve overall water use efficiency at the basin level and productivity on the farm, alleviating some of the adverse consequences of climate change by helping farmers to cope with higher temperatures and drought. Investments in on-farm rainwater storage can reduce pressures on off-farm water supplies. Programmes for irrigation typically provide support to adopt more efficient technologies, with the goal of supporting adaptation to more variable water availability, although their impact on water consumption will depend on the presence of effective water demand policies (Grafton et al., 2018[52]; OECD, 2016[43]). China’s Farmland Irrigation Construction programme provides payments to support the construction of small irrigation facilities, rainwater collection, sprinkler and drip irrigation, pumps and small hydropower stations. The United Kingdom’s Water Management Grant, round 2 provides grants for capital items to promote more efficient use of water for irrigation and support to construct on-farm reservoirs to store water abstractions or harvested rainwater. Countries expected to experience a surplus of water under climate change, such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden, have invested in support to install and renovate drainage systems.

Crop or livestock production technology investments can facilitate adaptation on the farm, for example through the installation of canopies to control the growing climate for tree crops. Strategies such as providing shading, installing electric fans in sheds, bathing animals several times per day, or installing ventilation and cooling systems can support adaptation in livestock systems by providing relief from heat stress. Programmes also target on-farm investments in adapted crop and livestock technology. For example, Austria’s Investment Loans in Agriculture provide an approach for investments in technologies, such as biomass heating systems and equipment for manure management. Lithuania’s Modernization Fund, initiated in 2022 with EUR 1 million already committed, supports the development of non-arable technologies to reduce fuel and mineral fertiliser costs, preserve carbon deposits in the soil and reduce the risk of spring drought. The Philippines’ Adaptation and Mitigation Initiative in Agriculture (AMIA) is its national flagship programme, which seeks through an approach tailored to villages, to advance the delivery of productivity enhancing technologies, such as the use of coconut husk as mulch in the upland agro-ecological zone. Colombia’s Climate-smart Initiatives for Climate Change Adaptation and Sustainability in Prioritised Agricultural Production Systems (CSICAP) seeks to develop, validate and scale technologies to increase resilience and low-carbon agriculture.

Regional water infrastructure such as flood control technology, or the construction of reservoirs or canals, can play an important role in adaptation as complement to water policies (OECD, 2016[43]). The impacts of climate change on infrastructure needed for agriculture is expected to increase, and it is therefore essential to ensure that regional water infrastructure can withstand damage from climate-related natural hazards. At the same time, not all investment will be conducive to adaptation: large-scale or groundwater-based irrigation projects without effective water demand, including water pricing, policies can lead to maladaptation, potentially resulting in increased water consumption and surface or groundwater depletion during periods of drought (OECD, 2015[42]; OECD, 2016[43]).16

A handful of programmes are targeted toward mitigating flood-related risks, such as Hungary’s efforts to develop temporary flood water storage in agricultural areas of the Middle Tisza River Basin and the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (EWP) of the United States. Others, primarily in emerging economies, seek to expand water supply infrastructure, such as China’s expenditures to support large-scale irrigation projects and Viet Nam’s Mekong River Delta water planning and supply projects.

Behavioural and cultural approaches are cited in 56 programmes, accounting for 9.3% of the total. Among these, attention is predominantly given to breeding or breed selection (3.3%), followed by livestock operations or management (2.3%), pest, disease and invasive species management (2.2%) and crop operations or management (1.5%).

Improvements in cultivars offer an effective means to combat climate change. Adaptation via conventional crop breeding has demonstrated good progress but will require rapid incremental improvements to keep pace with changes in temperatures and the environment. The IPCC states with high confidence that plant breeding biotechnology will contribute to adaptation for large-scale producers, however the uptake of climate-resilient crops may be limited by socio-economic and political factors (Bezner Kerr et al., 2022[45]). Genome sequencing can help to identify agronomic traits that are relevant to climate change and develop crop varieties that are resilient to stress from pests, diseases, temperature and water extremes. In the livestock sector, a range of adaptation options are available including breeding for heat stress tolerance, crossbreeding, and switching to more heat and drought-resilient species.

Programmes in breeding and breed selection emphasise the development and adoption of varieties adapted to their particular climate challenges. The project Breeding Coffee for Agroforestry System (BREEDCAFS) from 2017-2021, co-ordinated by France’s CIRAD and funded by the European Union, seeks to develop varieties of Arabica coffee suited to agroforestry production, which reduces temperatures in coffee plantations, preserves soil biodiversity, and enhances yield. India, Indonesia and Viet Nam are experimenting with varieties of rice that are tolerant of increased salinity. Costa Rica’s Project for Strengthening Capacities in Seed Production for Adaptive and Resilient Agriculture seeks to promote the use of adapted seeds by family farmers to enhance agricultural productivity. In 2023, India promoted the production and use of millets, which are drought resistant nutritious crop, during its Presidency of the G20 coinciding with the United Nations’ International Year of Millet. A special scheme was also established in 2023 by the OECD Seed Scheme to facilitate trade in pearl millets and sorghum seeds (Box 1.3). The United Kingdom is exploring more environmentally efficient cattle breeds via its Ruminant Genetics Programme in Northern Ireland.

Altering crop management and operations can involve changes in planting schedules or shifts in production location. While shifting the location of crop production holds significant potential as an adaptation strategy, it may also be impeded by climatic, cultural, institutional and economic barriers, including support payments that lock in production systems and discourage adaptation. Altering livestock management and operations includes measures such as matching stocking rates with feed availability, managing diet quality, rotational grazing, adjustments in animal husbandry and manure management.

While governments tend not to specify particular adaptation strategies, favouring instead the development of adaptive capacity, there are some examples of programmes that support the adoption of crop or livestock operations that are known to perform well under changing climate conditions. The Red Meat Development Programme (for sheep) and the Dairy Improvement Programme of Wales (United Kingdom) are examples of programmes that specifically target herd management. Australia’s Extension and Adoption of Drought Resilience Farming Practices Grants Program funds grants ranging from AUD 100 000 to AUD 3 million (USD 69 000 to USD 2.1 million) to support adoption of proven drought resilient farming practices at a large scale (e.g. multiple farms, regions or industries).

Pest, disease, and invasive species management is essential to mitigate the potential increased impacts of pests and diseases on agricultural production resulting from climate change. Some programmes address pest and disease risk, either in general or in response to specific threats, typically by enhancing monitoring. This category also includes efforts to reduce harmful effects from chemical pesticide use by moving to alternative products or pest control systems. In Croatia, for example, the Phytosanitary Information System (FIS) has been upgraded and a new Act passed that requires farmers to connect to the FIS and to be trained in the safe handling and proper applications of pesticides. Japan’s strategy MIDORI targets a 10% and 50% reduction in risk-weighted use of chemical pesticides through facilitating a shift toward Integrated Pest Management (IPM) systems by 2030 and 2050, respectively.

The above section discussed policies employed by countries that specifically deal with enabling agricultural sectors to adapt to a changing climate. However, other agricultural support policies may unintentionally improve or hinder the ability of individuals to adapt to climate change. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 2020-22, support to agriculture across the 54 countries – totalled USD 851 billion per year, of which USD 630 billion per year was provided as transfers to individual producers. The remainder was made up of support for general services (USD 106 billion) and budgetary transfers to consumers (USD 115 billion). Some emerging economies also implicitly taxed their producers by an average of USD 179 billion per year. This section discusses the mechanisms by which these current support policies may impact climate change adaptation and the potential effects.

Agricultural policies that provide support coupled to production are among the most common forms of support to the agricultural sector (around 65% of positive producer support). By distorting production signals, these policies can worsen vulnerabilities to climate risk through a variety of mechanisms (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]). Policies that increase the price received by the producer (positive MPS), which represent the largest share of overall producer support, incentivise production, the intensification of input use, the allocation of land to supported crops and the entry of land to the agricultural sector, all of which can reduce the capacity of agriculture to adapt to climate change. Other types of direct production support, including coupled payments, have a similar effect as positive MPS. Some of these effects can be mitigated when support is subjected to environmental conditionality. Conversely, negative MPS for a given commodity shifts resources away from the production of that commodity, potentially altering the mix of commodities produced relative to what would be optimal under given market and climatic conditions. Policies that distort trade flows may reduce resilience: trade plays an essential role in supporting climate change adaptation and ensuring stability by allowing goods to flow from food surplus to food deficit areas, and by helping to absorb the impacts of local and regional supply shocks (Adenäuer, Frezal and Chatzopoulos, 2023[53]; OECD, 2017[25]; OECD, 2014[38]). Given that production tends to be more volatile in domestic than in global markets, and that domestic shocks are becoming more frequent with climate change, trade will play an increasingly important role in mitigating domestic supply volatility and enhancing global food security.

Most support policies also incentivise the production of specific agricultural commodities over others.17 These policies, here entitled single commodity transfers (SCT), can create barriers to changing production systems away from subsidised commodities and potentially hamper the ability of farmers to adjust production to a changing climate (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]; OECD, 2017[54]; OECD, 2014[38]). Depending on the commodities that are subsidised and the conditions or regulations associated with these payments, SCTs can reduce incentives to change to more resilient crops; reduce incentives to diversify production; or can induce farming in more risky locations or with risky practices. For instance, support for the production of water-intensive crops such as cotton or rice may increase farmers’ risk of loss due to drought in a given season (OECD, 2015[42]; Wreford, Moran and Adger, 2010[55]). Modelling suggests that removal of certain forms of SCTs could enable adaptation by facilitating a shift in production towards regions with comparative advantage and increasing trade flows to areas affected by climate change (Guerrero et al., 2022[56]). These measures are significant; across all 54 countries covered in this report, governments provided USD 380 billion in positive transfers to individual commodities, as well as USD 179 billion in implicit taxation.

Other targeted forms of direct payments not included in the SCTs may also favour certain types of products, and ultimately hamper adaptation. For example, support for cereals or ruminants are included as Group Commodity Transfers (GCT), but also create barriers to adaptation by limiting farmers’ ability to adjust their production in response to changing climatic conditions. Ultimately the impact on adaptation is highly context-specific and depend on the specific instrument used, the commodity subsidised, and the conditions or regulations associated with these payments.

Policies to help manage risk are a common form of producer support. Interest in these forms of support is rising due to the uncertainties posed by climate change, as reflected in the adaptation actions and programmes focused on insurance (4.4% of programmes from Figure 1.5) and other financial mechanisms (5.5% of programmes). Subsidised agricultural insurance policies are largely used to help manage risks and insurance markets can be useful mechanisms to transfer and pool risks. This can improve resilience in the face of increasing extreme events by allowing farmers to build absorptive capacity to recover from shocks (Cobourn, 2023[9]). Government insurance subsidy programmes can play an important role in ensuring the functioning of insurance markets that allow farmers to manage small to medium business risks. This is because insurance programmes can be economically unviable for insurance companies to offer without subsidies due to high costs of administering, monitoring and adjusting losses which keeps demand low (Glauber et al., 2021[57]).

However, insurance-related subsidies can also change producer behaviour and impede adaptation, encouraging farmers to adopt riskier and unsustainable production strategies (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]; OECD, 2016[43]). Insurance which covers a farm for individual loss of yields may cause a moral hazard problem in which the farmer undertakes fewer other risk mitigating activities and instead takes on more risk with less diversification (OECD, 2011[58]; Antón et al., 2012[59]). For instance, insured corn and soybean crops have been shown to be significantly more sensitive to extreme heat compared to uninsured crops, suggesting farmers are less inclined to undertake other adaptation measures to mitigate these risks (Annan and Schlenker, 2015[60]). Subsidies could be made less distortionary by, for example, shifting subsidies to cover only insurance for catastrophic risk rather than normal farm business risks, refraining from restricting crop choice, requiring minimum deductibles on claims and providing transparency over the level of subsidy in each premium (Glauber et al., 2021[57]; OECD/FAO, 2021[8]). Likewise, switching support from schemes based on individual losses to index-based schemes – facilitated by satellite and digital technologies – may reduce the moral hazard problem and the administering costs (Sumner and Zulauf, 2012[61]). However, under this approach indemnities may differ from actual loses, which may not be attractive for farmers.

Disaster assistance programmes are another commonly adopted form of risk management support. These programmes are usually introduced in the form of a payment following a natural disaster. In most instances producers are unaware they will be protected until the disaster occurs and the payment is announced. However, there are some cases, such as the United States’ Livestock Forage Disaster Program, where the conditions for disaster relief are known in advance. Expectations play a significant role in how producers interact with disaster assistance, as producers may be willing to forego other forms of risk management if there is a credible belief that governments will bail them out in the event of a loss. Disaster assistance should therefore be limited to providing protection for catastrophic or uninsurable risk so as not to discourage participation in other risk mitigating activities such as diversification, irrigation investment or insurance (Glauber et al., 2021[57]). An optimal approach should emphasise capacities farmers need to adapt or transform to climate risks, including exiting the sector altogether. Investment in public goods including weather and climate information resources, research and development and knowledge dissemination will build producers’ resilience and strengthen their ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events.

Agricultural policies can also be designed to incentivise adaptation directly, by linking payments to providing environmental goods and services, such as preservation of rural landscapes, resilience to natural disasters, habitat provision, and control of invasive species. Payments for ecosystem services can provide nature-based solutions to some climate risks while also yielding co-benefits for climate mitigation and the environment. For instance, payments for restoration and protection of wetlands reduce flood risk by providing a store for excess water while also providing habitat for animals and sequestering carbon. However, only USD 1.6 billion of the USD 297 billion in budgetary producer support in 2020-22 across the 54 countries was purely for environmental public goods (i.e. payments based on specific non-commodity outputs in the PSE data). The United Kingdom’s Countryside Stewardship programme and Korea’s direct payments for land conservation are two examples of these types of policies. Some countries also require compliance with certain environmental standards as a condition to other types of payments.

Public funding for agricultural knowledge generation and innovation remains limited, despite the fact that investments in these areas are often cited as one of the most important roles for public policy in aiding the agricultural sector to adapt to a changing climate and build resilience (Ignaciuk, 2015[36]; Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]; OECD, 2020[39]). Spending on agricultural knowledge generation programmes represented 0.4% of the value of agricultural production for the 54 countries covered in this report in 2020-22, while support for knowledge transfer programmes accounted for 0.2% of value of production.

There is a clear role for public R&D to provide accurate and detailed information that allows private agents to make well-informed adaptation decisions. Modelling has suggested that directed innovation has offset as much as 20% of the potential losses in agricultural land value from damaging climate trends in the United States since the 1960s (Moscona and Sastry, 2022[62]). Equally important is to support research on risk and vulnerability assessment. A number of countries already provide services which help producers to assess their vulnerability to climate risks and adaptation needs, as captured by the 66 actions and programmes dedicated to climate services. Examples include the Netherlands’ Climate Stress Test tool, the Philippines’ Climate-Risk Vulnerability Assessment Maps, Portugal’s Climate Portal and the United States Climate Hubs among others.

Weather forecasting or early warning systems are also important tools to prepare farmers to undertake early action to minimise the negative effects of extreme events. Some countries already provide funding for or are developing such services, including Australia’s Drought Early Warning System, Austria’s contribution to a worldwide Database for Soil and Near Surface Temperatures, France’s Meteo-France agro-climatic services, Ireland’s Forest Fire Danger Rating, New Zealand’s high resolution drought-forecasting tool (NIWA35), and the United States’ Drought Monitor, among others. Services such as these equip producers with necessary information to understand short and medium-term risks of climate change and facilitate autonomous adaptation actions by producers without distorting production or trade signals. In designing knowledge generation programmes, consideration should be given to “no-regrets” policies, which are those that help farmers under a wide range of scenarios of worsening climate change, such as those discussed above.

Knowledge transfer programmes targeting adaptation also play a key role in building capacity of the agricultural sector to deal with future climate change. Knowledge gaps can play a contributing role in creating barriers to uptake of adaptation and other climate-friendly practices on farms (Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). Improved access to information helps farmers and other private agents to overcome these barriers and make rational decisions in relation to adaptation actions. Capacity-building policies are among the most common employed by countries in this report, for example Australia’s Farm Business Resilience Program, Canada’s Agricultural Climate Solutions Living Labs and the Netherland’s Regional online connection sessions all work to bring farmers together with the aim of exchanging best practices on climate change.

Provision of infrastructure projects will often be required to reduce barriers to the adoption of climate-friendly practices in agriculture. In the context of this report, infrastructure spending is included under general support services for public good infrastructure, whereas subsidies to producers for the provision of on-farm infrastructure projects are included in payments to producers for fixed capital formation. Spending on these programmes totalled USD 49 billion across the 54 countries covered in this report in 2020-22, equivalent to 1.1% of the value of agricultural production.

Farmers rely directly or indirectly on public infrastructure, and its availability will influence how they respond to climate change (Ortiz-Bobea, 2021[63]; Wreford, Ignaciuk and Gruère, 2017[35]). Infrastructure needs are highly location specific and long-term sustainability assessments of each project are important to assess their suitability. For example, irrigation infrastructure will be important to deal with the effects of climate change in some regions, whereas in other regions, in the absence of adequate water management policies, adoption of irrigation infrastructure may actually become a maladaptation mechanism and discourage the move towards less water and emission-intensive production systems, which would increase the overall resilience of the region. Faced with uncertainty in the viability of long-run adaptation projects, the economic literature typically prescribes implementing “no-regret” policies – those which build resilience to risk under a wide range of future scenarios and which will provide benefits to the sector even in the absence of shocks (OECD/FAO, 2021[8]; OECD, 2020[39]; Mullan et al., 2013[64]; Hallegatte, 2009[65]; Antón et al., 2013[37]).

Disease and pest outbreaks will be an increasing source of risk for agricultural producers under climate change (Skendžić et al., 2021[12]). Producers typically manage some pest and disease risks on farm through the use of pesticides, cropping practices, antibiotics and other forms of management actions. However, some risks are outside the control of individual producers. For instance, outbreaks on farm can harm producers directly through crop and livestock losses, however, outbreaks elsewhere can still impact them if it results in closures of trade or changing consumer preferences. For this reason, there is also a clear role for governments to continue providing a public good in preventing and managing these risks. Many governments operate nationwide biosecurity systems which employ inspection and control measures to prevent incursions from entering and spreading through agricultural areas. In 2020-22, these measures accounted for USD 8 billion among the 54 covered countries in this report, equivalent to 0.2% of the value of agricultural production.

There is also a role for more forward-looking activities, including systems to anticipate new pests and diseases, developing response plans, and early notification systems that help producers and other actors respond to threats. Knowledge transfer and extension programmes are also important to spread information on best practices to manage disease and pests. For instance, as part of its Farm to Fork Strategy, the European Union ran a pilot programme, Farmer’s Toolbox for Integrated Pest Management, between 2020 and 2022 with the objective to provide background knowledge on the most promising ways farmers could reduce pesticide dependency.

Climate change is increasingly impacting global agriculture and food systems, through slowing agricultural productivity growth, negative impacts on crop and grassland quality and harvest stability, and disruptions to terrestrial ecosystem services. Higher temperatures and the increased frequency of droughts, floods and natural disasters have negative consequences for food security and livelihoods; this includes a greater frequency of sudden losses in food production, reduced food availability, and higher food prices. Climate change is projected to make some areas unsuitable for food production, increasing the number of people at risk of hunger, malnutrition and diet-related mortality (Bezner Kerr et al., 2022[45]). The agricultural sector faces a formidable challenge: it needs to adapt to a changing climate while reducing GHG emissions, preserving biodiversity and environmental quality, ensuring food security and nutrition, and supporting rural incomes and livelihoods.

Governments are already taking significant steps to facilitate climate change adaptation in their agricultural sectors: UNFCCC reports reflect greater attention to agricultural adaptation and adaptation-mitigation co-benefits over time and a stocktake of measures indicates 587 adaptation programmes and activities across the 54 M&E countries. However, a large proportion of reported activities focus on planning, with 120 strategic planning documents recorded across three-quarters of M&E countries. Moving beyond planning to focus on implementation is imperative to support agricultural production systems in adapting to climate change. While there is increasing evidence that many plans are being implemented, evidence on the extent of implementation or documenting the outcomes of programmatic efforts is scant. Countries should continue to implement, monitor and evaluate adaptation policies and programmes in an effort to strengthen resilience by fostering absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities.

Most agricultural producer support policies were not designed to address climate change adaptation objectives. While some may support adaptation, the majority do little to facilitate, and in many cases hinder, farmers’ efforts to adapt to climate change. Support to individual producers amounted to USD 630 billion per year in 2020-22, of which USD 380 billion was provided in the form of support tied to the production of specific commodities that discourage production adjustments. Governments should reduce and reform market price support (MPS) and payments targeted to specific commodities that encourage farmers to maintain pre-existing production systems and reduce incentives to shift production away from subsidised commodities in response to changing climatic conditions. Dismantling policies that distort trade and impede price transmission can also reduce supply volatility by allowing produce to flow from food surplus to food deficit areas, helping to manage domestic food shortages driven by droughts, floods, and other catastrophic events. To facilitate this, short-term non-trade-distorting measures may be required. Market price support and payments linked to outputs or the unconstrained use of variable inputs also have the greatest potential to increase GHG emissions, exacerbating the extent of adaptation required (OECD, 2022[48]). Reforming these policies would help to mitigate climate change and increase the resources available to allocate to climate change adaptation. Developing coherent policy approaches involving all agencies with policy levers is important in this regard so that the synergies and trade-offs are properly understood.

Well-functioning insurance markets can strengthen resilience to climate change by allowing farmers to build absorptive capacity to recover from shocks. While small and medium-scale idiosyncratic risks can be managed at the farm level and through market-based instruments such as insurance, agricultural policy still has a role to play in covering large-scale systemic risks that cannot be covered by farmers themselves or by risk markets, particularly in view of the increasing number of extreme weather events and catastrophic disasters. Disaster assistance payments can generate maladaptation if they are not targeted to catastrophic risks and not well designed. Governments should ensure that insurance subsidies and disaster assistance payments do not cause moral hazard and impede on-farm adaptation, and policies should be well-designed to avoid crowding out private sector activity. Better and more granular data on risks and climate can help to reduce uncertainties surrounding climate change and support the development of optimal local solutions and on-farm strategies. The development of index-based insurance schemes for marketable risks can help to reduce moral hazard and make coverage more affordable for small-scale producers.

Overall, agricultural support policies tend to be poorly targeted, inequitably distributed, and often result in substantial leakages to unintended beneficiaries along the supply chain. This comes at considerable cost not only to consumers and taxpayers, but also to farmers due to the low income transfer efficiency of support policies. Policies should aim to offer multiple adaptation pathways for farm households: supporting sustainable productivity improvements, diversifying income sources among household members, and when necessary, facilitating the transition away from agriculture.

Better targeting of agricultural support can facilitate autonomous adaptation and free up scarce budgetary resources that could be used to support planned adaptation initiatives or provide transitional assistance. Investments in research and development, extension services, entrepreneurial skills, human capital, and the uptake of resilience-enhancing technologies can build on-farm resilience capacity and reduce farmers’ risk exposure to climate change over the long-term. Payments can also be made conditional on the provision of ecosystem services such as landscape preservation, biodiversity conservation and control of invasive species – although care must be taken in design and implementation to ensure environmental benefits. However, only USD 1.6 billion of the USD 297 billion per year of budgetary support to producers in 2020-22 was purely dedicated to the provision of environmental public goods (i.e. payments based on a specific non-commodity output).

Investments in innovation, infrastructure and biosecurity can play an essential role in helping agriculture adapt to climate change. However, support for these and other general services is low. Only USD 106 billion in 2020-22 was spent on these areas, an amount accounting for just 2.5% of the value of agricultural production, or 12.5% of total support directed to the sector. Channelling a greater share of R&D spending towards adaptation can provide the foundation for stronger risk and vulnerability assessments, support informed decision making, facilitate the emergence of new technologies and production practices adapted to the changing climate, and build capacity via knowledge transfer programmes. Investments in infrastructure should be climate-resilient, in that they are planned, designed, built, and operated in a way that adapts to changing climate conditions. Investments in infrastructure may also support nature-based solutions at a landscape scale, which have the potential to contribute simultaneously to objectives related to adaptation, mitigation, and other ecosystem services. Biosecurity measures should be upgraded to ensure farmers can prevent, respond to, and recover from emerging threats from pests and diseases.

Public-private partnerships can catalyse investment in innovation and infrastructure, allowing public and private entities to share the risks and costs associated with projects. They can be particularly effective for large-scale infrastructure projects with long time horizons, or in areas where the private sector may be less active. Investments should be carefully designed to avoid maladaptation: for instance, the development of irrigation infrastructure or water-efficient technologies should be complemented by additional measures to discourage the adoption of water-intensive crops or the expansion of production into overly arid areas that may become unsuitable for production in the long run.

In the long run, farmers will face increasing pressure for transformative change. This is particularly salient in the context of tipping points, which are likely to irreversibly affect agriculture in certain regions, rendering current agricultural systems untenable. Policies should aim to facilitate structural adjustment and support the emergence of new and diverse income sources as complements to revenue from traditional cropping and livestock production. Examples include renewable energy generation or payments for biodiversity conservation, emissions reductions, and other ecosystem services, or moving towards off-farm employment.

Policies to support climate change adaptation in agriculture can have important synergies with climate change mitigation and other food systems objectives and require a coherent, whole-of-government approach to policy making. Successful adaptation actions should be effective (anticipated or observed to reduce climate risk), feasible (possible and desirable in a particular context), and just. Robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks can help to assess the effectiveness of adaptation measures, prevent maladaptation, and ensure consistency with climate change mitigation goals and wider objectives for food systems. In 2022, signatories to the OECD Ministerial Declaration18 committed to “promote the development and implementation of agricultural practices that conserve, sustainably use and restore biodiversity, tackle negative effects of land conversion to agriculture on biodiversity, enhance ecosystem services and improve soil health and water and air quality, including through agro-ecological and other innovative, context specific, approaches.”

References

[53] Adenäuer, M., C. Frezal and T. Chatzopoulos (2023), “Mitigating the impact of extreme weather events on agricultural markets through trade”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers No. 198, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/aa584482-en.

[60] Annan, F. and W. Schlenker (2015), “Federal Crop Insurance and the Disincentive to Adapt to Extreme Heat”, American Economic Review, Vol. 105/5, pp. 262-266, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151031.

[37] Antón, J. et al. (2013), “Agricultural risk management policies under climate uncertainty”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 23/6, pp. 1726-1736, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.08.007.

[59] Antón, J. et al. (2012), “A Comparative Study of Risk Management in Agriculture under Climate Change”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 58, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k94d6fx5bd8-en.

[32] Ara Begum, R. et al. (2022), Point of Departure and Key Concepts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter01.pdf.

[22] Basso, B. et al. (2018), “Soil Organic Carbon and Nitrogen Feedbacks on Crop Yields under Climate Change”, Agricultural & Environmental Letters, Vol. 3/1, p. 180026, https://doi.org/10.2134/ael2018.05.0026.

[45] Bezner Kerr, R. et al. (2022), Food, Fibre, and Other Ecosystem Products, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter05.pdf.

[11] Brás, T. et al. (2021), “Severity of drought and heatwave crop losses tripled over the last five decades in Europe”, Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 16/6, p. 065012, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf004.

[49] Bustamante, M. et al. (2014), “Co-benefits, trade-offs, barriers and policies for greenhouse gas mitigation in the agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector”, Global Change Biology, Vol. 20/10, pp. 3270-3290, https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.12591.

[15] Cai, W. et al. (2014), “Increasing frequency of extreme El Niño events due to greenhouse warming”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 4/2, pp. 111-116, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2100.

[16] Cao, J. et al. (2023), “Forecasting global crop yields based on El Nino Southern Oscillation early signals”, Agricultural Systems, Vol. 205, p. 103564, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2022.103564.

[9] Cobourn, K. (2023), “Climate change adaptation policies to foster resilience in agriculture: Analysis and stocktake based on UNFCCC reporting documents”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers No. 202, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5fa2c770-en.

[6] CRED (2023), EM-DAT: The international disaster database, https://www.emdat.be/ (accessed on 13 June 2023).

[7] CRED and UNDRR (2020), The Human Costs of Disasters: An Overview of the Last 20 Years (2000-2019), https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/74124.

[71] Crumpler, K. et al. (2021), 2021 (Interim) Global update report: Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in the Nationally Determined Contributions, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb7442en.

[23] Deutsch, C. et al. (2018), “Increase in crop losses to insect pests in a warming climate”, Science, Vol. 361/6405, pp. 916-919, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat3466.

[70] Gagnon-Lebrun, F. and S. Agrawala (2006), Progress on adaptation to climate change in developed countries: An analysis of broad trends, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/37178873.pdf.

[28] Gaupp, F. et al. (2019), “Increasing risks of multiple breadbasket failure under 1.5 and 2 °C global warming”, Agricultural Systems, Vol. 175, pp. 34-45, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2019.05.010.

[57] Glauber, J. et al. (2021), “Design principles for agricultural risk management policies”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 157, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1048819f-en.

[19] Gowda, P. et al. (2018), Chapter 10 : Agriculture and Rural Communities. Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: The Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II, U.S. Global Change Research Program, https://doi.org/10.7930/nca4.2018.ch10.

[52] Grafton, R. et al. (2018), “The paradox of irrigation efficiency”, Science, Vol. 361/6404, pp. 748-750, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat9314.

[56] Guerrero, S. et al. (2022), “The impacts of agricultural trade and support policy reform on climate change adaptation and environmental performance: A model-based analysis”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 180, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/520dd70d-en.

[65] Hallegatte, S. (2009), “Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 19/2, pp. 240-247, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.12.003.

[68] Hsieh, H. and S. Shannon (2005), “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis”, Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 15/9, pp. 1277-1288, https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687.

[36] Ignaciuk, A. (2015), “Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change: A Role for Public Policies”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 85, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5js08hwvfnr4-en.

[34] Ignaciuk, A. and D. Mason-D’Croz (2014), “Modelling Adaptation to Climate Change in Agriculture”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers 70, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jxrclljnbxq-en.

[4] Iizumi, T. et al. (2018), “Crop production losses associated with anthropogenic climate change for 1981-2010 compared with preindustrial levels”, International Journal of Climatology, Vol. 38/14, pp. 5405-5417, https://doi.org/10.1002/joc.5818.

[1] IPCC (2023), “Summary for Policymakers. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.”, in Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf.

[31] IPCC (2022), “2022: Technical Summary. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_TechnicalSummary.pdf.

[13] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 10: Asia. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: IMpacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter10.pdf.

[17] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 11: Australasia. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: Imapcts, Adaptation and Vulnerability., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter11.pdf.

[20] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 12: Central and South America. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.”, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and VUlnerability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter12.pdf.

[10] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 13: Europe. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter13.pdf.

[18] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 14: North America. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter14.pdf.

[2] IPCC (2022), “Chapter 5: Food, Fibre and Other Ecosystem Products. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingodm and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter05.pdf.

[26] IPCC (2021), “Chapter 11: Weather and Climate Extreme Events in a Changing Climate. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, in Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Chapter11.pdf.

[30] Kummu, M. et al. (2021), “Climate change risks pushing one-third of global food production outside the safe climatic space”, One Earth, Vol. 4/5, pp. 720-729, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.04.017.

[40] Lankoski, J., A. Ignaciuk and F. Jésus (2018), “Synergies and trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation and agricultural productivity: A synthesis report”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 110, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/07dcb05c-en.

[33] Malik, A., X. Qin and S. Smith (2010), “Autonomous adaptation to climate change: a literature review”, IIEP Working Paper, No. 2010-24, Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, D.C., https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Smith_Malik_IIEPWP2010-27.pdf.

[3] Moore, F. (2020), The Fingerprint of Anthropogenic Warming on Global Agriculture, California Digital Library (CDL), https://doi.org/10.31223/x5q30z.

[62] Moscona, J. and K. Sastry (2022), “Does Directed Innovation Mitigate Climate Damage? Evidence from U.S. Agriculture”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 138/2, pp. 637-701, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac039.

[64] Mullan, M. et al. (2013), “National Adaptation Planning: Lessons from OECD Countries”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 54, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k483jpfpsq1-en.

[24] Nardone, A. et al. (2006), “Climatic Effects on Productive Traits in Livestock”, Veterinary Research Communications, Vol. 30/S1, pp. 75-81, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11259-006-0016-x.

[47] OECD (2023), Net Zero+: Climate and Economic Resilience in a Changing World, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/da477dda-en.

[48] OECD (2022), Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2022: Reforming Agricultural Policies for Climate Change Mitigation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7f4542bf-en.

[27] OECD (2022), Climate Tipping Points: Insights for Effective Policy Action, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/abc5a69e-en.

[74] OECD (2022), Declaration on Transformative Solutions for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0483.

[39] OECD (2020), Strengthening Agricultural Resilience in the Face of Multiple Risks, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2250453e-en.

[44] OECD (2020), Water and agriculture, Agriculture Policy Brief, OECD, Paris, https://issuu.com/oecd.publishing/docs/water_and_agriculture.

[54] OECD (2017), Adaptation to climate change in Philippine agriculture, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264269088-7-en.

[25] OECD (2017), Water Risk Hotspots for Agriculture, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264279551-en.

[43] OECD (2016), Mitigating Droughts and Floods in Agriculture: Policy Lessons and Approaches, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264246744-en.

[42] OECD (2015), Drying Wells, Rising Stakes: Towards Sustainable Agricultural Groundwater Use, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264238701-en.

[38] OECD (2014), Climate Change, Water and Agriculture: Towards Resilient Systems, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209138-en.

[58] OECD (2011), Managing Risk in Agriculture: Policy Assessment and Design, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264116146-en.

[72] OECD (2010), Sustainable Management of Water Resources in Agriculture, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264083578-en.

[8] OECD/FAO (2021), Building Agricultural Resilience to Natural Hazard-induced Disasters: Insights from Country Case Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/49eefdd7-en.

[63] Ortiz-Bobea, A. (2021), “The empirical analysis of climate change impacts and adaptation in agriculture”, in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesagr.2021.10.002.

[5] Ortiz-Bobea, A. et al. (2021), “Anthropogenic climate change has slowed global agricultural productivity growth”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 11/4, pp. 306-312, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01000-1.

[50] Pauw, P., K. Mbeva and H. van Asselt (2019), “Subtle differentiation of countries’ responsibilities under the Paris Agreement”, Palgrave Communications, Vol. 5/1, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0298-6.

[29] Perry, S. et al. (2017), “Future Changes to El Niño-Southern Oscillation Temperature and Precipitation Teleconnections”, Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 44/20, pp. 10,608-10,616, https://doi.org/10.1002/2017gl074509.

[69] Potter, W. and D. Levine-Donnerstein (1999), “Rethinking validity and reliability in content analysis”, Journal of Applied Communication Research, Vol. 27/3, pp. 258-284, https://doi.org/10.1080/00909889909365539.

[41] Schipper, E. (2020), “Maladaptation: When Adaptation to Climate Change Goes Very Wrong”, One Earth, Vol. 3/4, pp. 409-414, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.09.014.

[46] Shukla, P. et al. (eds.) (2022), Introduction and Framing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.003.

[12] Skendžić, S. et al. (2021), “The Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Insect Pests”, Insects, Vol. 12/5, p. 440, https://doi.org/10.3390/insects12050440.

[73] Smith, L. et al. (2019), “The greenhouse gas impacts of converting food production in England and Wales to organic methods”, Nature Communications, Vol. 10/1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12622-7.

[61] Sumner, D. and C. Zulauf (2012), Economic and Environmental Effects of Agricultural Insurance Programs, C-FARE Reports, https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.156622.

[14] Thirumalai, K. et al. (2017), “Extreme temperatures in Southeast Asia caused by El Niño and worsened by global warming”, Nature Communications, Vol. 8/1, https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15531.

[51] Tibi, A. et al. (2022), Protéger les cultures en augmentant la diversité végétale des espaces agricoles. Synthèse du rapport d’ESCo, INRAE (France), 86 p.

[67] UNFCCC (2022), Adaptation communications, https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/adaptation-communications (accessed on 10 October 2022).

[66] UNFCCC (2022), Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): The Paris Agreement and NDCs, https://unfccc.int/ndc-information/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs (accessed on 10 October 2022).

[21] WMO (2022), State of the Climate in Latin America and the Caribbean 2021, World Meteorological Organization, No. 1295.

[35] Wreford, A., A. Ignaciuk and G. Gruère (2017), “Overcoming barriers to the adoption of climate-friendly practices in agriculture”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 101, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/97767de8-en.

[55] Wreford, A., D. Moran and N. Adger (2010), Climate Change and Agriculture: Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264086876-en.

Each Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is required to submit national communications in accordance with guidelines developed and adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP). The Convention defines three main groups: Annex I countries that were members of the OECD as of 1992 plus economies in transition (EIT); Annex II parties that consist of OECD members as of 1992 but excluding the EIT and Türkiye; and Non-Annex I parties. The distinction is important because reporting requirements differ between groups, as do expectations with respect to climate financing.

Annex I Parties are required to submit a national communication (NC) every four years, with the most recent being the 8th national communication, due as of 31 December 2022. Non-Annex I Parties are required to submit their first national communication within three years of entering the Convention and every four years thereafter. For Annex I Parties, the COP adopted guidelines for a standardised national communication format that includes a chapter specifically devoted to assessing climate change vulnerabilities and adaptation measures. For Non-Annex I Parties, the reporting guidelines are more flexible, but the national communications are expected to include sections on programmes that facilitate adaptation to climate change, barriers to implementation of adaptation measures and information on how support programmes through the Convention help to meet their adaptation needs.

A core component of the Paris Agreement is the preparation by each Party of a nationally determined contribution (NDC), which embodies “efforts by each country to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2022[66]). Each Party is required to communicate an updated NDC every five years starting in 2020, where each NDC represents a progression compared to its predecessor and captures the Party’s “highest possible ambition.” As of October 2021, all 191 Parties to the Agreement had submitted one or more NDCs to the UNFCCC.

In addition to the NDCs, Parties are encouraged to provide information on climate change impacts and adaptation progress as part of an adaptation communication. Although not a formal requirement, article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes the expectation that each Party submit and update a communication on adaptation in order to: “(a) increase the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation; (b) strengthen adaptation action and support for developing countries; (c) provide input to the global stocktake; (d) enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions” (UNFCCC, 2022[67]).

While NDCs are mandatory under the Paris Agreement, reporting on adaptation within them is not. In contrast, adaptation communications are not mandatory, but their content by design focuses exclusively on adaptation. There is considerable flexibility in the form of the adaptation communication. Slightly more than half of those submitted to date are unique documents. The remainder take the form of the most recent NDC, national adaptation plan (NAP), or national communication to the UNFCC. Adaptation communications are relatively new, with first version submission dates in 2020-2022.

The analysis of keyword frequencies in this chapter incorporates all versions of national communications, NDCs and adaptation communications submitted to the UNFCCC prior to 1 February 2023 by 38 OECD members, the European Union as a collective, 5 non-OECD EU members, and the 11 emerging economies included in this report. In total, the quantitative portion of the analysis reviews 413 documents (329 national communications, 67 NDCs, and 17 adaptation communications). The documents reviewed are listed in Table 1.A.1.

The approach taken to analyse the use of keywords is grounded in content analysis, established within the social sciences as a method for analysing textual data. At its core, content analysis views words and the context in which they are used as data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005[68]). The analysis takes a mixed-methods approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis. It begins with quantification of the frequency of word use, which serves as an indicator of the extent of interest in, or importance assigned to, particular words, without considering their contextual meaning (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999[69]). For example, the number of instances in which keywords related to agriculture appear in the UNFCCC documents may indicate the degree of concern over the consequences of climate change for the sector (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala, 2006[70]). The analysis then takes a qualitative approach to examine the context within which keywords of interest are used. This second stage involves examining the text near a keyword to determine, for example, if words related to agriculture are used in a discussion of vulnerabilities, mitigation, or adaptation.

The keyword analysis is conducted using NVivo qualitative analysis software (release 1.7). Keyword frequency analysis is executed by developing a set of search words that describe a concept of interest. In this analysis, keywords for agriculture include “agriculture”, “food”, “farm”, “crop”, “livestock”, related variants for each (e.g. agricultural, farming, crops, cropping). Contextual keywords used for mitigation include “mitigation”, “emission”, “carbon”, “greenhouse”, “gas”, “enteric”, “fermentation” and “food waste”; keywords for adaptation include “adaptation” and “resilience”; keywords for vulnerability include “vulnerability”, “impact” and “pressure”. For each category, related word variants in English and the Spanish and French equivalents for all keywords are included. To identify the context within which agriculture is discussed, the analysis identified the intersection of agricultural keywords with each of the categories of contextual words (mitigation, adaptation and vulnerability). The coding for each text excerpt was then manually verified.

The results of the keyword search are reported as a percentage of the total number of words published, which adjusts for differences in the lengths of documents by type (NDCs are generally shorter than adaptation communications or national communications) and across UNFCCC classifications (the NDCs of Non-Annex I Parties tend to be longer than those of Annex I parties).

This chapter’s stocktake of current agricultural climate change adaptation programmes and activities uses information collected by the Secretariat from each of the M&E countries, as reported in the individual country chapters, as well as supplemental research to identify efforts implemented to support climate change adaptation. The catalogue of activities reported herein is not exhaustive, but rather represents an overview of areas of programmatic emphasis and investment across the M&E countries.

Each of the programmes and activities that were self-reported to the Secretariat by member countries was manually reviewed and classified, first to ensure that activity is specifically focused on adaptation (rather than a general programme that may touch incidentally on adaptation), then reviewed and classified based on GAMI category and sub-category, as defined in Table 1.1. Where actions spanned more than one category or sub-category, they were cross-listed. Each action was coded by at least two staff to ensure consistency in the classification of programmes. Many actions undertaken by governments do not involve direct intervention to facilitate adaptation, but rather the creation of institutions to support adaptation decisions by individuals or groups. In most cases, these sorts of supporting actions fall into the realm of social, economic and institutional (SEI) measures. For example, a decision support tool that provides information on potential changes in crop operations in response to climate change would fall into the category of “climate services”, not “crop operations and management.” Programmes that are planned for implementation but have not yet been implemented were coded to the SEI category and the sub-category that best fit the information available on the programme.

Notes

← 1. Part of this increase in event frequency may be attributed to better recording and reporting of disaster events since the 1980s. For more information, see CRED database documentation/publications.

← 2. Expressed in 2019 US dollar terms.

← 3. Increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have been shown to increase biomass growth and drought resistance. This has the potential to benefit crop yields and pasture growth. However, it could also increase the growth of weeds and invasive plant species. Increased carbon dioxide has also been associated with declining nutrient content in many crops which may offset some of the potential benefits of increased vegetation. The IPCC report finds that the positive impacts of climate are likely to be outweighed by the negatives in most regions (IPCC, 2022[10]).

← 4. The speed of transformation may vary, but the underlying shift in the structure of the industry typically corresponds to the economic notion of the long-run in which fixed costs become variable.

← 5. This analysis builds on OECD (2023[9]), Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala (2006[70]), Mullan et al. (2013[64]), Pauw et al. (2019[50]), and Crumpler et al. (2021[71]) to analyse the text of documents submitted to the UNFCCC by each of the M&E countries. Details of the analysis are presented in the chapter Annex.

← 6. As discussed in the Annex, the national communications contain a chapter that focuses on vulnerabilities and adaptation. The NDCs for Annex I parties are largely focused on mitigation, whereas those of Non-Annex I parties contain a wealth of information on adaptation. The adaptation communications are solely focused on adaptation.

← 7. These documents cover many sectors and topics, and as a result do not present a comprehensive catalogue of adaptation activities undertaken by the M&E countries.

← 8. The GAMI classification encompasses both autonomous and planned adaptation measures. As such, not all of the categories are areas that are appropriate or desirable for government policy intervention, nor are they all applicable to food and agriculture.

← 9. Cross-listed activities are counted in each category, meaning that the number of actions and programmes summarised herein exceeds the number reported.

← 10. The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT supports sharing of information on climate change adaptation strategies across Europe (https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/).

← 11. The evidence on organic production systems with respect to adaptation and mitigation is mixed. These systems certainly reduce the use of inputs and evidence suggests that they increase soil carbon sequestration, but they also generate lower yields, potentially requiring an increase in production elsewhere. For example, Smith et al. (2019[73]) find that at a national scale, a shift to organic farming increases net emissions.

← 12. https://igedd.documentation.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/documents/Affaires-0009000/010178-01_rapport.pdf

← 13. The Centre has two key components: AgriZeroNZ (the Centre for Climate Action Joint Venture – an innovation 50:50 government/private-funded mechanism), and the New Zealand Greenhouse Gas Research Centre (NZAGRC).

← 14. Agroecological actions or programmes broadly refer to sustainable agricultural production systems. There are a variety of approaches and practices that may fit into this category, including among others regenerative agriculture, conservation agriculture, circular agriculture.

← 15. https://esdac.jrc.ec.europa.eu/esdacviewer/euso-dashboard/

← 16. Public investments should also not prevent self-financing as countries should aim to ensure full supply cost recovery in irrigation (OECD, 2010[72])

← 17. This is the case with MPS and output payments but can also occur through policies such as payments per head of specific livestock, or payments for area planted to specific crops, among others.

← 18. OECD (2022[74]), Declaration on Transformative Solutions for Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems, OECD/LEGAL/0483, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0483.

Legal and rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2023

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.