Chapter 2. The European Union’s policy vision and framework
Framework
A new Consensus, firmly anchored in the 2030 Agenda, unites all European Union actors and member states behind a common vision for development co-operation. This landmark achievement takes place in a complex legal and institutional system where development co-operation remains a shared competence between European Union institutions and member states. Delivering on this ambitious agenda will require strong leadership from the European Union, along with scaled-up efforts by member states to align their own programmes behind common objectives and targets.
A new vision owned by member states and anchored in the 2030 Agenda
The new European Consensus on Development (the Consensus), adopted in June 2017, provides a common vision for the European Union (EU) and all member states. As the cornerstone of the EU’s development policy, the Consensus builds on the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, reiterating the same central poverty reduction objective while also affirming the economic, social and environmental dimensions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Council of the European Union, 2017a). In this way, the Consensus broadens the objectives for development co-operation. It places new emphasis on leaving no one behind by tackling inequality and discrimination globally as well as the need for new and innovative means of implementation in support of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.
This framework for action replaces the 2005 European Consensus on Development, building on the EU’s 2012 Agenda for Change (COM, 2011). Together with the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy - which provides a broad vision for all the EU’s external engagement - and the EU’s framework for humanitarian assistance, the new Consensus serves as an overarching framework for development co-operation of all EU institutions and member states.
Making full use of this collective vision remains challenging
While this new policy framework clarifies the scope as applying to all 28 member states and EU actors for the first time, it must be interpreted in a complex legal and institutional system where development is defined as a shared competence. In other words, the EU has competence to carry out activities and develop a common policy, but this does not prevent member states from exercising their individual competences in development assistance and/or humanitarian aid.1 This situation effectively results in the conduct of 29 parallel development policies, with the European Commission mandated to co-ordinate among them (European Union, 2010b).
The co-ordinating role of the EU over its member states presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it can use the collective weight to advance a number of key global issues in international fora such as financing for development (Chapter 1) and to enhance efficiency of development co-ordination through initiatives such as joint programming (Chapter 5). On the other hand, the EU lacks mechanisms to hold its members to account for their commitments, including to reach ODA targets (Chapter 3). Therefore, putting the EU’s common vision into practice relies on EU actors and member states agreeing on arrangements that make it possible to build on the comparative advantage of each member while reinforcing cohesion. In such a context, strengthening the EU’s evidence base for policy making and implementation is particularly challenging but also critical for success (Gavas et al., 2013).
Principles and guidance
The new Consensus, which responds to all 17 Sustainable Development Goals, establishes a thematic and geographic focus to achieve the European Union’s ambition for global influence and impact. To support its objectives, the European Union is expanding its operational guidance for gender and environment, stepping up its focus on leaving no one behind and improving the way its instruments work together. Going forward, the new Consensus could be strengthened by having associated operational guidance for implementation.
A comprehensive approach in need of operational guidance for implementation
The EU’s 2017 Consensus, which responds to all 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), is structured around the five core themes of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. Eradicating poverty, tackling discrimination and inequality, and leaving no one behind are at the heart of this comprehensive approach. Collectively, in addition to the 0.7% target (Chapters 1 and 3) the EU and its member states are committed to meet the target of 0.15% of ODA/GNI to least developed countries (LDCs) in the short term and to reach 0.20% of ODA/GNI within the time frame of the 2030 Agenda. The European Commission has also set a target of allocating at least 20% of EU ODA to social inclusion and human development for the MFF 2014-20, although to date this target is yet to be met (Chapter 3).
The Consensus commits all EU institutions and member states to take action in three key areas:
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Recognition of strong interlinkages between development and peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, environment and climate, as well as cross-cutting elements.
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Promoting a comprehensive approach to implementation that combines traditional development aid with other resources and a strengthened approach to policy coherence for development.
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Creating better-tailored partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders.
To support implementation, the Commission is implementing the following principles, which had already been adopted in the Agenda for Change:
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Differentiation: taking into account the increased differentiation between developing countries, the EU targets its resources where they are needed most to reduce poverty and where they can have the greatest impact. At the same time, for countries already on sustained growth paths and/or able to generate more domestic resources, the EU pursues different forms of partnerships based on blending, technical co-operation or support for trilateral co-operation
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Concentration: to increase the impact and leverage of its assistance, the EU aims to engage in no more than three sectors per partner county
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Co-ordination: strengthening joint programming to reduce the fragmentation of aid and further increase collective impact and
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Coherence: strengthening progress on policy coherence for development.
Despite the European Council’s adoption of a range of action plans over recent years, such as the Gender Action Plan discussed below, the EU lacks a comprehensive road map for implementing the Consensus, as well as a plan for operationalising SDGs in its external action. Such planning could usefully clarify how EU actors will work proactively with member states to achieve collective goals - including ensuring a focus on the poorest countries and leaving no one behind - and how they will collectively measure impacts including at country level. To date, the objectives of the draft Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27 and the 2018 directives for the post-Cotonou negotiations2 offer little insight into how the EU might translate its ambitious development agenda into action (Castillejo et al., 2018; Trimmel, 2017). However, these processes offer the EU important windows of opportunity to consider how to link high-level political pledges to a comprehensive action plan for delivering on its commitments.
A large body of operational guidance, including on cross-cutting issues
Since the 2012 DAC peer review, the EU has introduced a large body of operational guidance that clarifies its thematic and cross-cutting areas. Among the topics covered are human rights and democracy; private investment and trade; gender equality and women’s empowerment; migration and forced displacement; environment, climate change, and energy; fragility and resilience; and security and development.
For example, the EU has a strong foundation for its work on gender equality with its revised action plan Gender equality and women’s empowerment: transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations 2016-2020 (GAP) that is supported by guidance. Nevertheless, as observed by the review team in Mali and Bolivia and through the findings of a 2017 joint evaluation with member states of the GAP’s implementation, the EU needs to make improvements to enhance capacity, incentives and measures of organisational performance across EU actors to track and meet the high level ambition on gender equality and to ensure impact on the ground (Ioannides, 2017). While the EU has made significant progress by integrating gender equality into 48% of its bilateral allocable ODA in 2015-16,3 more effort is needed to meet its target of 85% by 2020 laid out in the GAP. As it looks to step up its commitment towards gender equality and women’s empowerment, the flagship Spotlight Initiative (UN-European Union, n.d.) to end violence against women and girls, launched in 2017, has the potential to make an important contribution.
On environment and climate change, the new Consensus requires deepening and broadening efforts to mainstream them in EU co-operation, including greening the new External Investment Plan. Thus the EU has made significant progress in their mainstreaming, backed by guidance, capacity development, quality control, dedicated staffing and a technical assistance facility at headquarters. DG DEVCO also provides significant support in conducting ex-ante environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental assessments.
The EU has also made a number of important commitments, including allocating 20% of its MFF 2014-2020 budget for climate change mitigation and adaptation actions (European Commission, 2016a). In fact, the proportion of ODA for climate mitigation and adaptation increased from 10% in 2011-12 to 22% in 2015-16 (Table C.5 in Annex C). It has also committed to double biodiversity related financial flows to developing countries by 2015 and at least maintain this level until 2020 (UNEP/CBD/COP, 2012). Further consideration is now warranted on whether an explicit strategy, as recommended in the 2012 review, would support implementation more broadly. On other priority areas, written guidance is generally comprehensive, but a key remaining challenge is ensuring high quality implementation at posts where sectoral expertise has declined (Chapter 4 and Annex D).
Fragile contexts: A strong framework in an increasingly complex reality
The Lisbon Treaty sets out the EU’s objective to promote and preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security, thereby structuring the way the EU can respond to crises. In 2011, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) strengthened the coherence and comprehensiveness of the EU’s response to external conflicts and crises, which was subsequently expanded in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy as an integrated approach to conflict and crises (European External Action Service, 2016). The strategy recognises crisis as the result of a complex mix of factors such as violence, inequalities, poor governance and political instability. Such an approach enables the EU actors and member states to set common objectives and to deploy the instruments at their disposal accordingly.
This approach was evident in this review’s field mission to Mali, where EU interventions were coherent with a wider regional policy for the Sahel (European External Action Service, 2011) which defined security and development as complementary objectives. Furthermore, the Sahel Regional Action Plan has broadened the geographical scope of the EU’s strategy in Mali while also reinforcing a security and migration focus (Council of the European Union, 2015). As a result, the EU is putting into play most of its relevant instruments to address the security-migration-development nexus in the Sahel region (Annex D). At the same time, there is room for additional complementarity between the EU’s national and regional approaches in the Sahel region to increase the overall impact on security and development. In translating this comprehensive approach on fragility into action, two main challenges emerge.
First, while the EU claims to be active at all stages of the conflict cycle, the complexity of funding sources and programming cycles for the EU’s external action and security instruments acts as a constraint on the coherent implementation of the strategy. In Mali, for example, the EU works through the regional and national indicative programmes under the European Development Fund (EDF), member states’ programmes, the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa4 and the Common Security and Defence Policy missions,5 the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, humanitarian aid and the EU Special Representative. This makes overall EU involvement difficult to grasp for all stakeholders, including partner country governments. From this perspective, the streamlining of the external action instruments proposed by the European Council for the next Multiannual Financial Framework for the 2021-27 period provides a good opportunity to increase coherence across the EU’s work in fragile contexts, promote better quality dialogue with partner country governments and improve the visibility of the EU’s assistance.
A second challenge emerges around how to reconcile short-term crisis response with transition and long-term development response. On the one hand, cross-policy responses to global risks are promoted in the EU Global Strategy, which recognises that peace is connected to prosperity and inclusion (European External Action Service, 2016). On the other hand, linking development co-operation with migration increases the risk of allocating development funds according to migration patterns, thus diluting focus on development objectives.
For example, in the Sahel situation, the EU’s regional action plan 2015-2020 is a clear response to the deteriorating security. But it was elaborated in a highly-charged political context as migration flows to Europe from Africa reached unprecedented levels.6 As a result, the EU was compelled to design a response plan to address the key drivers of migration in a context of shared competence with its member states (Council of the European Union, 2015). In this case, it is clear that the additional financing secured and instruments developed - most notably the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa - have facilitated co-ordination efforts among EU actors and external stakeholders.
However, this new paradigm has also raised concerns from civil society organisations and think tanks that the EU’s focus on security and migration is undermining its focus on partner countries’ long-term development needs, particularly by increasingly designing development co-operation programmes with their impact on security in mind7 (Trimmel, 2017; Castillejo et al., 2018). The risk of subordinating development objectives to broader security and migration concerns, then, remains a key challenge for the EU, as it does for other DAC members. In the EU’s case, this challenge might be exacerbated by the proposed streamlining of instruments in the upcoming MFF if appropriate safeguards are not included.
In such complex contexts where even defining objectives is difficult, it is extremely hard to measure results. In this respect, the EU Conflict Early Warning System, introduced in 2014 to analyse a series of risk factors that can lead to conflict, is a key element in the design of the EU’s integrated approach (European Commission, 2016b). The EU is thus improving the link between early warning and early action in order to respond to early warnings in a timely, relevant and coherent way to prevent the emergence or escalation of violence (Council of the European Union, 2017b). In addition, the proposed Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27 presents an opportunity to bring the EU’s comprehensive approach to the next level by articulating at the design phase how different instruments will work together to meet common objectives and how results will be measured. Chapter 3 discusses EU financing in greater detail.
Basis for decision making
The European Union is expanding its global influence, including by increasing its geographic reach, in line with the ambitions of the new Consensus and through proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27. However, it lacks a clear implementation plan to shift resources towards priorities and to identify strategic partners.
The European Union is increasing its global reach and expanding its influence
Based on the new Consensus, which sets the direction for EU development policy, the EU uses a methodology8 for country allocation based on five indicators. They are: population; GNI per capita; the Human Asset Index; the Economic Vulnerability Index; and Worldwide Governance Indicators, with a qualitative adjustment “reflecting criteria that cannot be fully captured through quantitative measures” (European Commission, 2018a). However, this methodology applies only to the country programming of the Commission which excludes humanitarian aid and programming of the European Investment Bank. In practice, and given the EU’s increasing global footprint, decision making on resource allocation is determined by a complex array of financial instruments,9 most of which are focussed geographically rather than thematically. The instruments also provide a framework for programming that ensures the predictability of spending on EU external action.
Negotiations over the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27 are paving the way for a new architecture for development co-operation (European Commission, 2018). This includes a larger global role for the EU, a stronger sense of European value added, a sharper focus on global public goods, and increased flexibility to move funding between programmes and to create reserves to tackle unforeseen events and crises (Gavas, 2018).
Regarding the development co-operation of EU member states, the co-ordinating influence of the EU over their decisions is limited. For example, even though the Consensus prioritises providing aid to the poorest and most in need and reiterates the ODA/GNI target of 0.15% - 0.2% for LDCs, this has yet to be met. Therefore, the extent to which the EU’s co-ordinating role drives decision-making in member states warrants further review. Furthermore, the EU lags well behind the EU member states on the proportion of allocable bilateral ODA going to least developed countries, making its co-ordinating role particularly challenging when it is unable to lead by example (Chapter 3). Overall, the EU currently lacks a clear implementation plan for the 2030 Agenda, linking the Consensus with its instruments and detailing how EU and member states collectively plan to allocate resources in line with priorities across all 29 parallel programmes.
The EU lacks a comprehensive strategy for partnership identification
The 2017 Consensus commits the EU to forge multiple partnerships in bringing collaborative solutions to local, regional and global challenges. For example, as highlighted in Chapter 1, the EU is increasingly using its convening power in multilateral fora to successfully extend its global influence. It is also a significant provider of bilateral aid through multilateral channels (Chapter 3). Furthermore, there is increasing collaboration with International Financial Institutions - particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group - where concrete steps have been taken to map relations, define partnership modalities, identify focal points in various Director Generals, create co-ordination groups, develop guiding principles, and establish annual high level strategic dialogues.
However, when it comes to defining its approach to multilateral co-operation, particularly with organisations that the Commission funds (Chapter 3), the EU lacks a general strategy. This is partly explained by the EU’s decentralisation of authority to delegations on multilateral partnerships. Nevertheless, a clearer and more transparent approach to partnering with multilateral agencies could help inform choices and ensure that funding is based on evidence of how specific partnerships might add value (Chapter 5).
Since the last DAC peer review, the EU has expanded its bilateral partnerships to 140 countries from around 130 - a global coverage that is significantly broader than the development co-operation programmes of individual member states. In determining its bilateral partnerships, the DAC’s 2012 review noted the EU’s approach was one of expansion, identifying the comparative advantage of its development programme as its scale and reach (OECD, 2012). At the same time, despite efforts to establish developing country selection criteria that apply to part of the EU’s development co-operation (outlined in the previous section), high level statements on country partnership selection can appear contradictory. For example, while the Global Strategy states that prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe, it refers to aligning the EU’s development policy and choice of partners more closely with EU interests, making no mention of least developed countries. Meanwhile, the 2017 Consensus stipulates that development will be targeted at countries where it is most needed.
As noted in the previous section, differentiation is a guiding principle for the EU’s development co-operation, signalling a dual approach whereby the EU aims to target its resources to countries where they are most needed while also pursuing different investment or knowledge-based partnerships with middle income countries that are already on sustained growth paths. However, despite this in-principle focus on countries that are most in need, the proportion of EU disbursements to upper-middle income countries is high, representing 43% of its allocable bilateral ODA in 2015-16, compared to 27% to least developed countries (Chapter 3).
As the EU looks to expand its assistance to least developed countries, it could further build on its focus on knowledge exchange and private resource mobilisation in middle income countries as they are less resource intensive. This would in turn offer good opportunities to shift its financial support to countries most in need. For instance, partnering approaches with middle income countries and large emerging economies in Latin America and Asia by many DAC members are evolving to meet increased demand for more and better technical and policy advisory support (Davies and Pickering, 2015). Therefore, current plans by the EU to scale up triangular co-operation programmes, facilities and management tools, could be an effective way to reallocate financial support from middle income countries to the poorer countries (European Commission, 2018). Experience from other DAC members may offer important lessons to develop this partnership modality further.
The EU’s engagement and partnerships in Brussels with civil society and Associations of Local Authorities are strategic and comprehensive. They are particularly facilitated through the European Commission’s Policy Forum on Development (PFD) for more structured dialogue. The EU is also mainstreaming its framework partnership agreements for medium-term engagement with them. At country level, EU delegations are also implementing country roadmaps to help diagnose and define a tailored approach to CSO engagement in each country. However, as demonstrated in Mali and Bolivia, the EU could do more to engage civil society as strategic partners; this is an area that could be enhanced if the EU is to extend its whole-of-society approach to its partner countries with a view to improve its implementation through local solutions (Chapter 5 and Annex D).
Furthermore, in line with its global commitment to financing for development, the EU is scaling up its partnerships with the private sector based on twelve key areas of action and defined criteria for engagement (European Commission, 2014), although they do not extend to the European Investment Bank. Moreover, the EU’s External Investment Plan (EIP), presented in 2016, offers an ambitious approach to strengthening the investment climate and regulatory environment in EU partner countries, which is to be complemented by a new guarantee fund to reduce investment risks for, inter alia, low-emission and resource-efficient business projects (Chapter 3). As this approach to private sector partnerships rolls out, the EU would benefit from ensuring that these efforts add value rather than duplicate the work of EU member states, when it channels their contributions to their own national development financial institutions as intermediaries to reach the private sector.
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Notes
← 1. The Lisbon Treaty maintains that development co-operation is to be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action. Its primary objective is the reduction of poverty, and in the long- term, eradication of poverty. However, the EU’s legal framework defines development co-operation as a shared competence - the EU and of member states “shall complement and reinforce each other”. See the Treaty of Lisbon at http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445325.0007 .01/DOC_19 and Article 208, TFEU, 2010.
← 2. Since 2000, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement has been the framework for the EU’s relations with 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The agreement focusses on eradication of poverty, sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries in the world economy. It seeks to increase peace and security and to strengthen the domestic political environment. Renewal of the 2000-20 Cotonou Agreement is under way, with the integration of the budget of the European Development Fund to be expected in the EU’s general budget. This would also allow the European Parliament to scrutinise the European Development Fund budget.
← 3. This is based on the DAC gender equality policy marker, taking into account only bilateral allocable ODA to measure donor’s intentionality, which includes sector budget support, core support to NGOs, other private bodies, PPPs and research institutes, contributions to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations, basket funds/pooled funding, project-type interventions, donor country personnel, other technical assistance, and scholarships/training in donor country. At the same time, the Commission reported that it integrated gender equality into 57% of its ODA as principal or significant objective in 2016 and 66% in 2017. However, this does not include ODA by the EIB.
← 4. The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability to address root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa is created under the European Development Fund. Its objective is to promote resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development as well as to address human rights’ abuses. See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/emergency-trust-fund-stability-and-addressing-root-causes-irregular-migration-and-displaced-persons_en. (EU, 2015).
← 5. These missions are EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali.
← 6. This can be seen in the sharp rise in asylum applications from non-EU citizens in the 28 EU member states from 2006-16.
← 7. The Sahel Regional Action Plan has set four priorities, three of which relate to security and migration. The priorities are: fighting and preventing violent extremism and radicalisation; creating appropriate conditions for youth; migration; mobility and border management; the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21522/st07823-en15.pdf.
← 8. For more detailed information on EU allocation criteria, see https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/allocation-methodology_en_3.pdf.
← 9. As discussed in chapter 3, a multiannual financial framework sets out maximum amounts that the EU budget can allocate to different priorities or headings (Article 312, TFEU). The EU’s external assistance, including its ODA, is contained in Heading 4 (Global Europe) of the EU budget and in the European Development Fund (EDF), which is not part of the EU budget. The current 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework allocates an envelope of EUR 58.778 billion to Heading 4. The 11th EDF covers the same time period with a current budget of EUR 30.5 billion and is composed of direct member state contributions. It is the legal basis of the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states. The EDF is also due to expire in 2020 and is under negotiation, with a proposal to bring it into the EU budget under the development heading.