1. Assessment and Recommendations
With the absolute global increase in migration and mobility, a new perspective on return migration is necessary. Data on exits and returns is very scarce in OECD countries. Migration movements are registered primarily as entries, with few countries recording exits or returns. Origin countries capture return only sporadically if at all.
In the absence of records on return migration, an alternative way to address this knowledge gap is to calculate exit rates from OECD destination countries. Exits are a proxy for returns, even if some exits are for onward movement to third countries. Exit rates can be calculated for major OECD destinations in Europe and North America, for migrants who resided in these countries for at least a year.
For migrants who arrived in 2010-14, in Europe the average exit rate was about 50%, although this differed substantially across destination countries with the Netherlands (75%) and Germany (67%) leading, and France (26%) at the lowest exit rate. The exit rate from the United States was lower than in any European OECD country. From 2010-19, the exit rate after five years was about 15% in the United States. In Canada, it was higher – at about 21%.
At least 300 000 migrants depart annually from European OECD countries, and about 150 000 from North America. These figures are lower-bound, since they refer only to those migrants who had arrived within five years and exclude short-staying migrants. Taken cumulatively, they indicate a very large scale of exits.
Exits vary according to the origin country of migration. From European OECD countries, about one in four migrants from North Africa has left after five years, and almost two in five from Sub-Saharan Africa. The exit rate was lower for migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, and higher (about 45%) for migrants from Asia.
The category of arrival affects propensity to stay: students are least likely to remain, while family migrants and those arriving for humanitarian reasons are most likely to remain.
These exit rates are much higher than those on return migration reported by available origin country surveys. Recent surveys in Morocco and Tunisia estimated the number of residents who have returned from abroad since 2000 at 210 000 and 180 000 respectively. Considering the scale of short-term migration from these countries and the evidence of returns, these figures appear low, and census and other administrative sources suggest much higher numbers more in line with the estimates of exits obtained from European countries.
In these broad return movements, forced and assisted voluntary returns comprise only a small part. Migrants receiving return and reintegration assistance are very limited in the total return population. At its peak in the pre-pandemic years, returns from European countries – forced and voluntary – were no more than 70 000 annually.
Re-migration – movement after return, whether back to the same original destination country or to a third country – is little studied and not monitored. Destination countries may note absence of legal residents but do not track or report this. Circularity of migrants using regular channels is well-known but not quantified. Among beneficiaries of reintegration assistance, re-migration is partially captured in follow-up evaluation of outcomes, but has not been systematically analysed. Stronger follow-up of beneficiaries of AVRR to better capture re-migration is necessary.
Migrants return to families and communities, and many returning migrants – especially those returning spontaneously – bring resources. For others, it is the resources available in families and communities which can assist their reintegration. Families provide reintegration support in the form of housing, financial support and even co-operation in business activities. Family support for reintegration is particularly important for those receiving reintegration assistance and for vulnerable returnees who do not qualify for AVRR programmes.
Even in reintegration programmes, the family may sometimes be expected to help address return migrants’ needs without any direct support. The family role in AVRR is not always recognised by the design of reintegration assistance. Prior to return, a focus on the lead migrant in the family unit may comport gender-based exclusion, especially of women, from the decision-making processes and negatively affect subsequent reintegration. Upon return, most mainstream measures do not contemplate involving the extended family in the project, through direct funding, even if this may be the most promising route to reintegration.
It is communities which ensure that services are in place to support returning migrants. For spontaneous returnees, reconnecting with communities is crucial to building social networks. Community members can be the bridge to connect returnees, some of whom have been abroad for many years, with the right people to set up businesses or social development projects. Their advice is also helpful in dealing with administrative procedures.
For returning migrants who receive reintegration assistance, community actors, and in particular community organisations, are implementers. However, even for this group, community support goes beyond the scope and timeframe of implementation of reintegration assistance.
Not all community organisations have the capacity to qualify as implementation partners of reintegration assistance funded by donors, even if they are already providing community services and would be well positioned to participate. The high demand in terms of project management capacity by funders of implementing partners of reintegration assistance may exclude some organisations.
Civil society organisations addressing general needs of communities, including those of all migrants, may also be attracted to the niche of reintegration assistance of assisted returnees. In such cases, development assistance donors and actors contracting reintegration support for beneficiaries of assisted voluntary return may fund the same organisation, with different objectives and implementation approaches.
As implementers, community organisations covered in this study reported limited ability to influence the direction of strategies or policies at the national level. Opportunities for networking and experience-sharing have been created, but there remain barriers across regions or between organisations funded exclusively by one donor.
Family and community play a role in the return decision. Family is one of the main overall drivers of return decisions. In spontaneous and planned returns, longing for family and the need to support family are major factors. The social and cultural conditions of family life in the origin country may attract migrants back home to raise their own families. These same conditions may also discourage some migrants from returning with their families – especially in the case of mixed couples.
Migrants facing the prospect of forced return must deal with different family considerations. Family preferences may be for the migrant to stay in the destination country, complicating communication and co-ordination with the family prior to the decision to use assisted voluntary return. When the family unit is in the destination country, the expected impact of return on children influences the decision.
Communities also play a role in the return decision, particularly in influencing perceptions of return. The perceived welcome of the community of origin might influence the decision of those considering voluntary return assistance. Community stigma can be an obstacle to considering return, although stigmatisation is far from universal. Spontaneous, unassisted returns attract less attention, even if returnees may initially struggle to find their place especially after a long absence. Communities can reinforce the legitimacy of return for this group and provide examples of successful capitalisation of the migration experience which can inspire return. Some spontaneous returns are driven by a desire to use the skills and resources acquired abroad to engage in meaningful work within their communities and contribute to local development. An expectation that returnees should return to contribute to their communities may however discourage return by those who are unable to meet such expectations.
The ability to re-migrate is a factor contributing to the decision to return for all categories of return migrants. Those who maintain rights in the destination country have no restrictions on re-migration and can move back and forth. Those whose return is due to having no right to stay in the destination country face restrictions on re-migration (visa ban). The visa ban is shorter for those who take voluntary return than those who are forced returns. A re-migration ban can negatively affect uptake of voluntary return assistance. The shorter re-migration ban is meant as an incentive for uptake of voluntary return, but eligibility for re-migration after the ban has expired is by no means assured.
Re-migration – or a re-departure of return migrants – is known to be common. Surveys find that close to half of return migrants consider re-migration. Re-migration is a frequent intention among return migrants, whether they have returned spontaneously or with assistance through voluntary return. Among beneficiaries of assisted return and reintegration, re-migration intentions are high in post-conflict and fragile contexts, if the original push factors persist. But other factors play a role: time spent abroad, the success of reintegration, family dynamics, and living conditions.
Development co-operation actors can enhance the effectiveness of their reintegration activities by aligning them with broader development co-operation objectives. This strategic alignment involves identifying the main obstacles facing returnees, particularly those related to structural factors in countries of origin, such as weak political institutions, inadequate education and health systems, and poor social protection systems. Structural factors affect all return groups and their reintegration, with different implications. For migrants with financial, human and social capital who have been abroad for longer periods, addressing structural factors can provide incentives for long-term return. For migrants who receive reintegration assistance, addressing structural factors can help create an environment conducive to sustainable reintegration.
Development co-operation actors can strengthen capacity-building initiatives in countries of origin, focusing on areas where gaps in reintegration support have been identified. A key aspect of this capacity building should be the development of psychosocial support services, which are often difficult to access in countries of origin. Capacity building in psychosocial support could enhance sustainable community support for all returnees who need such services. Psychosocial support is necessary for vulnerable returnees, whether or not they have returned through a channel that provides reintegration assistance. It is also important for their family members, who rarely receive it even when the returnee is supported.
To address the lack of co-ordination among activities to support reintegration, the origin country authorities have a clear role in providing co-ordination of services available. Strengthening national partner governments to better take on this coordinating role themselves is one means to improve policy coherence. However, development co-operation actors are particularly well positioned to improve policy coherence among donors and the projects they support. There is a space for more exchange among community organisations, development actors, funders of reintegration support and national authorities to circulate information, build capacity and allow community actors to influence policy development at the local and national level and among destination countries. This should be done in co-ordination with migration actors in destination countries.
While development actors have a view of the structural level, migration actors are more focused on providing services and addressing the situation of individual migrants and return migrants.
Providing reintegration assistance can represent an opportunity for capacity building, but also carries the risk of diverting attention from higher priority issues for local community development. Funders of reintegration assistance should consider the impact of their intervention on the social ecosystem. To ensure greater participation of community organisations, there is a clear role for capacity building in participating in tenders and in project management.
On the issue of regular channels for migration, the enhancement of regular channels for migration in origin countries through partnerships with destination countries has led to a variety of structured regular channels for short-term and longer-term migration. These channels are developing in a context where non-migrants and return migrants of different profiles are interested in accessing legal channels. Community organisations can help publicise and identify appropriate profiles for participation in these channels.
Legal channels are an opportunity to foster spontaneous returns, since returnees know they will be eligible for future migration opportunities. Increasing re-migration opportunities can increase return. This is true even if regular channels are not designed to serve beneficiaries of assisted return and reintegration support.
AVRR packages may be insufficiently flexible in involving a range of actors and services. Reintegration assistance including economic reintegration support should consider providing direct support for family partnering in the returnee’s business activity especially where co-managing the business. Packages should ensure flexibility in terms of allowing vocational training or education rather than business creation. A sufficient margin should be included to provide adequate psycho-social support when this is a priority for the individual case.
A final point can be made on the perception of re-migration, which is not necessarily seen positively within AVRR, which aims at sustainable reintegration. If it occurs through regular channels whether or not to third countries, it should not be accounted exclusively as a failure of reintegration. As regular channels are improved, re-migration should be included as a possible eventual success of reintegration.