3. An action plan to improve higher education in the Slovak Republic

This action plan includes ten policy actions across three areas of recommendations to be implemented between 2021 and 2024, and aims to provide a roadmap for the Slovak government to implement higher education reform in a carefully sequenced manner.

Each area of recommendation can be regarded as a step in the reform process, although there will be some timing overlap, as noted in the action plan’s summary table provided below:

  • Action Step 1: Developing and implementing a co-ordinated higher education strategy

    The Government of the Slovak Republic has a key role to play in developing a higher education strategy in close collaboration with autonomous higher education institutions (HEIs). Such a strategy needs to be ambitious but realistic, well communicated, and supported by a large share of higher education stakeholders to generate change in institutional culture and practices.

    It needs to build on a shared, evidence-based understanding of higher education challenges, identify clear objectives and the public policy and institutional actions to achieve them. It also needs a concrete plan to implement the strategy and to monitor progress towards the objectives.

    Well-designed institutional contracts can help translate the strategy at the institutional level, provided government and HEIs have the capacity to design and implement such contracts effectively. Collaboration between government and HEIs needs to improve to support the effective development and use of institutional contracts as a key tool to increase the performance of Slovak higher education.

  • Action Step 2: Using funding to enable and reward higher education performance

    The level of public funding and the method through which government allocates it to HEIs can, together, constitute powerful policy levers to shape institutional behaviours and improve quality in teaching, research and engagement. However, to maximise the impact of funding levers, investments need to be designed to enable and incentivise an institutional culture focused on continuous improvement. This means that the actions of HEIs, as well as those of individual staff and students, need to collectively focus on the continuous improvement of teaching and learning, research and engagement with the wider society.

    This requires a detailed understanding of current barriers to quality improvement to identify issues that may be addressed through funding mechanisms and those that require other changes, such as changes to the legislative and policy framework. It also requires making budget provisions to help HEIs build professional teams to ensure transparent and effective use of funding and to help public authorities develop and manage new policy processes, such as the introduction of institutional contracts.

  • Action Step 3: Enabling responsive institutional governance and management

    Successfully implementing higher education reform requires that HEIs have governance and management arrangements that permit them to make strategic use of public investments to advance their institutional priorities and contribute to national policy objectives.

    Governance and management arrangements must be designed in a way that strikes a balance between the legitimate interest of the government to ensure strategic, efficient and accountable use of public resources and the essential need for HEIs to function with full scientific and artistic autonomy from the government.

    The development of appropriate governance and management arrangements thus requires careful delineation between key principles that need to be established in law, such as enabling HEIs to responsibly exercise their autonomy based on a clear profile and mission and organisational choices that HEIs must make based upon their own needs and characteristics.

    Developing appropriate governance and management structures and processes is a challenging process. While it requires a legal framework that sets key parameters and provides sufficient flexibility for HEIs to manage their own affairs, such a process fundamentally requires committed individuals in institutional governing and management bodies who have appropriate supports and incentives to shift institutional practices. The shift required is one that would take the Slovak Republic from a higher education model largely concerned with meeting the fast-growing student demand observed in the 1990s and 2000s to one where student enrolment is decreasing, performance remains low, and where HEIs need to re-evaluate their role to best respond to a changing global environment and the needs of the wider Slovak economy and society.

In the sections that follow, we outline these three areas of recommendation. For each area of recommendation, we describe in sequence:

  • The current state of policy and practice,

  • Challenges limiting the adoption of effective reforms,

  • Relevant international experience that points to possible policy reforms, and

  • Concrete policy actions that the Slovak government may wish to consider.

The action plan builds on analysis and advice provided by recent national and international projects, input provided by Slovak stakeholders throughout the project, and a rich body of policy experience across OECD countries.

The following Table lists the policy actions, suggested timeframes, and organisations that might take responsibility for implementing the actions. It also assigns a broad cost estimate to each action: “low”, “medium” or “high”. These indications should be interpreted as follows:

  • Low: Actions that focus on policy processes and can be undertaken by existing bodies or bodies funded through other actions.

  • Medium: Actions that focus on policy processes or the provision of financial incentives requiring investment of a limited scale.

  • High: Actions that require substantial new investments.

The Table aims to provide a starting point for the implementation of the ten policy actions, based upon the OECD’s assessment of implementation considerations in the Slovak Republic. Timeframes, responsibilities and costs will need to be discussed and refined by the Slovak authorities in close collaboration with higher education stakeholders.

The Slovak higher education system has transformed in major ways since the country's transition to an independent, democratic state in the early 1990s. Changes were driven partly by legislation and policy, such as bringing academic freedom and legal independence to HEIs and including the Slovak Republic in the Bologna Process, and by massive increases in student enrolment (Reichert, 2009[1]).

Over the past 15 years, Slovak have sought to anchor the Slovak higher education system more firmly within the European Union, to promote modernised and labour-market-relevant educational programmes, high-quality, internationally competitive research, and greater engagement of higher education institutions in supporting the economic development of the Slovak Republic and its regions.

Government has pursued these goals through a range of strategies, some focusing on broad transformation, others with a targeted focus. The sections that follow review these strategies, namely (i) an attempt at comprehensive higher education reform, (ii) reforms of system structure and quality assurance, (iii) plans for reforming institutional governance, and (iv) new investments and funding reform plans.

One of the most comprehensive higher education reform plans developed in recent years was part of the 2016 National Programme for the Development of Education (“Learning Slovakia”), which aimed to reform the entire education system in the Slovak Republic (MoE, 2016[2]). This plan included four strategic objectives for higher education, namely improving the quality of educational programmes, fostering high-quality research, supporting greater involvement of HEIs in regional development and improving the effectiveness of HEIs through funding and governance reforms. The plan encompasses a range of measures to achieve these objectives, as outlined in Box 3.1.

According to the 2018 European Commission’s peer counselling on the governance of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic (see Box 3.4 for details), the Learning Slovakia plan was based upon the work of a task force of independent experts, who produced a 226-page long discussion document made available for public comment, generating almost 4 000 contributions.

While this plan was not implemented in its entirety, it generated significant debate and led to smaller reforms, most notably in the area of quality assurance as discussed below.

After limited government steering during the period of fast enrolment growth until the early 2000s, governments have attempted to steer HEIs towards greater quality in two ways: by introducing different institutional profiles to concentrate research excellence among a small number of HEIs, and by creating a new regime of quality assurance promoting rigorous standards controlled by an independent agency.

After a change of government in 2006, an amendment to the Act on Higher Education No. 131/2002 (hereafter “HE Act”) introduced three types of institutions differentiated according to their mission, namely “universities”, “professional HEIs” and “HEIs”. “Research universities” were no longer identified (Reichert, 2009[1]). The intention was to pursue differentiation between research and professionally focused institutions along a single criterion of evaluation: research intensity. The amendment’s classification scheme was to be tanligbly implemented through a differentiated funding formula.

The amendment introduced threshold levels in areas such as the number of students per level of education and per head of staff, research performance and third-party grant income to determine the institutional type. To obtain the title of university, HEIs were required to reach threshold levels in six areas, five of which were research-related, namely the number of doctoral students per staff, the number of doctoral graduates, the research results of their theses, the average grant income per professor and overall research performance (Reichert, 2009[1]).

In the area of quality assurance, the 2018 Act on Quality Assurance in Higher Education introduced a critical policy shift ending a model that had been criticised as ineffective as described in Chapter 2 (Machlica et al., 2017[3]). The new model involves an independent agency, the Slovak Accreditation Agency for Higher Education (SAAHE), which is responsible for formulating standards for HEIs’ internal quality assurance processes and criteria that will be used in the external quality assurance activities it will undertake. Among other areas, the new model focuses explicitly on strengthening the labour market relevance of higher education. In particular, it requires each HEI to regularly monitor and evaluate study programmes in co-operation with relevant employers and other stakeholders (OECD, 2020[4]). In 2021, the SAAHE and the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport (MoE) took a number of steps to support effective implementation of the new quality assurance model, publishing an action plan outlined in Box 3.2.

It is not yet possible to assess the types of changes Slovak HEIs will pursue to meet new quality assurance standards and the extent to which implementation will vary across HEIs, since implementation is ongoing until 2022. However, several institutional stakeholders interviewed by the OECD team expressed hopes that the system would strengthen HEIs’ focus on quality, noting in particular the value of re-thinking long established processes in light of new standards of quality.

At the same time, other higher education stakeholders suggested potential limitations of the new model. For instance, a few higher education stakeholders noted that the new list of evaluators published by the SAAHE, in charge of assessing HEIs’ internal quality assurance systems, would have benefitted from a greater diversity of profiles, rather than continued reliance on established Slovak and Czech academic networks.

There have been several attempts in the Slovak Republic to modernise the model of university governance inherited from the change of political regime in the 1990s. This model presents several weaknesses, especially as it results in HEIs that are insufficiently focused on the needs of students and their wider social and economic environment, as further discussed in Action Step 3.

Over the past few years, the 2016 Learning Slovakia plan recommended reforming institutional governance to improve the accountability and integrity of institutions while increasing their autonomy, a direction that was also supported by the findings of the 2018 European Commission peer counselling on university governance (Box 3.4).

In 2020, the newly elected Slovak government set out to pursue legislative reform to make changes in various areas following directions that are broadly similar in their objectives and key features as elements recommended in previous national policy plans and echoing recommendations made by international organisations. Key areas of focus and objectives according to a document outlining the government’s rationale and shared with the OECD team are listed below:

  • A first area focuses on increasing the quality of higher education teachers by creating professor and associate professor positions accessible without the requirement of a formal title (surpassing changes in access to higher education employment implemented in 2018, discussed later in this report). The amendment proposes that the MoE create minimal national criteria for these positions and separates the process of habilitation from the accreditation of titles. These changes are expected to help open up the Slovak higher education system to international academic and non-academic professionals as well as to guarantee a minimal quality of higher education teachers across the country.

  • A second area proposes to harmonise the length for full-time and part-time studies, in an attempt to make study options more attractive to a greater range of learners, including adults with work responsibilities, and limit the number of young Slovaks emigrating to pursue higher education.

  • A third area focuses on the governance of public HEIs, aiming to strengthen the position of the board of trustees and of the rector, to re-balance powers between academic governing bodies and those whose executive capacity is limited in several ways, as further described later in this chapter. Governance changes are also expected to end the dual structure where governing bodies exist at both institutional and faculty levels.

  • A fourth area relates to the implementation of institutional contracts, between the government and each HEI. These contracts are expected to increase strategic planning and diversification in Slovak higher education.

Governance changes have raised significant concerns among higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD during the project. Common concerns included the risk that the reinforcement of executive entities such as the board of trustees versus that of academic bodies could lead to a decrease in institutional autonomy and academic freedom, as well as the view that there are more relevant and pressing changes that should be addressed – such as improving the funding available to the system – to foster quality improvements. Persistent disagreement with respect to governance changes are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

The 2016 Learning Slovakia plan called for increasing public funding to higher education, diversifying HEIs’ sources of funding, and for multi-year funding contracts to be established between government and HEIs. While these broad funding reforms have not been implemented – and there has been a decrease in higher education funding in 2021 – Slovak authorities have implemented several changes to the annual allocation formula to incentivise a focus on performance (see Action Step 2).

Most recently, changes to higher education funding have been proposed as part of the Slovak government’s national reform plan developed in the context of the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, a financial relief plan for member states to respond to the pandemic. The Slovak Republic’s national plan was approved by the European Commission in June 2021. The higher education chapter of the plan proposes a comprehensive reform package underpinned by substantial new funding. The plan includes five key reforms:

  • change to university funding through the introduction of new institutional performance contracts

  • a new “periodic scientific performance evaluation system” that would identify excellent research and research teams to foster the diversification of the higher education system

  • the implementation of the new approach to higher education accreditation currently underway

  • HEI governance reform

  • concentration of excellent education and research capacities.

The plan includes quantitative targets to be achieved, timelines for implementation, and a costing plan totalling EUR 203.9 million. The objective is to create conditions for attracting talented students and academics from the Slovak Republic and abroad by offering attractive teaching, research and housing facilities. Key elements of the plan are presented in Box 3.3.

Alongside government strategies, some stakeholders have advocated for broad changes to the Slovak education system in recent years. The project “Learning Makes Sense” (To dá rozum), conducted from 2016 to 2020 on the basis on an extensive number of stakeholder interviews and surveys, and the establishment in late 2020 of an “Alternative Rectors Platform” (Vznik Alternativnej platformy slovenskych rektoriek a rekorov), are examples of the push for reform. Both highlight the need for a more student-centred and high-performing higher education system.

In parallel, recent international studies called for reforming the governance of universities, such as the 2018 European Commission’s peer counselling on governance of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic, and more broadly made recommendations to improve the skills of Slovak citizens and workers (OECD, 2020[4]).

Recommendations for higher education from Learning Makes Sense (To dá rozum) and the 2018 European Commission’s peer counselling on governance of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic are summarised in Box 3.4.

The reform attempts of past Slovak governments outlined in the preceding section have not led to a comprehensive overhaul of the higher education system, and have had limited success in improving its performance. The historical context and timing of higher education expansion in Slovakia offers one source of explanation for this persistent challenge: the country has been unable to address “the widening array of challenges and the increasing number of problems with quality of provision which the rapid, un-orchestrated expansion has caused” (Reichert, 2009, p. 84[1]). These issues are now compounded by the opposite pattern unfolding in Slovak higher education, namely the decline of enrolment resulting from a combination of demographic factors, high emigration rates among young Slovaks, and lower rates of application to higher education, as discussed in Chapter 2.

In some countries – such as neighbouring Hungary – falling student numbers have pressured both government and HEIs to work together to enhance the higher education system’s attractiveness, with a focus on recruiting international students and enhancing innovation in the delivery of higher education (OECD/European Union, 2017[10]).

By contrast, in the Slovak Republic, the lack of collaboration between the Slovak government and higher education stakeholders, the lack of agreement among key stakeholders about the problems to be addressed and their causes, and the discontinuity in reform efforts persistently undermine the ability of both government and HEIs to address these problems. These issues are examined in turn in the sections that follow.

Policy development in higher education takes place without effective collaboration with stakeholders, despite the existence of representative bodies set up in legislation. The government plays a key role in Slovak higher education as the main funder of public HEIs and main driving force behind education reforms. The government typically develops reform plans through its analytical teams with little engagement of the higher education sector and economic and social stakeholders, such as employers. Some higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD highlighted the frequent lack of communication from government on reform plans, a lack of systematic engagement, a practice of consulting a limited number of individuals and publishing reform plans once already advanced, limiting the opportunity for broad discussion. Some noted that while the law establishes bodies representing higher education stakeholders that government must consult ahead of legislative changes (outlined in Chapter 2 under “Key features of the Slovak Republic’s higher education system”), these rarely play a consensus-building role. This can lead to changes passed through the national Parliament that have low support from higher education stakeholders, or that underestimate the financial and human resources needed at the institutional level to implement reforms.

At the same time, Slovak HEIs have displayed a limited pattern of collaboration with external actors, whether government or the private sector. This results in part from the internal governance structure of HEIs as set out in law, which provides rectors and boards of trustees with a limited capacity to identify and pursue institution-wide interests and academic senates at both institution and faculty levels with broad powers, but a limited external orientation.

The “top-down” culture of policy making in the Slovak Republic and the inward focus of HEIs contribute to weakly developed norms and routines of collaboration in policy making. Even in areas of mutual interest, the lack of established communication and collaboration channels has hampered co-operation. This has been the case for instance between businesses and HEIs, despite efforts from both sides to increase co-operation to address the long-standing issues of skills mismatch and research funding and performance (EBRD, 2017[11]).

The Digital Coalition of the Slovak Republic provides an example of the limitations of such collaborations (European Commission, 2017[12]). A private-sector initiative aiming at improving digital skills and creating synergies between IT associations, industry leaders and HEIs, the coalition gathers 80 partners, including businesses and universities. Yet, it has had limited success in strengthening the ties between academic research and the private sector. Similarly, in a survey of universities and businesses by the University-Business Cooperation in 2017, Slovak HEIs emphasised the importance of developing mechanisms to enhance co-operation with businesses, whereas none of these mechanisms were in place in over 40% of the businesses in the sample (Galán-Muros et al., 2018[13]).

Limited engagement and collaboration between government and stakeholders contributes to diverging views of the higher education system in the Slovak Republic. Several studies conducted by national and international bodies point to key problems in Slovak higher education (European Commission, 2018[8]; OECD, 2020[4]; MESA10, 2021[9]). The “Performance of Slovak higher education” section in Chapter 2 echoes findings from these studies, showing persisting high rates of emigration of Slovak students (despite improvements in attracting international students), high rates of skills mismatch and over-qualification, and a low international performance and visibility of Slovak research and innovation.

The majority of stakeholders interviewed by the OECD acknowledge these systemic weaknesses. According to these stakeholders, the high proportion of higher education students leaving the country and low performance of Slovak HEIs in international university rankings provides evidence of the system’s low quality. They generally identified contributing factors, such as the system’s under-funding and a lack of incentives to develop high-quality, labour-market-relevant programmes. In contrast, a small but notable number of higher education institutional stakeholders interviewed by the OECD perceived the overall low quality of teaching and research in the Slovak Republic as driven by a small number of low-quality institutions in a highly heterogeneous landscape. They viewed the high rates of students abroad as the result of misconception about Slovak higher education rather than evidence of low quality, suggesting it should be addressed by better signalling the quality of Slovak higher education to students and employers.

Besides disagreement on the extent of the Slovak Republic’s performance challenges, the views of stakeholders interviewed by the OECD were particularly polarised in terms of the actions that should be taken to improve performance. Some higher education institutional stakeholders viewed higher education governance arrangements as a key driver for the lack of quality improvement and strongly supported opening leadership positions to outsiders and/or changing the distribution of power between governing entities to strengthen the managerial capacity of rectors, for example. Conversely, other institutional stakeholders suggested that any intervention from government in university governance, in particular to modify collegial decision making, would undermine the universities’ self-governing nature and independence, in turn threatening academic freedom. This latter group suggests that reforms to the system should focus only on funding reforms.

Building the foundations of productive consultation requires trust and a shared base of evidence for discussion. While deepening trust is a long-term undertaking, it is possible to improve the shared evidence base available to support the engagement of higher education stakeholders. For instance, stakeholder disagreements regarding the factors leading students to study abroad suggests a better understanding of students’ needs and motivations is required. However, there has not been regular student, graduate or employer surveys that could provide a nuanced assessment of the learning experience of students or of employers’ perception of skills obtained by Slovak graduates. This situation is, however, poised to change given the new student survey launched by the SAAHE, described in Box 3.2.

Similarly, concerns about the use of national averages when looking at performance data in an international context, rather than a deeper exploration of heterogeneous performance among Slovak HEIs, call for more granular analysis of higher education outcomes measures. An example of this would be to analyse labour market outcomes – employment rate and earnings – according to graduates’ programme, field of study and institution, taking account of graduate demographic characteristics and of the national and local economic context. Background information provided to the OECD suggests that while the Slovak Republic has the capacity to identify the labour market outcomes of graduates shortly after graduation, as the Slovak Centre of Scientific and Technical Information (CVTI) collects basic information on social and economic conditions of HEI students (during their study and shortly after graduation). However, this was little discussed during the project, suggesting the data may have limitations or not be widely used.

Reforming the higher education system requires different types of reforms, which need to be aligned in their objectives and co-ordinated in their implementation to be effective. Efforts are taking place in this regard, but they are recent. For instance, in 2018, the European Commission’s peer counselling on governance of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic highlighted the disconnect between broad policy objectives, operational funding mechanisms, and the system of quality assurance (European Commission, 2018[8]). As an example, the annual revisions to the funding formula for HEIs are not connected to a broader policy framework, which may limit the effectiveness of incentives built in the funding formula to effectively shift institutional behaviour. Recent OECD analysis further suggests that quantitative and qualitative targets have rarely been established when new policies are implemented, and performance indicators in use often vary across government bodies (OECD, 2020[4]).

The Slovak Republic’s national RRP described earlier (see Box 3.3) includes broad system-wide targets and references several reforms underway, which represents a step in the direction of clarifying government objectives, the ways success will be measured, and to connect previously disconnected reform under a connected plan. However, it is not yet clear how policy instruments – such as the current funding formula or future performance contracts with HEIs – will incentivise HEIs to take action towards meeting these targets.

Similarly, concurrent higher education reforms reveal the weak alignment in policy design between different streams of reform. Most recently, the investment approach outlined in the national RRP focuses strongly on physical infrastructure with little investment in digital infrastructure – a potentially important aspect to modernising higher education and making the Slovak higher education system more flexible and attractive to domestic and international students, itself a key government objective. The plan is also not explicit on how this new European funding might be used to support large-scale changes in the processes and practices of HEIs and government that aim to improve teaching and research quality. Such processes, such as the introduction of institutional contracts, revised and improved quality assurance processes and new institutional governance arrangements, require in particular that adequate human resources – with appropriate skills profiles – be in place in HEIs and government. As discussed in Action Step 2, “Using funding to support and reward higher education performance”, HEIs face constraints in the ways in which they can manage their human resources, due to limitations in how European structural funds can be used, legislation on the employment of higher education staff, and the demographic profile of the higher education workforce. Taking into account the complex interplay of these factors through effective engagement with higher education stakeholders thus appears important to support reform success.

Another example relates to quality assurance processes. The SAAHE is carrying out prominent reforms of the accreditation system in parallel to the proposed legislative amendment and work on the Slovak Republic’s RRP. While the SAAHE and MoE recently issued a National Action Plan for External Quality Assurance of HEIs (see Box 3.2). that offers a good starting point for developing a more concrete understanding of quality, it is not yet clear how this effort may help guide broader higher education reforms and investments currently envisioned. Input from stakeholders interviewed by the OECD suggest that this lack of connection between different reforms results from a lack of co-ordination and communication channels between (and within) the bodies responsible for the various reforms within government, and between these bodies and HEIs.

Furthermore, despite relative agreement among recent governments around the need for reform in higher education, there is insufficient continuity in reform efforts. This is due, in part, to frequent political shifts, leading to difficulties in achieving objectives described in planning documents (OECD, 2020[4]). According to the Working Group of Slovak policy makers supporting the project, better co-operation among government bodies responsible for reform and between government and HEIs, as well as clear performance indicators and a stronger evidence base to measure progress, could substantially improve the identification of common objectives and priorities. In turn, common objectives and priorities, when set for the medium to long term, could help improve the continuity of reform efforts.

International approaches to developing and implementing comprehensive higher education reforms vary based on an array of factors. These include the legal underpinnings and historical developments that have shaped how the higher education system operates, and, in particular, the way government and autonomous HEIs work together. Another important factor is the extent to which data is collected and disseminated to create an agreed-upon evidence base on which government and higher education stakeholders can rely to identify targets and monitor performance improvement.

Latvia provides an example of a government-driven, long-term education strategy associated with clear indicators of performance. Norway provides an example of how stakeholder engagement is embedded in policy making, shaping both the direction of policy and the monitoring of implementation. England (United Kingdom) provides an example of a system with a well-developed approach to conceptualising quality teaching and identifying data to measure and reward progress made by highly autonomous HEIs.

Latvia’s Education Development Guidelines are a six-year mid-term strategy for education, which ensure alignment, co-ordination and continuity in Latvia’s education policy for the 2014-20 planning period. The guidelines define clear principles, goals, responsibilities and lines of action of education policy for all types and levels of education, coupled with indicators to monitor progress towards set goals. The main purpose of the guidelines, adopted in 2014 by the Parliament (Saeima), is to achieve high-quality inclusive education for personal development, human welfare and sustainable national growth. Through the guidelines, the government aims to encourage actors of the education system to move toward national goals and foster a strategic use of resources (Government of Latvia, 2014[14]).

Latvia’s Education Development Guidelines fall within its government planning framework, linking education policy with broader national objectives. The government planning framework includes Latvia’s comprehensive Sustainable Development Strategy for 2030 (Latvia 2030), which defines long-term economic development directions, the National Development Plan for Latvia 2014-20, which sets the medium-term strategy, and a number of sectoral planning documents, such as the Guidelines for Science, Technology Development and Innovation (OECD, 2019[15]).

The guidelines describe several education policy goals, such as developing educational infrastructure or improving efficiency of resources management through resource consolidation (Government of Latvia, 2014[14]). For each of the policy goals, lines of actions are defined with detailed activities, timelines, responsible bodies, outputs and key performance indicators (KPIs).

For example, the line of action “international competitiveness” includes 10 activities, 6 policy outputs and 12 KPIs. As part of this line of action, the activity “Support measures for international mobility and cross-border co-operation” is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and the National Centre for Education, with participation from members of industry, HEIs, social partners and the State Education Development Agency. This activity is to be developed by the second half of 2020, and falls within the funding of the EU Erasmus+ programme. For this activity, KPIs include the number and share of students enrolled in a mobility or exchange programme. An interim evaluation showed that Latvia outperformed the 2017 target set for the first indicators (2 156 students compared to a target of 1 960) and under-performed on the second indicator (8% of graduates compared to a 15% target) (Latvian Ministry of Education and Science, 2019[16]). In addition to the interim evaluation, a final impact assessment to be issued in 2021 by the Ministry of Education and Science will further help identify specific areas for improvement and shed light on areas where data is currently lacking but needed to measure progress.

Regular assessments of the guidelines serve as a basis to revise the policy objectives and indicators chosen. For example, as assessments showed that the involvement of stakeholders following the implementation of the 2014-17 Guidelines was not optimal – mainly because of governance arrangements involving too many stakeholders and diluting implementation responsibilities – these findings have informed a new model for engaging stakeholders and defining their roles and responsibilities, established in the 2021-27 Guidelines (OECD, 2019[15]).

Norway’s Skills Policy Council and the Future Skills Needs Committee were established by the Ministry of Education, as a new governance arrangement to support the implementation of Norway’s Skills Strategy 2017-21. The purpose of these bodies was to address the fragmentation of skills policy in Norway, which resulted from the diversity of policy areas falling into the skills umbrella, the large number of stakeholders involved, and multiple levels of governance at which decisions regarding skills policy are taken. These bodies are expected to improve the co-ordination of skills policy in two complementary ways.

The Skills Policy Council is an overarching co-ordination body chaired by the Ministry of Education, which comprises representatives from ministries, local governments, and social partners such as employer and employees organisations (OECD, 2019[17]). It brings together all actors with a role in skills policy to co-ordinate, reflect on the objectives and review the Skills Strategy.

The Future Skills Needs Committee is tasked with generating data and building evidence-based assessment of skills needs in Norway in the short, medium and long term, and is funded by the Ministry of Education. It gathers, organises and builds on existing data and evidence, and informs the development of new evidence. Its missions also include facilitating the work of governing bodies through disseminating evidence to different actors, and providing regular assessments of priority areas and skills needs. These assessments aim to inform agenda setting and policy planning at the national and regional levels, and to provide information to support decision making by employers and learners. It is composed of representatives from the social partners (employers and labour unions) and ministries, as well as experts, and builds on existing structures, as its secretariat is located within Skills Norway, a pre-existing directorate of the Ministry of Education and Research (OECD, 2020[18]). Information and evidence produced is used to inform discussions, reports and recommendations of skills policy made by the Skills Policy Council.

Norway’s Skills Policy Council and Skills Needs Committee have enabled greater co-ordination among different actors responsible for the skills policy and its implementation (OECD, 2020[18]). The Skills Needs Committee created common databases and integrated information systems that help inform the policy process. The Skills Policy Council has enhanced collaboration across government ministries. Nevertheless, Norway’s example also shows that the creation of new bodies involving a diversity of stakeholders requires defining a clear mandate and processes, and takes time to build and to have tangible effects.

In England (United Kingdom), the Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework (TEF), introduced by the Government of England, represents a unique approach to assessing and rewarding teaching quality at HEIs utilising a system of awards.

The TEF was developed to “introduce a framework to recognise universities offering the highest teaching quality” (Copeland, 2017[19]). The primary goals of TEF, as set by the government, was to develop a framework that: better informed students’ choices about what and where to study; raised esteem for teaching; recognised and rewarded excellent teaching; better meets the needs of employers, business, industry and the professions” (UK Department for Education, 2017[20]). TEF’s primary lever for rewarding HEI performance is an award system that is intended to have positive reputational impact and that allows institutions to increase student fees, an important part of institutional funding in England. TEF “awards” involve gold, silver or bronze levels. HEIs and recipients who receive an award, at any level, can increase their tuition fee cap from GBP 9 000 to GBP 9 250. England utilises a buffer body for the management, implementation and maintenance of the TEF: the Office for Students (OfS). The OfS is the independent regulator of higher education in England and has a range of additional duties alongside maintaining the TEF, including promoting value for money and ensuring student choice in higher education (OfS, 2018[21]).

The TEF system is based on three key areas of assessment: teaching quality; learning environment; and student outcomes and learning gain. Assessment of institutions against the TEF criteria is carried out by a panel of peers “comprised of experts in teaching and learning as well as student representatives and ‘employment and widening participation experts’” (UK Department for Education, 2017[20]). The TEF assessment panels access HEI data on the core metrics from centralised data sources, with individual HEIs’ submission statements providing additional qualitative context to the data and further evidence. The core metrics of the TEF rely largely on independent data, collected by buffer bodies or other government actors, as outlined in Table 3.1.

Reports have found mixed evidence of impact, including that 52% of university applicants had heard of TEF, and 56% had heard of the associated awards. Regarding raising esteem for teaching, 66% of academics contacted for an independent review of the TEF stated that it had a positive impact on teaching excellence for their institution, with 61% stating that it had a positive impact on teaching excellence for the HE sector as a whole (Vivian et al., 2019[23]). While recognition of the award level among students is reasonably high given its relatively short time in the public sphere, concerns have been raised that the use of gold, silver and bronze is overly simplistic, and that the term “bronze” – while in reality a sign of meeting or exceeding core quality standards – has a more negative implication that could hurt the reputation of the sector (UK Department for Education, 2019[24]).

The Slovak government has identified key performance challenges facing the higher education system. While there is strong impetus for reform in government and some parts of Slovak society, and opportunities for change as new European funding will soon be provided to the Slovak Republic, there are concerns within the higher education sector that reforms that are already underway – such as the reform of quality assurance – constitute an important step forward that should be implemented before considering additional reforms. In addition, past reform attempts in higher education suggest Slovak authorities must take particular care in designing, co-ordinating and implementing its reform plans.

Particular emphasis is thus needed on the co-ordination and sequencing of the various reform efforts underway and on collaboration with HEIs through the reform design and implementation process. Reforms should be guided by clear and widely supported objectives as well as indicators and reliable data to measure progress. Careful implementation planning is needed, taking into account the need for financial and human resources to implement reform, in both government and HEI (also see the next section, “Using funding to support and reward higher education performance”).

Examples from Latvia, Norway and England (United Kingdom) offer examples from which the Slovak Republic can draw to develop a long-term and regularly updated education strategy, to establish effective mechanisms for ongoing collaboration and engagement with stakeholders, and to conceptualise and measure quality teaching in higher education.

Three policy actions are recommended to Slovak authorities, which should be implemented in close collaboration with HEIs.

The Slovak government is considering higher education reforms that aim for transformative change, to be accomplished within a relatively short timeframe. To balance the need for large-scale change with that of effective implementation, the Slovak Republic needs to establish structures and procedures that allow for regular, transparent and results-oriented consultation between government and HEIs.

We recommend that the Prime Minister’s Office establish a Higher Education Task Force (hereafter “the Task Force”) that works closely with the Ministry of Education. The Task Force would aim to expand and structure stakeholder engagement and serve as a steering body to develop a higher education strategy that connects the many reform efforts underway and clarifies their value to higher education stakeholders and the public. The Task Force should be broadly inclusive of stakeholders and follow an agreed schedule.

The recommendation that the Task Force be accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office is meant to emphasise:

  • The importance of higher education as an engine for economic prosperity and social well-being in the Slovak Republic in the years to come.

  • The interdependencies between higher education and wider policy issues (e.g. population decline, vulnerability of the Slovak economy to automation, perceptions of relatively widespread corruption and a need to improve the business and regulatory environment – see OECD (2019[25])).

  • The importance of aligning government-wide fiscal priorities with the policy reform agenda.

The Task Force would:

  • Lead a process of stakeholder engagement:

    • The process should allow for sufficient time and breadth of engagement to generate a productive national debate on the role of higher education for the country’s future prosperity, build agreement on key performance challenges in higher education and identify key solutions with broad stakeholder support.

    • This process should engage higher education stakeholders beyond legally established consultation bodies to more effectively reach the users of the higher education system (students and employers) and individuals who play a critical role in the functioning of HEIs (academic staff – both tenured and on fixed-term contracts – and professional and administrative staff).

    • It should also include stakeholders in the broader economy and society, who represent the wider society. This includes businesses, non-HEI actors active in research, development, technology and innovation, as well as education and social actors (e.g. representatives from the education system, groups representing the interests of disadvantaged communities).

  • Secure appropriate expertise:

    • The Task Force should create an expert working group to provide recommendations on quality concepts, metrics and data (Policy action 2), institutional contracts that deliver new targeted funding for key reform priorities (Policy action 6) and on the revision of funding allocation mechanisms (Policy action 7). The expert group should include both Slovak and international experts, and individuals with both practical responsibilities in government and HEIs (policy makers, bursars/senior HEI leaders in charge of budget and finance matters) and academic knowledge of performance measurement and financing in higher education.

    • The Task Force should develop connections with the international higher education policy community, including university alliances and professional higher education associations, to obtain advice on specific issues (for instance, from countries that have set up institutional contracts). In particular, it could create an ongoing international expert advisory group to provide advice on a regular basis (e.g. annually) to the Slovak Republic’s government and key higher education stakeholders on opportunities to improve higher education performance.

  • Assess reform implementation capacity:

    • The Task Force should consider which key policy bodies are well positioned (especially in terms of their capacity) to lead and support the implementation of higher education reforms and how these bodies could work together. In particular, it should help identify the potential roles of the MoE, the Institute for Education Policies, SAAHE, the Research Agency, the Slovak Centre of Scientific and Technical Information (CVTI) and others to support reform implementation.

On the basis of the above steps, the Task Force should develop and recommend a higher education strategy and implementation plan to the government (see Policy action 2).

In addition, the Task Force could play an important role in helping government identify an appropriate public entity – or consider creating a new one using the model of buffer bodies in OECD countries (e.g. Ireland’s Higher Education Authority or New Zealand’s Tertiary Education Commission) – to ensure the strategic design and management of institutional contracts (see also Policy action 5). Such an entity should have the ability to provide guidance and support to HEIs in their data collection and strategic reflection on their profile and mission, help centralise data collection and dissemination to a range of users, and help with various areas where sector-wide, co-ordinated efforts would be valuable, such as scaling up HEI-business partnerships.

Key parameters for the Task Force operations include the following:

  • Small size and an uneven number of members to facilitate deliberations and conclusions (e.g. 11 members).

  • Include a minimum number of individuals representing policy makers (MoE, SAAHE, Institute for Education Policies, Research Agency, Ministry of Finance), higher education stakeholders (HEI leaders, academic and professional staff, students and recent graduates), employers and non-governmental organisations working on matters of higher education. Members should be proposed by the Ministry of Education. The Chair should be proposed by the Minister of Education and agreed upon by the heads of the SAAHE, Rector’s Conference, Higher Education Council, Student Higher Education Council and of an organisation representing employers and non-governmental organisations.

  • Be supported by funding from the government to ensure adequate size and quality of Task Force staff.

  • Be in place for a sufficient time period (e.g. 24 months).

On the basis of the work of the Task Force (Policy action 1) and the proposal of teaching and research quality concepts, indicators and data systems (Policy action 2), the MoE should adopt a higher education strategy and implementation plan that connects reform efforts into a coherent, mid-term plan.

The higher education strategy and implementation plan should:

  • Articulate the vision for the Slovak higher education system now and in the future, and how it is expected to contribute to economic prosperity and social well-being. Such a vision should take account of expected labour market changes, making use of tools such as skills assessment and anticipation (SAA) systems [for further details on SAA, see OECD (2020[4])].

  • Connect the goals of the various higher education reforms underway with the vision, and identify the benefits of these reforms for key stakeholder groups, including prospective and current students, graduates, higher education staff, employers and the broader Slovak society.

  • Identify thematic areas where the Slovak Republic may develop a comparative advantage in research and innovation, teaching, and engagement with wider society, as well as areas where the country has a particular need to generate new knowledge. This should take account of other government policies, such as the Smart Specialisation Strategy developed by the Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization [see MIRRI (2020[26])], as well as broader social issues and trends in the Slovak Republic, ranging from ageing and emigration to the social integration of Roma.

  • Identify whether the three types of HEI profiles created by the 2007 Amendment to the Higher Education Act should be strengthened or revisited to more effectively encourage specialisation and meet economic and social needs, drawing on the experience of differentiated systems (e.g. Finland’s Universities of Applied Sciences, Ireland’s Technological Universities).

  • Identify potential scenarios for institutional groupings to support greater higher education performance, especially in research and innovation, by concentrating resources:

    • Scenarios could include a range of options from collaborations maintaining distinct identities, consortia where identities are maintained but more activities are shared, to full mergers. The approaches taken by France and Finland, discussed in this report, provide examples in this area.

    • The scenarios should identify the local and regional implications of these approaches in co-ordination with regional actors, given the importance of HEIs in the economic development of regions and cities.

    • Scenarios should also identify the financial incentives that government would provide to support such processes and make clear the benefits of mergers and groupings to all parties involved. Attention should be placed on how new forms of higher education delivery, such as digitally enabled teaching and learning could support the provision of higher education to some student groups, such as part-time students, for instance.

  • Identify core concepts and indicators of quality teaching, research and engagement, which the government will use to monitor the performance of HEIs and of the higher education system as a whole (Policy action 2), and actions to enhance the capacity in HEIs and the government to monitor performance, including through appropriate data collection.

  • Set out parameters for the development of institutional contracts (Policy action 5) that will become a key policy tool to connect the national higher education strategy to institutional strategies.

The expert working group created in Policy action 1 should:

  • Develop concepts of quality teaching and research that could be used in the Slovak context, and metrics to measure these concepts, and specifically:

    • Develop concepts of quality teaching and research.

    • Based on these concepts, draft a set of core indicators that would be applicable to all HEIs. These core indicators should build on the standards developed by the SAAHE and draw from international examples, such as those in place in the United Kingdom (see above) and Denmark and the Flemish Community of Belgium (see Action Step 2). Attention should be paid to designing appropriate benchmarks of performance that allow for the measurement of progress over time, recognising that HEIs will have different contexts and profiles. Importantly, a focus on measuring performance can have unintended effects, from reducing the accessibility and equity of higher education to reducing the supply of programmes in fields where quality may be low at present but that are important to meet the needs of Slovak society. Indicators should thus be designed to monitor any unintended effects, and specifically to monitor the accessibility and equity of higher education and the provision of quality programmes across a diverse range of fields. These indicators should be complemented by institution-specific indicators agreed by government and HEIs as part of institutional contracts (see Policy action 5). Denmark provides examples of this approach, as shown in the next section.

    • Consult Slovak HEIs and the users of higher education – especially students and employers – on the draft set of quality concepts and indicators.

    • Assess measurement limitations, and propose approaches to remedy those caveats, including by combining multiple measures and data sources, both quantitative and qualitative.

  • Design new data tools to collect information on Slovak higher education to:

    • Monitor the labour market outcomes of graduates. This should enable the detailed analysis of employment and earnings according to various characteristics of students and higher education programmes. Such an approach would help identify the levels and fields of study leading to the best labour market outcomes, supporting both student choice and HEIs’ programme design. It would also provide evidence on the groups of students who face poorer outcomes, and help inform public policy and institutional measures to support inclusion and equity in higher education.

    • Understand upper secondary students’ expectations and motivations in choosing what and where to study, higher education students’ views on the quality of their learning experience, and employers’ views on the quality of graduate skills. This could include building on the SAAHE’s work to survey students undertaken in 2021 (see Box 3.2 for further details) to design student, graduate and employer surveys that could be implemented on a cyclical basis. This would help ensure that both HEIs and policy makers obtain regularly updated information from students, graduates and employers, and update public policies and institutional strategies to ensure the Slovak higher education system remains responsive to student, graduate and employer needs.

    • Assess working conditions of higher education staff – academic and professional, their engagement in professional development, as well as their attitudes to and readiness for innovation (including digitalisation in higher education – both of core activities such as teaching and research as well as administrative functions). This could include collection of data through higher education staff surveys and interviews.

    • In line with standards set out by the SAAHE, assess HEIs’ data collection capacities, including whether a dedicated structure to conduct data collection and analysis exists at HEIs and how well it supports institutional data collection. Particular attention should be paid to how digital technologies are (or may be) used to support the development of data capacities and the efficient collection, processing and reporting of data on higher education performance. This could include the collection of data through surveys and interviews of HEIs’ leadership teams and teaching and learning centres staff, as applicable.

In designing these data tools, the expert working group should highlight the time and resource implications of developing and testing these types of data tools, and the estimated time and resource implications for the implementation of these tools by HEIs. It should make special efforts to streamline data collection tools and connect them with existing processes of data collection where possible.

The sections that follow focus on:

  • The current state of policy and practice with respect to higher education funding,

  • Challenges limiting the adoption of effective reforms,

  • Relevant international experience that points to possible policy reforms, and

  • Concrete policy actions that the Slovak government may wish to consider.

The level of public resources devoted to higher education remains low in the Slovak Republic from an international perspective, despite significant increases in the past two decades. Public expenditure on higher education amounted to about 0.7% of the national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2017, compared to 1% on average in OECD countries (OECD, 2020[27]). This figure remains well below the 1.2% of GDP target that had been set in the 2016 “Learning Slovakia” strategy. In terms of R&D funding, the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) was 0.84% in the Slovak Republic in 2018, compared to 2.38% on average in OECD countries, and 2.03% on average in the EU28 (OECD, 2020[28]).

Over the past two decades, the increase in total public expenditure for higher education, combined with falling student numbers, has resulted in a substantial increase in public expenditure per student, as shown in Figure 3.1. The spike in 2015 is due to exceptional drawing of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), because of an overlap between two budgetary periods and a special exemption allowing the Slovak Republic to use resources from the 2007-14 budgetary period until the end of 2016. However, while the level of per-student public expenditure in the Slovak Republic has increased, surpassing that of several countries in the region, it remains well below the OECD and EC23 average and that of high-performing countries, such as Finland and Germany.

Public funding represented 68% of total funding for higher education institutions in 2017, a figure equivalent to the OECD average but slightly below the average in the EU23 (73%). Countries included in the EU23 average are the 23 EU countries that were also members of OECD as of the end of 2019, namely Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Funds from EU structural funds (“international sources”) represent 3% of the total, a figure equivalent to the OECD average but slightly below the EU23 average (4%) (Figure 3.2).

Public HEIs are eligible for the state contribution distributed annually by the MoE. State HEIs focus on providing professional education in key public sector areas (e.g. police, armed forces, health sector), and are financed from the state budget by ministries with a responsibility in each area (e.g. Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Health). Private HEIs do not receive any regular direct contribution from the state budget related to providing higher education.

Private funding is another important source of funding for Slovak HEIs. Private funding excluding household expenditures account for a relatively high share (14%) of current HEI revenues, significantly above the OECD average of 9%. Given that 29% of HEI revenues come from private sources, both in the Slovak Republic and on average across OECD countries, the main difference lies in the repartition between private funds coming from households and from third parties: 21% of HEI revenues come from households in OECD countries, above the Slovak average of 15% (OECD, 2020, pp. 299, Figure C3.2[27]). Universities with a technical orientation in particular attract funding from private companies by providing services as part of university-industry partnerships.

Similarly to one-third of OECD countries, public HEIs in the Slovak Republic do not charge tuition fees to domestic full-time students (OECD, 2020[27]). They are allowed to charge tuition fees within a framework defined by MoE from specific groups of students, including international students, students prolonging their study beyond the usual programme length and part-time students. These groups form a sizeable population: in 2019, part-time students represented approximately 20% of students in public HEIs (CVTI, 2021[30]). Students are also charged small additional fees – on average USD 62 converted in purchasing power parities (PPPs) for the year 2017/18 (OECD, 2020, pp. 331, Figure C5.6[27]), related to administration, registration and student union membership.

Independent private HEIs operate solely based on students’ tuition fees, which they can charge freely. For the year 2017/18, private HEIs charged on average USD 2 059 in converted in PPPs annually for a bachelor’s degree and USD 2 464 converted in PPPs for a master’s degree for national full-time students (OECD, 2020, pp. 333, Table C5.1[27]).

Higher education funding supports a range of services including core services such as teaching costs and other services related to education, ancillary services such as housing, transportation or meals for students and funding for R&D. In the Slovak Republic, expenditure for core services and R&D is well below the OECD and EU23 average, whereas the share of funding supporting ancillary services is close to three times the average in the EU23 (Table 3.2).

Slovak students who study on a full-time basis benefit from ancillary services provided by their institution, such as access to dormitories, meals, transportation and family subsidies. Students may also be eligible for public financial aid, though it is limited.

The Slovak Republic had the second lowest average annual amount of scholarships or grants received by students in OECD countries after Estonia in the year 2017/18 at USD 410 converted using PPPs (OECD, 2020, pp. 335-336, Table C5.3[27]). Grants are typically means-tested social stipends directly paid from the state budget to HEIs. To be eligible, students should not exceed the standard length of studies, and report their study progress. Merit-based scholarships also exist in selected departments and fields.

Public loans are also available, although they serve a limited number of students. Loan programmes include “The Fund to Support Education”, which, in its current form, was introduced in 2013. This programme provides loans to students, both full-time and part-time, and to teachers and educational professionals at different levels of education, to cover education-related expenses, including living costs. Eligibility criteria include enrolment in the Slovak Republic or in a comparable programme abroad and Slovak citizenship or long-term residency. Student loans are allocated based on family income, family composition and study performance (OECD, 2020, pp. 335-336, Table C5.3[27]). According to the MoE, in 2019/20, 1 099 applications for loans were approved, a figure consistent with the previous year. The total expenditure was EUR 3 520 600 (despite a total funding envelope of EUR 4.5 million), and the average amount per loan that year was EUR 3 203. From an international perspective, the average amount of student loans in the Slovak Republic was the third lowest amount across OECD countries after Latvia and Denmark (OECD, 2020, pp. 335-336, Table C5.3[27]). According to MoE, stabilisation loans were also introduced in June 2019 to cover study and living costs of students choosing fields of studies considered by MoE as in high demand in the Slovak labour market. Graduates who find employment in their field of study in the Slovak Republic do not need to repay the loan (FNPV, 2021[31]). According to the MoE, while EUR 2 662 000 were made available in 2018/19 for stabilisation loans, only about 18% was spent: 243 applications were approved for a total amount of EUR 486 000, so an average amount of EUR 2 000 per loan.

In addition to the total level and sources of funding for higher education, the mechanisms through which the government allocates funding to HEIs plays a key role in shaping the behaviours of HEIs (OECD, 2020[32]).

In the Slovak Republic, the MoE publishes annually the methodology through which the government contribution for public HEIs will be allocated, after the Parliament approves the total sum. For 2020, the formula allocated funds across four categories: teaching accounted for almost 50% of the contribution; research for approximately 37.5%; further development of HEIs for about 2.5%; and social support to students for approximately 10% of the contribution (Table 3.3).

The largest item – “teaching” – is allocated based on a weighted number of students and graduates. Several incentives are built into the formula, in particular to encourage a stronger institutional focus on the labour market relevance of programmes. For example, a greater weight is assigned to students enrolled in professional bachelor’s degrees compared to those enrolled in master’s degree programmes, and a coefficient is applied based on the share of graduates who are not registered as unemployed with the public employment service. The formula also aims to take account of cost differences in delivering programmes, through a field-specific coefficient.

Since 2017, incentives for academics to improve the quality of research have been strengthened: 13.8% of the “salaries and insurance” item in the “teaching” category are allocated based on publication performance over the past two years, measured by the numbers of publications registered in the international database, Web of Science (WoS). If a publication appears in the WoS database, it can generate ten times more funding than a publication that does not appear in WoS. The WoS impact factor is used to differentiate scientific journals into quartiles, with the difference in support received for an article in the first quartile potentially more than 12 times higher than for an article published in a journal from the fourth quartile. According to higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD, it is a common practice that a substantial share of these resources, allocated based on a methodology made available publicly, are paid to the authors.

Research funding is also allocated through competitive processes. Research grants are administrated by several agencies – the Slovak Research and Development Agency (APVV) that finances middle-sized specific and international research projects and the Scientific, Cultural and Educational Grant Agencies (VEGA and KEGA) that supports small-scale research, cultural and educational projects. The Research Agency mostly finances infrastructure projects. Despite these various structures, the Value for Money project of the Ministry of Finance pointed out that less than 20% of research funding was allocated based on competitive grant schemes (MoE, 2017[34]).

While funding per student in the Slovak Republic has increased in recent years due to declining student numbers and the influx of European funds, it remains below the level of high-performing OECD countries. In addition, HEIs face limitations in the ways in which they can use additional funding. In particular, several factors constrain spending on human resources.

The total amount of funding HEIs can allocate to human resources is determined by the public funding framework in two ways. First, the total amount of public funding available to HEIs, which is driven by student and graduate numbers as shown previously, imposes limits on their overall spending on staff wages that form the large majority of the “teaching” category in the funding formula (see Table 3.3). With declining student numbers, there is a lower amount of public funding available for HEI expenditure overall, including on staff.

Second, while there has been an increase in the flows of EU structural funds to higher education in recent years, the Slovak Republic makes limited use of available EU structural funds. In 2019, the country had drawn about 23% of the total allocation of EU funds to the Slovak Republic for the budgetary period of 2014-20 (Government of the Slovak Republic, 2019[35]).

According to the Learning Makes Sense study (To dá rozum), the under-utilisation of funds during the 2014-20 period resulted from multiple challenges. These include the lack of a national strategy to use the funds, in turn leading to delays in announcing calls and implementing projects, insufficient numbers of expert evaluators to review proposals, and uncoordinated project inspections by multiple government bodies. The project also noted the significant administrative burden involved in preparing project proposals and the poor quality of those proposals, often outsourced to third parties as HEI staff themselves face high levels of administrative burden in their regular activities (MESA10, 2021[9]). Another reason underlying this under-utilisation of funds relates to constraints associated with European funding that are not unique to the Slovak Republic: HEIs in the Bratislava region were not eligible to the same amount of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) as HEIs in other regions despite most research activity taking place in Bratislava.

Furthermore, EU funds have mostly been targeted to capital expenditure. As shown in Figure 3.3, Panel A, the increase of total resources for public higher education between 2010 and 2019 was not accompanied by a commensurate rise in spending on wages for higher education staff. Investments planned as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP to support the strategic development of HEIs also show a major focus on physical infrastructure projects, both to upgrade and to create new school and housing facilities, as discussed above. Despite these limitations, however, European structural funds have played an increasing role in higher education funding in the Slovak Republic. New funds as part of the Recovery and Resilience Facility are likely to continue this trend, as outlined in Action Step 1 (see Box 3.3).

At the same time, while the decrease in enrolment could, in principle, reduce overall teaching costs and reallocate them towards initiatives to improve teaching quality, the size of the teaching workforce has decreased to a much lower extent that the numbers of students over the past decade. As shown in Figure 3.3 Panel B, between 2009 and 2019, while the number of higher education students dropped by around 40%, the number of higher education teachers declined by approximately 10% and the number of professors increased by around 5%. This might be due to the combination of academic employment rules, discussed below in “Enabling responsive institutional governance and management”, and of the ageing profiles of higher education teachers.

In 2018, approximately 11.5% of higher education teachers were 60 to 64 years old in the Slovak Republic, compared to an EU average of 9%, and 12% were over the age of 65, compared to 6% on average in the European Union in 2018 (Eurostat, 2021[36]). Because older academic staff are more likely to have permanent employment, HEIs who may want to adjust the size of their academic workforce may face difficulties.

The Slovak government has taken steps to address this challenge, by restricting the employment of higher education teachers after they reach 70 years of age. Employment contracts of higher education teachers terminate automatically after they reach 70, and prolongations of employment contracts with persons older than 70 can only be signed for a maximum of one year, although they can be renewed. Moreover, the academic titles of staff over 70 did not count in the most recent accreditation process (Act on HEIs: §77 col. 6).

In the Slovak Republic, the main funding instrument used by the government to incentivise the behaviour of public HEIs is the funding formula. A major benefit of allocating funding through the formula is the transparency of this approach. Both the methodology for calculating the allocation and the amounts allocated to each HEI are published on the Ministry of Education’s website each year, allowing for public scrutiny of changes. In a context of low trust in government, this transparency is valuable.

Secondly, the government has used the formula to introduce incentives – to reward publications in high-impact journals or graduate employment in particular. According to some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD, HEIs respond to formula changes.

However, the formula presents several limits. These relate to the components of the formula, the method through which public funding once calculated is allocated to HEIs, and the general limitations of this policy instrument. In the Slovak Republic, recent policy efforts appear to have focused primarily on rewarding quality research, although some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD noted that more nuanced measures of research quality would be desirable in addition to scientometric indicators currently built into the formula. The new scientific evaluation process indicated as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP might be a step in this direction. Examples from other jurisdictions, such as that of the Flemish Community of Belgium discussed later, highlight potential indicators that may help the Slovak Republic improve its current approach to measuring the quality of research.

The current funding formula is a weak instrument to promote teaching quality. Graduate employment is taken into account, but no metric aims to reward the quality of graduate employment, a concept defined by the OECD as combining earnings quality, job security and a good working environment (OECD, 2016[39]). Earnings measures in particular are frequently used as a proxy for the value assigned by employers to graduate skills, the extent to which graduates use the skills they obtained through their higher education studies in the workplace, and at a system level reflect the overall alignment of a higher education system with the national labour market.

Labour market mismatches are large in the Slovak Republic, in part due to the insufficient focus of the education system – at the school level and in higher education – to labour market needs (OECD, 2020[4]). At the same time, as the Slovak Republic’s labour market evolves, ensuring graduates have appropriate levels and combinations of transversal skills is important to ensure graduates are prepared to succeed in occupations, jobs and tasks that do not exist today. This suggests the need for connecting funding with measures that more effectively reflect the quality of higher education teaching, in terms of skills and labour market outcomes.

The way government divides and allocates funding is important to ensure the incentives that the government builds into the formula have an impact on institutional actions. Two problems appear to limit the “incentivising power” of the funding formula in the Slovak Republic. First, frequent revisions are made, with new elements introduced, changed or removed, often on an annual basis. While policy priorities understandably change, overly frequent changes mean that HEIs have little ability (and few incentives) to plan their operations strategically. The complexity of the formula can also pose challenges, as many indicators with small funding impacts may discourage HEIs from taking decisive actions to improve on any specific priority area the formula aims to encourage.

The second issue relates to the timing of the funding allocation to HEIs. The Ministry of Education announces at the end of each calendar year the total amount of funding available for salaries and wages (the largest component of the formula), and then divides this amount between HEIs according to the number of weighted students and graduates. It is thus difficult for HEIs to anticipate their allocation for the coming year, other than estimating it based on the previous year. This exacerbates the first problem (frequent changes and complexity of the formula): while government aims to use the funding formula as a strategic policy tool to encourage HEIs to plan their operations to achieve certain objectives, the lack of predictability limits the policy effectiveness of this tool.

Finally, the funding formula has limitations as it is a policy tool focused on institutional actions, but it does not reach other key actors, such as students or employers. For instance, while the funding formula assigns a higher weight to students enrolled in professional bachelor’s degree programmes compared to those in other bachelor’s or master’s degree programmes, few students choose professional bachelor’s programmes and many continue to choose master’s degree programmes. Furthermore, some higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD highlighted that graduates of professional programmes often choose to pursue a master’s degree even if not required for employment.

Data presented in Chapter 2 about the earnings returns of master’s graduates, which are substantially greater than those of bachelor’s graduates, suggests that challenges exist about the real or perceived quality of professional (and other) bachelor’s degree programmes in the Slovak Republic, by both students who make study choices and employers who reward graduates financially. These challenges require complementing the funding formula with other policies, as suggested later in this section.

Stakeholders interviewed by the OECD have expressed several concerns regarding the current allocation of competitive research funding. They cited both the lack of long-term stability, with amounts fluctuating between calls, and frequent cases of lower funding allocation than those requested by researchers. Other concerns included the substantial level of administrative duties required to apply for grants and low administrative support in HEIs to help researchers with this task, which has been described as severely limiting individual researchers’ motivation to pursue competitive research funding. This was particularly the case for small grants from VEGA and KEGA that cover core research activities (e.g. travelling and standard equipment) but make applying for such funds less attractive due to the associated administrative burden. Some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD also expressed concerns regarding the lack of transparent processes used by the agencies allocating research funding.

Many concerns exist regarding the use of EU structural funds dedicated to research and innovation, some relating to the under-utilisation of EU funds for education and research generally, as highlighted earlier in the “funding levels and priorities” section. In addition, according to the Learning Make Sense (To dá rozum) study, the management of the majority of the 2014-20 Operational Programme (OP) on Research of Innovation by the Ministry of Economy led to the transfer of a majority of these funds to business entities rather than to the higher education sector. The study argues this approach led to inefficiencies, as businesses often outsourced the research these funds supported to the Slovak Academy of Science or HEIs due to their limited capacity to conduct it (MESA10, 2021[9]).

Governments have a range of funding levers they may use to steer the actions of HEIs, or directly those of higher education staff and students. The Slovak Republic could use some of these tools more strategically, both in terms of greater and better use.

Institutional contracts that tie a portion of higher education funding to performance can be useful tools to reward HEIs for identifying and building on their strengths and contributing to national policy objectives. While many countries use performance contracts – 13 did according to a recent OECD study on higher education resourcing – the impact of contracts depends on the amount of funding tied to institutional contracts, which varies from below 5% to close to 100% (OECD, 2020[32]).

MoE and each HEI sign a contract each year based on the allocation provided to the HEI according to the funding formula, and thus reflecting past performance according to formula criteria. No funding is attached to future plans of HEIs, limiting longer-term, strategic management of institutional resources. Slovak authorities have not yet communicated the scale of funding they plan on associating with multi-year institutional contracts they are aiming to create, other than noting that the large infrastructure projects envisioned as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP will contribute to priorities identified in performance contracts. Nevertheless, even if contracts are tied to low funding amounts, they can play an important role from an accountability and transparency perspective, by requiring the reporting of standard performance indicators. They can also play a role in forward planning, by allowing HEIs to signal their plans and facilitating dialogue between HEIs and government, as in the case of Denmark’s Strategic Framework Contracts, described later in this section.

International experience suggests that the development of institutional contracts that focus on performance metrics requires care to avoid unintended consequences. An important one is the risk that HEIs shift away from equity of access in their search to meet demanding performance goals (Dougherty et al., 2014[40]). From an implementation perspective, stable indicators known well in advance are important, as is sufficient human and financial resources in government (or a buffer body) and in HEIs, and a collaborative relationship between government and HEIs to manage contracts most effectively.

Targeted funding programmes constitute an important tool that OECD countries use to achieve their policy objectives. Such programmes present the advantage of flexibility, allowing government to directly incentivise HEIs to focus on certain priorities without creating variations in regular funding allocations. Targeted funding may be allocated based on a competitive basis. In such cases, it works best in contexts where there is a high level of integrity and transparency in the allocation of funding (OECD, 2020[32]), which thus must become an important national priority when considering the use of these instruments.

Targeted funding is used for various purposes, from incentivising HEIs to collaborate to develop internationally competitive research (such as in France, discussed below). It can also be used to address emerging and possibly transitory needs – for instance, in the US state of Washington, top-up funding was approved to increase the salaries of academics hired by public HEIs in fields of study such as health or science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), where individuals would obtain significantly higher earnings outside of academia (OECD, 2020[41]). Targeted funding can also be used to encourage HEIs to develop labour-market-relevant programmes designed and delivered in partnership with employers. Examples of such programmes exist (see, for instance, Box 3.5), but they are not common in the Slovak Republic.

The Slovak Republic appears to be making limited use of targeted funding instruments, resorting instead to the funding formula as the main policy lever to influence institutional behaviour. Part of this approach might be explained by significant capacity issues – highlighted below in the area of allocating research funding. In addition, some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD highlighted that targeted funding could create concerns of uneven treatment among HEIs if their allocation was not as transparent as the funding formula.

Despite these challenges, there might be an opportunity for the Slovak Republic to pay special attention to developing sound mechanisms for targeted funding, as it may be an important instrument to consider in light of the multiplicity of challenges the country faces in higher education. This would require minimising the administrative burden by connecting targeted funding, for instance, to institutional contracts, and by setting a high standard of transparency in the allocation of funds from the government to HEIs, as is currently done for the funding formula.

The Slovak Republic has some needs-based student aid programmes that focus on student loans rather than grants. While no comparative data is available on the share of higher education students receiving financial aid in the Slovak Republic, some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD suggested that a modest share of students participate in financial aid programmes. This may be a concern even in a context where there are no tuition fees for students studying in Slovak-language programmes (that is, most domestic students), because the indirect costs of attending higher education can be high. These include, for instance, costs for housing, transportation or learning equipment – for example, digital devices in the context of remote learning. The opportunity cost of higher education can also be significant as Slovak students typically engage in long study programmes.

Financial aid can also be used to encourage study in programmes that equip students with knowledge and skills in demand in the labour market. Stabilisation loans, described earlier, aim to support access to in-demand study fields, but the extent to which these loans are available and taken up by students is unknown, as well as the extent to which they have been effective in encouraging the take-up of in-demand study fields. There is an opportunity for the Slovak government to consider evaluating efforts – both financial and non-financial – to inform students about (current and future) labour market needs and to provide financial supports to higher education students pursuing in-demand fields of study. Some information-based initiatives have been developed, as illustrated in Box 3.5, but their reach and impact is unclear.

The rapid expansion of higher education systems in OECD countries over recent decades has led to greater investments from both governments and individuals. Moreover, between 1995 and 2005, the average expenditure per student across 13 OECD countries doubled, after taking inflation into account (OECD, 2020[32]). While countries have different approaches to who should bear the cost of higher education, governments across OECD countries have developed increasingly sophisticated funding instruments to ensure their growing investments deliver results – in particular, increased accessibility, quality and equity of higher education.

Denmark provides an example of a country that has continued to shift the role of performance measures in its funding model while creating a system that is more collaborative and tailored to individual HEIs (de Boer et al., 2015[43]). The Flemish Community of Belgium provides examples of an innovative approach to funding research and innovation, another key area of interest for the Slovak Republic.. France provides an example with respect to using a combination of competitive funding and legislative requirements to consolidate the network of HEIs – another area of interest to the Slovak Republic.

Denmark has a long history of performance-based funding in higher education, with significant shifts over time that present lessons learned. Prior to 2019, performance-based funding (PBF) for teaching for institutions was comprised of two key components. First, a “taximeter scheme” of funding (now renamed but still operational), and second, a “completion bonus”, which has since been discontinued (the bonus was based on the number of students that complete their degree in the prescribed time plus one year).

The taximeter scheme is based on HEI performance in terms of student examination completion – each student completion elicits a “fee” for which the university can claim government funds. Typically, universities can collect a greater per-student fee for STEM student exam completions, with social sciences and humanities providing a smaller one (Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science, 2019[44]). Through this mechanism, the government is able to ensure that varying programme costs are accounted for in funding provisions, and as a result, incentivises institutions in delivering a mixture of different programme subjects. For courses that are evaluated as having poor labour market performance, a cap is placed on funding (OECD, 2020[41]).

As of 2019, the completion bonus has been replaced with three new funding streams: basic funding, results-based grants and quality funds. In the new funding model, taximeter funding (now termed an “activity grant”, post 2019) accounts for 67.5% of all funding, while the remaining 32.5% of funding is allocated as follows: basic funding (25%); results-based grants (7.5%); quality funds (<1%). The Results-Based Grant is calculated based on how universities have performed on two indicators: duration of study and graduate employment. Any funds that remain after the allocation of the results-based grants are pooled into the quality fund and awarded via quality grants – designed to “support specific quality initiatives” outlined within strategic framework contracts (Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science, 2019[44]; Adam, 2020[45]). Denmark has also introduced some PBF elements within the basic funding envelope itself: 5% of Basic Funding is dependent on the “quality achieved”, as determined by the outcomes of the “Learning Barometer”. A further 5% of Basic Funding is conditional on the achievement of strategic objectives included in the strategic framework contracts.

Strategic Framework Contracts (SFCs) were introduced in 2018, replacing the previous policy of performance contracts that had been in place since 2000 (Jongbloed and de Boer, 2020[46]). These new framework contracts focus on building the relationship between the Ministry of Education and HEIs. SFCs have shifted from measuring performance against Ministry-set indicators (used by prior iterations of performance agreements), to illustrating a series of ambitions for the institution, with indicators agreed between the HEI and the Minitry of Education. This includes the specific data that will be used as a measure of improvement.The contracts also have a specific funding link not present in the prior agreements. Universities risk a financial penalty if they do not meet the strategic goals set out in their contract (assessed by the Ministry at the end of the contract period). The Ministry of Education may withhold up to 5% of the 25% Basic Funding if they decide that an HEI has under-performed.

Denmark has reformed its well-established PBF practices, seeking to adapt policies to achieve greater performance and quality from its higher education system. This has been approached from two angles. The first has been to adapt a previously 100% performance-based funding model for teaching (based on two system-wide mechanisms, the taximeter scheme and the completion bonus) to a new policy that seeks to more directly steer performance and HEI activity through additional system-wide and HEI-specific performance indicators. The aim of these changes has been to compensate for emerging challenges that the funding model was not addressing – concerns about graduate employment outcomes and concerns about the quality of the student learning experience. Denmark has also removed a proportion of funding from the PBF model in the process through Basic Funding, balancing these changes with some increase to funding stability. Second, it has evolved its use of performance contracts to align more specifically with institutional goals and to be tied to funding.

The Flemish Community of Belgium has spent the last two decades innovating in the design and implementation of its regional research, development and innovation (RD&I) funding as the region sought to increase the performance of its innovation sector, recognising its important role in the broader economic development of the region (Debackere and Glänzel, 2004[47]; OECD, 2019[48]). This example focuses on three interrelated elements of the Flemish RD&I investment system. The first of these is the implementation of bibliometric performance indicators in the “Extraordinary Research Fund” (Bijzonder Onderzoeksfonds, or BOF). The BOF represents an important component of the overall funding of university RD&I funding in the region, and is 50% performance-based (previously 100%, until changes were made in 2019). The second component is the “Centre for Research and Development Monitoring” (Expertisecentrum Onderzoek en Ontwikkelingsmonitoring, or ECOOM), an inter-university consortium created to help steer the creation and utilisation of indicators for performance funding in RD&I. Finally, the development of a new custom bibliometric indicator, the Flemish Academic Bibliographic Database for the Social Sciences and Humanities (VABB-SHW) is discussed.

The BOF was initially introduced as a new mechanism for distributing block research funds between Flemish universities in 1994. The allocation of these funds was based on a set of established indicators, termed “pre-allocation keys”, recalculated each year, with “key” meaning “formula” (Jonkers and Zacharewicz, 2017[49]). The Flemish government has continually adapted the indicators used in the BOF since its introduction, early indicators included degree completions, and overall investment a HEI received from other sources. Bibliometric indicators were introduced in 2003 (Engels and Guns, 2018[50]). In 2019, the BOF key was redesigned, reducing the weighting of degree completions, and introducing a new fixed allocation representing 50% of total funding. Changes were implemented with the aim to increase stability and place greater emphasis on quality over quantity of research outputs. Table 3.4 sets out the current indicators, and their weighting in funding allocations, alongside planned adaptations to weighting set to come into effect in 2024.

The Centre for Research and Development Monitoring (Expertisecentrum Onderzoek en Ontwikkelingsmonitoring, ECOOM) is a consortium of all five Flemish universities. ECOOM began as a project undertaken by researchers at KU Leuven University, initiated and funded by the Flemish government, to develop and implement a new bibliometric indicator for the BOF key (VABB-SHW) which continues in use. VABB-SHW is a shared database of “bibliographic references of published social sciences and humanities (SSH) research outputs by scholars who are affiliated to Flemish universities” (Ossenblok, Engels and Sivertsen, 2012[51]), designed to fill a gap in existing bibliometric sources for non-English language and social science publications. The ECOOM-Antwerp group is responsible for maintaining the VABB-SHW, adding sources that meet an agreed set of criteria and delivering an updated version of the database annually (Engels and Guns, 2018[50]).

ECOOM has a number of further roles within the research, development and innovation (RD&I) landscape, including maintaining the Flemish Indicator Book, a public-facing publication of “policy indicators that chart the development of the Flemish potential in science, technology and innovation” (ECOOM, 2021[53]). The government has encouraged ECOOM and other system stakeholders to “come forward with consensus suggestions to improve the BOF key and BOF regulation” (Engels and Guns, 2018[50]).

The use of bibliometric indicators in the BOF key has been viewed as a success by the Flemish government. Systems and datasets designed to track and measure performance within BOF have since been replicated and instituted in other areas of Flemish governance. This includes the Industrieel Onderzoeksfonds (IOF) key. The BOF key development experience presents valuable insights into how smaller non-English speaking jurisdictions can adapt commonly utilised performance metrics like bibliometrics to better align with the needs of their own HE system. The most recent edits to the BOF key, decreasing PBF, can be seen as a response to concern raised with previous versions, including that the use of bibliometric indicators created pressure for researchers in certain fields to publish at a higher rate to increase their bibliometrics presence, which in turn could lead to a more short-term approach to research, where quality could be impacted (Engels and Guns, 2018[50]). The collaborative approach to the BOF key’s development has also shown evidence of success in both the creation of a system that has considerable buy-in from institutions and also one where all universities have been able to develop expertise in how the system works, indeed helping steer it through a university consortium.

In France, several initiatives have been conducted since the 1990s to foster co-operation between HEIs in a higher education landscape characterised by a high number of small institutions. The government primarily used funding contracts as the mechanism through which it incentivised collaboration, providing funding to collaborating institutions on top of their regular allocation or allowing them to hire additional personnel (directly funded by government) (Williams, 2017[54]). Consolidation efforts resulted in the creation in 2006 of Centres for Research and Higher Education (Pôles de recherche et d’enseignement supérieur, PRES), bringing together a small number of HEIs and providing them with flexible options to pool resources (e.g. a shared doctoral school, management of scientific equipment and facilities, strategies for internationalisation and the joint attribution of scientific publications). Although participation in PRES was optional, the initiative received a positive response from HEIs: 26 PRES were constituted in 2012, whereas the government was expecting 10 by that date.

To create additional opportunities for HEIs to collaborate, France introduced excellence initiatives, with a focus on capital investments, to encourage the concentration of public resources and enhance funding for a select number of internationally competitive clusters (Guiselin, 2019[55]). The first “excellence initiative” call for applications (IdEX), which is part of the Plan d’investissement pour l’avenir (PIA), attributed EUR 6.35 billion in 2010 over ten years to eight initiatives from institutions pursuing a grouping or merging process.

The 2013 legislation on higher education and research goes one step further in developing institutional groupings, by requiring all HEIs under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Research to be part of an institutional grouping from 2014 onwards (Légifrance, 2013[56]). HEIs can choose from three types of clusters, providing different degrees and types of integration: mergers; Communities of Universities and Institutions (Communautés d’Universités et d’Etablissements, COMUE) (all participating institutions reach an agreement on the COMUE statutes and the competences that each institution transfers to the COMUE level); or Association of HEIs and research institutions with one institution in charge of the co-ordination (Légifrance, 2013[57]). The 2013 law stipulates that only one grouping – whether a merged institution, a COMUE or an Association – is responsible for co-ordination of higher education per academic region (called “Academies”), except in the Paris area where different groupings coexist (Légifrance, 2013[56]).

Following requests from established COMUEs to experiment with additional forms of institutional groupings or mergers, a 2018 government regulation (ordonnance) permitted the creation of a new form of grouping called “experimental public institution” (établissement public experimental) for a ten-year trial period (Légifrance, 2018[58]). Experimental public institutions, whose creation and continuation are subject to evaluation and approval conducted by national councils in charge of the co-ordination and evaluation of higher education and research aim to provide increased flexibility to participating HEIs, for instance, allowing participating institutions to choose whether or not to remain a distinct legal entity while joining the grouping (French Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport, 2020[59]).

In 2020, 168 HEIs were part of 27 institutional groupings (7 Associations, 9 COMUEs, 2 Coordinations territoriales, and 9 experimental public institutions), representing approximately half of the total student enrolment in higher education (French Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport, 2020[59]). These groupings, in addition to several full institutional mergers, have transformed the French institutional landscape. The groupings have different levels of integration, some of them having, for instance, obtained the ability to deliver degrees as a single entity. The process of institutional grouping was not always well understood by the public, and has encountered resistance from stakeholders, including staff and student unions, which some analysts have attributed to limited consultation and entrenched political positions (Williams, 2017[54]).

The effects of institutional groupings on international competitiveness were not as immediate as expected by the government, with a stagnation of the position of France in indicators of excellence and international competitiveness (Guiselin, 2019[55]). However, the French National Committee of Scientific Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS) highlighted that the institutional groupings developed between 2015 and 2020 resulted in improved international recognition of French HEIs in the 2020 Shanghai ranking, were COMUEs and experimental public institutions figured as single HEIs in the ranking. The 2020 ranking places France in third place worldwide (compared to sixth in 2019 and fifth in 2015), with 30 HEIs placed in the ranking, and with the highest ranked being the COMUE Paris-Saclay, which gained 23 seats from 2019 and was ranked 14th in the world in 2020 (CNRS, 2020[60]).

The Slovak government announced cuts to the higher education budget in 2021 of approximately EUR 21 million, according to the Ministry of Education. This decline appears related in part to budgetary pressures associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. According to some stakeholders interviewed by the OECD, it may also reflect the view that declining student numbers justify budget reductions, and that reforms of the sector should take place before an increase in funding levels.

On the other hand, new EU funds through the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) provide an opportunity for an increase in higher education funding. The Slovak Republic thus needs to consider how to use new funding strategically to help achieve the goals stated in its higher education reform plans.

To do so involves a consideration of the total amount of funding available in coming years for higher education, as well as the extent to which this funding can be used on the human resources required in HEIs and government to undertake comprehensive changes in higher education. It also involves taking stock of the funding instruments used by the government to allocate funding to HEIs, and how these may be improved or supplemented to more effectively incentivise a focus on quality teaching and research in institutions.

Examples from Denmark, the Flemish Community of Belgium and France offer insights into the design of performance-linked funding mechanisms in the area of both teaching and research. The policy changes that these countries have undergone over recent decades highlight the importance of calibrating funding instruments to meet policy objectives without creating unintended effects. They present concrete examples for the Slovak Republic in terms of the metrics it may consider for measuring quality teaching and research, the funding amounts tied to different metrics, and more broadly highlight the value of using several policy tools to achieve multiple objectives. It is crucial as well to take account of the overall policy design and implementation capacity in these countries: as it considers improving its funding policy levers, Slovak Republic will need to ensure it factors in sufficient resources and time for their efficient and transparent design and implementation.

Four policy actions are recommended to Slovak authorities, which should be implemented in close collaboration with HEIs.

The Slovak Republic’s higher education funding on a per-student basis remains below the EU28 average, despite the increase resulting from declining student numbers, and funding cuts have been introduced for 2021. This suggests that HEIs have limited room to make the investments required to implement reforms within their current budgets.

We therefore recommend that the Slovak Republic take stock of the costs involved by higher education reforms (those envisioned and those recommended in this action plan), of new or potential sources of funding for HEIs, and map out the potential for the country to enhance higher education funding levels to support the large-scale reform efforts underway. This understanding of the funding landscape for higher education is an important complement of reforms currently envisioned to the structure and functioning of the system.

International experience presented in this report shows that a clear commitment to reform on the part of the higher education sector and a sufficient funding envelope to support reform must go hand in hand for reforms to be successful. Without a commitment to reform, it is difficult from finance ministries facing competing priorities to invest in a system they believe is not making effective use of funds. Without adequate financial support and incentives, it is difficult to garner support from higher education stakeholders given the costs of reform implementation and potential redistribution of funding and/or responsibilities between stakeholders that may result from reform.

We recommend that MoE develop, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and using insights generated by the Higher Education Task Force (Policy action 1):

  • A mapping of expected spending required to support higher education reforms. This includes:

    • Funding attached to institutional contracts (Policy actions 5 and 6)

    • Funding to encourage the take-up of optional governance status (Policy action 9).

  • An analysis of expected revenues for HEIs (public, private and state institutions) from public and private sources and how these sources may be used to support the investments incurred by the reform process:

    • National funding.

    • European funding – RRF and structural funds. Focus should be placed on how European funding could address the human resource needs associated with higher education reform. Assessing the use of these funds to support capacity-building initiatives (see, for instance, Policy action 10) could be of particular interest.

    • Expected contribution of tuition fees.

    • Expected contribution of other private funding (e.g. collaboration with the private sector).

  • Potential options for the country to:

    • Reduce higher education costs without compromising quality. This could include, for instance, taking into account smaller student cohorts and pursuing economies of scale through enhanced HEI collaboration.

    • Increase revenues for higher education without compromising affordability for students. This could include, for instance, making greater use of European funding and enhancing all HEIs’ capacity to partner with, beyond HEIs that have a vocational orientation and established links with local enterprises.

The Slovak government announced plans to establish institutional contracts as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP. The government aims to use these contracts to clarify and differentiate institutional profiles based on each HEI’s strengths and regional skills needs. Such an approach, which supports system-level planning in multiple OECD countries, will highlight areas of strengths as well as areas of weaknesses in Slovak higher education, and needs to be conducted with great care to secure institutional support and achieve a meaningful degree of differentiation.

We thus recommend that the Task Force set out in Policy action 1 outline key parameters for institutional contracts, with a focus on aligning the achievement of government policy objectives with adequate financial support and incentives and providing sufficient room for institution-specific priorities. International experience shows that governments have experimented with various combinations of top-down steering and institutional flexibility, and suggest that this “policy finetuning” may require several years to function properly in the specific Slovak context.

Key parameters that should be identified include:

  • The duration of institutional contracts (e.g. two, three or five years, with the potential to start with a first round of shorter contracts to be followed by longer contracts once the practice has been established and refined).

  • Whether or not there should be a single type of institutional contract or contracts for different types of institutions. This should include consideration of the types of contracts that would be established with HEIs that are part of a consortium or that merge. The design of contracts should balance the need for data on performance with the need to minimise the reporting burden for HEIs. An effort should be made to focus on a small set of indicators and to simplify contract development and data collection to the extent possible, including through the adequate use of digital technologies (e.g. making use of, and expanding, data systems).

  • The indicators that will be included as part of the contracts and on which HEIs will report on. This should include identifying:

    • The small set of core, system-wide, indicators of teaching, research and engagement quality applying to all HEIs (see Policy action 2). Reliable data sources to provide information on these indicators should be identified. Baseline data on all indicators should be collected, providing a point from which institution-specific targets could be developed.

    • Quantitative indicators and qualitative approaches to report on the use of targeted funding (see Policy action 6).

    • Examples of institution-specific indicators, targets and data sources.

    • Identifying the process through which HEIs will report (e.g. in the HEI’s annual report).

  • The financial implications of institutional contracts. This should include identifying:

    • The financial flexibilities attached to good performance on core performance indicators (e.g. additional funding, ability to charge tuition fees in cases where it is not currently possible) and the consequences of not meeting targets (e.g. no funding on top of regular allocation or a reduction in regular allocation).

    • The possibility to use institutional contracts as an instrument through which to allocate targeted funding to HEIs on top of their funding formula allocation. This could be done to promote rapid progress on key policy priorities (see Policy action 6).

    • Funding to support the implementation of the contracts should also be estimated. This includes funding for human resources in government and HEIs for developing and monitoring contracts and support for the improvement of data collection systems in the government and HEIs.

  • Sections of the institutional contracts that will be available publicly.

In addition, the government should support HEIs in developing and managing contracts. This involves:

  • developing a clear vision for higher education and institutional profiles

  • identifying a public entity responsible for managing institutional contracts (see Policy action 1)

  • developing guidance on data collection and reporting.

OECD countries have diversified the mechanisms through which they fund higher education to optimise the strategic impact of the funding they provide. As the Slovak Republic engages in a broad reform agenda, the government may consider using the new institutional contracts as an instrument through which to allocate targeted funding to complement funding provided through the funding formula and research agencies.

This could imply linking a specific funding envelope allocating targeted funding to each institutional contract. Alternatively, targeted funding could be allocated through a new component built into the funding formula, and HEIs would report on the use of targeted funding through institutional contracts.

Great caution should be taken in the design of targeted funding programmes to ensure they are efficient and effective policy instruments. This should include taking account of the following principles:

  • Clear and simple eligibility criteria for the funding – for some funding programmes, all HEIs might be eligible; for others, eligibility may depend on the institutional contract agreed with the government; in other cases, eligibility may be based on a competitive process.

  • Transparency of the eligibility criteria, for instance, by publishing the criteria and the funding received by each HEI on the MoE’s website in a manner similar to the detailed annual allocations published annually by the Ministry. Sections of institutional contracts where the HEIs would report on use of funding should be made public.

  • Sufficient funding amounts to influence behaviour.

  • Quantitative and qualitative information should be included in institutional contracts to indicate the use of the targeted funding, the expected impact of new targeted funding, and the actual impact of previously received funding after an agreed-upon implementation period. Including this information in institutional contracts would consolidate and minimise the reporting requirements placed on HEIs while fulfilling accountability requirements for additional public spending.

We recommend the expert working group identified in Policy action 1 provide recommendations for targeted funding in five areas:

  1. 1. Promote the development of high-quality, flexible, professionally oriented higher education programmes.

    • This includes the expansion of professional bachelor’s degrees, but also exploring the expansion of short-cycle tertiary education programmes in the Slovak Republic [see the examples from France and the United Kingdom presented in OECD (2020[41])].

    • It could also support activities within existing programmes that expand students’ opportunities to develop key transversal skills and attitudes (e.g. problem solving in a technology-rich environment, disposition towards lifelong learning), and the development of partnerships with employers to strengthen the provision of work-based learning opportunities.

    • Finally, consideration could be given to how infrastructure investments, including those planned as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP (see Box 3.3), could support the digitalisation of higher education. This could include both the digitalisation of administrative functions to make them more efficient, and of teaching, learning and research. Digitally enhanced teaching and learning in particular could be a driver for the modernisation of pedagogy, make higher education programmes more flexible and accessible to a greater range of learners from the Slovak Republic and abroad, and facilitate the supply of short, modular, study options such as micro-credentials, which are often delivered through online methods.

  2. 2. Promote research excellence through greater institutional collaboration.

    • Multi-year excellence funding could be provided as part of institutional contracts (Policy action 5) to encourage institutions to consider different types of collaboration, from sharing of key services to generate efficiencies and economies of scale, through to full mergers. Mechanisms should allow HEIs to take small steps to collaborate under a single entity without necessarily eliminating the identity or specialisation of partner institutions. Such a model, used, for instance, in France’s “experimental public institution” (établissement public experimental), may offer a way to enhance the quality and global visibility of best-performing Slovak institutions without resorting to mergers. This method can be complex to implement, however, and lessons from international experience should be considered.

    • The design of targeted funding to promote research excellence and international competitiveness should take account of wider economic policy efforts, such as the Smart Specialisation Strategy conducted by the Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization (see Policy action 2).

  3. 3. Enhance the salaries of academic and non-academic staff by allocating funding for HEIs to strengthen performance bonuses for professional excellence in teaching, research and professional/administrative functions.

    • Attention should be paid to avoid unintended effects, such as increased competition and uncooperative behaviours between staff. HEIs should be provided guidance upon receiving funding on the structuring of performance bonus in a way that rewards excellence and collaboration.

    • Attention should be paid to professional and administrative staff across all areas of work in HEIs. This includes staff who support the day-to-day operations of HEIs (e.g. academic, career, and personal supports for students, supports to staff to improve teaching and facilitate application and securing of research funding – and personal counselling and well-being supports for both students and staff, and system-wide services such as the digital technology infrastructure supporting HEI administrative functions and online teaching and learning). It also includes staff supporting the effective governance and management of the institution, such as professional teams supporting governing bodies (see also the increased need for professional support in a context of reforming institutional governance, as discussed in Policy actions 8-10).

  4. 4. Encourage strategic internationalisation activities.

    • This could include targeted funding to attract academics and professionals from abroad to work in Slovak HEIs and in key higher education entities such as the Research and Development Agency. This could take the form of increased financial incentives, but also non-financial incentives, such as ensuring international staff has access to attractive teaching and research opportunities.

    • Such funding incentives should complement the planned reform of access to academic positions. It should be accompanied by improvements in the administrative and human resources capacity to support international academics and professionals as they start and pursue careers in the Slovak higher education system.

    • Targeted funding could also promote capacity in Slovak HEIs to seek and develop international partnerships, for instance through European University Alliances, following the promising examples of Comenius University Bratislava and Technical University in Košice, respectively partners in ENLIGHT and the ULYSSEUS alliances, as well as the Slovak Agricultural University in Nitra, leader of the INVEST alliance (Slovak Rectors Conference, 2021[61]).

  5. 5. Enhance student supports before and after higher education to support student choice and improve access and success for all qualified students. This could include:

    • The provision of well-designed labour market information and career guidance services for students, to help them better understand opportunities in the labour market and make informed study choices. Such information and services should be provided early in youth’s educational pathways given that study preferences and choices are often formed at the school level.

    • The review of current financial supports for students to assess their adequacy based on students’ needs. Such assessment should review impediments to access and completion of higher education among disadvantaged populations, especially Roma. Particular attention should be paid to the range of supports – at the school level as well as broader social supports – needed to help disadvantaged students consider participating in higher education in general and in particular in study fields with high labour market demand and good labour market returns.

The funding formula for higher education is the main tool through which the government allocates funding to public HEIs, and plans have been announced to revise it as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP. Efforts to review the funding formula should be accompanied by a review of other funding allocation mechanisms, both existing – such as the competitive research funding allocations – and future, such as funding potentially tied to new institutional contracts.

To review and propose specific enhancements to the funding formula and the competitive research funding allocation, it is recommended that the expert working group created in Policy action 1:

  • Identify options to restructure the funding formula and, in particular, consider:

    • building in an element of funding providing stability to HEIs that complement performance-oriented funding, learning, for instance, from the example of Denmark

    • assigning a sufficient weight to a small number of key teaching and research performance metrics, identified through expert work (see Policy action 2), work of the Slovak Accreditation Agency, and work on scientific performance evaluation considered as part of the Slovak Republic’s national RRP

    • reducing the frequency at which formula revisions are introduced, clarifying the approach and rationale for funding formula revisions, and communicating these early to HEIs to facilitate their planning.

  • Identify options to reform the way competitive research funding is allocated, including:

    • increasing the size of grants and making the allocation criteria transparent

    • reducing the administrative burden placed on researchers applying for funding and increasing the support for researchers through an increase in competent administrative staff (see also Policy action 6)

    • establishing clear expected outcomes and simplified reporting procedures.

Best practice in research granting at the European level should serve as an example in this area (e.g. European Research Council, Horizon 2020).

The sections that follow focus on:

  • The current state of policy and practice with respect to institutional governance and management,

  • Challenges limiting the adoption of effective reforms,

  • Relevant international experience that points to possible policy reforms, and

  • Concrete policy actions that the Slovak government may wish to consider.

Higher education governance and management are closely connected, but distinct, concepts. In general terms, the governance of HEIs can be understood as referring to the entities and processes through which the HEI takes the highest level decisions about the HEI’s mission, profile, and overarching priorities and how the institution engages with the wider world. Management in higher education typically describes the entities and processes through which decisions are made to put a governing vision into practice – most importantly decisions about the allocation of the budget and about the work and performance of staff. The section that follows describes key features of institutional governance in Slovakia and their impact on institutional management, and closes with a brief overview of rules structuring the hiring and pay of academic staff – an important aspect of institutional management.

All Slovak HEIs have the same institutional governance structure, which is set out in the HE Act. While the law confers an autonomous status to HEIs and the capacity to set management rules through internal policies, it defines the composition and responsibilities of self-governing bodies of HEIs and the relations between these bodies in a comprehensive and detailed manner. This explains the Slovak Republic’s particularly low level of “organisational autonomy” on the European University Association’s Autonomy Scorecard, a comparative tool published in 2011 and 2017 (Table 3.5).

The institutional governance of Slovak HEIs, illustrated in Figure 3.4, is characterised by three main features: (i) a two-level governance structure with an important role of faculties; (ii) the large role of academic bodies (academic senates and scientific/art councils), and within them, of academic staff, in institutional management; and (iii) complex lines of accountability of the rector and dean. In addition, new internal quality assurance bodies are currently being implemented in Slovak HEIs in response to the quality assurance reform. These features are discussed in the sections that follow.

The HE Act establishes the principle of two-level governance, according to which decision making is divided between the institutional – also referred to as central level – and faculties. Similar governing bodies are established at the institutional level and at the faculty level, with the exception of the university-wide board of trustees. The governing bodies of faculties have broad powers in managing the activities of the given faculty. In addition to issues related to study programmes and human resources, they also decide on the management of the funds allocated to their faculty and take part in decisions regarding property (e.g. the sale of property used by the faculty).

This dual structure creates a system where faculty-level interests are strongly represented. For example, the faculty dean, who is elected by the academic senate of the faculty and appointed by the rector, is accountable for some of his/her activities to the rector and for others to the academic senate of the faculty. This structure also affects the dean’s dismissability: in general, a petition for a dean’s dismissal is submitted by the academic senate of the faculty. While there is a possibility of the dean’s dismissal by the rector, such a proposal has to be approved by the senate of the faculty, or, if the latter does not agree, by the senate of the HEI. This process appears rarely used in practice. The composition of the institution-wide academic senate, provides another example: this body is conceived of as representing faculty senates, and functions on the principle that each faculty should be represented by an equal number of members.

The law provides academic bodies – the academic senates and scientific/art councils – with relatively broad responsibilities in both academic and management matters. The academic senate at the university level elects the rector, decides on the existence of individual faculties, on the long-term strategy and important internal regulations of the HEI, and approves the HEI’s budget and annual report. The faculty-level senate elects the dean and approves important faculty-level policies, including the conditions for admission to study and budgeting.

The scientific/art council is another type of academic body. It decides on matters related to pedagogical and research activities, which notably include the approval of the document stipulating what HEI-level body will decide on the creation and termination of study programmes (this can, but does not have to be, the scientific or art council itself). The scientific/art council also approves the determination of the criteria for the granting of academic titles, as well as the appointment of associate professors and professors. Additionally, it comments on most of the strategic documents adopted by the academic senate.

In both academic senates and scientific/art councils, academic staff play a particularly important role. While academic senates represent both employees and students, the law specifies that the academic senate must have at least 15 members, of which at least one-third are students (the specific number of members and the proportion of students is determined by the HEI’s internal regulations). The academic senate of faculties must have at least 11 members, of which at least one-third must consist of students of the given faculty.

Scientific/art councils are composed of experts in the fields in which the HEI carries out its teaching, research, development, artistic and other creative activities. No less than one-quarter and not more than one-third of its members are external, i.e. non-concurrently the members of the academic community of the particular HEI. Members of these councils are appointed by the rector (or the dean at faculty level), following approval by the academic senate.

The roles of the rector and dean are to oversee the day-to-day management of the institution and of the faculty, including the implementation of strategic directions and the use of funds. Rectors also represent the university externally. However, while rectors and deans develop budget proposals, academic senates control the approval of the budget.

The rector is elected by the academic senate of the university and is appointed by the president of the Slovak Republic. His or her primary accountability is to the academic senate, which is also the only board that can propose his or her dismissal to the president. At the same time, the university’s management board (or board of trustees) establishes the performance parameters linked to the rector’s salary. The academic senate of the faculty elects the dean and can petition for his/her dismissal. At the same time, the dean is also accountable for some of his/her activities to the rector, and the rector is responsible for setting the performance parameters that impact the dean’s salary.

New internal quality assurance bodies are currently being formed in Slovak institutions. This results from the reform of quality assurance, and specifically standards issues by the SAAHE that HEIs must meet by 1 September 2022. These standards include the requirement to create internal quality assurance bodies in HEIs that are independent of existing governing structures. These bodies must include representatives of students and of the external environment and should be designed to ensure an objective, professional, transparent and fair periodic review and approval of all study programmes in each HEI.

At the time of writing, the SAAHE indicates that most HEIs have established temporary bodies for this purpose. While no systematic analysis of these bodies has been undertaken to date, the SAAHE noted substantial variation among HEIs with respect to their composition. For instance, the share of student and external members in these bodies varies, as well as the head of these bodies – the rector of the HEI in some HEIs, academic staff or representatives from other HEIs in others.

The SAAHE further highlighted that it would be placing special emphasis on the independent evaluation and approval of study programmes conducted by these bodies in its review of internal quality assurance processes in HEIs. It noted, however, that a system-wide analysis will only be possible after the deadline for compliance with the standards, therefore after September 2022.

Several legislative and regulatory provisions structure academic employment in the Slovak Republic (Eurydice, 2020[64]). A major feature of academic employment resides in the system of “academic titles”: individuals who want to teach as professors or associate professors (“docent”) are expected to obtain corresponding academic titles to access these positions in public HEIs. The scientific and artistic titles of “docent“ and ”professor“, which offer access to tenure, are awarded only in the fields of study that may be pursued in the second level (master) or in the third level (doctoral) of higher education study.

Obtaining an academic title involves a complex procedure. Acquiring a title of “docent” involves prerequisites such as obtaining a doctoral degree, preparing a habilitation thesis (separate from the doctoral thesis), and successfully completing a habilitation procedure. Individuals must also fulfil three conditions: (i) carry out scientific/artistic activities in the given field of study in the HEI; (ii) create a comprehensive scientific or artistic work in the given field of study; (iii) be a recognised scientific or artistic personality in the given field of study. Obtaining the status of ”professor” requires complying with the requirements of the status of ”docent“, as well as successfully completing a nomination procedure (National Council of the Slovak Republic, 2002[63]).

Access to senior teaching positions for individuals without an academic title has improved due to a 2018 amendment to the HE Act, although individuals are still required to obtain a title within three years of starting employment. The 2018 amendment partially opened positions of professor and associate professor to applicants from abroad, or to those who have worked in an industry relevant to their chosen field of teaching (OECD, 2019[65]).

The post-2002 model of institutional governance described in the preceding section creates three main problems that may hinder the performance of Slovak HEIs: i) a lack of responsiveness to changes in the wider society and to student needs, ii) obstacles to efficient and performance-oriented decision making, and iii) constraints on human resource management.

Over the past two decades, Slovak HEIs have had to respond to profound shifts in their environment. These include a change from a rapidly growing student body to one that is declining steadily, which has exacerbated the competition for students in a global higher education environment marked by strong student mobility. It also includes a shift from significant under-funding to the availability of European funds since the Slovak Republic’s accession to the European Union in 2004. The availability of funds does not automatically translate into increased resources to HEIs, however, as these funds include certain requirements and accessing them require processes in HEIs and government to apply for, secure, and allocate funding effectively and transparently.

Stakeholder interviews led by the OECD in this project and country peer analysis conducted as part of the 2018 European Commission peer counselling exercise suggests that the governance structure of HEIs in the Slovak Republic hampers their responsiveness to changes in their environment. This is due in part to the limited representation of individuals external to the university on governing bodies, and in part to the dispersion and balancing of power among different parties within the institution.

Under Slovak law, the institution-wide Board of trustees (BoT), also referred to as governing or management board, is the principal vehicle through which wider public interests are linked to the operations of HEIs. The BoT must include 12 external individuals out of 14 members, including representatives from business, regional self-government and the national government, while the other two represent the academic senate. However, the BoT’s main role is mostly supervisory: created following the transformation of state universities into public HEIs in 2003, in which state property was transferred to public universities, the BoT decides on the management and acquisition of property and approves the budget of the HEI after its adoption by the academic senate. It also decides on the rector’s salary.

The remit of BoTs does not extend to establishing a clear vision and priorities for the HEI or to developing the HEI’s relationships with external actors – whether public authorities at the central or local government level, employers, or actors in the research and innovation landscape. While the level of involvement of BoTs in strategic matters varies across HEIs, the limited awareness of the activities of BoTs among other HEI governing bodies appears to be a frequent problem (MESA10, 2021[9]). This may limit the ability of BoTs to shape institutional decisions, and the ability of other members of the HEIs to benefit from the relationships with external stakeholders – such as employers – that the BoT may create.

Institutional governance arrangements also appear to be weakly responsive to student and graduate needs. This in due, in part, to the limitations of students’ representation on HEI governing bodies. Stakeholders interviewed by the OECD reported that is difficult to find students interested in participating in university governance, which aligns with findings of The Learning Makes Sense (To dá rozum) project. This project suggested that students’ low engagement results from their insufficient knowledge of the role of their representative in the academic senates and low interest for discussions not directly relevant to them (for instance, discussion of property management rather than of the quality of study programmes). The project also noted that students may be concerned about expressing critical opinions, especially in public HEIs that are viewed as more hierarchical than private and state HEIs (MESA10, 2021[9]). By contrast, some academic staff interviewed by the OECD argued that less student representation would in fact be warranted given that students do not have a long-term view of the HEIs’ interests.

Current governance arrangements create three types of problems. A first issue lies in the legislative prescription of the governance structure, which means that these structures apply to all HEIs regardless of their size, location and focus. Given the heterogeneity of the Slovak higher education landscape, this limits the ability of HEIs to adapt their structure to their own needs, for instance, streamlining the number of governing bodies in small HEIs. As noted in the 2018 European Commission’s peer counselling on the governance of HEIs in the Slovak Republic, when choice is provided, some if not all HEIs may choose to change their governance arrangements (European Commission, 2018[8]). For example, a 2002 reform allowing HEIs in Austria to choose their own governance structure led universities to choose different organisation structures fitting their particular needs. Universities of Applied Sciences (UAS) in Austria are vocational HEIs that have shown particular flexibility in adapting their governance structure to their particular needs. An example of such structure is presented in Box 3.6.

The dual structure of HEI governance, with governing bodies at both university and faculty level, creates a second problem. This system was established by the 2002 Act on Higher Education, which also conferred the status of legal entities to HEIs and ended that of faculties. The dual structure, which can be viewed as a compromise between empowering the central management of universities and maintaining a key role of faculties in steering HEIs, appears to have preserved much of the power vested in faculties and made it difficult for HEIs to establish institution-wide priorities. According to higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD, the academic senate at university level largely represents the interests of the different faculty senates, resulting in competition between faculties, as well as tensions between the institutional and faculty level regarding the appropriate level of decision making for managerial decisions.

Another issue lies in the misallocation of responsibilities for governance, management and academic tasks. In the Slovak Republic, academic bodies such as senates and scientific/art councils play a major role in managerial decisions. For instance, the HEI’s academic senate approves the budget and elects the rector, while the scientific/art councils makes decisions regarding the body approving the creation or termination of study programmes or the appointment of professors and associate professors. In addition to electing and having the power to dismiss rectors and deans, academic senates often approve the nomination of their key staff members such as vice-rectors and vice-deans (MESA10, 2021[9]). This may have an impact on the ability of university leaders to constitute effective management teams.

In contrast, the actions of rectors and deans are limited in scope (for instance they propose but do not approve budgets) and due to their accountability to academic senates. The latter may limit the ability of rectors in particular to take strategic initiatives not broadly supported by senates, and in turn may perpetuate established interests and stifle innovation. This situation may also create problematic incentives for rectors, who are not encouraged to focus on strategic management or, to the contrary, who may seek alternative approaches to obtain greater flexibility, such as longer mandates. The latter may not be desirable, as it is important that rectors are held to high standards of accountability for the overall performance of the institution they lead, with consequences in case of poor performance.

The ability of HEIs to attract sufficient numbers of qualified staff – both academic and professional – is critical to their performance. Slovak HEIs have maintained a relatively high number of teaching staff despite declining student numbers, while the increase of funds available to higher education has generally not supported an increase in teaching staff wages, as discussed earlier in the section “Using funding to support and reward higher education performance”. This has thus limited the funding available to HEI leaders to create attractive working conditions for higher education employees.

This challenge was confirmed by higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD, who pointed out the difficulty in attracting highly skilled academic and professional staff, especially from outside academia and from abroad. Despite changes in policy described earlier, the number of individuals with such profiles in Slovak HEIs appears to remain low. According to the Ministry of Education, in 2019/20, there were 824 higher education teachers from abroad, while no figures are available regarding individuals with a professional background. By comparison, and taking into account the Austrian’s higher education system is about 2.5 times larger than the Slovak system in terms of student enrolment, there were more than 10 000 foreign scholars in Austria in 2016 (ETER, 2019[67]).

Unattractive salaries are another barrier to hiring and retaining competent staff. MoE publishes payroll tables annually, which are binding for all public HEIs except those who adopt their own table in agreement with teaching staff unions. These tables define the level of higher education teachers’ basic salaries according to their qualification level and years of experience. In 2020, the range of gross salary for teachers with entry-level qualifications and up to two years of experience started at EUR 807.50 per month and reached EUR 1 706 for those with the highest qualification level and over 40 years of working experience in the higher education sector. In comparison, the average entry wage of Slovak tertiary education graduates in 2019 was EUR 1 204 (Uplatnenie, 2021[68]).

MoE has tried to improve the attractiveness of higher education teaching by revising payroll tables, allowing teachers’ real wages to grow since 2012. In addition, HEIs can complement the basic salary set in the payroll table by personal payroll bonuses up to a level doubling the basic salary. As a result, the average gross salary of higher education teachers in 2019 reached EUR 2 520 for professors, EUR 1 929 for doctors and EUR 1 472 for assistant professors, according to data provided by the MoE. This presents an operational human resource management tool, provided that surplus wage-eligible funding is available and effective management methods are applied to utilise the tool. Since 2017, the allocation by HEIs to their staff of personal payroll bonuses is reported to have increased, although with differences across HEIs, possibly as HEIs responded to the incentive built into the funding formula encouraging high-quality research. Nevertheless, given the level of basic salaries, employment in HEIs remains a less attractive option for many young graduates than other employment sectors.

Low levels of remuneration alongside short contracts also create challenges for those who choose to teach in higher education, especially during the first part of their careers. For instance, higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD reported frequent cases of higher education employees combining multiple jobs. In response, MoE introduced a maximum of three employment contracts – and only one full-time contract – for staff in Slovak public HEIs (Act on HEIs, §74 col. 4). Despite the obligation to keep additional employment contracts part-time, in international comparison, the Slovak Republic ranks among the countries with the lowest proportion of part-time contracts for higher education teachers.

Non-teaching staff also face relatively low remuneration levels. In 2019, the average gross salary for non-teaching staff was EUR 1 060 according to data provided by MoE to the OECD, with differences again across HEIs. While non-teaching staff are also eligible for personal payroll bonuses and are in principle able to combine several jobs to increase their income, some stakeholders reported that bonuses as well as combining jobs may be less prevalent among non-teaching staff than among staff who teach. This may create risks for the quality of administrative and professional support in HEIs, contributing to various challenges for Slovak HEIs, ranging from HEIs’ low effectiveness in applying to and securing international funding, to low quality support for the recruitment and management of foreign academics and professionals in Slovak higher education.

Salaries levels may continue to pose challenges in the Slovak Republic for both teaching and non-teaching staff. As noted previously, this is due to the fact that the size of public funding that contributes to teachers’ salaries is tied to the total number of students through the funding formula – and student numbers are declining – and because the increase in EU structural funds has mainly resulted in increases in capital spending.

The internal governance of HEIs varies greatly across OECD countries, as a result of different traditions reflected in national legislative frameworks. The analysis of institutional governance over the past four decades nonetheless reveals common patterns across OECD countries.

These include a trend in public steering and institutional governance in which government have extended wider managerial autonomy to HEIs, while at the same time seeking to have institutions more strategically led to better exercise this wider autonomy and more responsive to their external environment. In many higher education systems, HEI governance and management responsibilities have typically shifted from collegial bodies representing the HEI’s academic staff and students to executive bodies open to external members and supported by professional teams (OECD, 2003[69]; OECD, 2008[70]; OECD, 2019[48]).

At the same time, there has been recognition of the part of policymakers that institutional differentiation within higher education systems, including differentiation in the governance and management of higher education institutions, is beneficial, permitting institutions to adopt arrangement best fitted to their mission.

Policy in the Slovak Republic has run counter to these two trends, creating an undifferentiated framework of governance for all HEIs, in which many strategic management responsibilities rest with inwardly-focused collegial bodies. As the Slovak Republic works to increase the strategic management capacity and openness of HEIs to the wider world, it needs to ensure this shift does not lead to a decrease in institutional autonomy. This is particularly important as the Slovak Republic already faces lower autonomy than most other EU countries on three out of four dimensions of autonomy (organisational, staffing and academic), as shown in Table 3.5.

In the following sections, we describe the examples of Finland and Portugal: both countries undertook complex higher education reforms focusing on or including institutional governance reform, with the aim of improving the performance of their HEIs in an increasingly competitive environment. Because these countries undertook these reforms more than a decade ago, they also offer reflections on the reforms’ impact and limitations.

The experience of Finland illustrates the possibility of modernising institutional governance while preserving and increasing institutional autonomy. It also shows that the change in the balance of powers between higher education stakeholders – increasing the role of professional staff and of individuals who are external to HEIs – can generate concerns among the academic community, who see their role redefined and perceive it as reduced. The experience of Portugal shows that pursuing legislative reform of institutional governance without support from the academic community can limit the impact of the reform as institutional practices change less than intended.

In addition to the brief examples presented below, in-depth case studies of these countries are provided in Annex A.

Finland provides an example of a multi-year higher education reform that arguably resulted in the modification of underlying social and governmental expectations of the role of HEIs – a shift of the scale the Slovak Republic is envisioning according to government strategic documents. This reform was characterised by public debates taking place across wider society and central government before undertaking legal changes. These debates included the commissioning of two key reports that helped guide new policy and legislation reform in the higher education sector, based on clear desired outcomes: improving efficiencies of the sector, increasing the visibility and impact of national research, driving HEI-industry collaboration, and striving for the development of globally recognised institutions.

In 2005, the government officially called for large-scale reforms of what was termed the “innovation system”, which included the higher education sector and the public research system (driven primarily through universities). The approach of the Finnish government was to promote the rationalisation of the system by providing funding incentives to encourage a bottom-up movement towards institutional mergers. The aim was to ensure that the institutions themselves collaborated and drove the mergers, creating buy-in and a level of institutional autonomy in the process. Some mergers were geared toward providing a consolidated higher education offering to their region, with increased institutional efficiencies and financial stability (e.g. University of Eastern Finland), while other merger projects sought to represent Finland’s international and R&D ambitions for the higher education sector (e.g. Aalto University).

Beginning in parallel, and continuing on through the merger process, the Finnish MoE also used financial incentives to push institutions to specialise in specific research areas and subjects, becoming “centres of excellence” through institutional co-operation and mergers between HEIs to increase their global recognition and research output. A further tool to facilitate specialisation and the creation of “centres of excellence” has been the creation of foundation universities. In terms of governance, foundation universities differ in that their board is made up entirely of members external to the university itself, representing the wider civic and business community.

The government also pursued the reform of institutional governance across the higher education system by making all universities separate legal persons through the new Universities Act, while maintaining public funding for universities. Among other changes highlighted in Table 3.6, the governance reform strengthened the relationship of universities with their external environment by requiring the governing body of HEIs to include 40% of members external to the university. It also strengthened their autonomy from government in several ways, by providing them with greater financial flexibility, the ability to set up their own organisational structures and to establish their own recruitment/human resources policies.

Recent evaluation of the reform suggests that institutional autonomy has been preserved and strengthened and is viewed in Finland as strengthening an institutional culture focused on effective decision making and continuous improvement. In terms of system rationalisation, the operational goals of the structural reform have been achieved, though some of the wider outcomes (such as increases in institutional specialisation and position of Finnish HEIs in international rankings) remain areas for ongoing policy adaptation and improvement.

The Legal Regime of Institutions of Higher Education (Regime Jurídico das Instituições de Ensino Superior, RJIES) reform carried out in Portugal offers an example of governance and funding changes implemented to increase HEIs’ institutional autonomy by allowing them to manage their resources and more quickly respond to changes in their environment. Portugal’s movement toward institutional autonomy, governance reform and greater accountability in the 2000s occurred alongside related developments in quality assurance. This included the inauguration of the country’s quality assurance agency, A3ES, first operational in 2009, which placed external programme quality validation alongside new autonomy and governance measures for institutions.

RJIES resulted in institutional governance changes for all HEIs, including the reform of elected governance bodies and in the selection of rectors, or presidents in the case of polytechnic HEIs. The functions of former HEI assemblies and senates that could cumulatively have hundreds of members were replaced with unicameral general councils as the highest decision making body. Under the legislation, general councils are composed of 15-35 members, depending on the size and structure of the HEI (Table 3.7).

While staff-student parity was previously practiced within many HEI governance bodies, RJIES imposes a minimum of only 15% of students among general council members, while professors and researchers must account for more than half of the general council. While representation of community actors from outside of the HEI (such as employers) was previously possible, RJIES mandated that at least 30% of general council members must be external to the HEI. These external members are nominated and selected by a vote of the internal student and academic general council members. The Chair of the general council is selected by a vote of all general council members but must be one of the external council members. This reform allowed HEIs to gain autonomy while guaranteeing quality through increased accountability.

Under RJIES, university rectors and polytechnic presidents are elected by the general council through a secret ballot. This follows public announcement of openings, submission of applications, and public hearings with candidates. In the case of universities, rectors may be professors or researchers from within the institution or from other Portuguese or international institutions. For polytechnics, the role of president is also open to non-academics who have relevant professional experience.

Beyond these governance changes made for all HEIs, RJIES opened the possibility of HEIs attaining “foundation status” that would grant them greater operational autonomy, notably regarding financing and staffing. Among other key changes, this reform permitted HEIs to employ academic and non-academic staff independently under private employment law through their status under private law. These changes are described in detail in Annex A.

When properly implemented, there are important benefits to be gained by shifting from an inwardly-oriented and collegial model of HEI governance to one in which external engagement and strategic management capacity are enhanced. These benefits include greater effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making, including in the securing and use of funds to produce high-quality teaching, research and closer engagement with society. These capabilities can assist HEIs in responding to new demands – from governments with constrained budgets that require greater value for money, students with access to a larger range of study options who “vote with their feet”, and employers needing new types and combinations of advanced skills who look to higher education systems to help develop these skills (or choose to import them).

Not all Slovak higher education stakeholders interviewed by the OECD believe that the governance structure of HEIs need to be reformed to strengthen strategic decision making and openness to the external environment. Some argued that the institutional governance structure was not a cause of performance challenges facing the Slovak higher education system. Instead, they proposed that individuals in leadership roles, and of their relationships and working processes were the key determinants of HEIs’ ability for strategic decision making and performance improvement, rather than a problem linked to the governance structure itself.

Two considerations appear to be of fundamental importance when considering institutional governance changes in the Slovak Republic. First, meaningful stakeholder engagement must be conducted to identify governance changes viewed as most relevant to foster performance improvement by stakeholders and to identify areas of concern or that are most disputed as relevant levers to foster performance improvement. Second, an approach that focuses on setting key principles in legislation and providing HEIs with choices in setting their own governance structure – with incentives to adopt a new structure – could be effective in addressing different institutional contexts and different perceptions of the usefulness of institutional governance changes. Such an approach may progressively demonstrate to the higher education community the benefits of modernised governance structures adopted by some leading HEIs, as seen in Portugal, for example.

Three policy actions are recommended to Slovak authorities, which should be implemented in close collaboration with HEIs.

The level of prescription regarding institutional governance prevents HEIs from designing governance arrangements that are most suitable to their particular contexts. At the same time, removing legal requirements may not lead to change if institutional stakeholders who are currently empowered to make decisions on their governance structure do not view changes to governance as necessary. At the same time, taking a top-down approach requiring far-reaching governance changes may lead to important stakeholder resistance, and undermine the government’s broader reform efforts in higher education.

We thus recommend that the Slovak Republic take a careful, staged approach to system-wide changes in institutional governance, including a combination of basic principles set in framework legislation and increased flexibility for HEIs.

Specifically, we recommend that the Slovak government:

Pursue broad stakeholder engagement on the proposed governance changes

  • As part of stakeholder engagement undertaken in Policy action 1, the Task Force should pay special attention to consulting on governance arrangements.

Include a statement of purpose and key principles in the legislation

  • Such a statement would aim to clarify the purpose of reforming institutional governance, highlighting the importance of responsive governance and sound management to increase the trust of Slovak society in its higher education system.

  • Key principles governing the re-balancing of powers between higher education governing bodies could be clearly stated, including:

    • the obligation of publicly funded HEIs to establish governance arrangements that enable them to make strategic, efficient and accountable use of public resources

    • the essential need of higher education institutions to function with full scientific and artistic autonomy from government, which requires particular attention in public HEIs and as the use of public resources is shaped by government through the design of funding levers

    • the obligation of HEIs to establish governance arrangements that permit them to responsibly exercise their autonomy, on the basis of clear profile and mission, formulated by a governing body that takes into account (and contains) members of university academic staff, students, and employees, and stakeholders outside the institutions who reflect its profile and mission; and an administration with management capacity sufficient to implement policies set by the governing body.

Establish key features promoting good institutional governance in the law

Governance changes should carefully balance greater openness to the external environment and enhanced managerial capacity with the need to preserve and enhance the autonomy of Slovak HEIs.

We recommend the timing for implementing governance changes be no less than 18 months to ensure sufficient time for planning and to ensure the changes are informed by the implementation by HEIs of the SAAHE standards by 1 September 2022. The recommendations formulated below should be examined in light of the results of this accreditation and quality assurance reform.

While HEIs should be free to determine the details of their governance structure, the law could establish key features promoting good institutional governance. These could include:

  • Require HEIs to have institutional-level governing bodies that have distinct responsibilities (see, for instance, guidance on HEI governance in the United Kingdom (Committee of University Chairmen, 2001[74]) and Ireland (THEA, 2018[75]; Irish Universities Association, 2019[76])) HEIs should have, at a minimum:

    • A board of trustees (BoT) responsible (with the support of a professional team) for the institution’s governance – including the review, revision and approval of the institution’s mission, approving the annual operating budget and large sale/acquisition of infrastructure (including digital), appointing the rector according to a transparent procedure.

    • An academic body responsible for a range of academic issues such as the HEI’s academic strategy and promotion of research, criteria for student admissions, procedures for the award of qualifications, academic standards, the approval of content of curriculum and new programmes, policies regarding examinations including appointing internal and external examiners, and student discipline.

      • Criteria for the composition and selection of the academic body should ensure an institution-wide view of academic issues rather than the strict representation of individual faculty interests.

      • HEIs are currently establishing internal quality assurance bodies to implement the standards published by the SAAHE. The extent to which such bodies fulfil some of the above-mentioned functions and complement or duplicate other academic bodies (e.g. academic senates) should be carefully examined.

    • A rector responsible (with the support of a professional team) for implementing the vision of the HEI through effective human and financial resources management.

    • Clear processes of consultation between governance, academic and managerial bodies to resolve matters that concern several of these areas (for instance, managerial decisions with implications for study programmes).

  • Set a maximum number of BoT members, which should be low enough to ensure efficient decision making (for instance, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland [United Kingdom], the Board of Governors are required to include between 12 and 24 members (Committee of University Chairmen, 2001[74]); in Portugal, general councils are to include 15-35 members).

  • Require that the HEI’s BoT include a minimum share of external members representing wider society (e.g. 40%, as in Finland, or a share appropriate to the Slovak context, based on consultation with HEIs).

  • Require that the government identify external member candidates through a process that involves higher education staff and students, and guarantees: (i) the independence of these members; (ii) the quality and relevance of their expertise and experience; and (iii) their understanding of the HEI’s context and commitment to active participation in its strategic development. For instance, internal members of the BoT (staff and students) would select external members from the list provided by government to meet the minimum threshold of external members. Alternatively, internal members of the BoT could prepare a list of individuals following the same principles, and MoE could select the individuals.

  • Require that the terms for BoT members be fixed in duration (e.g. four to six years), limited in number (e.g. two consecutive terms), and that board members could serve on a staggered renewal schedule.

Increase HEIs’ autonomy in the creation of institutional governance arrangements

The law should permit HEIs to create their own additional governance arrangements according to local needs. In particular, it should be adjusted to:

  • remove the obligation for HEIs to have governing bodies at both HEI and faculty level

  • authorise Slovak HEIs to develop their own governance statutes and register these with the Ministry of Education

  • authorise foreign HEIs to establish themselves in the Slovak Republic, within a legal framework setting minimum operating and quality standards.

The heterogeneity of the Slovak higher education landscape, the diversity of views among stakeholders regarding the value of institutional governance changes, and the current and future reform processes in higher education call for a careful reform approach. Reforming governance mechanisms is a difficult task requiring an important investment in time and resources from the HEI on top of regular core activities and of new activities that result from recent reforms, such as the engagement of HEIs in the creation of robust internal quality assurance systems.

We thus recommend that the MoE incentivise HEIs to adopt a new governance structure. Interested HEIs would be required to:

  • undertake the accelerated adoption, e.g. within eight months, of system-wide changes to institutional governance proposed in Policy action 8

  • establish a simplified governance model with three institutional-level governing bodies with clearly delineated roles

  • report on the benefits and challenge of implementation within 12 months, so that it may inform the governance reforms undertaken by other Slovak HEIs, as recommended in Policy action 8.

To incentivise this, MoE support would be provided to interested HEIs, in the form of:

  • One-time additional funding.

  • Expanded financial flexibilities of HEIs, provided the interested HEIs demonstrate sound financial management practices. These would build on existing flexibilities available to all Slovak HEIs (such as increasing staff compensation beyond levels established in the MoE grid) and could involve a range of areas – such as those considered in Portugal’s foundation status (Government of Portugal, 2007[73]) and presented in the detailed case study in Annex A.

The shift to a responsive form of institutional governance and management requires all individuals involved in governing bodies to take on different and potentially expanded roles in clearly delineated areas of responsibilities. Increasing the role of the BoT in setting the strategic vision for the HEI and monitoring its implementation – through institutional plans, for instance – will require BoT members to take on responsibilities they did not hold previously. Rectors, if they are to become accountable to the BoT and take on a greater role in the strategic management of the HEI’s financial and human resources, will also experience a shift in both their tasks and relationships with the governing body of the HEI – the BoT – and the academic body of the HEI – the senate or equivalent body. The academic body, for its part, has a crucial role to play in assuring and improving the academic standards of the HEI, particularly as the Slovak Republic moves forward with a quality assurance system that places the responsibility for assuring and improving quality on HEIs themselves, through their development of sound internal quality assurance systems.

While legislation and government regulation set key parameters, and funding incentives are key to encouraging change, the individuals working in the Slovak Republic’s governing bodies will need appropriate supports to perform their responsibilities.

This would include collaboration between the MoE and the Higher Education Task Force (see Policy action 1), to develop the following supports:

  • Fund the development of guidelines for practitioners to understand how to effectively perform governing body responsibility. This could involve work performed by groupings of HEIs, as done in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom), for instance (Committee of University Chairmen, 2001[74]). It could also involve the provision of funding to bodies with expertise in higher education to undertake such work of benefit to the while higher education system, as done, for instance, in the United Kingdom by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, in partnership with a funding body for higher education (Higher Education Funding Council for England, now Office for Students, see (Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, 2017[77])). Fund the development training programmes for individuals in governance and management positions in HEIs to assist them in putting guidelines into practice.

  • Recommend HEIs dedicate funding to the creation of adequate supports for all governing bodies, including professional teams performing secretariat functions, stipends for governing body members (for academic staff, this could also involve course releases to allow time to perform governance-related duties; for students, this could include recognising governance-related activities as credit-bearing extracurricular activities).

References

[45] Adam, E. (2020), “‘Governments base performance-based funding on global rankings indicators’: A global trend in higher education finance or a global rankings literature fiction? A comparative analysis of four performance-based funding programs”, International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 76, p. 102197, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2020.102197.

[60] CNRS (2020), Classement de Shanghai 2020 : La recherche française progresse, https://www.cnrs.fr/fr/cnrsinfo/classement-de-shanghai-2020-la-recherche-francaise-progresse (accessed on 28 December 2020).

[74] Committee of University Chairmen (2001), Guide for Members of Governing Bodies of Universities and Colleges in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Committee of University Chairmen, Bristol, https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/4503/2/01_20.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[19] Copeland, R. (2017), Understanding the United Kingdom’s Teaching Excellence Framework and its Implications, https://academicmatters.ca/understanding-the-united-kingdoms-teaching-excellence-framework-and-its-implications/ (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[37] CVTI (2021), Časové rady [Timelines], https://www.cvtisr.sk/cvti-sr-vedecka-kniznica/informacie-o-skolstve/statistiky/casove-rady.html?page_id=9724. (accessed on 1 July 2021).

[30] CVTI (2021), Štatistická ročenka - vysoké školy [Statistical Yearbook - Universities], https://www.cvtisr.sk/cvti-sr-vedecka-kniznica/informacie-o-skolstve/statistiky/statisticka-rocenka-publikacia/statisticka-rocenka-vysoke-skoly.html?page_id=9596 (accessed on 1 July 2021).

[44] Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science (2019), Funding for Danish Universities, https://ufm.dk/en/education/higher-education/danish-universities/the-universities-in-denmark/funding-for-danish-universities (accessed on 11 March 2021).

[43] de Boer, H. et al. (2015), Performance-based funding and performance agreements in fourteen higher education systems, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), Enschede, https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/5139542/jongbloed+ea+performance-based-funding-and-performance-agreements-in-fourteen-higher-education-systems.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[47] Debackere, K. and W. Glänzel (2004), “Using a bibliometric approach to support research policy making: The case of the Flemish BOF-key”, Scientometrics, Vol. 59, pp. 253-276, https://doi.org/10.1023/b:scie.0000018532.70146.02.

[40] Dougherty, K. et al. (2014), “Performance Funding for Higher Education: Forms, Origins, Impacts, and Futures”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 655/1, pp. 163-184, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214541042.

[11] EBRD (2017), The Slovak Republic diagnostic paper: Assessing progress and challenges in developing a sustainable market economy, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), London, https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/country-diagnostic-paper-slovak-republic.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2021).

[53] ECOOM (2021), Frequently Asked Questions (VABB-SHW), https://www.ecoom.be/en/vabb-shw/faq#why (accessed on 11 March 2021).

[50] Engels, T. and R. Guns (2018), “The Flemish Performance-based Research Funding System: A Unique Variant of the Norwegian Model”, Journal of Data and Information Science, Vol. 3/4, pp. 45-60, https://doi.org/10.2478/jdis-2018-0020.

[67] ETER (2019), Internationalisation of Academic Staff in European Higher Education, European Tertiary Education Register (ETER), https://www.joanneum.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ETER_AnalyticalReport_01_final.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2021).

[8] European Commission (2018), Peer Counselling on the Governance of Higher Education Institutions in the Slovak Republic, document provided to OECD for the project "Improving Higher Education in the Slovak Republic".

[12] European Commission (2017), Digital Coalition launched in Slovakia, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/digital-coalition-launched-slovakia (accessed on 30 April 2021).

[36] Eurostat (2021), Distribution of academic staff at education level by age groups [educ_uoe_perd02], http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=educ_uoe_perd02&lang=en (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[64] Eurydice (2020), Slovakia - Conditions of Service for Academic Staff Working in Higher Education, https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/conditions-service-academic-staff-working-higher-education-65_en (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[72] Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (2009), Universities Act 558/2009, https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2009/en20090558.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2021).

[71] Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (1997), Universities Act 645/1997, https://finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1997/en19970645_20061453.pdf (accessed on 19 July 2021).

[52] Flemish Government (2019), Vlaamse Regering keurt BOF-besluit definitief goed: 35 miljoen euro extra voor universiteiten [Flemish Government definitively approves BOF decision: 35 million euros extra for universities], https://www.ewi-vlaanderen.be/nieuws/vlaamse-regering-keurt-bof-besluit-definitief-goed-35-miljoen-euro-extra-voor-universiteiten (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[31] FNPV (2021), Pôžička pre študentov [Student loan], https://www.fnpv.sk/chcem-pozicku-student (accessed on 1 June 2021).

[59] French Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport (2020), Repères et références statistiques 2020, https://www.education.gouv.fr/reperes-et-references-statistiques-2020-1316 (accessed on 28 December 2020).

[13] Galán-Muros, V. et al. (2018), State of University-Business Cooperation: Slovakia, University-Business Cooperation in Europe, https://www.ub-cooperation.eu/index/slovakiabus (accessed on 11 May 2021).

[14] Government of Latvia (2014), Par Izglītības attīstības pamatnostādņu 2014.-2020.gadam apstiprināšanu [On approval of the Guidelines for the Development of Education for 2014-2020], http://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=266406 (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[73] Government of Portugal (2007), Regime jurídico das instituições de ensino superior [Legal framework of higher education institutions], https://data.dre.pt/eli/lei/62/2007/09/10/p/dre/pt/html (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[7] Government of the Slovak Republic (2021), Plán Obnovy - Cestovná mapa k lepšiemu Slovensku [Recovery Plan: A Roadmap to a Better Slovakia], Government of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava.

[35] Government of the Slovak Republic (2019), EUROFONDY: Čerpanie peňazí EÚ dosiahlo k 28. februáru 22,57 percenta [EUROFUNDS: EU money absorption reached 22.57 per cent on 28 February], https://www.partnerskadohoda.gov.sk/eurofondy-cerpanie-penazi-eu-dosiahlo-k-28-februaru-2257-percenta/ (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[55] Guiselin, E. (2019), “Les regroupements d’établissements dans l’enseignement supérieur et la recherche : enjeux politiques et cadrage juridique”, Revue française d’administration publique, Vol. 169/1, pp. 37-50, https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.169.0037.

[76] Irish Universities Association (2019), Code of Governance for Irish universities, Irish Universities Association, Dublin, https://www.iua.ie/publications/code-of-governance-for-irish-universities-2019/ (accessed on 6 August 2021).

[22] James, G. et al. (2019), Evaluation of the Statistical Elements of the Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework, Office for National Statistics, London, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/940301/5._ONS_Statistical_Evaluation_-_accessible_Sept_2020.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[46] Jongbloed, B. and H. de Boer (2020), Performance Agreements in Denmark, Ontario and the Netherlands, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), Enschede, https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/234127256/Performance_Agreements_in_DK_ONT_and_NL.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[49] Jonkers, K. and T. Zacharewicz (2017), Research Performance Based Funding Systems: a Comparative Assessment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, https://doi.org/10.2760/70120.

[16] Latvian Ministry of Education and Science (2019), Informatīvais ziņojums “Par Izglītības attīstības pamatnostādņu 2014.–2020.gadam īstenošanas 2014.-2017.gadā starpposma novērtējumu” [Informative Report “On the Interim Evaluation of the Implementation of the Education Development Guidelines for 2014-2020 in 2014-2017”], https://www.izm.gov.lv/lv/informativais-zinojums-par-izglitibas-attistibas-pamatnostadnu-2014-2020gadam-istenosanas-2014-2017gada-starpposma-novertejumu (accessed on 1 July 2021).

[77] Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (2017), Insight Guide: governing bodies and academic assurance, Leadership Foundation for Higher Education, London, https://www.advance-he.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-05/Insight%20Guide%20-%20governing%20bodies%20and%20academic%20assurance.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[58] Légifrance (2018), Ordonnance n° 2018-1131 du 12 décembre 2018 relative à l’expérimentation de nouvelles formes de rapprochement, de regroupement ou de fusion des établissements d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000037800979/ (accessed on 22 December 2020).

[57] Légifrance (2013), Code de l’éducation - Chapitre VIII bis : Coopération et regroupements des établissements (Articles L718-2 à L718-16), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006071191/LEGISCTA000027738668/#LEGISCTA000027738668 (accessed on 22 December 2020).

[56] Légifrance (2013), LOI n° 2013-660 du 22 juillet 2013 relative à l’enseignement supérieur et à la recherche, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/dossierlegislatif/JORFDOLE000027197524/ (accessed on 22 December 2020).

[3] Machlica, G. et al. (2017), “Enhancing advanced skills to better meet labour market demand in the Slovak Republic”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1416, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/72c55c64-en.

[42] Martinák, D. and D. Zápražná (2017), Analýza regulačných nástrojov na zlepšenie súladu odborov stredných škôl s potrebami trhu práce [Analysis of regulatory tools to improve the compliance of secondary school departments with labor market needs], Education Policy Institute, Bratislava, http://www.minedu.sk/data/att/11874.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[9] MESA10 (2021), “Learning Makes Sense” Project, https://en.todarozum.sk/ (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[26] MIRRI (2020), Supporting the transformation of the Slovak economy by increasing its innovation performance, Ministry of Investments, Regional Development and Informatization of the Slovak Republic (MIRRI), Bratislava, https://www.mirri.gov.sk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/RTDI-in-Slovakia-AS-IS-report.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[38] MoE (2021), Financovanie [Financing], https://www.minedu.sk/677-sk/financovanie/ (accessed on 1 August 2021).

[6] MoE (2021), National action plan for external quality assurance of higher education institutions in the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (MoE), Bratislava, https://www.minedu.sk/data/att/20126.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[33] MoE (2019), Výročná správa o stave vysokého školstva za rok 2019 [Annual Report on the State of Higher Education for 2019], Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (MoE), Bratislava, https://www.minedu.sk/vyrocne-spravy-o-stave-vysokeho-skolstva/ (accessed on 1 July 2021).

[34] MoE (2017), Revízia výdavkov na vzdelávanie - Záverečná správa [Revision of Education Expenditure - Final Report], Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (MoE), Bratislava, https://www.minedu.sk/21395-sk/revizia-vydavkov-na-vzdelavanie-2017/ (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[2] MoE (2016), Učiace sa Slovensko [Learning Slovakia], Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic (MoE), Bratislava, https://www.minedu.sk/data/att/10640.pdf (accessed on 9 August 2021).

[63] National Council of the Slovak Republic (2002), Zákon č. 131/2002 Z.z. o vysokých školách a zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov [Act No. 131/2002 on higher education and on the change and supplement to some acts], https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2002-131 (accessed on 13 August 2020).

[29] OECD (2021), OECD Education Statistics, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/edu-data-en (accessed on 1 July 2021).

[27] OECD (2020), Education at a Glance 2020: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/69096873-en.

[41] OECD (2020), Labour Market Relevance and Outcomes of Higher Education in Four US States: Ohio, Texas, Virginia and Washington, Higher Education, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/38361454-en.

[28] OECD (2020), Main Science and Technology Indicators, Volume 2020 Issue 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/e3c3bda6-en.

[4] OECD (2020), OECD Skills Strategy Slovak Republic: Assessment and Recommendations, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/bb688e68-en.

[32] OECD (2020), Resourcing Higher Education: Challenges, Choices and Consequences, Higher Education, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/735e1f44-en.

[18] OECD (2020), Strengthening the Governance of Skills Systems: Lessons from Six OECD Countries, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/3a4bb6ea-en.

[48] OECD (2019), Benchmarking Higher Education System Performance, Higher Education, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/be5514d7-en.

[65] OECD (2019), Education Policy Outlook 2019: Working Together to Help Students Achieve their Potential, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/2b8ad56e-en.

[25] OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: Slovak Republic 2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-svk-2019-en.

[15] OECD (2019), OECD Skills Strategy Latvia: Assessment and Recommendations, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/74fe3bf8-en.

[17] OECD (2019), OECD Skills Strategy Poland: Assessment and Recommendations, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/b377fbcc-en.

[39] OECD (2016), How good is your job? Measuring and assessing job quality, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/sdd/labour-stats/Job-quality-OECD.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[70] OECD (2008), Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society: Volume 1 and Volume 2, OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264046535-en.

[69] OECD (2003), Education Policy Analysis 2003, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/epa-2003-en.

[10] OECD/European Union (2017), Supporting Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Higher Education in Hungary, OECD Skills Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Union, Brussels, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264273344-en.

[21] OfS (2018), Securing Student Success: Regulatory Framework for Higher Education in England, Office for Students (OfS), Bristol, https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/media/1406/ofs2018_01.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[51] Ossenblok, T., T. Engels and G. Sivertsen (2012), “The representation of the social sciences and humanities in the Web of Science - A comparison of publication patterns and incentive structures in Flanders and Norway (2005-9)”, Research Evaluation, Vol. 21/4, pp. 280-290, https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvs019.

[62] Pruvot, E. and T. Estermann (2017), University Autonomy in Europe III: The Scorecard 2017, European University Association, Brussels, https://www.eua.eu/downloads/publications/university%20autonomy%20in%20europe%20iii%20the%20scorecard%202017.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[1] Reichert, S. (2009), Institutional diversity in European higher education: Tensions and challenges for policy makers and institutional leaders, European University Association, Brussels, https://eua.eu/downloads/publications/institutional%20diversity%20in%20european%20higher%20education%20%20tensions%20and%20challenges.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[5] SAAHE (2021), Slovak Accreditation Agency for Higher Education published the first results of the largest survey of student satisfaction in the Slovak Republic, https://saavs.sk/survey-first-results/ (accessed on 15 July 2021).

[61] Slovak Rectors Conference (2021), Slovenské univerzity úspešné v iniciatíve European Universities [Slovak universities successful in the European Universities initiative], https://www.srk.sk/sk/aktuality/407-slovenske-univerzitu-budu-sucastou-iniciativy-european-universities (accessed on 16 July 2021).

[75] THEA (2018), THEA Code of Governance forIstitutes of Technology, Technological Higher Education Association (THEA), Dublin, https://hea.ie/assets/uploads/2018/01/THEA-Code-of-Governance-of-Institutes-of-Technology-January-2018.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2021).

[24] UK Department for Education (2019), Independent Review of the Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework (TEF), Department for Education, London, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-tef-report (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[20] UK Department for Education (2017), Teaching Excellence and Student Outcomes Framework Specification, Department for Education, London, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/658490/Teaching_Excellence_and_Student_Outcomes_Framework_Specification.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[68] Uplatnenie (2021), Uplatnenie, http://www.uplatnenie.sk (accessed on 1 June 2021).

[23] Vivian, D. et al. (2019), Evaluation of Provider-level TEF 2016-17 (Year 2): Measuring the initial impact of the TEF on the Higher Education landscape, Department for Education, London, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/evaluation-of-provider-level-tef-2016-to-2017-year-2 (accessed on 10 August 2021).

[54] Williams, J. (2017), “Collaboration, alliance, and merger among higher education institutions”, OECD Education Working Papers, No. 160, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/cf14d4b5-en.

[66] Zehetner, A. (2021), Using funding levers to promote higher education performance – An institutional perspective, presentation provided to OECD during expert-meeting for the project "Improving Higher Education in the Slovak Republic".

Metadata, Legal and Rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2021

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.