Chapter 7. Public governance and ways to implement it
This chapter describes cross-sector constraints affecting the proposed reforms and pre-conditions for carrying them out and speeding up progress towards the status of an emerging nation. It suggests creating a top-level unit to implement reforms and steer change and lists the major features of support needed for them: communication, co-ordination and follow-up. The condition of emerging nation must be the fruit of an agreement between the most senior politicians and be conveyed to all Ivorians, including the private sector. The government must ensure good co-operation between public bodies, since most of the reforms will need the involvement of many participants. Any economic transformation depends on robust monitoring and assessment of the reforms, so a table of indicators adapted to the country’s emergence is presented.
The MDCR presents detailed action plans to overcome the obstacles to achieving emergent nation status based on an in-depth study of Ivorian experience and its constraints, some of them reflecting problems that have long been evident. Sometimes the challenge lies not in identifying the constraints and how to apply solutions but to get the process of change under way. Problems arise from communicating the nature of the changes, co-ordinating the many parties involved required to take action, raising the resources to support the process, and then evaluating the results or adjusting the programme if necessary.
Côte d’Ivoire has made progress since recovery began in 2012, but constraints are preventing speedier application of the emergence programme
Carrying out change can be hard for many organisations, especially large bureaucracies such as government departments or those with many uncoordinated parties involved, which are based on regular and repetitive tasks and sometimes lack authority to make changes.
The MDCR’s recommendations call for thorough change by public bodies and many private participants and include modernising the tax administration, improving the status of technical and vocational training and encouraging the private sector to expand into new fields. To become an emerging country requires action on all fronts and strong government involvement going beyond simple funding.
The remarkable economic progress since 2012 is sometimes slowed by public bodies that need to be more efficient. Many governments find it hard to implement major reforms, grappling with poor communication, co-ordination and follow-up. Côte d’Ivoire’s public bodies often have major problems keeping up with the rapid changes of the revival period. Their internal mind-sets are not geared to performance and adapting to new things and they operate in bunkers, in isolation from each other, making success unlikely when new tasks are added.
This chapter does not aim to give a detailed and exhaustive list of recommendations, but highlight good practices and suggest useful approaches once adapted to Côte d’Ivoire. Many of the steps needed to remove emergence obstacles may seem obvious or banal but this is deceptive, as many organisations struggle to apply the basics required for successful management of change.
A solution for continuing ambitious reform: A top-level unit to carry out reforms and guide change
Implementation units, solutions to be adapted to local conditions
A special implementation unit could help priority projects move forward, push for more change and ensure action plans are working. The government must try permanently to expand the public administration’s capacity. As this can take time special units dedicated to the implementation of change are one way of meeting immediate issues, This arrangement is inspired by such units in the United Kingdom in the 1990s (Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit), and those in Malaysia (Performance Management & Delivery Unit, PEMANDU), Thailand, Indonesia (President’s Delivery Unit), and South Africa (Planning Commission). They organise introduction of the reforms and variously motivate and co-ordinate participants, ensure follow-up and assessment and monitor implementation and impact.
There is no universal approach or optimal model for implementation units, which depend on the country’s institutional and operational structure, which means there must first be an analysis of local institutions. When such a unit is considered appropriate, it can begin prioritising the reforms, identifying and co-ordinating key participants and doing follow-up and assessment. The shape and functions of the unit depend on its powers and where it is located inside the government.
The success of the units depends on their nature and the political support they get. Strategic communication inside the government about their activities and powers is essential to form coalitions and win support from various government structures. A concise shared strategic vision will also be important in prioritising and focusing on sectors for reform. The unit must be able to foresee, along with others involved and ministries, the challenges ahead so as to devise the best solutions and also be able to innovate, share knowledge and expertise and encourage efficiency in providing public services (OECD, 2015).
Côte d’Ivoire can consider setting up an implementation unit
Côte d’Ivoire could create a top-level unit, with a clear mandate and sufficient resources, to ensure reforms are efficiently carried out and with these aims:
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Develop and apply a continuous communication strategy about the purpose and content of the reforms, starting very energetically and continuing and being adjusted throughout the reforms.
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Co-ordinate implementation of the reforms by ensuring effective co-ordination when several bodies are involved. This will involve development and assignment of detailed tasks under the authority of the prime minister and building productive working links with members of these task-forces.
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Monitor application of the reforms by keeping track of their progress, identifying possible obstacles and assessing their impact. The reforms can be adjusted if necessary based on how they go and how the situation changes. The unit must in particular gather data to make regular assessment reports (perhaps every six months) and identify the main areas in danger of failure.
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Assess performances and supervise use of performance data by the government for any policy changes. The unit must consider if and how government policies achieve their goals and adjust those that do not produce the expected results.
The new unit could be under the authority of the president and operate within the prime minister’s office. The link with the presidency would ensure top-level support and the unit would be run on a day-to-day basis by the prime minister. A senior government or private sector official would oversee its operations. The prime minister would be officially responsible for the unit’s results.
The unit must be closely linked to the ministries and major government bodies most involved in the reforms in order to maximise its efficiency. One of the reasons for its existence is to ensure co-ordination within the government, support introduction of reforms and monitor their progress, a process which will be helped by such close ties. In many countries, a good way to do this is to second to the unit staff from other bodies. They need to be motivated, have a strategic grasp of the issues and the activities of the bodies, and have good communication skills. They will help build a coalition of civil servants and bodies focused on carrying out the reforms. They should be chosen on a competitive basis and not just appointed by their usual employers; otherwise unit will have less control over their quality and performance. They should be drawn to the unit by its value for their career and by good salaries.
The unit’s core team must be small and varied, with length of secondment depending on the work to be done. The public domains most involved in the unit will include monitoring policy and thus central bodies concerned with political measures and actions (offices of the president and prime minister, and the Ministry of Planning and Development). The unit must also be involved with the Ministry of the Budget and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (and possibly other government finance bodies) to ensure efficient financial management. Staff of several ministries can be focal points for the unit’s activity, supplying data and helping its work without being fully part of it. Ministries involved would be those of labour, social affairs and training; economic infrastructure; education and technical training; higher education and scientific research; transport; agriculture; construction, housing, sanitation and urban affairs industry and mines; posts, ICT and communications; and the trade ministry.
The unit’s area of activity and regulatory framework must be spelled out to ensure its robust operation and integrity. It could be set up for an initial five-year period linked to the 2020 emergent nation status goal and then its performance compulsorily reviewed, along with the possible future need for it and what more it should do if extended. This would also avoid staff becoming entrenched and allow the team to be restructured if necessary and thus reduce political influence.
Key elements to support reform on the way to emergence: Communication, co-ordination and follow-up
Communication, co-ordination and follow-up are needed to remove obstacles to emergent nation status. Communication ensures that all social and economic stakeholders understand the action, the advantages it has for them, and their part in achieving it. Co-ordination can find solutions to simple obstacles to emergent country status by organising the parties involved to act, and is closely linked to communication. Follow-up (monitoring reforms and adjusting them according to how they perform and to changing conditions) is vital to ensure the limited resources for reform are used efficiently and to encourage all stakeholders to continue taking part.
The report on Phase II of the MDCR pointed to many problems in co-ordination and communication. The idea of an emerging Côte d’Ivoire is strong in the country but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Each ministry or public body sees emerging just in terms of how it affects them and only vaguely beyond that. Communication and co-ordination gaps are everywhere. The financial sector development programme works only a little with current programmes to ensure private sector access to funding, such as the Phoenix Plan. In agriculture, full strategies have been adopted in some value chains tied to particular products. Better communication would encourage sharing knowledge and publicising good practices.
Communicating to all a message and shared vision
Emergent nation status should come from consensus between top politicians and then be communicated in a clear way to all Ivorians. A cross-sector working group of political officials, which could be led by the implementation unit, would ideally steer an inclusive national process to spell out the meaning and implications of emergence and win recognition and acceptance of the inevitable compromises involved in major social and economic change. The politicians would then organise an information drive to convey messages about emergence in suitably-worded language for different sectors of the population, whether urban business-people or rural schoolchildren.
Communication inside and between public bodies is needed to carry out major reforms. This involves messages about the main goals and ambitions, communication with the wider community about its role, and feedback to bodies co-ordinating reforms about problems encountered and how successful the changes are. If well run, communication can be a major tool of the commitment of participants in the economic transformation process (Box 7.1).
Communication takes place through both formal and informal channels and the emergent country strategy must use both. Most attention goes to formal channels (published documents, press releases, circulars), but these may not always be effective because not attractive enough and are often unsuited to two-way exchanges, for example gathering comments or tailoring messages for different audiences. Seminars or publications can also be seen as a waste of resources or time.
Informal communication and co-ordination, mainly in a personal context and outside structures, should be an essential complement to formal channels. It could be useful to ensure informal channels have sufficient impact with a very wide range of concerned parties, which could lead to healthier and more reliable institutions and be helped by networks of several public bodies and regions. This could involve twice-yearly exchanges between agencies or regions, encouraging job mobility within or between public bodies, and include organising social events for officials from a range of public bodies.
Staff rotation should be considered as a possible tool. This would allow civil servants to work in another ministry for a set period (six to 24 months in many cases) while still able to return to their original job and conditions. Human resources management is done by the civil service and administrative reform ministry (MFPRA), so Côte d’Ivoire is quite well placed to introduce such a programme. This will need a framework setting out the legal conditions and duration of secondments, fixing rules for the level of collaboration between ministries and their ability to handle such exchanges, and civil servants’ eligibility for the scheme. Standard contracts and agreements should be drawn up and the MFPRA could issue a call of an expression of interest and run a trial programme with a few civil servants, who would have preparatory courses and then be debriefed at the end of their secondment. A follow-up and assessment tool would also be used to ask staff about their experience and its benefits. Such a programme would make it easier in the long term to create interpersonal links between ministries, which could improve exchange of information and create better understanding between public bodies.
Source: Authors
Communication with the public and overall transparency can be fundamental to successful reform. An educated and well-informed public can demand greater responsibility and become watchdogs, pushing for reform and helping overcome economic and political obstacles. Regular communication with the public and civil society leaders about government policy is vital for accountability and transparency. This requires the government to make public its structures, its reforms and the progress being made, and to discuss assessment of policy and performance with citizens. This is a chance for rulers and ruled to improve public policies and services together. Such efforts, also found in industrialised countries, are often seen in open data programmes that increase transparency and public access to information. Developing countries have limited ability to provide data but this kind of approach, coupled with a good communication strategy, could support Côte d’Ivoire’s reforms.
An effective communications strategy would use a range of old and new technologies to engage the community in government programmes and provide necessary transparency. Communication methods must be adapted to different messages and audiences. Sometimes radio and public meetings would be the best media, especially for simple messages, while for others, interactive forums would be better. New technology can convey detailed information to a wide public, as long as it is clear, co-ordinated and provides enough detail and accessibility.
Communication with the public could also be improved to ensure a coherent message. Ivorian ministries and public bodies use a range of websites but with very little co-ordination or uniformity and the sites are often out of date. They usually contain basic information (such as the organisation of a ministry) and a lot of press releases, but it is hard to find more precise information about any given ministry. The government must remedy this, setting common rules and organising the data and the distribution of information from ministries and public bodies. Demand for important information should be anticipated and a commitment made to update information regularly. This will push ministries to make progress. The government has posted on its main website data about the national development plan (PND), and the entire plan can be consulted, but navigation of the site is difficult. The section about the 2011-15 performance, for example, can only be found by chance, and then after plenty of searching.
Government agencies must be better co-ordinated and work together more
Removing obstacles to economic transformation mostly assumes that those involved from all parts of society will help, but this is often an obstacle in itself. It may seem simple, but it can be very hard to get major participants together and carry out reforms. Co-ordination will also show if the programme is focusing on achievable reforms and introducing them well, and not aiming for overly ambitious targets and making the reform process more complicated. Co-ordination should be expanded as a priority in these areas:
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Ensure collaboration between public bodies working on related or complementary issues.
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Encourage collaboration between public and private stakeholders trying to achieve related goals (Box 7.2). Much of the action needed to reach emergent country status falls mainly on the private sector and receives at best limited backing from the authorities. The government has limited capacity directly to help achieve the goals and must co-ordinate with the private stakeholders, looking after the sharing and dissemination of information.
Existing ways to improve public-private sector co-ordination by the CCESP committee could be maximised by drawing on the experiences of other countries. Structural transformation and diversifying the productive sector must be based on “self-discovery” of new opportunities, allowing the private sector to spot goods and services where Ivorian firms could have comparative advantage. The government’s job, using consultations and dialogue, is to remove basic constraints preventing these opportunities from being taken up. Efficient facilities are needed to reach this level of co-ordination and consensus. Five main principles should be kept in mind:
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The government must leave enough room and freedom to the private sector for it to become a committed and constructive partner.
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The private sector must be able to organise and to decide how it can be encouraged to take part in dialogue.
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Discussion groups must be set up in some sectors to encourage exchanges and avoid the temptation to press for government support and protection.
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The aims of the platform must be clearly defined. The government wants to improve the supply of public inputs for some products, not give subsidies to sectors.
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A balance must be found to ensure private sector financial commitment and/or the achievement of practical goals, but also to allow government follow-up, in turn encouraging the private sector to continue its involvement.
Source: Authors.
The government must take note of the many co-ordination tools that already exist or are in the pipeline. The CCESP and the steering committee for town and country planning are examples of some of the basic issues of co-ordination and communication between the parties involved in Côte d’Ivoire.
The main principles listed above for dealing with these challenges should be borne in mind when new processes or committees are set up. They can also be examples for reforming existing operational frameworks. The first step should always be to identify the chief parties involved. To set up the steering committee, representatives must be drawn from all parts of the population, going beyond public bodies to include the private sector and civil society. They could have a preparatory meeting to identify the key parties to join the steering committee. An inventory of current projects and programmes (run by the government, donors or the private sector) should be made before any action is taken, so as not to waste limited resources. Improving co-ordination is another challenge that can be met by drafting main principles for everyone. Balanced representation between parties involved (the number of people from different sectors – ministries, the general population etc.) is essential. Other basic conditions to ensure better public-private dialogue are:
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The participation of civil servants should not be too variable. Each public body should designate two or three people to ensure continuity in participation and knowledge in committees. Participation will be clearly mentioned in their missions and among their performance goals and assessments to encourage them to actively commit themselves. Ensuring visibility and recognition of participants could also be an incentive (for example, mentioning them in ministry brochures or other routine communication material).
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Setting up efficient co-ordination beyond simply sharing information so as to achieve solid results. This can be done with a clear meeting agenda, setting goals and results to produce at the start of each process. Expected consequences and results should be agreed on, such as drawing up minutes, filing documents produced and agreeing on the various contributions to be made or documents to prepare.
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Results should be followed up and monitored by a joint committee. If participants promise to produce things or agree on various activities, the agenda for the next meeting must include assessment of the work and discussion of any problems associated with it. Ministries overseeing a steering committee should verify that all this is done, for example by producing a summary in the form of an organisation chart or a checklist.
Monitoring and assessment, essential for successful reforms
Successful economic transformations have robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) facilities in their reform programmes. Côte d’Ivoire has made remarkable progress in reforms since 2011 but now requires M&E as well as good performance habits. These facilities will become increasingly important as issues and reform projects become more complex. Developing countries must set up this machinery to help assess progress and guide the results of reform without requiring too many resources (such as staff and statistical costs) already in short supply. Côte d’Ivoire should take a gradual approach, setting up basic systems now and expanding them as the country progresses.
The M&E model can initially be based on the implementation unit and ministries, and then gradually develop a strong supervisory role. The unit should follow the overall advance, mainly using a wide range of statistics from comparable countries. The ministries involved (listed in the MDCR) should set up the M&E alongside carrying out the reforms, using clear and balanced guiding principles (such as two to five overall indicators and five to ten more specific ones, using basic procedural methods). The country should begin drafting a longer-term strategy, including expansion of capacity, and statistics essential to setting up a more sophisticated M&E better suited to an emerging market economy. This assumes complete co-ordination with a unit for upgrading monitoring systems. It will be essential to:
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Establish guiding principles for M&E.
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Have discussions with funding sources.
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Do an inventory of all M&E procedures.
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Plan how to get the required data, if possible drawing on available sources (such as Gallup customer satisfaction research, donor-funded surveys) to reduce the statistical burden and focus efforts on priority needs.
Côte d’Ivoire can benefit from feedback about the M&E experiences and steps taken by other developing countries, including Uganda, one of the first African countries to use complete M&E frameworks. But a medium-term evaluation showed that the data work was too much, with ministries and public bodies obliged to gather more than 1 000 performance indicators from many entities and sectors. So the government introduced a national integrated M&E system that reduced the number of indicators and improved co-ordination. Côte d’Ivoire should thus try to do the same, by focusing on indicators that can be obtained easily and regularly and are ideally comparable to those in other countries, relate properly to the reforms by balancing input indicators (such as spending) and output indicators (results such as customer satisfaction), cover the whole country and can be analysed by region, gender and other criteria so they can eventually be expanded and upgraded.
Risk must be managed so it does not hamper the development programme
Anticipating and managing risk is essential to ensure smooth application of ambitious development programmes such as those described in the MDCRs. All countries are exposed to unexpected risks that can have especially big effects on small open economies like Côte d’Ivoire. Some positive events such as the raw materials boom in the 2000s are welcome but negative shocks can slow private investment, undermine budget policy and focus the attention of the main political decision makers. Anticipating them and taking counter-measures can reduce their effect on the major national programmes described in the MDCRs. Such steps must accompany national risk management strategies and the work of specialised natural disaster management agencies.
Risks can come from different sources, and future events, not yet seen as risks and not resembling previous shocks, can have devastating effects. Risks already experienced by Côte d’Ivoire or known from other countries include:
International
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Relating to demand and prices for Côte d’Ivoire exports
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Shortage and higher cost of funding for infrastructure and public investment.
Regional
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Political instability or spread of terrorist groups that will reduce economic demand and create lawlessness in border areas.
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Effects of climate-change on expansion of agro-industry if rainfall becomes more unpredictable.
Domestic
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Changes in personnel or problems of energising the private sector or international partners that will slow implementation of development programmes.
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Government budget commitments, especially for public-private partnerships (PPP).
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Regional disparities.
Management of these risks must focus on careful monitoring, prudent budget policy and include protection in implementation programmes. A small open economy like Côte d’Ivoire is especially liable to fall victim to unexpected events with significant consequences during the MDCR’s implementation. Outcomes and shocks like these can, however, be anticipated and their negative effects reduced:
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M&E (see above) should alert political decision makers to outside events that could affect implementation of the MDCR, which should be regularly reviewed to see if the reform requirements are still valid. This information must then be used to adjust the programme.
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Côte d’Ivoire must keep its budget deficit and national debt under control so the government has enough budgetary leeway if a shock occurs. The country’s debt has been modest in recent years although risks associated with liabilities (such as with PPPs) have increased. Prudent budget policy can also mean more funding for the private sector by lowering demand in limited national liquidity and reducing macroeconomic risks as perceived by foreign investors.
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Implementation timetables should be modest to ensure they are properly carried out and can cope with possible delays and unexpected events. Schedules that are too ambitious, more vulnerable and more subject to planning complications can undermine a programme’s overall credibility if they are not kept to. Also, if further activities are planned, these too may be held up.
The scorecard system helps the move towards emergence
The scorecard system gives the Ivorian government a way to monitor progress towards emergent nation status closely linked with the action plans. It proposes targets for 2020 and intermediate ones for 2018 to do with creating economic wealth, well-being and structural transformation. It covers the priorities of economic transformation, competitiveness, infrastructure, the financial sector, human capital and skills and tax policy and has a cross-sector theme linked to institutional quality and governance.
All the themes have main indicators of progress towards emergent nation status chosen in agreement with the government. Each theme has a main goal and also secondary ones for detailed monitoring of expected results of reforms listed in action plans.
The scorecard proposes an indicator for each goal with several figures. The indicators include objective measurements (such as macroeconomic data) as well as survey data to take account of perceptions and opinions of Ivorians on a range of subjects and highlight from a different angle various reforms and policies carried out. The several figures calculated are:
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Côte d’Ivoire’s present situation (or last available figures).
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Goals for 2018 and 2020 are set according to the kind of data and national development targets. Two calculation methods are used, according to data available:
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A statistical method that reflects the levels generally achieved by the world’s emerging market and middle-income economies (see below), called the “level of emergence.”
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One based on earlier analyses (see MDCR Vols. 1 and 2, available in French only), national policy priorities and Côte d’Ivoire’s figures in 2015. This is used for some variables when prospects are improving for the countries doing best and for all the most relevant national data. This is the “2020 target.”
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The statistical method is applied for indicators that draw on international data. Estimates for 2018 figures and 2020 targets are calculated when data comes from international sources such as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Gallup polls, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The 2020 targets are the forecast levels for countries with per capita GDP just above USD 5 000 (after adjustment for different national purchasing power). The figure is equivalent to Côte d’Ivoire’s GDP (expected to double from XOF 16 650 billion in 2014 to 33 310 billion by 2020) after adjustment for population growth, forecast inflation and long-term fluctuating international exchange rates.
Estimates are based on a sample of all upper middle-income countries. Not all of them are necessarily models of emergence to be followed as such, but the income yardstick in most cases allows countries to be chosen that are quite similar to those with emerging economies and provide enough data to validate econometric estimates for the 2010 goals.
Bivariate regressions are calculated for each indicator using this group of comparative countries, the indicator used is the dependent variable and per capita GDP the independent one. The first step is the regression of the indicators on GDP (equation 1), then the intercept coefficient associated with Côte d’Ivoire is added to the estimated per capita GDP coefficient multiplied by the 2020 target per capita GDP (5 009 in PPP, constant USD) to obtain the target figures (equation 2). For example, 45% of Ivorians should have better sanitation by then, according to the statistical model, up from 21.9% in 2012.
indicator=α+β*GDP per capita (eq. 1)
target figureCIV=αCIV+β*5 009 (eq. 2)
The scorecard figures aim to inform political decision makers and eventually feed discussion with citizens about public policy performance. They come from a range of sources of varying quality and time horizons, and thus the possibility of sampling errors in estimates. The process of modelling the relationship between these indicators and per capita GDP can induce other statistical errors, some bigger in the case of long-term predictions where the indicators-GDP relationship is altered by changes in the Ivorian economy. External developments, such as fluctuating prices for the country’s exports or availability of foreign funding for landmark social development projects, can speed up or delay achieving targets. These statistical uncertainties and unexpected events must be taken into account when reading the scorecard. Its target figures are suggested trends and for the same reason the focus should be on major underlying trends over several years rather than annual changes.
The scorecard presents overall trends rather than a rigid structure to guide government policy and contains many indicators of various aspects of development. Each indicator reflects particular concepts but can only give a glimpse of progress being made, so the scorecard must be read with care, allowing for possible measurement errors and sensitivity to action taken. Its biggest value is therefore the summary of progress measured by different groups of indicators. The richness of these provides an overall view of progress towards the final goal of emergence and better well-being.
Côte d’Ivoire needs eventually to create its own good quality data system as an important monitoring and evaluation tool. The scorecard still relies mainly on international data for want of reliable up-to-date national statistics. Beyond the 2009-13 national statistics development strategy, the country should continue expanding the capacity of its institutions and statisticians, as well as physical infrastructure to improve data collection and analysis. The quality and archiving of statistics must also be improved for a broader range of users, including the World Bank’s Doing Business report, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Open Government Partnership, but also domestically to evaluate progress towards the goals of the PND.
Limited funding means allocation of statistical resources must be carefully prioritised among different areas, some of which seriously lack data and need more statistical investment than others. The PND and the national statistics institute can list them to give the government an idea of these action priorities.
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