Chapter 1. Background
This chapter presents the situation of digital government in the context of developing countries, in particular, the African Portuguese-Speaking Countries and Timor-Leste (PALOP-TL) region. It assesses the major initiatives, programmes and principles on digital government that have been driving international organisations and multilateral donors in recent years. It maps the potential pathways that could help PALOP-TL countries shift from e-government to digital government systems, in light of the most recent body of learning on digital transformation (including the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies). Finally, it reviews the political stability, institutional quality and economic potential of each of the PALOP-TL countries, with reference to the most relevant digital economy, development and society indicators to better understand the potential for PALOP-TL countries to transform their digital and development capacities.
Challenges and opportunities in the digital era
In today’s world, various technologies have completely transformed the way we live and work1. This transformation is not merely a prolongation of the third industrial revolution, characterised by the use of information technology and electronics to automate production2, but rather a distinct era, where the speed of current breakthroughs has no historical precedent as it is evolving at an exponential pace and heralding entire systems of production, management and government (Schwab, 2016). The reason for this is that we live in an increasingly interconnected and multifaceted world where new technological developments lead to continuously improving and newer technology.
However, the enthusiasm generated around the potential to raise global income levels and improve the quality of life of populations around the world through the enduring effects of digital transformation is often cooled by the recognition that digital solutions can also generate inequality and insecurity. Automation is likely to replace less qualified labour throughout the economy in the long term. In addition, the development and use of new digital technologies is also a challenge to governments’ ability to protect citizens’ data and safeguard their privacy. Cybersecurity is a major challenge to digital transformation, which fortunately has been countered by breakthrough approaches to governance that rely on cryptographic methods, such as blockchain.
Notwithstanding the above, it is recognised that new digital solutions will increasingly enable citizens to engage with governments, voice their opinions, co-ordinate their efforts and even circumvent the supervision of public authorities to such an extent that governments will progressively “face pressure to change their approach to public engagement and policy making, as their central role of conducting policy diminishes owing to new sources of competition and the redistribution and decentralisation of power that new technologies make possible” (Schwab, 2016).
Digital transformation in the global context
The progressive integration of digital technologies (e.g. cloud computing, social media, mobile technology, and blockchain) into the everyday lives of citizens, businesses and public sectors is changing the administrative capabilities of government and augmenting its ability to create and deliver public goods and value. Countries at all levels of development are exploring the benefits of digital technologies to enable or improve public sector performance and the quality of services in progressively ambitious ways, contributing to an expansion of citizen trust in government. It is also raising citizen expectations of public services delivery, which brings attendant risks for countries with more limited administrative and institutional capabilities.
Digital technologies and services can enable inclusive3 and sustainable growth, the responsive delivery of public services, and governance improvements. They can offer opportunities for more collaborative and participatory relationships that allow relevant stakeholders (i.e. citizens, business and non-governmental organisations) to actively shape political priorities, collaborate in the design of public services and participate in their delivery, which provides more coherent and integrated solutions to complex challenges (OECD, 2014). They can also provide a catalyst for improving lives, for example, by boosting productivity and job creation, empowering women and girls, and enhancing democratic governance and transparency (European Commission, 2017). Given this potential, enabling the digital transformation of the public sector through citizen-driven approaches has fast become a leading objective of developed and developing country governments (World Bank, 2016a).
The World Bank’s “World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends” shows that digital technologies, primarily mobile phones and the Internet, have contributed to considerable growth. In developing countries, it is estimated that a 10% increase in high-speed internet connections, for instance, produces an average 1.4% increase in economic growth. Despite this potential, many developing countries are yet to realise the full benefits of digital technologies in meeting their socio-economic priorities and are unable to progress their own digital transformation due to the development constraints that they face. These constraints are not readily “fixed” or circumvented through blueprint plans, one-off events or one-size-fits-all strategies (Hanna, 2016). Despite efforts made to render information and communication technology (ICT) widely available (more than half of the world’s population in 2017 had access to the Internet), the penetration rate in the least developed countries was only 14.7% (Figure 1.1).
Source: ITU (2017), Facts and Figures 2017, Geneva, www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2017.pdf.
Internet access continues to be prohibitively expensive in many developing countries due to the lack of adequate ICT infrastructure or the absence of the regulatory frameworks needed to promote competitive broadband telecommunication services (ITU, 2017). In most developing countries, mobile broadband is more affordable than fixed broadband services. However, in 2017, despite high growth rates in developing countries and in least developed countries (LDCs), there were twice as many mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in developed countries than in developing countries, and four times as many in developed countries than in LDCs. Mobile broadband prices constitute more than 5% of gross national income (GNI) per capita in most LDCs and are therefore unaffordable for the majority of the population. Developing countries also have lower rates of high speed internet penetration than developed economies, with penetration rates at 6% (1.6% excluding China) and 24%, respectively (ITU, 2017).
The divide within countries is also wide, particularly for mobile broadband networks and internet use, which cover 84% of the global population but only 67% of the global rural population. The divide is also evident when considering other factors, such as income distribution, age, location (rural/urban) and gender (Figure 1.2).
Note: Based on research ICT Africa surveys - various years; the chart shows a simple average for 12 countries.
Source: World Bank (2016a), World Bank. 2016. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington, DC, www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2016.
Despite these constraints, the evidence points to the potential for a digital transformation in developing countries. For example, more households in developing countries (on average 8 out of 10) have mobile phones than have access to electricity or clean water (European Commission, 2017).
Sustainable development goals (SDGs) and digital government
External actors – private sector investors, multilateral organisations, bilateral actors – play an important role in supporting the digital transformation in developing countries. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (including its 17 sustainable development goals) do not establish a separate target for digital government, but rather, envisage the use of ICT as both a lever and an accelerator in the promotion of the SDGs. Specific reference is also made to digital technologies in the context of several specific SDGs, as shown in Table 1.1.
Besides the SDGs set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the United Nation’s (UN) Addis Ababa Action Agenda for financing development (AAAA)4, launched in 2015, makes explicit reference to the promotion of ICT, access to technology for all, and social innovation, and recognises the role of ICT as a mechanism for innovation. To this end, the Addis Agenda commits to:
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Promote the development and use of ICT, particularly in LDCs, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (including rapid universal and affordable access to the Internet).
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Facilitate accessible technology for persons with disabilities and promote access to technology and science for women, youth and children.
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Promote social innovation to support social well-being and sustainable livelihoods.
In addition, the Addis Agenda establishes four SDG indicators on ICT infrastructure as a basis to fulfil commitments on the development and use of ICT:
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Proportion of population covered by a mobile network, by technology (9.c).
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Proportion of individuals who own a mobile telephone, by sex (5.b).
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Fixed Internet broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, by speed (17. 6.2).
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Proportion of individuals using the Internet (17.8)5.
Multilateral strategies for digital transformation
Notwithstanding a positive evolution in the access and affordability of Internet services, the ambitious target set by SGD 9 to "significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020" presents an enormous challenge for developing country governments. Collaborative action on the part of government, the entrepreneurial sector, and the development community will be required to reach this target and bridge the digital divide.
According to the World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, “digital technologies have boosted growth, expanded opportunities, and improved service delivery. Yet their aggregate impact has fallen short and is unevenly distributed. The remaining digital divide needs closing for digital technologies to benefit everyone everywhere, especially regarding internet access. (…) To get the most out of the digital revolution, countries also need to work on the “analogue complements” – by strengthening regulations that ensure competition among businesses, by adapting workers’ skills to the demands of the new economy, and by ensuring that institutions are accountable”.
Most multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank6 and the European Union7, have been embracing this vision by adopting intervention strategies that simultaneously seek to expand digital connectivity in developing countries (for example, through financing broadband infrastructure and supporting information technology industries, or by enabling the right policy and regulatory frameworks for a competitive ICT environment) and to develop and mainstream the use of digital platforms and solutions through digitalisation in priority sectors (education, health, registers, etc.). Their final goal is to help partner countries harness the benefits of digital technologies and reduce the digital divide.
In addition, several OECD Member States (e.g. Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden) have recognised the potential of digital solutions both in terms of achieving the sustainable development goals and connecting markets and industry in a win-win situation (European Commission, 2017). Accordingly, they have published, or are in the process of publishing, digital strategies for development. The US Department of State "Global Connect Initiative”, launched in 2016, is pledging to connect 1.5 billion people to the Internet by 2020, as already agreed in the 2014 International Telecommunications Union Connect 2020 agenda. At the same time, digital strategies for development began to be addressed by the World Economic Forum's "Internet for all" initiative (www.weforum.org/projects/internet-for-all).
Despite the significant efforts of the donor community to tackle and accelerate the digital transformation of developing countries, their strategies have mainly been designed to foster the use of ICT by governments as a tool to achieving better government. Accordingly, most funding has been channelled towards the development of digital infrastructures (e.g. telecommunication networks) and introducing digital technologies into public administrations in order to support the digitalisation of public services (registries, schools, hospitals, etc.). In other words, multilateral organisations have been supporting the design and implementation of turnkey e-government strategies, rather than adopting “more strategic approaches for a use of technology that spurs more open, participatory and innovative governments” (OECD, 2014).
This excessive focus on the use of technology to support government processes is a missed opportunity to set up more open approaches to policy making and public service delivery and to support more collaborative relationships that allow relevant stakeholders within developing countries to actively participate in the development of political priorities.
However, it should be pointed out that in 2015, a large group of development organisations8 endorsed the Principles for Digital Development – a set of nine guidelines established to promote effective practices in technology-enabled programmes for international development and co-operation9, and which are based on a vision that goes far beyond the use of technologies for better provision of public services. These principles are intended as neither static nor compulsory, but rather represent a set of organic guidance intended to help practitioners succeed in applying digital technologies in development programmes.
There lacks a common policy framework similar to the existing Council Recommendation for OECD countries to guide digital transformations in developing country contexts10. Although the range of programmes and countries benefiting from e-government or digital government is highly diverse, the body of existing lessons learned tends to be derived from a multiplicity of ad hoc digital government strategies, programmes and projects that show uneven results. Given this current policy gap, the OECD Council Recommendation and the findings of this report constitute an important contribution to this field of work.
The OECD Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies
In July 2014, OECD member countries, through the OECD Council, formally adopted a recommendation “that governments develop and implement digital government strategies” to assist and guide them to achieve digital transformation. The OECD Recommendation emphasises the crucial contribution of digital technologies as a strategic driver to create open, participatory and trustworthy public sectors, to improve social inclusiveness and government accountability, and to bring together government and non-government actors and develop innovative approaches to contribute to national development and long-term sustainable growth. The recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies (OECD, 2014) is the first international legal instrument on digital government and has 44 Adherents, including 9 non-OECD countries. The purpose of the recommendation is to provide guidance to governments seeking to shift from analogue and e-government models to digital government.
Source: Adapted by Authors, from OECD (2014), Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies, www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/recommendation-on-digital-government-strategies.htm.
Governments using analogue systems focus more on internal systems and procedures than on the needs of the end user. Governments adopting e-government strategies focus on using ICT to digitise systems and procedures, and centre their service delivery on the end user. Digital government, the final stage of digital transformation, prioritises public value creation as the core of digital government strategies by adopting an open and user-driven approach.
In recent years, digital strategies for the public sector have been guiding governments to take more efficient and responsive administrative action and ensure accountability towards their citizens. However, digital technologies can also catalyse economic growth, innovation and social cohesion and development. It can enable collaborative and participatory engagement that allows citizens, businesses and non-governmental organisations “to actively shape political priorities, collaborate in the design of public services and participate in their delivery, providing more coherent and integrated solutions to complex challenges” (OECD, 2014). To facilitate this approach, the OECD Recommendation highlights the shift from “government’s anticipating citizens’ and business’s needs (citizen-centric approaches) to citizens and businesses determining their own needs and addressing them in partnership with governments (citizen-driven approaches)”. In simple terms, this constitutes a paradigm shift from the e-government to digital government. The recommendation creates a series of provisions or principles to: engage citizens and enable open government to secure and maintain public trust, improve governance and co-ordination for better collaboration and results, and strengthen capabilities to achieve a return on digital investments (Figure 1.4).
Source: OECD elaboration based on OECD (2014), Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies, www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/recommendation-on-digital-government-strategies.htm.
This report adopts the recommendation of the Council as a guiding frame of reference, and combines the learning or guidance established within the recommendation with the large body of recent learning on building core government functions in developing countries.
Ensuring the digital transformation of the PALOP-TL region
Citizen-driven digital services delivery (i.e. the ability to provide digital services to users through a multichannel approach, combining face-to-face services with web portals, internet applications, mobile platforms, online banking services, etc.) driven by user needs and demands is a core element of the digital transformation. Such an outcome can only be achieved in contexts where non-governmental organisations, businesses, citizens’ associations and individuals take part in the processes of co-production, co-delivery and co-value creation (OECD, 2014).
In line with the recommendation, a series of instruments or “enablers”, such as interoperability frameworks, data standards and digital identity systems, can be used to support coherent, efficient and sustainable digital transformation of the public sector. However, the digital transformation of public administration requires that governments are capable of exercising a minimum set of executive functions in administrative domains: public financial management; administration of the centre of government; management of the civil service; and local government and downstream public services delivery.
The ability of developing country governments to undertake core administrative functions (such as collecting revenues, monitoring expenditure, processing statistical data or managing the civil service) is an essential precondition for growth, development and change, and constitutes the foundations for a transition from analogue and e-government systems to the creation of a digital government. In the absence of these core government capabilities, an effective digital transformation could not be achieved or sustained, particularly in developing countries.
The theory of change adopted for this body of work asserts that the pathway of digital evolution or transition in developing or transition countries is messy, non-linear and subject to reversals. Although the pathways of digitisation or digital government reform may diverge across different developing country contexts, successful processes of digitisation tend to exhibit three common building blocks or elements: the use of digital solutions for the delivery of core government functions; establishing the foundations or key enablers for a digital government transition; and developing digital services for citizens and businesses.
This report examines each of these components in turn, looking at the role of digital technologies in the delivery of core government functions, the preconditions or foundations for digital government, and the level of development of digital services delivery in the PALOP-TL region. Recognising that each of these components is mutually complementary and need not happen in sequence (some elements could take place simultaneously), this report also seeks to identify the links or connections between these different elements, and any specific policy decisions or actions that may have led to particular results or outcomes.
Characteristics of the PALOP-TL region
The size of a country’s economic potential, together with its level of political stability11 and institutional quality and capability12, constitute important parameters through which to filter analysis, as these will heavily influence, if not determine, the trajectory of a country’s digital development. The physical, spatial and social attributes of a country are also important.
Despite geographical discontinuity and different levels of development, the PALOP-TL region shares a strong identity based on a common history and language. The region’s longstanding co-operation, which started in the 1970s, covers a wide range of mutual interests across cultural, economic, social and political domains. Timor-Leste joined in 2007, rendering the new acronym for the group – PALOP-TL13.
PALOP-TL co-operation has also facilitated the integration as members of all these countries into the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), which was created in 1996. The permanent co-operation framework within the CPLP has contributed to the PALOP-TL group evolving from a shared cultural heritage to a geopolitical and economic community.
Despite sharing the same language and having common cultural, legal and even institutional characteristics, PALOP-TL countries also widely differ. The size of their respective populations varies: from 200 000 citizens in Sao Tome and Principe to 28 million in Mozambique. There are 56.5 million citizens across the PALOP-TL community or region in total. Their geographical distinctions also stand out: three of these countries (Cabo Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor-Leste) are island states, and one is not located in Africa (Timor-Leste); Angola and Mozambique are much larger in size than the other countries.
The political outlook of PALOP-TL countries
All PALOP-TL countries have adopted multiparty political systems, but their political contexts widely differ. More than half have seen governments formed by different parties over time (Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor-Leste), whereas Angola and Mozambique have been governed by the same ruling parties (MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and FRELIMO – Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) since the first multiparty elections held in 1994 and 2008, respectively. There is also relative political stability in each country, with the exception of Guinea-Bissau, where six different governments have successively been sworn into office since elections in 2014.
Moreover, all PALOP-TL countries share similar semi-presidential constitutional systems, although over the years they have undergone changes towards more parliamentary (Cabo Verde and Sao Tome and Principe) or presidential-centered models (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Timor-Leste), depending on the political context of each country (Box 1.1).
In Angola, the 2010 Constitution established a new system, according to which the head of the party winning the most seats becomes the president. Conversely, in Mozambique, the head of state (the president of the republic) is elected by direct popular vote. However, in both countries, the president appoints the prime minister and remains the head of the executive. In contrast, in Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe, the president of the republic does not have the power to appoint the head of government according to his will, but rather according to the results of the legislative elections. In addition, the president has no executive powers. Finally, in Timor-Leste, although the prime minister is appointed by the most voted party or by the alliance parties with parliamentary majority, the ministers are nominated by the president of the republic, following the proposal of the prime minister.
Source: Adapted by Authors, from Legis-Palop+TL (2018), Base de Dados Jurídica Oficial, www.legis-palop.org.
Overall, experience has shown that, with the exception of Guinea-Bissau (where several governments have successively been dismissed by the head of state based on a “presidentialist” interpretation of the constitution), the formal constitutional models adopted in PALOP-TL countries have not significantly impacted political stability given the divergent paths that such models have followed in each country.
In addition to the low frequency of incidents of serious political violence, the political stability of PALOP-TL countries can be assessed by the extent to which elections are generally considered free and fair by the international community (occasional allegations of electoral fraud by opposition parties in some countries are often dismissed due to a lack of evidence) (Box 1.2).
In Angola, the 2017 elections brought President João Gonçalves Lourenço into office, Angola’s first change of president in 38 years. The ruling party (MPLA), led by Lourenço, received 61% of the vote, thus helping to maintain political stability since the end of the 27-year civil war in 2002. In Cabo Verde, the latest round of parliamentary elections was held in March 2016, resulting in an orderly and constitutional change of government, following the victory of the opposition party Movement for Democracy (MpD), thus succeeding to an African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV) government which had been in power for 15 years. In Mozambique, despite occasional instances of civil unrest (associated with increases in the cost of staple foods and basic goods) and the growing demand for social accountability (boosted by the emergence of civil society interest groups), FRELIMO, the ruling party, has been in power since the first multi-election held in 1994. In Sao Tome and Principe, the Acção Democrática Independente party (ADI) currently controls both the legislature and the presidency (new legislative elections are scheduled to occur in October 2018). More recently, early parliamentary elections were held in Timor-Leste: the Alliance for Change and Progress (AMP), a coalition of three opposition parties led by Xanana Gusmão’s National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), won an absolute majority of 34 of the 65 seats in Parliament. Guinea-Bissau can somehow be considered an outlier in the context of the PALOP-TL region: since independence, four successful coups have been recorded in Guinea-Bissau, with another 16 coups attempted, plotted, or alleged (World Bank, 2016b).
Sources:
World Bank (2017a), Country overview (Angola), Washington, DC
World Bank (2017b), Country overview (Cabo Verde), Washington, DC
World Bank (2017c), Country overview (Guinea- Bissau), Washington, DC
World Bank (2017d), Country overview (Mozambique), Washington, DC
World Bank (2017e), Country overview (Sao Tome and Principe), Washington, DC
World Bank (2017f), Country overview (Timor-Leste), Washington, DC
All PALOP-TL countries are unitary, non-federal states. However, in some countries, municipalities have been created and play an important role in the central-local political dynamics (Cabo Verde, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe). In other countries, local authorities are designated by the executive (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste), although democratic decentralisation is envisaged in the political agenda of the vast majority of PALOP-TL countries.
In general, the rights of minorities, freedom of the press and the rule of law vary greatly from country to country. According to the report "Freedom in the World 2018" (Freedom House, 2018), only Cabo Verde, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor-Leste are considered "free countries". Due to restrictions in political rights and civil liberties, Angola is still considered a "non-free country", while Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are considered "partially free countries". It should be pointed out that Timor-Leste improved its status from "Partially Free" to "Free" in that report due to fair elections that led to a soft transfer of power and allowed new parties and candidates to enter the political system. In Angola there are high expectations about how the new president will stem corruption and ease restrictions on politics, the media, and civil society.
Following the end of single-party regimes, all PALOP-TL countries have adopted free-market economic systems, albeit in some cases the state still maintains land ownership and some limitations remain on foreign investment (a trend that has been easing).
Institutional quality and capability in PALOP-TL countries
According to Hanna (2016), digital transformation in developing countries should occur in continuous interaction with the national development strategy and as a crosscutting enabler of priority economic sectors. In addition, “attention to building local policy and planning capabilities is much needed: to provide strategic direction, to plan and implement digital transformation”. The capacity of governments to implement digital transformation (and to adapt planning processes to diverse local contexts and stakeholders) is thus concomitant with a credible and durable transformative process. The more that institutions are strong and resilient to change, and the more stable and inclusive the political system, the more prepared countries will be able to successfully conduct their processes of digital transformation.
The OECD recommends that governments develop and implement digital government strategies which ensure greater transparency, openness and inclusiveness of government processes and operations (recommendation #1) and encourages engagement and participation of public, private and civil society stakeholders in policy making and public service design and delivery (#2), namely through the development of institutional capacities to help facilitate the engagement of all age groups and population segments (OECD, 2014). In addition, in developing their digital government strategies, governments should secure leadership and political commitment to the strategy (#5), ensure coherent use of digital technologies across policy areas and levels of government (#6) and establish effective organisational and governance frameworks to co-ordinate the implementation of the digital strategy within and across levels of government (#7).
The pre-requisites to ensure the success of long-term digital transformation processes (Figure 1.6) demand institutional quality and capability from the governments of PALOP-TL countries, but there is no standalone formula or established set of indicators to assess the institutional quality and capability of governments. However, among several dimensions of governance, one could be used as a proxy indicator for institutional quality and capability: government effectiveness. According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ definition, the “government effectiveness [indicator] captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (World Bank, 2018a).
Sources: Adapted by Authors, Hanna (2016), Mastering Digital Transformation – Towards a Smart Society, Economy, City, and Nation, Emerald Publishing Limited.
OECD (2014), Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies, www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/recommendation-on-digital-government-strategies.htm
The perception-based assessment carried out as part of the World Governance Indicators Report (World Bank, 2018a) shows very different, and somewhat negative results, concerning government effectiveness in the PALOP-TL region, although Angola and Timor-Leste recorded a modest improvement over the last 10 years (from 6/100 and 9/100 in 2006, to 14/100 and 13/100 in 2016, respectively). In 2016, Cabo Verde achieved by far the best result of all PALOP-TL countries (57/100), distancing more than 30 points from the second best result (Sao Tome and Principe - 26/100) and 53 points from the worst (Guinea-Bissau – 4/100). One possible explanation for these results is that Cabo Verde is widely recognised (including by the international community) for its good governance, strong institutions and low corruption. Conversely, the frequent changes in government and the governments’ inability to present their political programmes to the National Assembly (which has not opened since 2014) severely impacts on government effectiveness in Guinea-Bissau.
The capacity to undertake the prospective reforms needed to ensure and accelerate digital transformation can also be assessed by two further indicators: political stability and institutional capacity. According to the Institutional Profiles Database 2016 (Directorate General of the Treasury/Government of France, 2018), political stability refers to the functioning of political institutions, the influential organisations in public life and the participation of the populations (or the extent to which diverse social, economic, and political viewpoints are incorporated into decision making). The institutional capacity of governments can be assessed by the functioning of public administrations; the co-ordination of stakeholders; strategy, vision and innovation; and the security of transactions and contracts (or the degree to which policy stability and bargains over time can be enforced).
Angola and Mozambique, when compared to other developing countries in terms of political stability and institutional capacity, show the following results14:
Source: Directorate General of the Treasure/Government of France, (2018), Institutional Profiles Database 2016, Paris, www.cepii.fr/institutions/EN/download.asp.
Based on the indicators used to assess the institutional quality and capability of PALOP-TL countries, it is possible to conclude that, globally, the governments show weaknesses, both in terms of governance effectiveness and in terms of political stability and institutional capacity. This may challenge their ability to ensure the success of digital transformation processes in the long term.
An economic perspective of PALOP-TL countries
PALOP-TL countries comprise a mixture of heavily indebted countries (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe), small island developing states, and in at least one case, Cabo Verde, a country of lower middle income status. The size of their relative economies also widely varies, with the gross domestic product (GDP) of Angola and Mozambique at USD 95 335 and USD 11 015 billion respectively, vastly higher than that of the other PALOP-TL countries (check Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9, respectively).
Source: World Bank (2018b), World Bank Open Data (Angola), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola
World Bank (2018c), World Bank Open Data (Cabo Verde), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/caboverde
World Bank (2018d), World Bank Open Data (Guinea Bissau), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/guineabissau
World Bank (2018e), World Bank Open Data (Mozambique), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique
World Bank (2018f), World Bank Open Data (Sao Tome and Principe), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/saotome
World Bank (2018g), World Bank Open Data (Timor-Leste), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste
Source: World Bank (2018b), World Bank Open Data (Angola), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola
World Bank (2018c), World Bank Open Data (Cabo Verde), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/caboverde
World Bank (2018d), World Bank Open Data (Guinea Bissau), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/guineabissau
World Bank (2018e), World Bank Open Data (Mozambique), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique
World Bank (2018f), World Bank Open Data (Sao Tome and Principe), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/saotome
World Bank (2018g), World Bank Open Data (Timor-Leste), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste
Both Timor-Leste and Angola (Africa’s second largest oil producer) are resource rich developing countries with considerable economic potential. However, an over reliance on oil threatens their growth and development potential15 (Figure 1.10).
Note: Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production.
Source: World Bank (2018b), World Bank Open Data (Angola), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola
World Bank (2018g), World Bank Open Data (Timor-Leste), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste
World Bank (2018h), World Bank Open Data (Gabon), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/gabon
World Bank (2018i), World Bank Open Data (Nigeria), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria
Oil represents over 95% of Angola’s exports, and the sharp and prolonged decline in its price since mid-2014 has had a significant impact on Angola’s economy. Reduced revenues have caused GDP growth to decelerate from an annual average of 10.3% (from 2004 to 2014), to only 1.5% (since 2015). This has also negatively affected non-oil revenues (World Bank, 2017a).
With 95% of its current revenues derived from oil and gas exports, the government of Timor-Leste has been investing in the non-oil economy, and it is projected to grow at 5% on average in the period 2015 to 2020. However, immense challenges remain. Ensuring Timor-Leste’s young people are educated, healthy, and productively employed are arguably the biggest development challenges the country faces over the next decade. With 60% of the population under 25 years of age, Timor-Leste is one of the youngest countries in the world (World Bank, 2017f).
Despite the lack of natural resources (foreign direct investment and tourism exports are its major sources of growth), Cabo Verde’s successful socio-economic development during the last decade is widely recognised as among the most impressive socio-economic performance in Africa, with the country graduating from UN Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2007. The country has also made impressive progress on social development indicators, including poverty reduction16, although progress remains uneven, particularly among the different islands and between rural and urban areas. The percentage of the population living below the national poverty line still averaged 35% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017b).
Guinea-Bissau’s economy also continues to expand despite political gridlock and the suspension of donor flows to the country. Real GDP growth is projected to average 5% in 2016–2018, although this acceleration in growth reflects the assumption that output from the agriculture sector will remain fairly robust (mostly cashew production), and that political stability is achieved to allow for a return of donor financing that would support a recovery in secondary sectors17 (World Bank, 2017c).
In Mozambique, following a sustained increase in GDP between 1993 and 2013, at a rate of 7.4% per year on average, the country has recently experienced a decline in its rate of growth, largely on account of fiscal tightening and a slowdown in foreign direct investment18. The economy is led by mineral fuels, including oil (51.8% of total exports) and aluminium (26.6%). Critiques argue that growth has not been inclusive, with moderate to extreme poverty still heavily concentrated in rural areas and in the central and northern regions of the country. Currently, about half of Mozambicans live on less than USD 1 a day, and more than 60% of the population live in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2016c).
Sao Tome and Principe is a small island economy with no single source of economic activity that serves as a driver of growth. Tourism is an important and growing activity, but it has not been able to support growth on an economy-wide basis19. Historically, agriculture has been a strongly performing sector, with exports of cocoa, coffee, and palm oil increasing in recent years, but this has not compensated for the growth of imports. The country’s robust GDP growth in recent years (propelled by rising world cocoa prices, bonus payments for petroleum exploration, and foreign direct investment in tourism20) has also not translated into commensurate poverty reduction (World Bank, 2017e).
Due to large differences in economic and income potential across PALOP-TL countries, their respective levels of financial autonomy are also reflected in their relative level of dependence on external aid (Table 1.3).
PALOP-TL countries’ development indicators
According to the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations country classifications, PALOP-TL countries can be classified as follows:
The latest UN Human Development Index Report ranks Cabo Verde 122 out of 188 countries and territories, followed by Timor-Leste (133), Sao Tome and Principe (142), Angola (150), Guinea-Bissau (178) and Mozambique (181) (Table 1.5).
An important conclusion to be drawn from this data is that there is a large disparity in gross national income (GNI) per capita among PALOP-TL countries, ranging from a maximum of USD 6 291 in Angola, to a minimum of USD 1 098 in Mozambique. Income inequality in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (measured by the Gini coefficient21 ) is among the highest in the group (50.7 and 45.6 respectively)22.
In terms of key human development indicators, including those most relevant for digital development, results are again uneven. In general, the adult literacy rate (above 15-years-old) is low. In 2015, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had literacy rates well below the 70% average for the PALOP-TL region (59.9% and 58.8% respectively), although Guinea-Bissau has made great progress since 2000 when the literacy rate was calculated as only 41.4% of the population aged over 15 years. Cabo Verde has the highest literacy rate of countries in the group at 87.6% when last measured in 2015 (Figure 1.11).
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016), Human Development Index Report 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.
In 2015, the PALOP-TL group recorded an average of 321.33 maternal deaths per 100 000 births (from a maximum of 549 deaths in Guinea-Bissau to a minimum of 42 in Cabo Verde), below the average recorded in Africa (including several Sub-Saharan countries and Algeria), which was 542 deaths per 100 000 births (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). The data on child and infant mortality suggest that by these measures, PALOP-TL countries are also struggling. In Angola, the child mortality rate23 is among the highest in the world, although the rates of infant mortality dropped from 121.2 to 96 deaths per 1 000 live births in 10 years. Similar efforts have been made by the other PALOP-TL countries (Figure 1.12).
Note: Mozambique (2005 = 90.4; 2010 = 71,9; 2015 = 56.7) / Guinea-Bissau (2005 = 90.1; 2010 = 73.4; 2015 = 60.3).
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016), Human Development Index Report 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.
Despite modest improvements in national development indicators compared with the 188 countries currently measured, only Angola and Timor-Leste have improved their Human Development Index ranking compared to the position reached in 2003, and Timor-Leste has the benefit of its considerable natural resources (Figure 1.13).
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2016), Human Development Index Report 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf.
The digital economy and society indicators in PALOP-TL countries
In the PALOP-TL region, as elsewhere, the digitalisation of public administration has progressed significantly in recent years, with digital technologies rapidly penetrating the daily lives of government, private sector/business, civil society and community. A number of countries, principally Mozambique and Angola, also exhibit the underlying preconditions necessary to transition from e-government to the creation of a digital ecosystem, and Cabo Verde has already taken important steps as part of this transition.
Common indicators can be identified as illustrating this trend. These measures also reflect the rapid, albeit uneven, adoption of digital technologies in the six countries. During the period of 2007-2016, for example, mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people in the PALOP-TL region increased by more than 300%, from an average of 19.9% to 87.3% (Figure 1.14).
Mobile penetration has in some way compensated for the structural difficulties faced by PALOP-TL countries in providing fixed broadband connections throughout the territory.24 When reviewed against fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people during the same period of 2007-2016, mobile penetration increased in the region from 0.2% to 0.8% (ITU, 2017), illustrating the high potential of mobile technologies compared with fixed broadband communications.
Source:
World Bank (2018b), World Bank Open Data (Angola), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola.
World Bank (2018c), World Bank Open Data (Cabo Verde), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/caboverde.
World Bank (2018d), World Bank Open Data (Guinea Bissau), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/guineabissau.
World Bank (2018e), World Bank Open Data (Mozambique), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique.
World Bank (2018f), World Bank Open Data (Sao Tome and Principe), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/saotome.
World Bank (2018g), World Bank Open Data (Timor-Leste), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste.
The levels of Internet use by individuals in PALOP-TL countries also increased between 2007-2016, from an average of 4.8% in 2007 to 22.6% in 2016 – slightly higher than the average of 20% across the Sub-Saharan Africa Continent25 (ITU, 2017). When measured at a country level, Internet use shows higher levels of variation (Figure 1.15). Cabo Verde experienced an impressive uptake of Internet usage in the population between 2006 and 2017 (from 8.3% to 48.2%); Sao Tome and Principe ranks second highest in the region; Timor-Leste and Mozambique demonstrated a spike in Internet uptake from 2013 and 2012, respectively; the pace of Internet penetration has been slower in Angola than among peers in the region; and Guinea-Bissau presents as an outlier, with limited to no Internet uptake during this period, largely due to contextual constraints (e.g. high political instability with negative effects on social and economic development).
Source:
World Bank (2018b), World Bank Open Data (Angola), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/angola.
World Bank (2018c), World Bank Open Data (Cabo Verde), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/caboverde.
World Bank (2018d), World Bank Open Data (Guinea Bissau), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/guineabissau.
World Bank (2018e), World Bank Open Data (Mozambique), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique.
World Bank (2018f), World Bank Open Data (Sao Tome and Principe), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/saotome.
World Bank (2018g), World Bank Open Data (Timor-Leste), Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste.
Seizing on the progressive integration of digital technologies in PALOP-TL countries, the governments of the six countries have worked to promote the digitalisation of public administration and the benefits of digital technologies in order to deliver core government functions, create the institutional foundations for a digital government ecosystem, and enhance citizen-driven approaches to public service development.
In terms of the levels of digital development among PALOP-TL countries, the United Nations E-Government Development Index (Table 1.6) shows some level of deviation between higher performing countries, such as Cabo Verde and Timor-Leste, and the other countries. The results of the index clearly speak to the underlying development conditions that can constrain the digital development of a given country, with Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau ranked 154th, 155th, 160th and 187th, respectively, among 193 countries.
With the PALOP-TL context laid out in brief above, the following chapters will focus on the potential for e-government to enable or reinforce the delivery of core government functions (Chapter 2), building on the institutional foundations of a sound digital government ecosystem (Chapter 3), and citizen-driven approaches for coherent and sustainable digital service delivery (Chapter 4).
References
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Notes
← 1. Including, among others, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, synthetic biology and 3D/4D printing technology.
← 2. In the first technological revolution (industrial revolution), water and steam power were used to mechanise production, whereas in the second, the use of electric power was mainstreamed to create mass production.
← 3. Inclusion is also felt by the economies of scale generated by the use of digital technologies. In effect, the more people and companies use digital services, the more useful and valuable they become (World Bank, 2016a). Digital payment systems like M-Pesa in Kenya and E-Kwanza in Angola are good examples.
← 4. More than just a framework, the Addis Agenda embodies several hundred concrete actions that Member States of the United Nations pledged to undertake individually and collectively. As subsequently emphasised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the General Assembly in September 2015, full implementation of the Addis Agenda is critical for the realisation of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and targets.
← 5. Two additional indicators have been proposed to serve as proxies to measure advances in the level of skills in the use of ICT: proportion of youth/adults with ICT skills by type of skills (4.4.1), and proportion of schools with access to the Internet and computers for pedagogical purposes (4.a.1).
← 6. To make digital solutions available to developing countries and operationalise the ambitious agenda outlined by the 2016 World Development Report, the World Bank launched the Digital Development Partnership (DDP), a platform for digital innovation and development finance. The DDP brings together public and private sector partners to foster the creation and implementation of digital development strategies, to facilitate global knowledge exchange on digital development, and to make digital solutions available to developing countries with an emphasis on data and indicators, digital economy enabling environment, cybersecurity, Internet access for all and digital government.
← 7. The European Union has recently approved a working document called “Digital4Development: mainstreaming digital technologies and services into EU Development Policy” (European Commission, 2017). Digital4Development is a framework for mainstreaming digital technologies into development policy and details and operationalises the objectives set out in the “Commission Communication concerning a proposal for a new European Consensus on Development” (2016) on the usage of digital technologies in development. It covers four main priority areas: access to affordable and secure broadband connectivity and to digital infrastructure, including the necessary regulatory reforms; digital literacy and skills; digital entrepreneurship and job creation; and digital technologies as an enabler for sustainable development. As part of the Digital4Development initiative, the European Commission has prepared an indicative list of actions to be funded in the medium term (2018-2020), to be agreed in conformity with the rules and procedures regarding programming and implementation of the relevant financial instruments.
← 8. Those development organisations included: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; UNICEF; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; United States Agency for International Development; World Health Organization; World Bank Group; World Food Programme; and World Vision International.
← 9. Starting in the late 2000s, several large donors and multilateral organisations began talking about the use of technology in development. Sets of principles, lessons, and best practices began emerging, beginning with the UNICEF Innovation Principles in 2009. A year later, a group of health practitioners and donors met and independently developed a different set of guidance known as the Greentree Principles. These two sets of principles were organised and worded differently, but encompassed similar ideas. Other sets of similar principles soon followed, some focused at the national level, like the UK’s Government Design Services Digital Principles, and others related to internal, institutional procurement processes, such as the World Bank’s Open Development Principles. A "Principles for Digital Development Working Group" was launched in 2014, followed by an endorsement campaign in 2015.
← 10. However, it is worth noting that the OECD has taken the lead in benchmarking digital government strategies in non-OECD countries using the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies as a frame of reference. For instance, “Benchmarking Digital Government Strategies in MENA Countries” (OECD, 2017).
← 11. Political stability refers to the functioning of political institutions, the influential organisations in public life and the participation of the populations – or the extent to which diverse social, economic, and political viewpoints are incorporated into decision making.
← 12. Institutional capacity refers to the functioning of public administrations, the co-ordination of stakeholders, strategy, vision and innovation, and the security of transactions and contracts – or the degree to which policy stability and bargains over time can be enforced.
← 13. The European Union is supporting the group since 1992 through the EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) co-operation framework and the European Development Fund financial instruments.
← 14. The “Institutional Profile Database” does not yet provide data regarding the other PALOP-TL countries.
← 15. Timor-Leste reached Peak Oil in 2012, and current reserves under production are expected to be depleted by 2021. Development of a major new field, “Greater Sunrise”, remains the subject of intense bilateral negotiations between the Government of Australia and Timor-Leste.
← 16. Cabo Verde’s average life expectancy is the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2011, 94% of children under one year of age were fully immunised, and the percentage of the total population living less than half an hour from a health centre reached 86%. Similarly, education outcomes put Cabo Verde at the top of Sub-Saharan Africa. The country also made considerable progress on increasing basic services, including in health and water and sanitation. (Human Development Report database - http://hdr.undp.org/en/data).
← 17. Poverty in Guinea-Bissau is high and increased between 2002 and 2010. Nearly 1.2 million people (69.4%) were poor in 2010. One-third of the population (33.1%) lived in extreme poverty, surviving on under USD 1 per adult equivalent per day (national extreme poverty line) (World Bank, 2017g).
← 18. Traditional export earnings dropped due to depressed global demand and the weak foreign currency inflows, as gas mega projects were interrupted and external partners suspended budget support (African Development Bank, 2017).
← 19. Oil exploration has been taking place since 2012, however, production isn’t expected until after 2020.
← 20. Real GDP is expected to average 4.9% in 2018-19, supported by public investment in infrastructure, and rising activity in the tourism and construction sector.
← 21. Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income or wealth distribution of a nation’s residents. It’s the most commonly used measurement of inequality.
← 22. Cabo Verde scores 47.2, Angola 42.7, Timor-Leste 31.6 and Sao Tome and Principe 30.8.
← 23. Regarding the healthcare sector, some of the indicators that best illustrate its state of development are the infant mortality rate and the maternal mortality ratio, as they highlight the discrepancies of countries in the delivery of basic health services.
← 24. Mobile broadband is predominately the technology chosen to cover large territories, where low population density makes fixed broadband harder to deploy and sustain economically. Mobile broadband networks (3G and 4G) reach 84% of the global population but only 67% of the global rural population. 4G networks have spread quickly since 2013 and reach almost 4 billion people today (53% of the global population), enhancing the quality of Internet use. In particular, since 2006 the African continent has leaped from 12 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants to 80 (European Commission, 2017).
← 25. Compared against the global average of 45%, however, there is still room for considerable improvement in the PALOP-TL region.