3. Trust and competence in Brazil

Abstract

This chapter focuses on perceptions of government competence in Brazil, particularly in terms of responsiveness and reliability. It underscores the pivotal role these perceptions play in shaping public trust. In Brazil, trust in the local government and civil service is driven by perceptions of responsiveness, while trust in the civil service is strongly influenced by perceptions of reliability. The chapter proposes a range of strategies to preserve and enhance institutional trust in Brazil. These include aiming for more accessible and responsive public services, robust long-term planning, and achievement of climate mitigation objectives.

Perceptions of the competence of government institutions are a crucial determinant of overall trust in government. Competence implies institutions are capable and effective at carrying out their activities, that is, they deliver according to expectations (Nooteboom, 2007[1]). When they do not meet expectations, levels of trust are strongly and negatively affected (Kampen, Van De Walle et Bouckaert, 2006[2] ; Christensen et Laegreid, 2005[3]). The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions identifies competence as one of the two dimensions of public governance determining public trust, which can be further broken down into responsiveness and reliability (see Box 1.4 in Chapter 1).

In Brazil, perceptions of responsiveness are significant drivers of trust in the local government and civil service, while perceptions of government reliability are a particularly significant driver for trust in the civil service (see Chapter 2). In addition, Brazil’s federal government has historically played a key role in fostering economic and social development, and there is widespread support for statism (Bresser Pereira, 1998[4] ; Ban, 2013[5] ; Milanez et Santos, 2015[6]). Such attitudes nurture high expectations of government competence, which can be difficult to satisfy. Indeed, evidence from the OECD Trust Survey suggests a mismatch between Brazilians' needs and expectations, and their public institutions’ ability to anticipate and respond to them.

This chapter reviews people’s perceptions of responsiveness and reliability in Brazil in relation to current policies in the country and good practices in OECD and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. People’s satisfaction with public services is comparatively low in Brazil, and inequalities between population groups remain high. There are widespread feelings that services lack responsiveness among the Brazilian population, fuelling the disconnect between people and institutions, and hindering trust. Similarly, Brazilian people are quite sceptical about the government’s reliability, and lack of certainty matters for trust. To enhance public trust, the government needs to bridge existing gaps in access to services among population groups, to ensure wide and equal reach of policies and, most importantly, to anticipate and adapt to future needs.

The analysis in this study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with both the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government. The political and economic context when the data were collected has undoubtedly had an influence on the trust levels. Indeed, historical data indicate that the share of the public expressing trust in the government in Brazil and in Latin American countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 30 years, although remaining, on average, at around 30%. Major peaks in public trust are observed after national elections and the beginning of economic cycles (see Chapter 2), underscoring the importance of the wider context to people’s perceptions and attitudes.

3.1. Responsiveness

The first dimension of government competence within the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions is responsiveness, which reflects a core objective of any public administration: to serve citizens and deliver what is needed as expected (OECD, 2017[7]). The OECD Trust Survey assesses two aspects of the responsiveness of government operations. First, its ability to provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government, respond to people’s expectations and satisfy users. Second, its ability to operate an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs.

The OECD Trust Survey asks the following three questions related to government responsiveness:

If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?
If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible [public agency/office]?
If over half of the people clearly express a view against a national policy, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that would be changed?

It also asks citizens about their satisfaction with public services, and if they have had a recent experience with them:

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with public schools in Brazil?
In the last 2 years, have you or one of your children been enrolled in a public school in Brazil?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the Unified Health System in Brazil?
In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your household used the Unified Health System in Brazil?
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of administrative services (such as requesting an ID card, a passport or a certificate from the tax authority) in Brazil?

3.1.1. Despite progress in the quality and coverage of public services, satisfaction remains low and unequal

Satisfaction with public services is comparatively low

A responsive government implies public institutions are well attuned to the needs of the population they serve and have the means to fulfil their expectations. Some aspects of responsiveness, in particular satisfaction with public services, are key drivers of trust in the civil service and local government in Brazil (Figures 2.13 and 2.14 in Chapter 2).

According to the OECD Trust Survey, Brazilian people are less satisfied with the performance of public services than those surveyed across LAC and OECD countries (Figure ‎3.1). Of the services covered by the survey, respondents were least likely to be satisfied with public education (29.7% of Brazilians satisfied) and administrative services (31.8% satisfied). In comparison, 36% of respondents in Colombia were satisfied with the education system and 44% with administrative services. In OECD countries the figures were 58% for public education and 63% for administrative services. Healthcare fares slightly better in Brazil, where 32.7% of respondents are satisfied with its unified healthcare system (Sistema Unico de Saúde – SUS) compared with 28% in Colombia and 62% across surveyed OECD countries.

Figure ‎3.1. Satisfaction with education and administrative services in Brazil is lower than in Colombia and surveyed OECD countries

These findings are consistent with those from regional studies, which also point to comparatively low levels of overall satisfaction with public services (OECD, 2020[8]). According to Gallup World Poll data, in 2022, Brazil performed slightly below the LAC average for satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare, and well below the LAC average for satisfaction with the education system or the schools (Figure ‎3.2).

Figure ‎3.2. Satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare and the education system are slightly below the regional average

Expectations towards the state in Brazil are partially shaped by a robust legal and regulatory framework. Indeed, Article 6 of the Federal Constitution establishes broad social rights, including the right to education, health, work, housing, leisure and social security, and Article 205 further enshrines education as a duty of the state and the family. More recently, Law 13.460/2017 includes equality of treatment and prohibition of any kind of discrimination among the basic rights of citizens.

Brazil has made significant improvements in the reach and quality of its public services in recent decades. For instance, over the period 2001-2018, completion rates rose from 90% to 95% in primary education, from 67% to 86% in lower secondary education and from 44% to 67% in upper secondary education (OECD, 2021[9]). In contrast to many other countries in the region, the country did experience a modest rise in satisfaction with education services, from 57% in 2010 to 64% in 2022 (Figure ‎3.2). Brazil also has the highest share of spending on social benefits among LAC countries, at 36.7% of total government spending (OECD, 2020[8]). The federal government has made significant efforts to increase access to public services among the most vulnerable groups through programmes such as Bolsa Família and Estratégia de Saúde da Familia. The most recent Digital Government Strategy 2020-2022 also reflects efforts to make the government more accessible to the people and more efficient at providing services. According to government figures, 104 federal agencies and entities already offer 73% of their services in a digital or partially digital version, adding up to 1 666 public services in total (Government of Brazil - Casa Civil, 2022[10]). Despite these improvements, and the ambitions laid out in the legal and regulatory framework, the low levels of satisfaction recorded by the survey suggest access to and quality of services still fall short of Brazilians’ expectations and standards.

Satisfaction with public services is very uneven across population groups

The OECD Trust Survey found varying levels of satisfaction with public services among different population groups for all three services surveyed – administrative (Figure ‎3.3), healthcare (Figure ‎3.4) and education (Figure ‎3.5). Previous research across OECD countries finds that around 81% of changes in people’s satisfaction levels is related to changes in the objective performance of services (Baredes, 2022[11]). Identifying which segments of the population are dissatisfied with which services, and for what reasons, could provide clues as to how the government might remedy gaps and ensure greater satisfaction across the whole population.

Levels of satisfaction with administrative services and healthcare in Brazil vary according to socio-economic status (SES), levels of education and other demographic factors, such as age. For instance, 45.7% of respondents belonging to the upper class reported being satisfied with administrative services, compared to 28.2% for those belonging to the lower class (Figure ‎3.3). Similarly, 42.3% of respondents with a high level of education suggested they were satisfied with healthcare compared to 27.8% of those with low levels of education (Figure ‎3.4). Less economically privileged individuals might need more support from the state through a variety of channels, and thus have more frequent and complex interactions with administrative services (IPEA, 2019[12]). This evidence also supports findings of a recent OECD Review of Health Systems in Brazil which found poorer health outcomes and lower quality of care were more prevalent in economically vulnerable municipalities in the North and Northeast regions (OECD, 2021[13]).

Figure ‎3.3. People with a low socioeconomic status and those with a low level of education are less satisfied with administrative services

Figure ‎3.4. People with a low socioeconomic status and those with a low level of education are less satisfied with the Unified Health System

Moreover, minority group leaders interviewed for this study highlighted that although there have been efforts to expand universal services, and some progress has been made, the people they represent still have limited access to such services and perceive public institutions to be disconnected from their local realities (Box ‎3.1).

Box ‎3.1. In-depth interviews with minority leaders from the Amazon region in Brazil

As part of this study, three rounds of focus groups interviews were carried out with minority leaders from the Amazon region in Brazil. The focus on the region follows specific suggestions from experts interviewed as part of this study, as well as from the Advisory Group for the Trust Survey in Brazil, underscoring the difficulty in ensuring this population group were represented, and as an alternative to the online survey as a way to reach this population. This research strategy collects views on specific topics to be elicited and is an efficient way to get input on what leaders think, while also understanding why they think as they do, allowing in-depth meanings and group processes involved in their experiences to be explored (Denzin et Ryan, 2007[14]).

Nine minority leaders were identified together with a country expert, supported by information and contacts provided by the Igarapé Institute. They included indigenous representatives from social movements (such as the Movimiento de Mulheres do Campo e Cidade) and organisations –coletivos – such as Maria-Maria or Sapato Preto.

The structured interviews were organised around three broad topics: 1) how citizens access the state institutions and public services; 2) improvements needed and current challenges that communities face in accessing the state and representing the demands of their members; and 3) how minority groups perceive state institutions and public services.

The leaders were asked to describe how the sectors of the population they represent access different government institutions and public services. They tended to agree that direct access to government institutions and public services is limited. Civil society organisations and community leaders are described as playing a key role in mediating the population’s access to state services and institutions: “Organisations are a bridge to access government institutions and public services. They represent the people. We have great partners today. Individual people would have a lot of problems to access the state. But these organisations help, they defend minorities”. Yet, despite the existence of an extensive network of local organisations, the leaders reported that these organisations often lack the resources and support they need to effectively represent the demands of the population.

The leaders also identified areas for improvement in the relationship between minority groups and the state, although they recognised that there have been significant advancements in the reach and quality of public services related to health and education: “In the past, some of these services simply did not exist. Now the services are there. The challenge is how to access them efficiently”.

Finally, state representatives and institutions were clearly perceived as both disconnected from local realities and incompetent to deal with the demands of the population. Consequently, trust in state and government institutions is very low, as described by one minority leader: “There is no decent access to services like education and health. There is no justice. How can we trust institutions if we denounce conflict, crimes and threats, but the state does absolutely nothing to resolve them? There is a complete lack of credibility.”

Source: In-depth interviews with minority leaders.

Some of the patterns of satisfaction with administrative services may be also linked to the unequal uptake of digital public services. Brazil has a stark digital divide due in part to issues of access, but also of digital literacy. In a 2021 survey, the Regional Centre for Studies on the Development of the Information Society found that 90% of individuals with a high level of education used e-government services, compared to 50% of those with a low level of education and 30% of the illiterate population (Centro Regional para o Desenvolvimento da Sociedade da Informação, 2021[15]). The same survey found a 42 percentage point difference in the use of e-government services between individuals with a high (96%) and low income (54%). Minority group leaders interviewed in the context of this study also described how the lack of investment in technology hinders the population’s access to public institutions. For instance, one leader noted that the digital transformation further excludes those in remote areas of the country, where Internet and phone services are precarious.

When it comes to the education system, the OECD Trust Survey finds that the population groups with more direct experience of public schools (Figure ‎3.6) are more satisfied with the public education system than those with less direct experience. This might explain why results from the OECD Trust Survey show that patterns of satisfaction across population groups are slightly different to those related to healthcare and administrative services: only 25.4% of those belonging to the upper and upper-middle classes are satisfied with public schools, compared to 33.3% of the lower class (Figure ‎3.5). Likewise, 23.5% of Brazilian respondents with a high level of education reported being satisfied with public schools, compared with 31.5% of those with a low level of education.

Despite these higher satisfaction levels among disadvantaged respondents, Brazil’s public schools do face general quality issues, and socio-economic disadvantage remains a major barrier to success in Brazil's education system. In the 2018 round of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), 43% of students in Brazil scored below the minimum level of proficiency (Level 2) in reading, mathematics and science while the OECD average was 13% (OECD, 2019[16]). Socio-economic disadvantage may be a significant driver of low performance in Brazil, explaining 14% of the variance in PISA reading scores, compared to the average of 12% across the OECD. Advantaged students outperformed their disadvantaged peers in reading in Brazil by 97 points, compared to an average gap of 89 points across the OECD (OECD, 2021[17]).

Figure ‎3.5. People with high levels of education and those with higher socioeconomic status are less satisfied with public schooling

Figure ‎3.6. Respondents with low levels of education, lower socioeconomic status and from the northern regions reported more experience with public schools

3.1.2. Improving satisfaction with public services could increase trust levels

As Chapter 2 found, improving satisfaction with public services is an area with great potential to increase trust in Brazil, particularly in the civil service and local government. This section reviews three aspects that Brazil could consider addressing: improving the responsiveness of services in a context of rising expectations, tackling perceptions of inequity in access to public services and identifying the most effective balance in the governance of public services across levels of government to reduce territorial disparities and improve effectiveness.

Enhancing government responsiveness in a context of rising expectations

Governments are operating in an increasingly complex and fast-paced environment with growing expectations from people, who in turn are sceptical about their government’s ability to adapt to changes, improve and innovate (OECD, 2022[18]). People’s perception of government responsiveness is a challenge for Brazil and for many OECD countries (Figure ‎3.7). Results from the OECD Trust Survey show 36.1% of Brazilian respondents believe services would improve if people complained, close to the OECD average of 40%. Likewise, people are also sceptical about the responsiveness of public policies themselves: 31.4% of Brazilian respondents believe a national policy would change if a majority were against, compared to 37% in Colombia, 45% in Mexico and 36.5% in surveyed OECD countries.

Figure ‎3.7. Perceptions of responsiveness in Brazil are close to the OECD average

Brazil nevertheless faces some unique challenges in building a public administration that is more responsive to its inhabitants’ needs. Over the past two decades the government has had to contend with expanding basic services such as sanitation and water, while managing rising expectations across its population linked to the country’s remarkable growth. For example, in polls carried out in 2003, Brazilians named basic subsistence issues such as unemployment (31%), hunger/misery (22%) and violence/crime (18%) as the country’s “main problem” (Datafolha, 2003[19]). By 2021, respondents were naming health (24%), unemployment (14%), and the economy (12%) as the country’s primary issues (Datafolha, 2021[20]). The shift in citizens’ priorities over time underscores the need for the government to remain responsive to changing needs and expectations while continuing to expand basic services to the most vulnerable.

Moreover, Brazil faces significant challenges in delivering public services to its citizens. The country has a large and diverse population, coupled with a complex and decentralised government apparatus and disparities in service provision across its states (OECD, 2013[21]). These make it difficult to meet the diverse needs and expectations of citizens effectively (OECD, 2020[22] ; World Bank, 2021[23]). This tension became apparent in June 2013, when Brazilian people took to the streets to protest a rise in public transport fares and more broadly expressed their pervasive discontent with public services (Singer, 2013[24]).

The OECD Trust Survey also found unequal perceptions of government responsiveness across Brazil’s territory and different socio-economic groups, supporting the evidence presented in the previous section (Figure ‎3.8). While close to four in ten Brazilian respondents in the North and Northeast regions believe that services would improve if they complained, this drops to 34% in the Southeast and South, pointing to existing economic and fiscal disparities across Brazilian states. There is also a significant gap in perceptions based on socio-economic status: 42.2% of respondents from the highest socio-economic class feel that services would improve if they complained, compared to only 34.2% of those from the lowest. These findings highlight the need for the Brazilian government to address the unequal perceptions of government responsiveness to better tailor services to people’s needs.

Figure ‎3.8. Men, people with high levels of education and those with a higher socioeconomic status are more confident public services would improve if people complain

To further improve the responsiveness of public services in Brazil, the government could consider prioritising and consistently employing user-centred design of public services and policies, while continuing to invest in feedback loops.

User-centred design focuses on user needs and experiences instead of emphasising the public administration’s own division of labour and administrative boundaries. This approach to designing public services and policies has not been systematically deployed in Brazil, and remains relatively experimental and ad hoc. At the central level, some efforts were made in conjunction with “innovation labs” (Cavalcante, 2019[25]) and some initiatives were developed at subnational level but remain stymied by administrative boundaries. For instance, in 1997 the State of Sao Paulo created one-stop shops across 16 municipalities as part of its Poupatempo reform, bringing together many different authorities in charge of the delivery of personal documents and other administrative tasks in the same location. However, the effectiveness of this initiative has been limited as it did not cover federal services (Fredriksson, 2015[26]).

To shift towards a more systematic user-centred approach to the design of public services, bodies within the centre of government (CoG)1 could start by providing guidance on how to approach user-centred design and co-creation. In the United Kingdom, this is done through the Service Standard (Governement of the United-Kingdom, 2023[27]). Brazil could also begin by targeting a limited number of high-impact “life events” to ensure the services associated with them are user-centric (Box ‎3.2).

Box ‎3.2. Customer experience centred design in the United States

On 13 December 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order entitled, Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government. Thirty-five of the nation’s highest impact service providers were identified due to the scale and impact of their public-facing services, to raise the standard of users’ experience across government. These service providers are subject to the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 Section 280 activities including an annual enterprise-wide customer experience capacity assessment and action plan, focused improvement efforts for designated services, customer feedback collections, and public reporting.

Collectively, more than ten agencies across government have formed interagency teams to improve the public’s experience during the following five moments in people’s lives:

approaching retirement
recovering from a disaster
navigating the transition to civilian life following military service
birth and early childhood for low-income women and their children
facing a financial shock and becoming newly eligible for critical support.

Teams will develop success measures that will be used to demonstrate improvements in the delivery of services during these life experiences.

Source: Signature Trust Initiative, shared with OECD’s Public Governance Committee.

Governments around the world are also increasingly using feedback loops for continuous public service improvement to ensure they are responsive to citizens’ needs. OECD experience suggests that successful feedback loops are built on a few key elements. First, governments need to establish channels for citizens to provide feedback and to gather objective performance information tied to the delivery of the services in question. These channels can be online or offline and they can take a variety of forms. Governments then need to ensure that the feedback is collected in a structured and standardised manner and is acted upon. Finally, the loop is closed by communicating with citizens about the actions taken in response to their feedback. Box ‎3.3 gives an example of the use of customer feedback to improve services in France.

Brazil is increasingly moving towards a continuous improvement approach to public services. Its legal framework has recently enshrined several mechanisms to help ensure citizens’ complaints and experiences can influence service design. Law 13.460/2017 establishes clear quality standards through the establishment of user service charters, as well as mechanisms for feedback and improvement through the creation of Councils of Users and the framework for the assessment and improvement of public services. In 2019, the Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) established Fala.br – a single platform where people can request information and provide feedback (including complaints, ideas for administrative simplification and compliments) about public services from the federal, state or municipal government (OECD, 2022[28]).

To bolster these efforts, Brazil could put in place some safeguards to ensure it has a holistic view of citizens’ needs and their preferences. Although Law 13.460/2017 states that an annual satisfaction survey will be used to evaluate public services, these results will need to be systematically complemented by performance indicators measured directly by the administration (Box ‎3.3). Moreover, given that the government has the ability to gather feedback through a wide variety of sources (yearly surveys, Fala.br, social media, councils of users, etc), it will be important to ensure these information and data do not remain in silos and can be used effectively for self-diagnostic exercises.

Box ‎3.3. Services Publics + in France

France’s Services Publics + (SP+) programme aims to support the continuous improvement of public services, focusing on the user experience to develop closer, simpler and more efficient public services.

The cornerstone of the SP+ initiative is transparency about the efficiency and quality of the services. It aims to facilitate reporting on the results of the administration's work and the evaluation of its staff, but also focuses on ensuring that users' expectations are at the heart of the daily work of public services, managers and staff. Quality and satisfaction indicators are displayed on the Public Services + platform (www.plus.transformation.gouv.fr/recherche-de-resultats) as well as in the public service locations that receive users, and are used for internal diagnosis to improve services.

Two types of indicators

The results on the platform reflect both user satisfaction, i.e. the quality of service assessed by the public, and service performance, i.e. the quality of the service provided by the administration. This is reflected in two types of indicators:

Satisfaction indicators, measured by surveys: overall satisfaction, satisfaction with the quality of the reception, clarity of the response provided, etc.
Performance indicators, measured by the administration: telephone pick-up rate, average response time to e-mails, proportion of files processed in less than X days, etc.

Source of the data

The indicators measured and displayed are intended to be in line with the priority expectations of users (speed, accessibility, personalisation, etc.) in their relations with public services and with the SP+ commitments. The data are measured as close as possible to the user at the local level, and updated as regularly as possible (year N-1 at least).

Each one of the public services involved in the SP+ programme produce published data. For example, the national police force calculates the average response time of the police-secours after an emergency call (a performance indicator); the tax authorities measure the satisfaction rate of users who have requested an appointment (a satisfaction indicator).

Source: (France - Direction Interministérielle de la Transformation Publique, 2019[29]); (France - Direction Interministérille de la Transformation Publique, 2022[30]).

Finally, work to improve responsiveness could also benefit from a dedicated focus on identifying any issues faced by those social groups with lower average satisfaction levels or who experience worse outcomes. To enable this, the data collection must allow for sub-group analysis. Upstream public bodies should also strive to ensure all groups are making use of existing feedback channels. Despite efforts – such as the campaign Não fique em silêncio (do not keep silent) – not all population groups in Brazil, especially the more vulnerable, are aware of their right to complain. Some might avoid reporting an issue due to fear of reprisals, especially when complaining about corrupt practices or discrimination. In order to ensure that all citizens feel empowered to demand better services, more proactive measures could be taken to increase people’s awareness of their rights. Such efforts could include meeting people in their local communities, or appearing regularly on radio or TV shows for Q&A sessions with citizens. Complaint systems should take into account the needs of different social groups and be accessible by people who do not have access to the Internet, even in an era of rapidly developing computer literacy.

Providing more equal access to high-quality services

Pockets of dissatisfaction with public services in Brazil may be explained by a widespread perception that access to high-quality services is unequal and reflects structural inequities in Brazilian society, as well as territorial and fiscal disparities (OECD, 2013[21]). Results from the OECD Trust Survey find that around two-thirds of respondents (64.6%) believe that contacts are important to access public goods or services, and only 21.9% felt that an intermediary was not needed (Figure ‎3.9). A recent survey of civil servants carried out by the World Bank found that those beliefs were well-founded: 58.7% reported witnessing some unethical practice during their career in public service, most commonly using one's position to help friends or family, and bending the rules under pressure from further up the hierarchy (World Bank, 2021[31]).

Figure ‎3.9. Most Brazilians believe having a contact is important for accessing public services

These results reflect the differences in access to services for individuals in different social and economic situations, and suggest that individuals without direct contacts face substantial barriers in accessing public goods and services. Some will therefore need to resort to the use of “state brokers”. Brokers use their connections with politicians and bureaucrats to help more vulnerable people access state benefits, such as school admissions, subsidised healthcare, electricity and welfare programmes.

Interviews held with minority leaders for this study lend further credence to the idea that state brokers play a role in accessing public services in Brazil, by providing information, resources (such as transport) or contacts (Box ‎3.1). While state brokers may empower communities and play a role in increasing democratic responsiveness (Berenschot, 2018[32]), they can also perpetuate inequality of access to services. State brokers may demand bribes or kickbacks from citizens in exchange for access to public services. This creates a situation where those who have more money have better access to public services. Brokers also may give preferential treatment to individuals or groups based on factors such as ethnicity, religion or political affiliation (Nunes et Lotta[33]).

Furthermore, access to services in Brazil is also characterised by a two-tier system; the public and private sectors in Brazil are deeply interwoven with many essential services, such as healthcare, education and transport provided by both (OECD, 2021[34] ; OECD, 2021[13] ; Raymundo et al., 2015[35]). In some sectors, this has led to a situation where those who can afford to pay for private services receive better quality services than those who rely on the public system, helping to entrench a system where the more vulnerable groups in Brazilian society have less access to high-quality services. For instance, a recent OECD Review of Education in Brazil found students from public schools scored significantly lower than those from private schools, indicating a difference in quality between the two sectors. In contrast, results from other LAC countries surveyed, such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru, did not show a significant difference in quality (OECD, 2021[34]). Likewise, Brazilians who have private health insurance (25%) were found to have greater access to healthcare services and better health (OECD, 2021[13]). These differences are apparent to people in Brazil: according to the 2020 Latinobarometer, 49% of Brazilian respondents trust public hospitals while 63% trust private clinics (Figure ‎3.10).

Figure ‎3.10. More Brazilian people trust private clinics than public hospitals

Several steps could be taken to improve equality of access to public services in Brazil. The government could increase targeted communication and awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens of their rights and how to access public services directly. The civil society organisations and community leaders who currently play a key role in helping populations access to public services could help the government to design and disseminate these campaigns. Such initiatives can help ensure all groups feel empowered and are effectively reached and engaged through means and languages that they use. Canada’s co-creation approach to public communication during COVID-19 could be a good example to follow (Box ‎3.4).

Box ‎3.4. Co-creation approaches to public communication in Canada

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Canada developed new ways of engaging with influencers, opinion leaders and community representatives to better understand the concerns and expectations of specific demographic groups and minorities and co-create targeted and tailored messages.

Confronted with challenging times, these new approaches responded to evidence and feedback pointing to the need to adapt communications for groups that are difficult to reach or have less trust in government messages but needed to be rapidly and efficiently addressed during the crisis.

As well as translating resources and developing ads about the government’s COVID-19 response in different languages distributed through a variety of channels, the government strengthened relationships with leaders of minority groups or communities. For example, they co-developed national and regional communication campaigns with indigenous leaders and equipped them with the necessary skills and information to respond to concerns and expectations and give feedback to the government.

Evidence from these COVID-19 initiatives shows that co-creation approaches result in culturally appropriate products and support messages that are more likely to reach and be trusted by all groups, increasing the impact of crisis communications. Building on this experience, the Canadian government plans to further use and institutionalise such development and co-creation processes in future public communication strategies and activities.

Source: (OECD, 2021[36]).

In addition, public employment management practices could evolve to promote more equal access to services. Brazil is widely considered to have one of the most merit-based and professionalised civil service in the LAC region (BID, 2013[37]). Yet, although efforts to promote merit-based recruitment have been successful at the federal level, they remain limited at the subnational level, particularly in municipalities and states. For instance, a recent study found that alternation in power (that is, a change of municipal government) was associated with significant increases in the number of party members working in the municipal bureaucracy, with employment rising more in senior positions (Brollo, Forquesato et Gozzi, 2017[38]). Another study highlighted that alternation in power at the municipal level was related to a decrease in the quality of education, as civil servants in the area were replaced with less competent ones (Mitra Akhtari et al., 2022[39]). An effort to systematise and improve merit-based recruitment at all levels of government, in particular municipalities and states, could therefore help improve equal access to quality services in Brazil. It could be modelled on existing successful initiatives, such as the Transforma Minas programme launched by the Minas Gerais State in 2019 (Minas Gerais, 2021[40]).

Balancing responsiveness and equity in the quality of public services: The challenge of multi-level governance

Satisfaction with public services seem to follow a slight geographical pattern in Brazil. According to the OECD Trust Survey, respondents from the North have the lowest satisfaction levels with administrative services (Figure ‎3.3) and healthcare (Figure ‎3.4). Patterns of satisfaction with the public education system are different, with the more affluent Southeast showing the lowest levels (Figure ‎3.5).

Yet, territorial disparities revealed by objective indicators are even starker than differences in satisfaction levels would suggest. For example, premature mortality rates from noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) have fallen in the South, Southeast and Central-West regions, but have remained constant in the North and risen in the Northeast, the least developed regions (OECD, 2021[13]). Rural North and Central-West regions recorded below-average early childhood education enrolment rates (OECD, 2021[17]).

The complexity inherent in multi-level governance in a federal and decentralised system generates challenges in many countries. Decentralisation can help governments tailor service delivery to local needs and offer more opportunity for citizens’ input into service design and delivery. However, when decentralisation arrangements are not effectively designed, they can generate fragmentation and/or duplication in government activities, as well as increasing inequalities in quality and access between territories (OECD, 2019[41]). In Brazil’s federal context, where many public services are delivered by states and municipalities, intergovernmental relations are an important element of the broader institutional environment that affects the quality of public service delivery. Two mechanisms could help Brazil balance this tension: 1) clarifying responsibilities and co-ordination mechanisms between levels of government; and 2) ensuring responsible bodies are given the financial means to deliver and can rely on effective equalisation mechanisms and regional development policies (OECD, 2019[41]).

Clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability in specific policy areas could be pivotal to finding this balance between equity and responsiveness. The issue was raised during debates on the constitutional amendment proposal 188/2019 2 which oversees the decentralisation of resources, but a general consensus on clearly defining government relationships has yet to emerge (OECD, 2020[42]). A striking example of this tension relates to public education 3. At present there is no national system to co-ordinate and distribute responsibilities for public education. The federal government has typically enacted top-down policies which may have inhibited efforts to respond effectively to local realities. The 2021 Education Policy Outlook of Brazil (OECD, 2021[17]) suggests education outcomes in Brazil would benefit greatly from more clearly defined responsibilities and relationships between levels of government. The OECD provides guidance on the criteria needed to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear (Box ‎3.5).

The resources available to different levels of government should ideally be enough to meet the responsibilities allocated to them. The funding of subnational responsibilities in Brazil tends to be rigid and leaves little room for manoeuvre (OECD, 2020[42]). The new fiscal regime approved by the constitutional amendment No. 95 of 15 December 2016 4 imposes a 20-year period of fiscal consolidation, including in primary sectors such as health and education. Historically tax and own-source revenue have made up a smaller share of municipal revenue than transfers from the central government and state (Government of Brazil - National Treasury, 2021[43] ; OECD, 2020[42]). This imbalance in financing sources can lead to underfunded higher-level mandates, and thus weaken service provision.

Box ‎3.5. Clarifying responsibilities between levels of government: The OECD criteria

In 2019, the OECD published Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers, which provides an overview of current trends in decentralisation, including the design and implementation of decentralisation reforms. The report identifies guidelines for making decentralisation work and promoting regional and local development.

One of these guidelines is the clarification of the responsibilities of the different levels of government, in order to help decentralisation take hold and function properly.

There are eight essential criteria that a government can use to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear:

1. A clear delimitation of the hierarchy of legislative acts: a Constitution, national legislation and decrees and agreements.
2. A division of powers where functions are shared, e.g. who sets policy? Who sets the standards? Who is responsible for monitoring? Who is responsible for funding, etc.
3. The establishment of institutional mechanisms for shared functions and sub-functions, such as consultation, burden sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms.
4. Decentralisation of sub-functions within each function.
5. Empowering subnational governments to adopt integrated approaches to local economic development.
6. A separation of decision making for capital and operating expenditures;
7. The authority to hire, fire and set the terms of reference and day-to-day management/supervision of its own employees.
8. The separation of decision making between the different levels on planning, policy and finance.

Source: OECD (2019[41]), Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers, https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en.

Capacity gaps at the subnational level can also generate significant bottlenecks for effective public service delivery, resulting in missed opportunities to access federal programmes and resources (OECD, 2020[42]). In Brazil, the federal government implements programmes to address social and economic issues, but subnational governments may struggle to access information about these programmes due to limited resources, bureaucratic hurdles, or inadequate communication. Differences in resources, both in quantity and quality, available to municipalities, lead to wide regional disparities in Brazil (Azzoni et Haddad, 2018[44]). These regional disparities could be addressed through the use of fiscal equalisation systems, which aim to correct imbalances among subnational governments and foster equity across territories (OECD, 2020[42] ; OECD, 2019[41]). OECD countries could offer examples of ways of avoiding compounding inequalities and enabling levels of government to successfully deliver the services for which they are responsible (Box ‎3.6).

Box ‎3.6. Overview of equalisation systems in OECD countries

Fiscal equalisation aims to reduce disparities in fiscal capacity and expenditure needs among sub-central governments (SCGs). This is achieved by redistributing financial resources from wealthier governments to those facing higher costs or lower revenue capacities, either vertically or horizontally. The objective of equalisation transfers is to provide comparable levels of public services at similar levels of taxation across SCGs and to enhance the relative fiscal autonomy of jurisdictions with fewer resources.

The OECD Fiscal Federalism 2022 Review outlines a number of selected good practices, including:

Regular reviews by an arms-length body, with input from SCGs. Representative examples include Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission and India’s Finance Commission.
Implementing a representative tax system can avoid linking taxation choices to equalisation receipts. It is a common feature of many equalisation systems and is often linked to the average tax rate across all SCGs in countries such as Australia, Canada and Germany.
Clearly linking equalisation entitlements to SCG per capita income, rather than factors that can be directly influenced by policy choices. Sweden’s equalisation system provides a clear example of this practice, relying on per capita income as the primary measure of revenue potential and objective measures of cost such as demographic profiles.
Using inter-governmental transfers outside of the equalisation system to achieve well-defined policy goals, while equalising transfers remain non-earmarked. For example, in Australia, the Commonwealth Grants Commission noted that the challenges faced by indigenous communities could not be adequately addressed by equalisation alone.
Rewarding SCGs for increasing their own revenues while maintaining redistributive systems. Countries with horizontal equalisation systems, such as Sweden and Germany, allow SCGs with above-average own-source revenue to retain some of their additional tax income according to a progressive schedule.
Assessing cost equalisation may be possible via subnational performance benchmarking. For instance, Italy’s sophisticated approach to the measurement of public service outcomes may allow the effect of cost equalisation to be observed.

Source: (OECD, 2021[45]).

3.1.3. Enhancing the civil service’s capacity to innovate could help meet changing expectations

Government responsiveness is largely dependent on the public administration. As such, it is strongly linked to civil servants’ capacity to identify citizens’ needs and to innovate in the design and delivery of services so as to match their needs and expectations.

According to the OECD Trust Survey, only 27.9% of Brazilian respondents believe the public administration would implement innovative ideas to improve public services, compared to an average of 38% across the OECD and 37% in Colombia (Figure ‎3.11). This perception highlights a core challenge for the Brazilian administration, as governments which lack the capacity to innovate remain more vulnerable to the unrelenting pressure of change and volatility. As expectations of government change, so too will the public service to maintain trust and legitimacy. Efforts to challenge this perception could thus lead to important trust gains (see Chapter 2).

Figure ‎3.11. Only one-third of Brazilian respondents expect public agencies to adopt innovative ideas to improve services

A recent study of the innovation system of the public service of Brazil underscores how some historical factors, such as legalistic tendencies and an institutional bias towards control may hinder innovation (OECD, 2019[46]). As in other countries in Latin America, public service initiatives tend to be set out in laws and decrees rather than policies (OECD, 2019[46] ; IPEA/ENAP, 2018[47]). Civil servants must then navigate the complex intersection of these laws and decrees, which may generate unclear messages and entail high transaction costs. These historical patterns will be obvious to citizens and would thus inform their perception of the public administration’s capacity to innovate. In addition, those interviewed for this study mentioned the perceived rigidity of the system as a barrier to innovation, underscoring the limited autonomy of the civil service to implement and deliver of services, exacerbated by a lack of stability in senior positions.

Efforts to promote a widespread “culture of innovation” across the public service could help to counteract this perception of a rigid bureaucracy unlikely to innovate. Public servants may be less likely to innovate if they fear that their attempts will be seen as mistakes or bad performance instead of rewarded by their organisations. Decision makers should thus consider trade-offs and try to balance the need for control and oversight with the promotion of a culture for innovation (Flemig, Osborne et Kinder, 2016[48]). The Institute of Brilliant Failures in the Netherlands provides a compelling example of how to shift the culture around mistakes and bad performance (Box ‎3.7).

Box ‎3.7. Learning from failure in the Netherlands

The Institute of Brilliant Failures in the Netherlands was established in recognition of the importance of embracing risk-taking activities and experiments, showcasing learning and experiences, and learning from failures and successes. The institute runs an annual Brilliant Failure award for projects that were well prepared but resulted in unexpected outcomes. It ultimately seeks to shift attitudes towards risk and failure and create opportunities to learn, leading to better outcomes. Changing the culture around risk, experimentation and failure is a necessary step on the journey to building innovative capacity – learning from risky projects, which sometimes fail, is critical for any government to achieve its full innovative potential. Openness to failure and risk taking within the leadership is an essential first step.

Source: (OECD, 2022[49]) Institute of Brilliant Failures (2022): https://www.briljantemislukkingen.nl.

The National School for Public Administration (Escola Nacional de Administração Pública, ENAP) does have in place the LIDERAGOV programme, which places a specific focus on building innovative processes and adopting management models oriented to delivering better services focused on citizens. The programme is currently selective and limited to the federal government (ENAP, 2023[50]), but civil servants across the country and at all levels of government could greatly benefit from its expansion, or a version of the programme tailored to their needs. Innovative skills could also be streamlined across the administration through mobility programmes, as was the case in Canada (Box ‎3.8).

Box ‎3.8. Canada’s free agent programme: Embedding innovation into regular practice

If public sectors wish to attract and retain motivated and skilled individuals then they need to provide them with the ability to creatively make a difference. Canada’s Free Agent programme demonstrates the complexity of embedding innovation into regular practice. While the Free Agent programme is based on a model that identifies “innovators” who possess specific attributes, participants could work in a project-based manner and be deployed across the system based on demand.

The first Free Agents programme was launched in 2016 in Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) as a two-year pilot. Because many different types of work could benefit from the model, NRCan’s Innovation Hub chose not to choose a specific background or skillset for Free Agents. Instead, the Innovation Hub developed a set of attributes and behaviours that the Public Service innovation community considered valuable for innovation and problem solving in their organisations. These attributes formed the basis for the pilot screening process. Candidates who successfully demonstrate these core attributes are offered lateral deployments to positions in a special unit of the NRCan Innovation Hub. This lateral deployment model allows for flexibility in the selection process and assessment methodology. Deployments do not need to have clear priorities or undergo a traditional competitive appointment process. Furthermore, NRCan has removed the usual hurdles from hiring departments: the Free Agents are hired by and work for NRCan but are deployed elsewhere. Hiring departments can give two weeks’ notice if the agents do not fit the purpose or the team, while the agents themselves enjoy job security with NRCan. The programme has now outgrown the single department in NRCan and is being scaled up.

The programme provides the possibility of expanding the capacities of the existing system within the boundaries of legacy systems. The involvement and integration of the “innovators” into projects could help demonstrate that innovation is a core part of everyday business. However, the programme also risks reinforcing the idea of an “innovator class”.

Source: (Kaur et al., 2022[51]); (OECD, 2018[52]).

3.1.4. Opportunities for improving the delivery and responsiveness of public services

This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve government responsiveness and strengthen public trust in the country.

Satisfaction with public services is comparatively low in Brazil and uneven across population groups. For instance, in April 2022, 30% of Brazilian respondents were satisfied with the education system and 32% with administrative services, compared with 58% and 63%, respectively in surveyed OECD countries. Satisfaction with services is a key driver for trust in local government in Brazil and levels of trust in local government (20%) are lower than trust in the civil service (24%) or the federal government (26%). To tackle these issues, Brazil could:
- Increasing targeted communication and awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens of their rights and how to access public services directly.
- Revisiting the allocation of responsibilities and co-ordination mechanisms between levels of government to deliver public services and ensuring resources are commensurate with the levels of responsibility allocated.
People’s perceptions of government responsiveness is a challenge for Brazil, as for many OECD countries. Most people are sceptical about whether institutions would adapt policies and services in response to feedback. Only 36% of Brazilian respondents believe that services would improve if people complained and 32% that policies would be adapted. To move towards more responsive services and policies Brazil could:
- Systematising user-centred design of public services through guidance and support from the centre, and pilot user-centred initiatives targeting high-impact life events.
- Continue strengthening feedback loops by ensuring satisfaction indicators are analysed in conjunction with performance indicators and by improving data integration to ensure the government has a holistic view of its users' needs.
- Ensuring that vulnerable population groups have the opportunity to provide feedback to the government and that their feedback is properly analysed.
Innovation is not seen as widespread in the public sector – only 28% of Brazilian respondents believe the public administration would implement innovative ideas to improve public services. Perceptions of the civil service’s capacity to innovate is an important driver of trust in local government in Brazil. To counteract this perception the Brazilian government could:
- Promoting a widespread “culture of innovation” across the public service and enhancing training in public sector innovation.

3.2. Reliability

The second component of government competence in the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in public institutions is reliability, which encompasses three inter-related aspects of government functioning. These are 1) anticipating needs and assessing evolving challenges; 2) minimising uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment; and 3) effectively committing to future-oriented policies.

To capture this dimension the OECD Trust Survey includes the following three questions:

If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that government institutions will be prepared to protect people’s lives?
If you share your personal data with a government department, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?
How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the business conditions that the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?

Considering the high levels of informality in Brazil, following discussions with the Advisory Group leading this report (see Box 2.3 in Chapter 2), the survey also includes an additional question about whether or not people are willing to register and formalise potential productive activities. There are several elements to this question that make it relevant to the Brazilian context. As well as knowing and understanding the procedure for registering a business, doing so entails exchanging information with the authorities and becoming eligible for benefits or liable for taxes. People who are willing to register a business may have confidence in the reliability of these agreements, see them as beneficial (i.e. their satisfaction with what they receive leads to social engagement), perceive that no one is favoured over others or benefit at their expense (e.g. no one is getting greater benefit from not registering), and trust the effectiveness of enforcement of penalties for not registering (OECD/CAF/ECLAC, 2018[53]). The question is formulated in the following way:

If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas, CNPJ)?5,

Finally, the survey asks respondents how confident they are that Brazil will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the next ten years, to gauge people’s perception of government commitment and effectiveness in tackling environmental challenges.

How confident are you that Brazil will succeed in its policies to reduce the negative effects of climate change (such as deforestation, fires, floods, etc.) in the next ten years?

3.2.1. Reliability is consistently low across indicators in Brazil

Some aspects of reliability have been found to have great potential to influence trust in public institutions in Brazil, in particular the civil service (see Chapter 2). However, public confidence in government reliability in Brazil is comparatively low. Less than a quarter of Brazilian respondents expect their government to be prepared to protect people’s lives if a new infectious disease was to spread; less than in Colombia (31%), Mexico (48%) and the average across 22 OECD countries (56%) (Figure ‎3.12). Although the share is consistently low across population groups, there is greater confidence among men and those with higher education and higher socio-economic status about the government’s ability to protect people in the event of an outbreak of a future infectious disease (Figure ‎3.13).

Figure ‎3.12. There is room to improve all aspects of reliability

Figure ‎3.13. People with a higher education and men are more confident in government preparedness for future infectious disease outbreaks

The comparatively small share of the population who consider the country to be prepared for future pandemics is most likely to have been influenced by some perceived governance failures in the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as lack of emergency planning, misleading and contradictory governmental communication, and structural disparities in health access and infrastructure (see Section 1.3 in Chapter 1). Many of these elements could be taken into consideration as lessons learned. Brazil could build on successful examples – such as Korea’s crisis management plan, or Portugal’s communications strategy during the pandemic – to prepare better for the future (Box ‎3.9).

Box ‎3.9. Country examples of planning and communication during crisis

Korea

Korea’s response to COVID-19 was based on three pillars: testing, contact tracing and treating. However, informed by lessons learnt from the management of previous disasters and infectious diseases, the government acknowledged that these were not enough alone to tackle the pandemic. It involved various stakeholders in its response and developed a co-ordination body within government which included representatives from different ministries as well as from the 17 provinces and major cities. One of the key elements considered in the governance of epidemic management was to revise the protocols of the disaster management system to clarify roles and responsibilities between the central and local governments.

Portugal

In January 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Portugal established a special Task Force for Prevention and Control of the Pandemic with the main objective of developing a plan to prepare for and respond to the pandemic.

Communication was one of the main priorities of the Task Force, and crucial in all stages of government’s response to the pandemic. The government’s COVID-19 Communication Strategy had four main objectives: to generate trust in vaccination, improve health literacy, fight fake news and misinformation, and monitor public perceptions and obstacles to vaccination, including through social media.

This strategy targeted a broad audience including health professionals, the media, vaccination priority groups, citizens, influencers, and public and private partners. It was supported by a comprehensive set of concurrent actions, such as the dissemination of regular and detailed information on the advancement of the vaccination programme; regular press conferences with well-prepared speakers and public administration officials; the systematic identification of fake news and education of the public about it; and information and education campaigns on COVID 19 and its differences from among other respiratory infectious diseases.

Two years after implementation, the plan was evaluated, and the most important outcomes of Portugal’s Pandemic Strategy were:

an improved system to monitor risk perception by the general public
a reinforced and more effective vaccination plan, targeting the most vulnerable
a new set of health recommendations for infection prevention
improved communication approaches by the Health Authorities
more transparency from policy makers and public administration officers and increased trust in public institutions
new evidence on policy impacts and citizens’ behaviour
reinforced partnerships with academia, stakeholders, civil society and influencers.

Source: (OECD, 2023[54]).

Slightly more than one-quarter (27%) of Brazilians believe that data they share with government entities will only be used for legitimate purposes, below both OECD average and results for Mexico (45%) and Colombia (34%) (Figure ‎3.12). This perception also varies across population groups (Figure ‎3.14).

Figure ‎3.14. Younger people are more likely to feel that personal data would only be used for legitimate purposes

As with many of the statistics presented in this case study, low initial levels of interpersonal and institutional trust may undermine the authorities’ ability to successfully implement policies that require people’s buy-in and compliance (Nguyen et al., 2022[55]). Brazil has, however, made strides in regulating the processing of personal data by private or public entities for ensuring the privacy of data subjects. The government pushed a General Data Protection Law (Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados -LGPD) that was enacted in 2018 (Law 13.709). In addition, in early 2022, the Congress amended the constitution 6making personal data protection a fundamental citizen right (Camara dos Deputados, 2022[56]). The amendment establishes that the federal government will be exclusively responsible for the protection and processing of personal data and information. This regulation could have the advantage of avoiding different treatment by state and municipal governments. Some concerns remain over the fact that the Data Protection Agency (Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados, ANDP) is linked to the president’s office. The absence of an independent data protection regulator was not only against international practice but seen as having the potential to undermine trust in personal data management by government entities (Laranjeira de Pereira et Guimaraes Moraes, 2022[57]). A provisional measure was adopted in June 2022 that granted the ANDP independence (including administrative and budgetary autonomy) from the presidency. However, for the measure to become law will still require legislative approval by both chambers.

There are also challenges in reconciling the application of the LGPD with initiatives designed to reduce the administrative burden on people dealing with the authorities by enhancing data sharing and interoperability among public bodies at the federal level, as such initiatives are based on the creation of different data sharing levels. According to the presidential decree regulating these matters (Decree 10.046/2019)7 it remains up to agents within the respective public bodies to decide which data correspond to each “level of secrecy” and whether or not they can be shared. Neither the sensitive nature of personal data nor the purpose of the transfer are regarded as criteria for sharing data across institutions (Laranjeira de Pereira et Guimaraes Moraes, 2022[57]). In addition, the press have exposed high profile cases such as the sharing of data from the National Transit Department (DENATRAN) with the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) which have received public attention. While this agreement was finally abandoned, such cases often reduce trust as they cast doubts on how public bodies intend to use private data. Enhancing security and investing in privacy-preserving technologies will remain essential to building trust, as well as clarifying responsibilities and the criteria for data sharing across government agencies in alignment with constitutional rights and the LGPD. Brazil could further benefit from strengthening interoperability across public institutions by implementing consistent and open standards for data formats and structures and supporting the use of measures such as common identifiers and programming semantics when collecting, sharing and publishing data (OECD, 2018[58]).

The third question on reliability in the survey asks about perceptions of the stability of those business conditions which are under the control of government (Figure ‎3.12). Just one-quarter of Brazilians (25.1%) expect this to be the case, which is below the share in Colombia (35%) and the OECD average (42%). In general, Brazil could do more to lower barriers to starting and expanding a business, particularly in some sectors. Starting businesses can be perceived as complex and burdensome, while the provision of services by professionals such as accountants, architects, engineers, lawyers, notaries and real estate agents are still subject to a range of regulatory constraints that limit competition and risk hampering innovation and productivity (OECD, 2022[59]).

Remarkably, when asked about formalising a potential business, 56.9% of respondents stated that they would be willing to do so (Figure ‎3.15). As with every result based on perceptions, willingness is just the first step, before moving to action when the necessary conditions are in place. This result could signal that a majority of Brazilians have enough confidence in public institutions to formalise a business, and perceive it could be beneficial. However, this is not the case for all segments of the population; there are stark differences across socio-economic groups. Those with lower socio-economic status and less education are less willing to register their potential business (Figure ‎3.16). This might reflect that decisions on whether to register a business are also dependent on its scale and visibility. Still, the extent to which some underprivileged segments of Brazilian society would be willing to play by the rules depends on whether they perceive institutions to be reliable, their satisfaction with public services and the overall benefit they believe they can obtain by participating in or fulfilling their obligations to the state. If Brazilians are dissatisfied with their government and the services it provides, they are more likely to justify not registering their business and this may also be reflected in other types of behaviour, such as cheating on taxes (OECD/CAF/ECLAC, 2018[53]).

Figure ‎3.15. The majority of Brazilian respondents express willingness to register a business

Figure ‎3.16. The willingness to register a business is higher among people with a higher education and higher socioeconomic status

Accordingly, it is important for the country to continue its efforts to reduce regulatory burdens imposed on firms. Brazil has started to tackle red tape by streamlining licensing and permitting procedures for businesses and by deploying a programme to digitalise public services, with over 4 000 procedures available online (OECD, 2022[59]). Existing efforts to review the burden of regulations are a step in the right direction, but they are not yet co-ordinated. By bringing the different initiatives under a single umbrella policy, Brazil could improve the benefits for citizens and businesses. Despite this progress, excessive regulation still means firms have limited incentive to become more productive. Comparative indicators on product market regulation show that regulatory burdens and market entry barriers in Brazil are among the world’s highest (OECD, 2020[60]). There is room to further simplify licence requirements for starting a company and reduce the administrative burden, for example by pursuing the roll out of one-stop shops for setting up new firms and the wider application of the “silence is consent” rule for licences. These would be important steps to increase productivity levels in Brazil (OECD, 2020[60]).

3.2.2. Enhancing longer-term planning could improve perceptions of reliability

Achieving reliability requires adopting a longer-term perspective for policy making and ensuring that guiding instruments are properly tied to resources or linked to the policy-making cycle. If people perceive that public institutions have a clear roadmap, that there is coherence and consistency across policies, and that plans go from wishes to implementation, they are more likely to place their trust in public institutions. Brazil is among the LAC countries with a well-rooted tradition of using planning as a strategic tool for defining priorities and setting up policies (OECD, 2022[61]). Historically, it has been estimated that centralised planning assures both the security and wellbeing of the nation. A dual focus on national security and economic progress has driven the government to intervene in the national economy (Edelman, 2018[62]). Planning is seen as a way to facilitate decision making by linking inputs and means to specified outputs (Mello e Souza, 2012[63]). In a country of continental dimensions, planning is essential to integrate a development narrative and provide a cohesive vision to the nation as outlined by policy priorities set by the government (Bercovici, 2022[64]).

The Plano Plurianual (PPA) 2020-2023 is the current document laying out the federal government’s vision through directives, objectives and goals for four years. While institutionalised national planning in Brazil has evolved over time (Box ‎3.10) some authors argue that its history of planning has been marked by frustration and failure in the face of changing reality, and the mismatched provision of adequate financial resources to implement the plans (Mello e Souza, 2012[63]). The incipient medium-term spending framework does not really incorporate a medium-term perspective into the allocation of resources. The absence of any stable medium-term fiscal planning leads to excessively short time horizons for decisions about revenue and expenditure during the preparation of the draft budget (Tollini, 2021[65]). Plans have also been criticised for a lack of elaboration of programmes and projects and limited co-ordination among different goals.

In this regard, in order to improve trust levels, Brazil could consider strengthening its planning function by streamlining national priorities, further enhancing co-ordination across the different bodies and instances in charge of implementing them, and improving the connection between the national development plan and its spending tools. Brazil could also improve the effectiveness of its prioritisation and strategic planning apparatus by building a more robust and transparent framework for identifying problems through better use of evidence and stakeholder engagement (OECD, 2022[61]).

Box ‎3.10. Key milestones of planning in Brazil

The first modern planning instrument was developed by the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP) in 1939 as a five-year special plan of public works and improvements for national defence.

In 1946 the constitution defined the term “plan” as arising from the necessity of rationalising the acts of intervention of the federal government. The national council on the economy was established and with the support of the DASP formulated a new and broad national plan for public health, food production and distribution, transportation, and energy. It moved economic development towards human resource development if not social development.

In the midst of political turmoil, in 1961 a 20-year projective plan, a five year or short-term plan and an emergency plan were presented to congress. These were never implemented but paved the way for planning over a long-term horizon (Edelman, 2018[62]).

The 1967 ratification of the Extraordinary Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination institutionalised national planning. The promulgation of five-year national plans was tied to to parallel programmes of public investment, creating a system of national planning.

In 1971, the first national development plan was enacted and in 1972, the federal planning ministry was transformed into the Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency.

Following important transformations to the public sector in the mid-1980s, a reorientation of the national bureaucracy affected the planning function. In 1987, the Secretariat of Planning and Coordination was separated from the presidency and subordinated to and within the Ministry of Finance. If planning had ever previously led finance, after that the opposite was the case. By 1990, the economy, finance and planning ministries were combined into a single entity.

In 1992 national planning was re-incorporated into the office of the president in the Secretariat of Planning, Budgeting and Coordination, with full responsibility for the formulation and budgeting of regional and national development plans, and in 1996 the pluri-annual development plans were launched as a series of instruments that laid out a four-year vision for the nation, regional axes, states and municipalities.

From 2003 national planning was directed towards the implementation of a series of social programmes and co-ordination across different levels of government. From 2016, the focus of national planning steered away from social programmes. In 2018, the ministries of Finance, Planning and Industry, and Trade were merged to create the Ministry of Economy.

Source: Authors adapted from Edelman (2018[62]) and other sources.

As well the national development plan, there are other tools which could be used to embed a longer-term perspective into policy making and integrate it into the work of the public administration. Examples such as the future reviews carried out by the Finnish Government or the Long-term Insights Briefings adopted by the New Zealand administration could be powerful tools to strengthen a longer-term perspective in policy making within the Brazilian administration (Box ‎3.11). Decentralising the process of building broad planning strategies and incorporating the views of line ministries and other public agencies could also be a powerful approach.

Box ‎3.11. Examples of forward-looking instruments for policy making in selected OECD countries

Future reviews in Finland

The future reviews of the ministries outline Finland’s key questions for the years ahead. Their purpose is to assess situations and developments in society and examine issues for political decision making. The aim is to generate public debate and provide information for forthcoming elections and government formation talks.

Long-term Insights Briefings in New Zealand

Following the enactment of the Public Service Act 2020, Long-term Insights Briefings are a new government initiative requiring agencies to develop and share insights on the trends, risks and opportunities that affect, or may affect, Aotearoa New Zealand. Chief executives of government departments are required to publish a briefing at least once every three years. However, the Long-term Insights Briefings are not government policy. The value of the briefings is the opportunity to identify and explore the issues that matter for the future wellbeing of the people of New Zealand.

Policy Horizons in Canada

Policy Horizons Canada is a federal government organisation that uses foresight to help the federal government build stronger policies and programmes in the face of an uncertain future. It does so by 1) analysing the emerging policy landscape, the challenges that lie ahead and the opportunities opening up; 2) engaging in conversations with public servants and citizens about forward-looking research to inform their understanding and decision making; and 3) building foresight literacy and capacity across the public service.

Source: Authors based in several sources.

3.2.3. Delivery on mitigating climate change is the single most important driver of trust in government

The disconnect between planning and implementing policies undermines belief in public institutions’ capacity to deliver on their promises. For example, there is a 25 percentage point gap between the share of people who believe that the government should prioritise tackling climate change (64.7%) and those who think that that the country will succeed in reducing its GHG emissions (39.6%). This gap is 10 percentage points higher than the average in OECD countries (Figure ‎3.17).

Figure ‎3.17. There is a 25 percentage point gap between those who think that tackling climate change is a priority and those who think that the government will succeed

This result is important for Brazil since confidence in government capacity to reduce GHG emissions is the most relevant driver of trust in the federal government (see Chapter 2). This topic has been also highlighted as a main concern by experts interviewed for this study, while deforestation in Brazil's Amazon rainforest reached a record high for the first half of 2022, according to Brazil’s national space research agency (Reuters, 2022[66]). Figure ‎3.18 shows no significant variation in confidence by region, indicating that this is a common concern throughout the country.

Figure ‎3.18. There is higher confidence that the government will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions among the older population and people with a higher education

As part of the Paris Agreement, Brazil pledged to reduce its emissions by 43% compared to 2005 (World Bank, 2018[67]) and has updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) twice since 2015. Although its most recent update in March 2022 is more ambitious than its 2020 update, it remains weaker than the original NDC submitted in 2016 (CAT, 2023[68]). This trajectory is symptomatic of climate policy’s vulnerability to political volatility in Brazil. People’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to tackle climate change could thus be explained by the instability of the legal and strategic frameworks which surrounds it. More recently, the country has experienced some positive developments in its fight against climate change and environmental degradation. In July 2022, the Supreme Court declared the climate fund must be reactivated, and recognised the Paris Agreement as a human rights treaty (CAT, 2023[68]). Moreover, Brazil has developed sound legislation on environmental information, water and waste management, and biodiversity, although further efforts are needed to translate legal provisions into effective practices (OECD, 2021[69]).

Despite these positive developments, Brazil’s policies and practices fall below OECD standards in other areas. A recent study found that Brazil had “failed to correct problems with environmental impact assessment (EIA) or strengthen the integration of environmental considerations into public policies and plans”. It also pointed deficiencies in its implementation of the polluter-pays principle, integrated pollution prevention and control, and the environmental performance of public facilities (OECD, 2021[69]).

In addition to bridging these gaps, in order to decrease emissions and limit warming to 1.5°C, Brazil will need to reverse its current trend of weakening climate policy. It will need to develop frameworks and institutions that are “durable by design” and be able to endure over a long period of time and ride out changes in the political economy. In the Brazilian context, these efforts should notably be focused on the forestry sector and the country’s long-term energy plans (CAT, 2023[68]).

Indeed, Brazil’s GHG emissions in 2021 had their fastest rise in almost two decades, with emissions from deforestation the main source of the increase (SEEG, 2021[70]). In 2009, Brazil committed to reduce deforestation in the Amazon by 80% from 1996-2005 levels. In 2012, the country had succeeded in reducing its deforestation rate by 84% compared to 2004. However, since 2013, deforestation rates have been rising due to a series of policy and legal setbacks, and recently reached historically high levels (Silva Junior et al., 2020[71]). While current laws and protections have proved capable of reducing deforestation in the past and should be retained, they will only be effective when coupled with stronger enforcement to combat illegal deforestation, which will require additional resources (OECD, 2020[60]). Achieving the country’s ambition to reduce GHG emissions will also require a reassessment of Brazil’s long-term energy plans, which currently point to an expanded role for gas and oil in the coming decade (CAT, 2023[68]).

Recent OECD research also advances some broad actions which governments could use to mitigate climate change (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[72]). It recognises that while policies to address climate change have been historically difficult, three types of actions are possible:

encourage green behaviour through infrastructure investment and subsidies
assess the relevance of compensatory mechanisms for disadvantaged sectors
inform citizens about how climate policies work and who they affect, and promote their involvement in the decision-making process (Box ‎3.12).

Box ‎3.12. Citizen and stakeholder engagement for climate action

Governments typically deploy a patchwork of structures to engage citizens and stakeholders in the decision-making and policy development process for climate action. Dialogue alone is not sufficient to generate meaningful participation and is typically embedded in an institutional framework to structure and leverage these exchanges. These initiatives can be categorised as follows:

Stakeholder engagement platform tied to a supranational commitment or event: For instance, the Peruvian government established a united platform for national civil society actors ahead of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties hosted by the Peruvian Government in 2014 – Grupo Peru COP20 – to develop common positions and co-ordinate collective advocacy around the negotiations. This loose civil society platform continues to collaborate and inform national climate policy today. More recently, some countries have launched dedicated stakeholder consultations with the aim of actively developing and revising their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Vietnam, for instance, has expanded its existing donor climate change co-ordination group to create a more inclusive, open, and strategic NDC Implementation Platform.
Permanent stakeholder engagement platforms embedded in the national or local climate governance framework: In several countries, stakeholder involvement for climate purposes is already institutionalised in the governance framework with the introduction of climate-dedicated institutions to ensure their sustained involvement and scrutiny over time. This is the case in France through the creation of a National Council for the Ecological Transition, gathering representative interest groups.
Citizen assemblies: the growing traction of climate citizens’ assemblies is another promising signal of governments’ intention to broaden traditional democratic governance instruments, serving as potential prototypes for longer-term infrastructure to engage citizens in national policy making. The multiplication of arenas for citizen-led participation, consultation or deliberation, at both local and national levels provides better evidence of their efficacy and potential limits. Well-known pioneer examples of citizens-led committees include Climate Assembly UK, France Citizens’ Convention on the Climate as well as other national-level climate assemblies introduced in Austria, Denmark, Scotland and Spain. Such deliberative arenas can facilitate collective discussions on highly complex issues. This was the case for the UK Climate Assembly for instance, where citizen members recommended that the United Kingdom’s path to net zero emissions by 2050 must be underpinned by education, choice, fairness and political consensus.

Source: https://climateactiontransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Stakeholder-Participation-Assessment-Guide.pdf; https://www.climate-kic.org/opinion/five-ways-of-meaningfully-involving-citizens-in-climate-action/; (Rüdinger et al., 2018[73]).

3.2.4. Opportunities for enhancing foresight planning and Brazil's preparedness to address long-term challenges

This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could implement to improve reliability and strengthen public trust:

In April 2022, when the OECD Trust Survey was implemented, only 23% of the Brazilian population expected the government to be prepared to tackle a new pandemic. There is room to enhance crisis management, risk management and emergency preparedness as important factors behind people’s trust in public institutions. Brazil could:
- Reviewing and adjusting the mechanisms for dealing with risks to better manage unexpected and new types of crises. The revision could seek to guarantee flexibility at the local level combined with the capacity to co-ordinate among different sectors and to integrate new stakeholders in order to cope with all foreseeable and unforeseeable hazards. It could also enhance emergency planning by reviewing the warning system and implementing modernised crisis communication tools.
- Improving planning capacity by formalising and strengthening the role of the centre of government, streamlining national priorities, and incorporating new tools into future-oriented exercises across the administration.
- Building a robust and transparent strategic foresight framework for the identification of problems through better use of evidence and stakeholder engagement.
Only slightly more than one-quarter (27%) of Brazilians expect their data to be exclusively used for legitimate purposes if shared with government, below both the OECD average and values for Mexico (45%) and Colombia (34%). Brazil has however made strides to regulate personal data processing by private or public entities to ensure the privacy of data subjects. In light of this, Brazil could:
- Enhancing security and investing in privacy-preserving technologies, coupled with robust ethical standards and regulations.
- Clarifying the scope of responsibilities and criteria for data sharing and strengthening interoperability across government agencies.
About one-quarter of the population expect business and regulatory condition to remain stable, although over half are willing to formalise a potential business. Brazil could:
- Reducing the regulatory burden imposed on firms, by simplifying license requirements and rolling out one-stop shops for setting up new firms.
The ability to mitigate climate change is the single most important driver of trust in government. However, when surveyed in April 2022, only 40% of Brazilian respondents were confident that the government would reduce greenhouse emissions in 10 years’ time. Brazil could aim to:
- Building trust by encouraging green behaviour and informing citizens about how climate policies work and whom they affect, as well as promoting their involvement in the decision-making process.

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Notes

← 1. The OECD defines the CoG as the “body or group of bodies that provide direct support and advice to heads of government and the council of ministers, or cabinet” (OECD, 2018[74]). In Brazil, a broad array of institutions reports directly to the president of the republic. Brazil’s presidency comprises six different institutions: the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic (“Casa Civil”), the Secretariat of Institutional Relations, the General Secretariat, the Personal Office of the President of the Republic, the Institutional Security Cabinet and the Social Communication Secretariat.

← 2. See Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n° 188, de 2019 https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139704.

← 3. For instance, states and municipalities have direct responsibility for the delivery of education, and at times directly run schools at the same education levels. Municipalities primarily delivering early childhood education and care (ECEC), primary and lower secondary education, and states primarily delivering lower and upper secondary education.

← 4. See Emenda Constitucional No 95 de 15 de Dezembro de 2016, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc95.htm.

← 5. The CNPJ is the Brazilian National Registry of corporations, partnerships, foundations, investment funds, and other legal entities, created and maintained by the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal do Brasil).

← 6. Amendment number 115 of 2022.

← 7. At the time of drafting, there are two constitutional actions before the Supreme Court questioning the decree. The first (ADPF 695) objected to the application of the decree for national security purposes and requested that the Court nullify the SERPRO-ABIN agreement. The Court stated, in a preliminary ruling, that it would assess the constitutionality of the decree’s application for national security purposes. The second proceeding (ADI 6.649) disputes the overall constitutionality of Decree 10.046/2019, under the reasoning that the instrument as a whole is a threat to the constitutional right to data protection. In both cases, the Court is yet to deliver a final decision.

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