2. Institutional set-up and organisational management
The nature of Organising Committees, created to deliver the Games and dismantled once the competition finishes, and the fact that they may not hold direct responsibility for the delivery of sports-related infrastructure and associated services, creates specific delivery challenges related to institutional set-up and organisational management. This chapter examines those challenges, shares insights, good practices and tools addressing risks ranging from unclear or overlapping mandates to the inability to attract and retain skilled staff.
OCOGs are established to deliver the Olympic Games on a predetermined and fixed timeline. Their mandate covers diverse aspects related to the organisation of the Games, as defined in the Host City Contract, ranging from communication, security, and the organisation of sports competitions to the delivery of sports-related infrastructure, among others. In addition, the OCOGs coordinate relations with and between the IOC, international sports federations, National Olympic Committees, as well as local and national governments. Since the 2000 Olympics, host countries have all passed special Games-related legislation which typically allows for the creation of public agencies to carry out key Olympic functions, such as building infrastructure and organising transportation and security. Governments will often appoint an Olympic minister or senior unelected official to coordinate between local, regional, and national stakeholders (Chappelet, 2021[1]).
The nature of OCOGs, created to deliver of the Games and dismantled once the competition finishes, and the fact that they may not hold direct responsibility for the delivery of sports-related infrastructure and associated services, creates specific delivery challenges related to institutional set-up and organisational management. This section examines those challenges in the context of the procurement and delivery of Games infrastructure and associated services, with a focus on four areas of risk:
2.1.1. Institutional framework
A transparent, coherent, predictable, legitimate and accountable institutional framework, in which relevant institutions are entrusted with clear, consistent mandates and ample decision-making powers, is a precondition for the effective delivery of infrastructure and associated services. OCOGs face challenges common to the delivery of major projects, related to both the complexity of formal structures, rules and norms, and to the number of parties, which requires a high level of ongoing interaction between many stakeholders (Denicol, Davies and Krystallis, 2020[2]). The fact that no single entity has ultimate decision-making power for the entirety of Games delivery creates a number of challenges for OCOGs.
Overlapping mandates and unclear decision-making powers can blur responsibilities around the effective delivery of the Games
OCOGs operate in an environment with a large number of institutions with varying responsibilities and decision-making powers. These stakeholders include national, regional and local governments, the IOC, the National Olympic Committee, international sport federations, and often delivery agencies established to deliver specific elements of the Games. Overlapping roles and responsibilities between these stakeholders can result in complex structures and processes that hinder effective decision making and blur the lines of responsibility and accountability. Weaknesses in defining organisational boundaries can introduce an additional layer of complexity when dealing with other challenges. A review of lessons learned from London 2012 found that there was clarity about responsibilities and decision making in most areas, with the exception of legacy, where responsibility was dispersed; legacy efforts were consequently found to be less successful. This lack of clear responsibility was also reflected in the lack of a specific legacy budget, which was described as a risk to achieving the maximum benefit from the Games (Norris, Rutter and Medland, 2013[3]).
The core team delivering Sydney 2000 was made up of three organisations: the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG), the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA). The OCA was responsible for the construction of all permanent and temporary Olympic facilities, as well as providing the fit-out, while ORTA’s function was to ensure coordinated planning and delivery of transportation services for the Games. A Minister of the Government of the State of New South Wales, Michael Knight, provided integrated leadership: the OCA and the ORTA were government agencies directly responsible to the Minister, who from 1996 was also the President of the SOCOG.
The Sydney 2000 organisational structure was based on the local context of the Games and of the Sydney Bid, as well as the need for coordination between the different organisations. Through the bid process, the State of New South Wales committed to undertaking all Olympic construction and underwriting any operating losses, necessitating a large role for the State in the preparation and staging of the Games. Strong state and federal government coordination mechanisms were backed as far as possible by legislation.
This integration with government had a number of advantages. For example, as a government body, ORTA was best able to manage the significant regulatory, political and financial risks associated with the provision of transport services for the Games. The high level of integration also enabled the preparation, tracking and reporting of a global Olympic budget (government plus SOCOG).
The model evolved from the award of the Games in 1993 to mid-2000, with significant operational integration occurring across Olympic agencies in the nine months prior to the Games. For example, key OCA executives were appointed to SOCOG Board Committees and the CEO of ORTA also held the position of Deputy Director-General of the OCA. There was progressively more detailed interaction between all agencies, and by the time of the Games they were brought together in an integrated operational structure through the Games Coordination Group, chaired by the Minister.
Source: (International Olympic Committee, 2020[4]; Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games, 2001[5])
If institutional arrangements are not well designed and implemented, they can result in an inability to operate effectively under the tight time pressures inherent to Games delivery. Because of the large number of stakeholders, governance and decision-making structures for Games infrastructure are often complex. For example, the Board of the Vancouver 2010 OCOG included three members appointed by each of the federal and provincial governments, two each by the two host municipalities, seven by the Canadian Olympic Committee, one by the Canadian Paralympic Committee and one by local First Nations (Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2010[6]).
The number of stakeholders involved in the delivery of Games infrastructure can make it challenging for OCOGs to implement effective co-ordination mechanisms and to establish and sustain timely decision-making processes. Designing and operationalising structures that include all relevant parties while also being able to provide clear and effective decision making is challenging, and legal and financial frameworks need to be supported by practical, sometimes ad-hoc, working arrangements and protocols. As shown in the above example of the 2000 Sydney Games, a more integrated governance structure could be progressively developed in the lead up to the Games to facilitate interactions between decision-makers. Governance mechanisms may also need to change over time, as OCOGs make fewer, more strategic decisions in the early years of planning and more frequent, operational decisions as the Games approach (Deloitte, 2013[7]).
Crossrail Limited (CRL) was established as a special purpose vehicle for the delivery of the Crossrail Programme and is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Transport for London. In order to deliver efficient and proper decisions over procurement the CRL developed the Scheme of Delegations to record the personnel or committees to whom authority to make procurement decisions has been delegated by the CRL Board, including the financial limits in each case.
No contract or agreement was permitted to be entered into unless budget is both available and released. Financial approvals were based on best estimates of contract outturn costs including appropriate risk allowances. This ensured that unintended costs were not incurred.
Additionally, responsibly for the dissemination and application of this Policy lied with senior management of CRL and with those to whom the CRL Board or Chief Executive delegates authority for the application of policies. CRL Heads of Department thus could ensure that everyone involved in the procurement cycle is aware of this Policy and that there was clear definition of responsibility for specifying contract requirements and for managing expenditure within budget.
The Head of Procurement was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Scheme of Delegations to ensure that authority is delegated and exercised appropriately in accordance with the needs of CRL and the project. The Head of Procurement also proposed any necessary revisions to the Scheme of Delegations. They were also charged with implementing an integrated policy that engaged with various stakeholder to support the CRL's overall objectives.
Source: (Crossrail Limited, n.d.[8])
Inadequate coordination mechanisms could impair OCOGs’ ability to manage a large programme of projects involving various stakeholders
Co-ordination of institutional stakeholders is an essential pre-requisite for efficient and effective infrastructure planning, and should be established as early as possible (OECD, 2020[9]). Mutual learning among actors is critical to maximising the impact of investments, while failing to share financial information and underestimating co-ordination challenges can exacerbate risks (OECD, 2018[10]). Complex organisational structures and the absence of coordination mechanisms can heighten difficulties in inter- and intra-institutional cooperation. With a large number of projects taking place simultaneously, the chances of projects interlocking or overlapping, and the associated need for strong coordination efforts, are high. Conversely, well-thought through networks could help OCOGs coordinating a diverse set of stakeholders. The 2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games, in the context of a federal country, provided a clear illustration of these benefits.
How did a large network of over 600 actors successfully organise itself to serve a mega project dominated by three levels of government? How did the three levels of government in Canada (federal, provincial and municipal) establish a network to coordinate efforts for hosting the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games?
To identify factors supporting effective coordination, academics explored the network created for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, British Columbia. Created on 30 September 2003, the Vancouver Organising Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (VANOC) had eight main divisions working towards hosting the Games. It was dissolved on 31 December 2010.
VANOC had only 7 years to prepare for the Games. As such, outsourcing to various stakeholders was required. Four governments assisted VANOC: the Canadian federal government, the British Columbia provincial government, and the Vancouver (host of city sports) and Whistler (host of mountain sports) municipal governments. Before it had been required by the IOC as a good practice, the governments signed a Multi-Party Agreement (MPA) with VANOC to outline each partner’s responsibilities.
Each of the four governments created a Games secretariat or office to coordinate their respective departments. A cross-government and cross-partner governance structure (including other Games partners) was also created via the setup of various committees.
From the research conducted and comparing it with the institutional set-up on the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, nine governance themes emerged as being requisite for an effective network of stakeholders:
Coordination mechanisms: coordination mechanisms and frameworks were important and needed to be established during the bid phase.
Internal engagement, momentum and motivation: The success of the relationships created through the coordination mechanisms depended largely on the individuals representing the organisations.
External transparency: transparency was used as an external process to gain support from the general public and media, and to help with these stakeholders’ degree of engagement.
Formalisation: to be successful, the network needed to formalize relationships and responsibilities.
Balancing autonomy and interdependence: while departments and governments are technically autonomous, they are interdependent in such time-limited mega projects.
Colocation: co-location or physical proximity in the same building was identified not only for the Vancouver 2010 Games but also for London.
Readiness exercises: to ensure that the coordination mechanisms, lines of communication, and actors’ responsibilities are ready, readiness exercises or test events were conducted.
Political alignment: political alignment, continuity, or unity helped support the overall goal of the network, ensuring a more effective and efficient process.
Time: the unmovable deadline of the Games’ opening ceremonies helped create momentum and push actors to work together towards a common goal.
Source: Adapted from (Parent, Rouillard and Chappelet, 2018[11])
As shown above, diffused responsibilities amongst institutions can also increase challenges in coordination with different levels and structures of government, especially when these public entities have differing priorities, resources, responsibilities, or expectations. The new event delivery model promoted by the Olympic Agenda 2020+5 and the increased use of existing venues both have the potential to exacerbate these risks. Outsourcing the delivery of events and relying more heavily on existing venue owners and operators may increase the number or the relative leverage of delivery partners. Large, experienced event delivery partners may expect greater autonomy and have existing processes and suppliers, creating more complex coordination challenges.
2.1.2. Organisational capacity
A sound institutional framework for the Games delivery requires capable organisations equipped with relevant skills and resources. Without the necessary institutional arrangements and resources from the very start of the programme, OCOGs could risk being unable to deliver the required infrastructure and associated services within the expected timeframes or quality standards. A lack of understanding, adaptability or seniority of resources to launch and support the delivery of major sport events can be prejudicial in high-speed acquisition and spending contexts (International Olympic Committee, 2020[12]). Local and national governments, in particular, may lack prior experience hosting and organising large-scale sporting events, as well as delivering major sport infrastructure. As a result, OCOGs face challenges in terms of anticipating human resources needs and finding and retaining staff with the right experience and skill-set. Additionally, OCOGs may also face difficulties imparting new skills needed to existing or available staff as needs change throughout the preparation for the Games.
Lack of staff with diverse skills in the delivery of infrastructure and associated services could risk the effective and efficient delivery of the Games
The delivery of the Games takes place in a fast-paced environment and imposes strict time constraints on OCOGs. They may be challenged to recruit qualified staff for time-limited employment, and to adapt their workforce to changing needs as the Games progress. The complexity and scale of infrastructure delivery often requires a specialised workforce, capable of designing and implementing complex procurement strategies, understanding and allocating risks, and adapting standard procedures to new and unique situations (OECD, 2021[13]). A wide range of skills and competencies are required at different points throughout the delivery cycle, including skills related to planning, procurement, construction, and operations. Beyond the universe of the Olympic Games, many countries have acknowledged the diversity of roles, skills and competencies that are core to the effective delivery of large projects. Such an example could be found in the Project Delivery Capability Framework developed, and last updated in 2021, by the UK.
Career paths, competencies and development opportunities in the government project delivery profession
The Project Delivery Capability Framework (PDCF) describes the job roles, capabilities and learning for Project Delivery Professionals across government in the UK. It contains four elements:
A signpost for Development opportunities specific to job roles
The criteria and process to obtain Accreditation as a Government Project Delivery Professional.
The PDCF is for all Project Delivery Professionals or aspiring professionals. It gives, as part of the large and diverse project delivery community, a common language to describe job roles, and the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform project work across all areas of government. It helps users to reflect on capabilities and development needs (or those of a team) and alongside the completion of the Government Online Skills Tool supports Government Project Delivery Profession Accreditation.
Using the framework, users can align with one of the project delivery job roles. Each job role lists the required capabilities and capability levels for the role. Users then assess themselves against these to identify areas of strength and development.
The Capability Framework is also the first step in the accreditation process and additionally sets out a range of learning opportunities to help in professional development towards the next level or a different area of expertise.
Source: Adapted from (Infrastructure Projects Authority, 2021[14])
At the outset of the Games delivery cycle, OCOGs require staff with the ability to define responsibilities and accountabilities, develop policies and strategies, and establish processes to monitor progress. Key early skills also include the ability to define scope, timelines and resource requirements for individual projects and functions, as well as provide consolidated planning of the overall Games programme. This includes the capacity to estimate costs, produce budgets and develop processes for tracking spending, as well as competencies related to the identification and analysis of delivery options and the ability to develop and recommend optimal solutions.
OCOGs also require procurement knowledge and experience from pre-publication to post-award, as well as staff able to operate in an increasingly complex environment: along with traditional value for money procurement goals, they must also be aware of the OCOG’s secondary procurement goals, such as sustainability, and the tools and techniques to incorporate them into the procurement process.
As Games delivery advances, OCOGs must manage the delivery of a programme of projects, and require staff with the ability to develop and maintain schedules that account for dependencies and constraints, manage complex and interconnected contractual relationships, as well identify, monitor and mitigate risk. Knowledge and experience with contract management, logistics and inventory management, and contract monitoring tools and techniques become increasingly critical as the Games approach. This list, while not exhaustive, provides a sense of the challenge OCOGs face in recruiting for this wide range of roles, and continuing to evolve their workforces as their needs change rapidly throughout the Games delivery cycle.
A lack of consistent, strong project leadership is also a potential risk for OCOGs. The more complex a project the greater level of required management expertise and experience, requiring leaders comfortable making decisions and setting direction in an environment of uncertainty and continual change. Dedicated leaders who are committed to the success of the project are a key success factor in the delivery of large-scale, complex projects like the Games (Denicol, Davies and Krystallis, 2020[2]). The large number of stakeholders means that the ability to recognize, anticipate and effectively deal with existing or potential conflicts is critical, as well as skills to influence and impact decisions internally and externally.
Inadequate or unresponsive on-boarding processes and high turnover rates could hinder the rapid organisational growth to meet OCOGs’ needs
In addition to challenges identifying and hiring appropriately skilled staff, the capacity of OCOGs to deliver the required sport infrastructure and related services can be compromised by slow on-boarding processes or insufficient continuity of resources throughout the different phases of the delivery of the Games ( (International Olympic Committee, 2020[12])). To successfully deliver Games infrastructure, OCOGs must grow as organisations extremely quickly across a range of functions. The London 2012 Organising Committee grew from approximately 95 staff (Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, 2007[15]) in 2007 to a peak of over 8,500 by 2012 (London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, 2013[16]), while the Vancouver 2010 Organising Committee added an average of 35 staff per month throughout 2008, two years before the Games (Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2009[17]). Recruiting and on-boarding experienced key resources and leaders is a critical early challenge, while as the Games approach there is an ever-increasing need to hire large numbers of staff.
Tokyo 2020 identified potential human rights impacts resulting from an inappropriate security response to physical or verbal communication at the Games. At the same time, the OCOG was concerned with infringements on the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the Olympic Charter resulting from the verbal or physical communication of individuals. OCOG staff, volunteers, and contractors should have not only basic knowledge of human rights, but also the practical knowledge and ability to respond appropriately to incidents.
To address these risks, Tokyo 2020 established an inter-departmental task force charged with producing a number of outputs:
The first output was a compilation of common discriminatory verbal expressions and gestures from countries around the world to help staff and volunteers identify discriminatory verbal expressions or gestures.
The second output was the design of internal guidelines which would assist staff and volunteers to respond to individual situations on a case-by-case basis. The document was conceived of as ‘guidelines’ rather than a ‘manual’ or ‘procedure’ in order to acknowledge the importance of assessing and responding to each individual situation.
Tokyo 2020 then moved to building the capacity of all staff and volunteers on the compilation and the guidelines.
Source: (Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralymic Games, 2021[18])
OCOGs are also tasked with a broad set of responsibilities, requiring staff with a diverse set of skills; for example, the Sochi 2014 Organising Committee was organised into nine activity streams, each consisting of a total of 55 functional areas (Organizing Committee for the XXII Olympic Winter Games and XI Paralympic Winter Games of 2014 in Sochi, 2014[19]). Designing and executing a human resources strategy that can quickly and effectively staff such a large and broad organisation, particularly in skill-dependent procurement and infrastructure roles, is a key challenge.
Successful delivery of infrastructure-related Games services such as transport, medical support at venues, and greeting and orientation, rely heavily on volunteers. Along with the challenges of training and onboarding tens of thousands of volunteers, risks include failing to secure sufficient volunteers (Rio 2016 and PyeongChang 2018 trained 50 000 and 14 000 volunteers respectively (Rio 2016 Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2016[20]; International Olympic Committee, 2019[21])) and potentially high attrition rates as a result of the commitment required or disillusionment over the roles volunteers are expected to play.
Paris 2024 has set up expert committees to address specific Games-related challenges and bring together key institutional stakeholders: one such committee is the Energy Council. Chaired by the Paris 2024 Chief Executive Officer and the Director General for Energy and Climate at the French Ministry for the Ecological Transition, the Energy Council is made up of representatives from the private and public sectors, including Solideo, French electricity and natural gas distributors, the French energy regulatory commission, and local authorities.
The Council meets at least twice a year. Its main goals are to:
Develop a framework through which risks related to the resilience of networks and the supply of electricity and gas for the Games can be understood, assessed, prioritised and presented for review by the appropriate authorities to enable decision making and the issuance of permits.
Work with French government agencies and departments to establish a process to manage risks related to the supply of energy to Games sites.
Source: (Organising Committee for the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2021[22])
The recruitment and deployment of 45 000 volunteers will be critical to the successful delivery of the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Volunteers will be mobilised to support the planning and promotion of the Games, the preparation of the Games and during the Games. Volunteer roles are grouped into six categories: welcome, orientation and assistance; sports operations support; organisational operational support; transport; medical services support; and ceremonies support.
The first of its kind for a large-scale sports event, the Olympic and Paralympic Volunteer Charter outlines the rights and duties of volunteers at the Games, as well as a detailed description of available roles. The Charter was produced by Paris 2024 in collaboration with the French government and the partners represented on the Paris 2024 Social Charter Oversight Committee and the Paris 2024 Ethics Committee (including representatives from trade unions, employer organisations, independent French administrative authorities, and the OECD).
Volunteers will have the right to be assigned to a role aligned with their interests and skills, to receive appropriate training and to withdraw at any time. They are guaranteed a well-coordinated and safe experience, including provision of civil liability insurance. They will be required to undertake appropriate training, be available at the committed times (minimum of 10 days during the Games), and comply with all instructions related to the security and organisation of the Games. They must also be committed to the vision and values of Paris 2024, including respecting the essential principles of dignity, impartiality and integrity, maintaining appropriate confidentiality, and refraining from profiting from their participation.
Recruitment will be based on inclusive criteria: gender equality; representation of all French regions, as well as international, and particularly European, volunteers; openness to all age groups over 18; and engagement of people with disabilities.
Source: (Comité d’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de Paris 2024, 2021[23])
Paris 2024 undertook a mapping of the human resources required to deliver the Games to help the OCOG, SOLIDEO, and other stakeholders anticipate their recruitment needs and work together to develop appropriate plans to meet those needs. The mapping, undertaken in 2019 and updated in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, had three objectives:
1. Provide an assessment of the number of jobs directly created by the Games from 2018 to 2024, including when in the lead up to the Games they would be required.
2. Determine the division of jobs between three broad sectors (construction, operations and organisation, tourism) involved in the delivery of the Games, with a breakdown by profession.
3. Study the conditions required to meet human resource needs and to meet commitments in terms of access for those facing barriers to employment.
The mapping allowed Paris 2024 to work with its partners understand the training and labour market preparation required to help ensure the necessary workforce for each broad sector and profession. Specific focus was placed on professions facing recruitment challenges, in order to prepare for those challenges and ensure the successful delivery of the Games.
Source: (Centre de Droit et d’Économie du Sport and Groupe AMNYOS, 2019[24])
2.3.1. Key principles
1. Establish clear divisions of responsibility and decision making for the delivery of infrastructure and associated services
OCOGs should seek to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly established as early and as comprehensively as possible. Instruments such as memoranda of understanding can supplement the Host City Contract to further delineate roles and responsibilities as well as governance structures, and can include a wider range of institutional stakeholders.
Decision-making structures should consider how institutions will work together throughout the evolution of the Games delivery cycle as capacities and appropriate responsibilities may differ significantly across through planning, delivery and post-Games phases.
2. Put in place informal or technical coordination mechanisms to increase agility in decision making
Formal governance structures should be supplemented with informal mechanisms and working groups, while measures such as physically siting institutional partners in the same building can help promote a common culture. Coordination mechanisms should integrate key decision makers and be sensitive to local context, aligning the Games within the institutional framework of the host city and country.
3. Build a flexible organisational structure to support delivery of infrastructure and associated services
OCOGs should invest in organisational structures that allow them to successfully bring internal and external institutional and operational threads together. The OCOG should be adaptive to changes throughout the delivery of the Games, and should reflect this flexibility in its human resources and organisational structure. OCOGs should seek to be flexible in both their structure and in their recruitment of personnel able to adapt and see through the full procurement and delivery cycle.
4. Invest in leadership and staff with the capabilities to deliver a complex programme of infrastructure and associated services
OCOGs should establish leadership that is empowered and committed to the success of the Games, with strong credibility and experience. Continuity through the delivery of the Games should be maintained to the extent possible.
OCOGs should invest in staff recruitment and retention to develop and accumulate knowledge and skills. Recruiting experts with previous Games experience in key areas and secondees from local operators is a key tool for facilitating knowledge transfer and leveraging local experience.
2.3.3. External resources
To ensure optimal institutional set-up and organisational management, OCOGs can take advantage of a range of existing policies, tools and good practices from the world of sport and from broader infrastructure governance practice. These resources provide opportunities for OCOGs to assess their current practices and approaches, inform the development of their own strategies and policies, and serve as examples of good practice.
Many of these external tools do not pertain directly to sport, however, could be useful to organisers of large-scale international sporting events as they detail relevant procurement roles and functions. They have been selected on their pertinence, quality and usefulness in terms of institutional set-up and organisational management. Table 2.2 provides a selection of tools and guidelines that can support institutional framework and organisational management of projects. There is a focus on enhancing understanding of procurement and project delivery roles and responsibilities.
References
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