5. Strengthening the demand for migrant skills in Flanders

Abstract

This chapter investigates constraints on the demand for migrant skills as well as the policy responses that attempt to tackle them. It starts with policy measures that encourage employers to hire people who are far from the labour market, including wage subsidies and, notably, service vouchers. Next, the focus shifts to policy tools that aim at strengthening migrants’ social networks and role modelling. Finally, anti-discrimination and diversity policies are discussed.

Engaging with employers: Giving migrants the chance to demonstrate their skills

There are many reasons why immigrants encounter additional hurdles on the Flemish labour market. Some of these, as outlined in Chapter 4, have to do with the skills that immigrants bring to the local labour market. Therefore, policy efforts must make sure that there is a follow-up after the completion of the civic integration programme that is centred on developing, activating, and using migrant skills.

However, there remain other hurdles that do not directly depend on the skills of immigrants but, nonetheless, impact upon their returns to these skills. These hurdles are connected to the demand for migrant skills in the labour market. Indeed, employers may be hesitant to hire migrant workers because they are unsure of how to assess their qualifications or experience acquired abroad; they may prefer to avoid the risk of hiring migrants because they are worried that the cost of hiring could exceed their productivity; or they may simply decide not to hire migrants on the basis of discriminatory practices – either explicit or implicit. These challenges, as well as the policy responses that attempt to tackle them, are unpacked in this Chapter.

Newly arrived migrants face many obstacles to fully use their skills in a new country, including limited language abilities and lack knowledge of the local labour market functioning. Hence, at least in the short term, their productivity is lower than that of their similarly skilled native-born peers. Employers would normally respond to lower productivity by paying lower wages until productivity rises. However, relatively high collectively bargained wages in Flanders mean that employers are constrained in their ability to do this. As such, employers may be reluctant to hire migrants with low language proficiency and additional training needs.

At the same time, it is essential that migrants can demonstrate their skills through early contact with employers. One way to stimulate employers to take on foreign-born workers with limited host-country language proficiency is to provide hiring support. Indeed, several OECD countries have introduced mechanisms such as wage subsidies and cuts in employer-based social security contributions with the aim of encouraging employers to hire people who are far from the labour market. Flanders has been among the OECD countries making most use of this type of active labour market policies (Godefroid, Stinglhamber and Van Parys, 2021[1]; OECD, 2022[2]; McGowan et al., 2020[3]).

Targeted reductions in social contributions for low-educated youth seem to have little effect on employment chances

Across the OECD, wage subsidies are a long-standing component of active labour market policies aimed at strengthening the employment opportunities of vulnerable groups. Wage subsidies have also proven effective for the foreign-born, sometimes even more so than for the native-born (Butschek and Walter, 2014[4]; Nekby, 2008[5]; Clausen et al., 2009[6]). However, immigrants are rarely explicitly targeted and tend to be underrepresented among the beneficiaries of such schemes, possibly because they themselves or employers do not know about their eligibility (Liebig and Huddleston, 2014[7]).

Flanders has a long tradition of using wage subsidies for the employment of disadvantaged groups (Godefroid, Stinglhamber and Van Parys, 2021[1]). These “target group policies” (doelgroepenbeleid), which were formerly in the remit of the federal government, were devolved to the regions in 2014 as part of the sixth state reform. The Department of Work and Social Economy is in charge of overseeing these policies in Flanders. Since 2020, wage subsidies (or a reduction of social security contributions) in Flanders are focused on employers who hire people from three disadvantaged groups: low-educated youth, jobseekers and workers aged 58 and above, and persons with an occupational disability (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2021[8]). Migrants are not specifically targeted.

An evaluation of the target group policies for the period 2016-18 indicates that jobseekers with a foreign nationality and jobseekers with limited Dutch language proficiency were both underrepresented among those who benefited from these policies (Desiere, Cabus and Cockx, 2020[9]). For instance, only 23% of beneficiaries of the subsidy for low-educated youth had a foreign nationality, compared to 29% of the eligible non-users. Similarly, 35% of the users had no to little Dutch language skills, compared to 46% of the non-users.

At the same time the authors find that the wage subsidy had no significant effect on the likelihood for low-educated jobseekers aged below 25 to be employed six months after having entered unemployment. This outcome is surprising, given that low-educated youngsters are a particularly vulnerable group in the Flemish labour market (Boey and Vansteenkiste, 2022[10]). Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the wage subsidy for low-educated youth frequently did not lead to durable employment, as individuals hired with such a subsidy had mostly brief periods of employment interspersed with non-employment (Desiere, Cabus and Cockx, 2020[9]).

The service voucher scheme is the most subsidised domestic work scheme in the OECD…

A key sector for wage subsidies is the non-care domestic household services sector. Several European OECD countries use a variation of policy designs (service vouchers in Belgium, France, Germany, and Austria; cuts to social security premiums in the Netherlands and Germany; and tax deductions for labour costs in Sweden, Denmark and Finland) to boost the demand for domestic services and create jobs for disadvantaged groups in the labour market (OECD, 2021[11]).

In 2004, Belgium implemented a comprehensive system of social vouchers on the non-care domestic service market, called dienstencheques. Since 2016, the regions have jurisdiction for the follow-up and implementation of the service voucher scheme, which in Flanders is managed by the Department of Work and Social Economy. The scheme subsidises a restricted list of household services including cleaning, washing, and ironing, to create low-skilled jobs, reduce informal sector activities and improve the work-life balance of the users (Marx and Vandelannoote, 2014[12]; Raz-Yurovich and Marx, 2018[13]). The Flemish service voucher scheme is the largest subsidised domestic work scheme in the OECD, costing Flanders nearly EUR 1.5 billion each year (Department of Work and Social Economy, 2021[14]).

The scheme is organised through licensed service voucher companies that serve as an intermediary between users, employees, and the government (see Box 5.1). Service voucher workers are all formally contracted as regular employees. Wages and working conditions are set in collective agreements that are generally binding and apply to all workers, unionised or not. The level of protection granted to workers in Flanders is by international standards among the highest (Lens et al., 2022[15]).1 Any worker can be part of the scheme for an indefinite period. Notably, there are no eligibility conditions, no qualification requirements for workers themselves and no time limit. The only formal condition is that regional and sectoral training funds provide regular training. However, the limit of this training is very low: just 12 hours of training per year are compulsory for service voucher workers.2

Box 5.1. The service voucher scheme in Flanders

Five actors are involved in the organisation of the service voucher scheme (see Figure 5.1). The voucher issuer is a private company – called Sodexo – that produces the service vouchers. It sells them to the consumer for EUR 9/piece, who can use the vouchers to pay for a clearly defined set of non-care household services, including cleaning, laundry and ironing, cooking, and grocery shopping. Users are entitled to a fiscal deduction of EUR 1.8/piece (20%), so the net cost of each voucher is EUR 7.2/piece. For each hour of domestic service performed, the workers receive one voucher from the users. They then give them to their employer – a licensed service voucher firm – in exchange for their monthly wage. Employers can be either commercial firms (private companies, temporary work agencies, and private individuals), non-commercial firms (non-profit organisations and local employment agencies) or public entities (public social welfare centres and municipalities). The licensed firm can then give all the vouchers from its workers to the voucher issuer in exchange for EUR 23.48/piece, which serves at least in part to pay for the workers’ wage. The difference between what the users pay (EUR 9) and what the service voucher firms are reimbursed for (EUR 23.48) is financed through a direct wage subsidy of EUR 14.48/voucher. The subsidy offered by the government is thus composed of a direct wage subsidy paid to the service voucher firm and a tax refund for the users of domestic services. Adding up both elements, the government subsidises EUR 16.28 per voucher or 69% of the total cost of each voucher.

Almost all employees are female (97%). The service voucher scheme has experienced rapid growth over the years and employed more than 120 000 women in 2020 (7% of the female working population in Flanders), up from around 23 000 women in 2005. About 740 000 active users used the scheme in 2020 (on a total population of 2.9 million households). In total, this amounted to 72 million service vouchers. Users are predominantly two-earner households in full-time work, although a second group – which is expanding – includes individuals above the age of 65. Most users are highly educated and are relatively high up in the income distribution (Raz-Yurovich and Marx, 2019[16]).

Figure 5.1. Set-up of the service voucher scheme

…and gradually became an important employer of migrant women

Although the scheme does not have a specific focus on migrants, it gradually became an important employer of migrant women. Between 2008 and 2020, the share of non-EU-born working women working in the scheme climbed from 16% to 22% (see Figure 5.2). Even more pronounced is the increase among EU immigrants, which went from 12% in 2008 to 28% in 2020. This increase was entirely driven by women born in countries that joined the EU after 2004. In 2020, close to 50% of working women from this group were employed by service voucher companies. In contrast, the proportion of native-born women working in the scheme remained constant at 5%. As a result, foreign-born women made up 46% of all employees who were working through service voucher companies in 2020, up from 21% in 2008.

Figure 5.2. The service voucher scheme is increasingly dominated by migrant women

The service voucher scheme is thus essential for migrant women’s integration into the Flemish labour market. It will likely become even more important going forward, as migrant women continuously show higher inflow rates into the scheme compared to native-born women. In 2019, approximately 6 900 non-EU born women entered the scheme, accounting for 22% of the total number of non-EU-born scheme workers that same year (see Figure 5.3). The entry rate of both EU-born and native-born women in 2019 was lower, at 16% and 14%, respectively. Notably, the scheme is increasingly made up by recently arrived migrants. Close to half of the migrant women who entered the scheme in 2019 had been in Flanders for fewer than five years, and three in ten had a duration of residence of less than two years. This trend also shows in the distribution of the labour market position from which migrant women entered the scheme, with more than half coming from inactivity without social benefits (see Figure 5.3).

Unfortunately, data from the Crossroads Bank for Social Security on the educational attainment of foreign-born scheme workers suffer from very low coverage rates (for EU migrants, the coverage rate is only 14%, while for non-EU migrants it is 33%). However, Lens and colleagues (2022[15]) conducted an analysis using linked data from the Labour Force Survey and the Crossroads Bank for Social Security, and their findings show that among women who have worked in the scheme between 2004 and 2017, approximately 16% of non-EU born women had a tertiary level of education, compared to 13% of EU-born women and 5% of native-born women.

The scheme traps many migrant women in low-skilled jobs

Although the initial aim of the service voucher scheme was to create low-skilled jobs that could provide a leverage to other jobs, the system largely fails to offer passage to non-subsidised work, despite many of the migrant women working in this system being overqualified. A recent study by Leduc and Toweroj (2020[17]) shows that the service voucher system was effective in reducing unemployment and inactivity, but only by increasing employment within the subsidised domestic service sector. There was little if any transition to other sectors and to other type of contracts (see also Lens et al. (2022[15])).

Recent data from the Crossroads Bank for Social Security confirms that exit rates towards regular employment are low, and even lower among migrant women than among native-born women. Of all non-EU-born women who were working in the scheme in 2019, only 7% exited to regular employment the next year (compared to 6% of EU-born women and 9% of native-born women) (see Figure 5.3). And even though it is hard to draw firm conclusions from the Crossroads Bank for Social Security data, further analysis indicates that exit rates out of the service vouchers scheme to regular employment are not much higher for highly educated foreign-born women (8%). This seems to suggest that many migrant women with high levels of education get trapped in the scheme and in domestic work for which they are overqualified.

Figure 5.3. Migrants are more likely to enter the service voucher scheme and less likely to leave it

Temporary agency work can help migrants to prove their skills

Alongside wage subsidies, temporary agency work might also open an opportunity for employers to “test” the skills of migrants at a low cost and can be an important tool for integration. According to data from the Crossroads Bank for Social Security, 7% of employees born in non-EU countries in Flanders were employed through temporary work agencies in 2020, compared to 5% among the EU-born and 1.5% among the native-born. As a result, foreign-born workers comprised 41% of all employees working through such agencies in 2020, up from 28% a decade before (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4. The expansion of temporary staffing over the past decade was primarily driven by foreign-born workers

When compared to other European OECD countries, Flanders does not stand out for having a large percentage of foreign-born workers who are employed through temporary job agencies. In fact, migrants – and recent arrivals in particular – are hired on temporary agency contracts less often than in France, and far less often than in the Netherlands and Germany (see Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5. The share of migrants in temporary agency work remains average in international comparison

Even if Flanders does not stand out with a large temporary agency sector, given the strict employment protection legislation for permanent employment (McGowan et al., 2020[3]), temporary work still represents an important channel to help newly arrived migrants gain a foothold in the labour market. The important question then, is whether temporary agency work functions as a steppingstone towards more stable and better-paid employment, or rather works as a trap, for migrant workers in Flanders. By hiring through temporary staffing agencies, employers – who often have difficulties evaluating the competence and credentials of migrant workers – can screen workers without committing themselves. And, by taking on assignments through agencies, migrant workers can gain domestic work experience and demonstrate their skills, increasing their chances for regular employment (Joona and Wadensjö, 2008[18]). However, temporary staffing may also just be a permanent way for employers of maintaining a hyper-flexible workforce, in which case, it provides few opportunities for advancement (Friberg, 2016[19]).

Past findings on whether temporary agency employment helps or hinders migrants’ labour market integration in Europe tend to provide more support for the hypothesis that temporary jobs offer steppingstones to permanent employment for migrants (Hveem, 2013[20]; Andersson and Wadensjo, 2004[21]; Jahn and Rosholm, 2013[22]). Jahn and Rosholm (2013[22]), for example, find evidence of a strong positive impact among immigrants born in non-Western countries in Denmark, even stronger than among the native-born. In Flanders, despite the policy focus on a fast labour market entry for newcomers (see Chapter 4 for further discussion), research on the function of temporary agency employment for migrants’ integration pathways has been limited. One of the reasons is the lack of detailed administrative data on contract type.

Working with employers includes supporting migrant entrepreneurs

Another channel of activation is to support self-employed immigrants and working with immigrants as employers themselves. In most European OECD countries, the foreign-born are slightly less likely than the native-born to be self-employed and open new businesses. Compared to other countries, Flanders had a relatively high self-employment rate among the native-born and EU-born migrants in 2020, whereas the proportion of self-employed among non-EU-born migrants was relatively low (see Figure 5.6).

Despite a reduction in the self-employment rate among EU immigrants over the past decade and stability in the self-employment rate among non-EU immigrants, immigrants make up a rising share of the self-employed in Flanders. Between 2010 and 2020, the proportion of immigrants in the working-age self-employed population rose from 10% to 15%, as a result of increased immigration.

Figure 5.6. EU immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than non-EU immigrants in Flanders

There are several positive aspects to immigrants becoming self-employed or setting up their own businesses, such as the significant contribution they make to employment, innovation, and international trade (OECD, 2010[24]; Lofstrom and Wang, 2019[25]). Self-employment can also be a particularly effective pathway into the labour market for migrants who experience difficulties in taking up salaried employment. In addition, migrant business owners can be an important role model and a potential employer for other (often migrant) workers (Hammarstedt and Miao, 2020[26]). In Flanders, self-employed immigrants are less likely as the native-born self-employed to have employees. Approximately 23% of the self-employed immigrants were employers in 2021, compared to 28% of the self-employed native-born.

Still, immigrant self-employment is no panacea for labour market integration. Many of the foreign-born end up in self-employment to escape from marginalisation in the labour market. In other words, self-employment is not always related to entrepreneurial skills. Indeed, Figure 5.7 shows that in most European OECD countries, the foreign-born are more likely than the native-born to have entered into self-employment due to involuntary reasons (i.e. out of necessity or because the employer requested it). The share of involuntary self-employed migrants in Flanders was relatively high in international comparison, at 16% (compared to 5% for the native-born).

Figure 5.7. Immigrants have a higher incidence of involuntary self-employment

Self-employment thus seems to represent an important fallback strategy for immigrants to avoid unemployment, blocked mobility, and discrimination in the Flemish labour market. At the same time, research for Belgium shows that immigrants are more likely to exit from self-employment into non-employment than the native-born, and that weaker attachment to the labour market preceding entry into self-employment plays a crucial role in explaining why immigrants suffer more from “bad exits” (Lens, 2022[27]).

Even though migrant entrepreneurship has been on the policy agenda of several OECD countries for a while, schemes that specifically target migrants are still often limited to pilot projects and generally of a small-scale format. In Flanders too, tailored assistance to support immigrants in self-employment is still relatively limited (see Box 5.2).

Box 5.2. Tailored assistance to support immigrants in entrepreneurship in Flanders

Targeted support for immigrant entrepreneurship is primarily offered by non-governmental organisations in Flanders.

Entrepreneurial training and promotion to immigrant groups is supported by civil society initiatives, such as Starterslabo. In 2016, they started a public programme supporting entrepreneurship among refugees and immigrants, which was merged into mainstream “inclusive” support in 2020. Other organisations, for example Stebo and Youthstart, co-operate to provide entrepreneurship training and support for refugees and NEET youth. In addition, ESF projects such as the AZO! Project in Flanders provide further coaching and support to new immigrant entrepreneurs.

Between 2015 and 2021, the Syntra training network, with ESF funding, has been running the “Work towards your own business” project (Maak werk van je zaak), which aims to guide the unemployed towards self-employment. Within the project, would-be entrepreneurs receive external training and individual coaching from professionally oriented organisations, creating easier access to a professional support network, not only before becoming self-employed but also afterwards. The recently started follow-up project “Jumpstarters” further increases the focus on vulnerable employees but also aims to target immigrants and refugees.

SheDIDIT is a project on female migrant entrepreneurship. The project started in July 2018 with a campaign starring successful role models, providing a platform for women, and a talent pool in which migrant women can register and talk about their interests, their expertise and what they would like to learn more or grow further into. Through events, coaching sessions, networking opportunities and mentoring, entrepreneurial migrant women get a voice and support.

Finally, the microcredit institute MicroStart has programmes for immigrants and jobseekers and provides information and support in various languages.

Source: OECD (2020[28]), “Inclusive Entrepreneurship Policies, Country Assessment Notes Belgium”, https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/Inclusive-Entrepreneurship-Policies-Country-Assessment-Note:.htm; https://microstart.be/fr; https://stebo.be/; https://syntra-mvl.be/nl/jumpstarters; https://starterslabo.be/.

Promoting social networks and role modelling

Networks are crucial to finding a first employment. Social contacts often provide the very first link with employers, give information about job opportunities and tacit knowledge about the functioning of the labour market. Social networks thus fulfil an important role in immigrants’ labour market integration, both shortly after arrival and in the long term (OECD, 2023[29]). However, networks are not always beneficial to immigrants, especially if they provide only limited, lower-paid job opportunities or if they induce immigrants to stay in their network and not look at other potential jobs, thereby limiting their opportunities and aspirations (Verhaeghe, Van der Bracht and Van de Putte, 2015[30]; Lancee, 2010[31]).

Mentorship is well developed in Flanders

Mentorship programmes are seen as a cost-effective way of promoting integration whilst increasing interaction and strengthening ties between immigrants and the host society. Indeed, mentoring can provide immigrants with essential knowledge which is hard to access through formal channels such as PES courses and trainings (De Cuyper, Vandermeerschen and Purkayastha, 2019[32]).

Most OECD countries have mentorship programmes targeted at migrants. Typically, newly arrived migrants are matched with host-country residents (including established migrants) who act as mentors, providing tacit labour market information and introducing the newcomer to relevant institutions and services. Mentors can also share their personal networks or act as intermediaries with potential employers. In Canada, for example, the Ottawa Community Immigrant Services Organization links mentees once a week with volunteer mentors who work in a similar or related profession to discuss career objectives, build professional networks, improve job search strategies and techniques, and gain insights into Canadian workplace culture and language. In Australia, the Community Guides Program from Adult Multicultural Education Services trains former refugees as community guides who provide support to resettled migrants in a contact language (OECD, 2016[33]). In Israel, the mentorship programme “Babayit Beyahad” links immigrant families to Israeli family within a shared community based on profession, age, and interests for social integration. The latter provide day-to-day assistance with paperwork and navigating services, including referrals to professional bodies and job-search resources, and language support (OECD, 2017[34]).

Despite the common use of mentorship programmes across the OECD, surprisingly few programmes have been thoroughly evaluated. Research from Sweden on the effect of mentoring unemployed refugees finds a positive short-term effect for males (defined as having an income from work or self-employment that at least exceeds a basic amount) but no effect for females (Månsson and Delander, 2017[35]). An impact assessment of the mentoring non-profit organisation “Start with a Friend” in Germany, finds positive effects on subjective integration such as social connectedness and housing satisfaction but no effects (in the short term) on objective indicators, such as employment (Jaschke et al., 2022[36]).

Mentorship is well developed in Flanders, and some projects have been piloted and upscaled in the past years. Different actors (NGOs, public bodies, companies) usually co-operate in these projects. Some projects focus on a local implementation (TEAM UP in West Flanders, GATAM in Antwerp and MENTORING@WORK in Limburg) or a specific group, such as the RISE SMART mentoring programme for tertiary educated mentees. Two large scale projects are the “DUO for a JOB” programme and the now terminated but long-time running Connect2Work project (see Box 5.3).

Flanders piloted and evaluated several recent initiatives in mentoring. De Cuyper and colleagues (2021[37]; 2018[38]) highlight that it is not only crucial to provide a first meeting and connections between local residents and newcomers, but also key to maintain the quality of a programme and provide guidelines and structured support. Their findings also indicate, amongst other things, that sector- or occupation-specific matching is key to add value for highly educated immigrants. Building a network in their occupational sector improves their labour market integration. Finally, their research shows the key role of the supervisory organisation in ensuring positive outcomes.

Building on this research, Flanders implemented a mandatory mentoring scheme as the fourth pillar of the civic integration programme starting 2023 (see Chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion). In addition to the first three pillars (Dutch as a second language, civic orientation, and registration at the PES), the new pillar assigns 40 hours to strengthen immigrant’s social networks, thereby formalising previously existing mentorship programmes. The exact details of the networking programme are up to each municipality to design. In OECD comparison, a mandatory state-led participation scheme is an innovate but also ambitious plan. It puts considerable pressure on (small) municipalities, that need to design and offer such a programme despite in some cases limited expertise and experience. During the OECD field mission, it was mentioned that clear guidelines on what the participation project should entail, including measures to follow-up and clear communication of expected funding for this task would help municipalities in planning.

Box 5.3. Mentoring initiatives in Flanders

DUO for a JOB links young immigrants with senior mentors

“DUO for a JOB” started in Brussels in 2013 and since then, the organisation has spread to six different cities in Belgium. The programme trains seniors over the age of 50 to be mentors for young migrants aged between 18 and 33 years old, and since 2015 also youth with migrant parents, who are seeking career or student guidance. The project thus addresses the high unemployment rate among youth of non-European parentage.

The NGO was the first association in the EU to make use of Social Impact Bonds 1 and since its launch, it has also focused on partnerships with other stakeholders in the sector. Between September 2013 and August 2021, it has reached about 1 500 mentors and 4 000 mentees. About seven in ten mentees found themselves in a job, internship, or further training within 12 months of starting the programme. However, this positive outcome might be in part due to a selection effect as mentees actively choose to take part in the programme. However, an evaluation by the Brussels Employment Observatory on the 300 young migrants who participated in DUO for a JOB between 2014 and 2016 finds a positive short-term effect on employment.

The Connect2Work project supported immigrants’ job search

The “Connect2Work” project, was a joint initiative of HIVA, the PES (VDAB) and the integration agencies. The mentoring project was running from 2014-20 and targeted highly skilled people speaking a foreign native language. It matched “mentees” with mentors to facilitate labour market entry based on a “mentoring pathway”. Over a minimum of three months and at least six meetings, mentors shared professional expertise and experience with mentees and supported their job search via information and tips on drafting a good CV and cover letter, advice regarding useful websites and documentation and support to expand their professional network. A coach from Connect2work closely followed-up on the mentoring pathway.

← 1. With Social Impact Bonds, companies are invited to invest in a private fund used to finance the programme in a pilot project. The bond is designed such that investors see a return on their investment if the costs associated with the labour market integration of participants are below those of a comparable group who do not receive the new training. In this manner, it is investors – and not the public sector – who carry the financial risks.

Source: https://www.duoforajob.fr/en/home/; http://www.mentor2work.be/2020/11/02/overzicht-van-mentoring-naar-werk-projecten-in-vlaanderen/.

Involvement of social partners is high

One way to enlarge migrants’ networks and to improve their chances on the labour market is to involve social partners. Employers and trade unions often know better than the government and local authorities what work experience and foreign qualifications are needed. They are also well placed to judge what content should go into bridging programmes and to support vocational and language training – as the most effective kind of training is provided directly on the job (for further discussion, see Chapter 4).

Across the OECD, there have been many examples of social partner initiatives often focused on integration of humanitarian migrants. In several Austrian regions, for example, the Chamber of Commerce has put in place language training, skills assessments, mentorship programmes and apprenticeship placements for humanitarian migrants. In Sweden, sector-based talks between employers and unions have led to schemes to fast-track refugees into several shortage occupations. The fast-track schemes include skills assessment in the workplace and publicly funded upskilling. Canada rewards companies which successfully assist refugees in obtaining a first job and finding their place in society with a national Refugee Employment Award (OECD, 2016[33]). UNHCR and OECD also established a 10-point multi-stakeholder action plan to support employers in their efforts to hire refugees (OECD/UNHCR, 2018[39]).

In Flanders, the network organisation JobRoad is jointly operated by the PES (VDAB), the Agency for Home Affairs, the Flanders Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VOKA), the Training Fund for Temporary Employees (TRAVI), the European Social Fund, and the local governments.3 The organisation’s initial goal is to help non-Dutch-speaking immigrants successfully integrate into the Flemish labour market via internships, temporary employment, and work-based learning. The team is working in various regions of Flanders to bring together organisations (companies, intermediaries, temporary employment sector) in a network so candidates are guided in a targeted and personalised manner towards potential employers. Recently, the organisation has increased the range of vulnerable target groups for its activities (youth not in employment, education or training, persons aged 55 and over, and people with a detention history). JobRoad also intends to target asylum applicants in partnership with the federal reception agency Fedasil.

Immigrants in public sector jobs can act as role models

Immigrants benefit from role models with whom they can identify. Role models encourage individuals to fulfil their potential and aspirations, a key challenge for many newcomers in an unfamiliar society. In many OECD countries, foreign-born are successful role models as entrepreneurs and in the sports or entertainment sector. However, in some countries they are less well represented in other role modelling functions. A prime example is the public sector.

In international comparison foreign-born are underrepresented in public sector jobs in Flanders. As depicted in Figure 5.8, despite a large share of native-born (37%) being employed in public sector jobs, the share among immigrants is only 26%. In Flanders individuals need to hold Belgian or European nationality to obtain certain posts in the public administration. This restricted access implies the under-representation of non-EU foreigners. Even for migrants with more than 10 years of residence in Flanders (not shown in the graph) the share working in public sector jobs is only 29%. This suggest that the underrepresentation of immigrants in the public sector remains a challenge for settled immigrants.

Figure 5.8. Immigrants are under-represented in public sector jobs

The underrepresentation of foreign-born in the public sector has several negative consequences. First, it limits the visibility of immigrants in this key sector of employment in Flanders. Second, it hampers the ability of the public services to benefit from the experiences and skills of foreign-born employees, especially when addressing the needs of other immigrants as general users of public services (Pina, Corluy and Verbist, 2015[40]). Third, it gives away the chance of having successful role models other immigrants can aspire to in the Flemish society. This is particularly a concern for the native-born children of immigrants (see Chapter 6 for further discussion).

Most of the challenges immigrants face to enter public administration are known, but in part remain unaddressed (Flemish Social and Economic Council, 2020[41]). Key among them is the strong focus on recognised diploma and certified formal skills. This focus is somewhat surprising given that the very same public administration has designed good policy solutions such as an extensive framework for recognising informal skills and prior learning. The public sector could take a lead in using these tools, thereby setting an example also to other sectors. Another challenge is the requirement of very high Dutch language skills for most public sector jobs. Here a focus on the actual language competences needed can be a first step to be more inclusive immigrants. Public sector jobs can also value the skills, including specific foreign language skills, foreign-born bring with them.

Tackling discrimination and encouraging diversity

Discrimination also impacts the chances of immigrants to gain employment. Discrimination generally takes one of two forms. The first, known as “statistical discrimination”, occurs when employers lack information about the candidate’s experience or qualifications and examine the statistics on the average performance of the group to which they assume that the candidate belongs to. The second and more pernicious, “taste-based discrimination”, occurs when employers are simply reluctant to hire foreign-born workers, or workers they perceive as “foreign”, based on their name or ethnicity. Whereas the empirical evidence for both mechanisms is generally mixed, experimental research on hiring outcomes yields more evidence of taste-based discrimination vis-à-vis statistical discrimination (Lippens et al., 2022[42]). In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between these two types of discrimination, as statistical discrimination tends to be based upon prejudices rather than accurate perceptions about immigrants and indeed, the effects on the individual immigrant tend to be the same.

Discrimination can also be indirect. Such indirect discrimination occurs when a person is disadvantaged by a provision that appears neutral but may put certain groups at a particular disadvantage, for example native-level language skills for jobs that do not require this competence. Discrimination can be measured through questionnaires surveying the target population, in which case they refer to perceived and self-reported discrimination, and they can be identified via field experiments such as direct hiring discrimination of individuals with “foreign” perceived names.

Both perceived and direct discrimination are prevalent in the Flemish labour market…

From the perspective of immigrants themselves, the proportion of foreign-born individuals that feel discriminated against in Flanders is high in international comparison. Figure 5.9 illustrates that 22% of non-EU-born and 8% of EU-born migrants in Flanders, aged 15 to 64, consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against. The finding that self-perceived discrimination is higher for EU than non-EU born also holds for all other countries, except Ireland.

Figure 5.9. Perceived discrimination among immigrants is relatively high in Flanders

In fact, people born in non-EU countries especially when they are not (yet) citizens experience more daily struggles and are subject to a form of discrimination EU nationals do not face. This includes for example the expensive and burdensome renewal process of their residence permit and their restricted access to certain jobs, as discussed above.

Discrimination particularly manifests itself in the labour market when employers are unwilling to hire foreign workers, or at workplaces in unequal treatment of colleagues of foreign origin. Figure 5.10 shows the proportion of employed people born abroad facing discrimination at work, on the grounds of their foreign origin. Flanders now reports a rather low percentage in international comparison, around 4%.

While these surveys display perceived discrimination, they provide little information on its actual incidence. To capture the incidence of discrimination, field experiments in Flanders have used fictitious applications with foreign-perceived names and otherwise equivalent CVs. A 2012 study captured the contrasting experience of male Turkish and Flemish perceived candidates with comparable education and work experiences. Candidates with Turkish-perceived names needed to send out 44% more job applications to be invited to the same number of job interviews as the Flemish-perceived candidates (Baert et al., 2015[43]). Other studies have shown that discrimination fell sharply when the Turkish-named candidate applied for bottleneck professions or could demonstrate work or volunteering experience (Baert et al., 2017[44]; Baert and Vujić, 2016[45]). Recent experimental research in Antwerp and Ghent demonstrates that discrimination is still widespread, but appears to have decreased recently (Baert et al., 2021[46]; 2021[47]).

Notably, innovative techniques like “open hiring” and anonymisation of CVs in the recruitment process are gaining attention and popularity in Flanders as a means of preventing hiring discrimination (see Box 5.4).

Figure 5.10. Whereas discrimination at work is low

Box 5.4. Open hiring and anonymous CVs to combat hiring discrimination in Flanders

As more practical answer to hiring discrimination, the Department of Employment and Social Affairs of the City of Mechelen launched in 2021 the project “12 Work”. Concretely, employers formally advertise open positions on the 12work website. Employers may provide a maximum of five requirements for their new hire when drafting the vacancy, and only qualifications required for the position (e.g. driver’s license, wanting to work irregular hours) are accepted. Job seekers can then apply for a vacancy at a central counter in the city, by putting their name on the corresponding waiting list. It is entirely up to the candidate to determine whether they are qualified for the position and meet the requirements. The order of the waiting list always determines who can be the first to get the job. By February 2023, the project launched 26 vacancies, reaching 350 candidates, of whom 40 found a job.

More recently, Accent, one of the three largest temporary work agencies in Flanders, decided to work entirely with anonymous CVs from February 2023 onwards. The CVs will share all objective data about competencies and experience, yet personal characteristics (including the applicant’s name and contact details, gender, nationality, date and place of birth, disability, marital status) are made anonymous. Additionally, any information about professional experience should only indicate the duration of employment spells and not their actual start date or end date. Steps to introduce anonymous CVs have received mixed successes abroad (Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Germany) (Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann, 2012[48]). While anonymous job applications can lead to the desired effect of increasing the interview invitation probabilities of disadvantaged groups, there are also indications for exactly the opposite effect, namely that anonymity prevents employers from favouring applicants from disadvantaged groups. Therefore, effects of anonymous job applications should be closely monitored.

Source: OECD field mission; https://www.12work.info/; https://www.accentjobs.be/nl/werknemers/open-minded-hiring-solliciteren-met-een-anoniem-cv/.

While not a measure of discrimination, prevailing public attitudes towards migrants and immigration in a society can also impact the well-being and daily experiences of migrants. Flanders harbours somewhat more negative views than other EU15 countries regarding immigrants’ contribution to the national cultural life and the economic impact of migration (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Immigration opinions are more negative in Flanders than in other EU15 countries
Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10 for question:
	Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?
Finland	7.0	5.5
Sweden	6.9	5.8
The Netherlands	6.1	C5.3
Germany	6.1	5.9
Ireland	6.0	5.8
Belgium	6.0	5.0
Flanders	5.8	4.9
United Kingdom	5.8	5.8
France	5.3	4.9
Austria	4.6	4.7
Note: The ESS is a biennial survey of 50 000 respondents in nearly 30 European countries. In Belgium, it is a face-to-face survey of 1 800 respondents, out of which 1 100 live in the Flemish Region.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on the European Social Survey 2016.

Nevertheless, Statistics Flanders’ survey¹ on the Flemish-speaking population’s socio-cultural values, attitudes, and behaviours (Sociaal-culturele verschuivingen) does show a positive evolution regarding attitudes towards immigration. In 2018, 58% of the respondents agreed that the presence of different cultures enriches Flemish society, up from 48% in 2011. The proportion that agreed with the statements “migrants cannot be trusted”, “migrants come to take advantage of social security”, and “migrants pose a threat to Flemish culture and customs” also declined considerably over the 2015-18 period (Statistics Flanders, 2018[49]).

The Flemish Living together in Diversity survey (Samenleven in Diversiteit, see Chapter 2 for more information) further shows significant differences by region of origin. In 2017, more than four in five respondents of Turkish, Moroccan and Congolese parentage agreed with the statement that the presence of immigrants enriches Flemish society, which is well above the share among respondents of Romanian (57%) or Polish (44%) parentage, as well as respondents of Belgian parentage (47%). When asked whether there are too many immigrants and children of immigrants living in Belgium, around half of the respondents of Turkish, Polish and Romanian parentage agreed, compared to 44% of those of Belgian parentage and 32-39% of the respondents of Moroccan or Congolese parentage.

…despite long experience in anti-discrimination legislation at the federal, regional and Community level

Belgium is generally considered as having comparatively strong anti-discrimination legislation. At the federal level, the 2007 Anti-discrimination Act defines 19 “protected” criteria, including origin, presumed race, or nationality. Several legislative texts also focus specifically on fighting discrimination in the labour market. More recently, the Law of 15 January 2018, which laid down several provisions relating to work, giving labour inspectors the ability to utilise “mystery calls” to combat discrimination in recruitment and to carry out situation checks (using fake CVs) to establish whether employers are in breach of anti-discrimination legislation. To intensify anti-discrimination efforts, in 2020, the Federal Minister for Equal Opportunities founded the Inter-Ministerial Conference against Racism, which was tasked with drafting the country’s first national anti-racism action plan. Additionally, the Federal Human Rights Institute was founded. The action plan and foundation of the Human Rights Institute have been long in the waiting, with national advocacy groups putting significant pressure on past governments to kick-start it.

Unia, an independent public institution that combats discrimination and promotes equal opportunities, is tasked with the fight against discrimination in employment. It provides advice and support to discriminated persons, drafts reports, informs and trains employers on anti-discrimination legislation, provides authorities with recommendations, and consults with the economic sectors, public authorities, and associations. Unia also handles discrimination cases concerning specific criteria in the anti-discrimination legislation. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of cases opened by Unia based on racial criteria for the Flemish region increased from 366 to 486. Despite the anti-discrimination legislation, Unia’s diversity barometers continue to indicate significant levels of discrimination in housing, education and the labour market (Unia, 2012[50]; 2014[51]; 2018[52]).

From March 2023 onwards, Unia will no longer be competent as an independent equality body for Flemish competences (i.e. employment services, job placement, housing, education, media, sports). Complaints of unequal treatment and monitoring of discrimination regarding these Flemish competences will fall under the responsibility of the newly established Flemish Human Rights Institute. However, Unia remains competent for the federal competences.

In Belgium, as elsewhere, tackling discrimination through the courts can be a challenge as proving its incidence is difficult. Even if differential treatment on the grounds of a person’s origin can be demonstrated, the employer may still demonstrate that substantive reasons, other than discrimination, motivated the alleged discriminatory behaviour. Employers often provide substantive explanations for their actions and, as elsewhere, it is difficult to determine whether discrimination has occurred during the recruitment process. The difficulty is highlighted in low case numbers. In 2021, Unia brought 7 cases based on racial criteria before the civil or criminal courts.4 Most disputes were hence solved through conciliation procedures.

Flanders is working with all sectors to tackle discrimination more effectively

In accordance with federal anti-discrimination law, Flanders has its own set of non-discrimination legislation. Notably, the Flemish Government developed an Action Plan to Combat Work-Related Discrimination (ABAD), focusing on three pillars: awareness-raising, self-regulation, and reinforced controls. The action plan was established in 2007 and last updated in 2016. The sectoral covenants, by which sectors and sectoral partners commit themselves to implement actions in their sector to support Flemish employment policy, are the primary tool for tackling discrimination in Flanders. A recent evaluation study, however, revealed that while most sectors have developed sectoral codes of conduct on non-discrimination, little actions were taken to address discrimination at the organisational level (Lamberts, Vanderstukken and De Lebeeck, 2020[53]). Most sectors reported a lack of support or incentives to set up such self-regulating and self-monitoring policies. The service and temporary employment sector are notable exceptions. For both sectors, separate agreements on the organisation of practical tests (mystery calls) to combat discrimination were drawn up.

In June 2020, the Flemish Government decided to further strengthen the path of awareness-raising and self-regulation by the sectors. In the framework of the 2021-2022 sectoral covenants, the Flemish Minister of Work provides a budget of EUR 3.2 million in total – EUR 850 000 to each of the 37 sectors – so that each sector could – for the first time – take targeted actions to combat discrimination in the Flemish labour market. In addition to financial support, an inter-sectoral guidance group and inter-sectoral advisor on anti-discrimination and diversity guide the sectors throughout this process.

Sectoral activities are implemented in three phases, following the guidelines of an expert study (Baert, Lamberts and Verhaeghe, 2021[54]). A baseline measurement is done in the first phase and entails two steps. The first step consists of a sector-specific risk analysis; a description of the socio-demographic makeup (sex, age, foreign-born parentage, and work disability) of the workforce and jobseeker population by sector based on administrative data. Based on the risk analysis, in the second-step, sectors monitor the incidence of discrimination on different grounds using field experiments and fictitious applications. During the second phase, sectors should then take targeted actions to combat discrimination, based on the baseline measurement results. Finally, the third phase consists of follow-up measurements. The plan is to communicate the findings of the risk analysis by March 2023 and those of the field experiments by December 2023.

Finally, at the local level, several cities – joined in the European Coalition of Cities against Racism – developed actions plan to combat racism and discrimination, as a pillar of their diversity policies. The cities of Ghent and Antwerp in particular have recently monitored the incidence of discrimination and launched a number of anti-discrimination initiatives as a response (Baert et al., 2021[46]; 2021[47]).

Overly stringent language requirements can discriminate indirectly

Indirect discrimination occurs when certain recruitment methods and job requirements that appear neutral put immigrants and their children at a structural disadvantage.

The most frequent occurrence of indirect discrimination during the recruitment process concerns the language requirements established by employers. Requiring Dutch as mother tongue is generally conceived as direct discrimination. Difficulties emerge however when employers request “a good knowledge of Dutch”. While in many cases this is a reasonable requirement, especially when a good knowledge of Dutch is necessary to accomplish the primary tasks of a job (e.g. if the job requires significant contact with customers), it may nevertheless constitute a neutral criterion that can result in indirect discrimination. Vacancy statistics from the Flemish PES indicate that employers have very high expectations when it comes to candidates’ Dutch language skills. Of the 360 000 vacancies that VDAB received in 2021, 31% requested a good knowledge of Dutch and another 50% requested a very good knowledge of Dutch. These figures suggest that, in many instances, language requirements are above those required for the job in question.

In practice, it can be difficult to identify, let alone to prove, that indirect discrimination has occurred in a recruitment process. Dynamics between employer and jobseeker can be complex. Tackling the issue must often focus on raising awareness and increasing the transparency of recruitment practices and outcomes. To that end, in the context of a broader renewed language policy (see Chapter 3 for further discussion), the Flemish PES is developing a more sophisticated screening instrument to evaluate migrant jobseekers’ language competencies. Based on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, the new scale has six language proficiency levels (instead of the current four): no knowledge, beginner (A1), basic (A2), intermediate (A2+/B1), good (B1+), and very good (B2/C2). Additionally, the PES is in the process of forming “language profiles” (taalprofielen), which specify the minimal language proficiency needed to enrol in a course or to practice a certain profession using a standardised approach (VDAB, 2021[55]).5

The Flemish Equal Employment Policy became less targeted

Another set of measures that have been used by several OECD countries to address implicit discrimination are Equal Employment Policies. Such policies include a range of agreements on quotas and targets, or the use of equality plans or codes of practice explaining what kind of human resource processes should be developed to respect non-discrimination principles and to enhance diversity. While the introduction of hard quotas has been relatively rare in European OECD countries, many countries have instead implemented policies based on flexible targets and experimented with the use of diversity charters, diversity labels and diversity plans.

Over the past two decades, Flanders’ approach to employment equity and diversity has developed into an integrated, well-balanced set of policy instruments (van de Voorde and de Bruijn, 2010[56]). Until 2016, Flanders proposed so called “Career and Diversity Plans” (loopbaan- en diversiteitsplannen) to employers, in co-operation with social partners and civil society. These plans were comparable to those used in other OECD countries, however with the innovative aspect that they targeted small- and medium-sized companies (SME) specifically rather than focusing on larger companies as elsewhere. Companies that chose to implement a diversity plan had to set targets for the recruitment, internal mobility, training, or retention of migrants or other vulnerable groups, like unqualified youth or disabled people. To achieve these targets, companies received free support from dedicated “diversity consultants” (e.g. on skill development and the management of diversity) and subsidies from the Flemish Department of Work and Social Economy to co-finance plan-related costs (e.g. language courses).

A 2014 evaluation was positive about Flanders’ instrument of diversity plans (Idea Consult, 2014[57]). Take-up was not small: in 2013, 4.5% of all companies in Flanders introduced a diversity plan, but the participation share rose with company size, reaching 12% for companies with more than five employees and 30% for those with 200 or more employees. Furthermore, most companies were satisfied with the support provided by diversity consultants, accomplished their targets for hiring members of the most disadvantaged groups, and expressed a desire to strengthen their diversity strategy in the long run. Flanders’ diversity plans have also frequently been cited in OECD publications as an example of good practices for other countries. In fact, OECD work of 2015 advised to further expand the diversity plans and link it more with other policy initiatives, such as language training in the workplace, PES training offers and skill validation (OECD, 2015[58]).

However, despite generally successful implementation at the micro-level of organisations, the Flemish Government discontinued all career and diversity projects in 2016 to make way for a new policy known as “Focus on Talent”. The policy shift was primarily motivated by the fact that diversity plans’ overall influence on vulnerable groups’ employment rates remained negligible. While the objective of Focus on Talent is largely the same, the underlying policy vision and the tools to achieve it are not. The new policy emphasises individual competencies (or talents), based on the idea that the previous focus on specific groups was too restrictive. While the new policy vision does provide specific attention for people with a greater distance to the labour market, it intendedly breaks with the previous policy on combating the under-representation of certain socio-demographic groups in the labour market.

Focus on Talent has three parts or “tracks”: the activation of the unemployed and inactive population by the Flemish PES, the investment in employee training via the SME portfolio and sectoral covenants, and a bottom-up approach wherein various labour market actors (employer organisations, unions, the Minorities Forum, and Grip) further develop and implement a talent- and competence-based mind switch. Diversity consultants (around 128, spread over different sectors) continue to have an important role within the policy’s third track. Their tasks range from intake interviews and prospecting in companies to drawing up plans of approach and aftercare processes to raising awareness by training professional trade union militants.

A recent evaluation of Focus on Talent’s third track has revealed several challenges (Idea Consult, 2019[59]). First, with the abolition of diversity plans and regional consultation, established networks largely disappeared and diversity consultants had to take the initiative for co-operation themselves. Additionally, the inclusion of general themes such as competence policy or workable work results in weaker attention to diversity issues. The SME Portfolio (second track) statistics support this trend: of the 465 advice files in 2019, just 13 dealt with diversity-related issues, while 452 dealt with more general Human Resources Management. Companies are also no longer required to report on their goals under the new policy, and the evaluation of the programme now focuses solely on monitoring the labour market outcomes of vulnerable groups in Flanders. Finally, the transient character of diversity projects, the lack of continuity, as well as the potential for employers to reject elaborated action plans, complicate the work of diversity consultants.

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Notes

← 1. The legal minimum gross wage for employees without seniority is EUR 11.81/hour. In reality, this wage can be higher, depending on the contract terms as negotiated between employer and employee. A full-time working employee thus earns a wage well above the minimum wage. However, very few workers (approximately 10%) have a full-time contract. Other social-legal protections stipulated in the scheme regulations are that workers automatically receive a contract of unlimited duration after three consecutive months of employment with the same company. Additionally, workers are guaranteed a minimum of 3 subsequent working hours per assignment and 10 hours per week. The wage and working hours must remain stable for the entire duration of the employment contract. Another aspect of the scheme architecture is the workers’ full integration into the social security system. Workers accrue social rights for unemployment, pensions, sickness, and disability.

← 2. Training is subject to financial incentives, and provider organisations can receive partial reimbursement on the training costs as well as extra subsidies from regional training funds for new workers coming out of unemployment.

← 3. See https://jobroad.be/.

← 4. See https://www.unia.be/nl/publicaties-statistieken/cijfers-van-unia.

← 5. The first language profiles for specific occupations are published on: https://extranet.vdab.be/arbeidsmarktinformatie/arbeidsmarktverkenner.

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