

ADDRESSING FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

NO LONGER A BLIND SPOT

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Addressing forced displacement in climate change adaptation

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Abstract/résumé

This paper shows that *climate-related forced displacement* is insufficiently addressed in two fundamental commitments made towards the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) between 2015 and 2023: National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). It describes the important role NAPs and NDCs play in prioritising the tackling of certain aspects of climate change adaptation, identifies gaps on forced displacement, and proposes ways of adding it among their policy objectives, and of mobilising finance to reach them.

Ce papier démontre que les déplacements forcés liés au climat ne sont pas suffisamment pris en compte dans deux engagements fondamentaux pris dans le cadre de la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC) entre les années 2015 et 2023 : les plans nationaux d'adaptation (PNA) et les contributions déterminées au niveau national (CDN). Il décrit le rôle important que jouent les PNA et les CDN dans la détermination des priorités de l'adaptation au changement climatique, identifie leurs lacunes en matière de déplacements forcés et propose des moyens de mieux les prendre en compte et de mobiliser les fonds nécessaires.

Foreword

There are few more pressing issues today than climate change, the policies to address it at its roots, and those to adapt to its effects. The OECD's International Programme for Action on Climate (IPAC) has made meeting this challenge a priority. But despite increasing global ambition to address climate change, we continue to head towards an environmental crisis, with widening societal gaps, sweeping structural economic change – and low- and middle-income countries particularly at peril. Amongst the challenges is the uprooting of populations living in areas no longer deemed economically viable or safe.

Forced displacement, within countries and across borders, is interrelated with climate change. Millions of people have no alternative but to move because of climate change. Displacement as such constitutes an adaptation strategy. Yet, forced displacement continues to be perceived primarily as a humanitarian issue, and a secondary area of policy action. Ignoring the eventual effects of climate change on human mobility will not only lead to human loss, it will also disrupt economies, and make development co-operation less effective in the long run.

This paper highlights a pathway through which forced displacement can be addressed structurally and with a long-term vision on climate change adaptation. It is part of a series of papers on addressing forced displacement with a long-term perspective across all dimensions of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, issued jointly by the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate and the OECD Development Centre. It is a deliverable of the forced displacement workstream of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and of the joint DCD-DEV workplan on forced displacement.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACMI	Africa Climate Mobility Initiative
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
AU	African Union
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
COP	Conference of Parties
DPoA	Doha Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for 2022-2031
DRR/M	Disaster Risk Reduction/Management
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUCOM	European Commission
GCM	Global Compact for Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPDRR	Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
HDP Nexus	Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILC	International Law Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MEND	Mass Evacuation in Natural Disasters
MICIC	Migrants in Countries in Crisis
NAP	National Adaptation Plan

NAPA	National Adaptation Programmes of Action
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
RCPs	Regional Consultative Processes
SIDS	Small Island Development States
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TFD	Task Force on Displacement
TPSAs	Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNSG	UN Secretary General
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

Executive summary

A web of inter-linked factors forces people to move. Among them, the effects of climate change have grown in importance since the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was drawn up in 1951. In fact, people displaced by the effects of climate change are out of scope from the Convention. And yet, climate-induced displacement is likely to increase significantly. Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people were living in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change as of 2022. The global population exposed to river floods, for example, will increase by 120% if global warming increases by 2°C, and estimates are that such floods already account for 10 million internal displacements each year.

Efforts to address climate-related displacement are siloed and fragmented, with persistent gaps, overlaps, and no clear hierarchy. Importantly, responses to forced displacement are largely humanitarian in nature, even though most climate-related displacement is not only protracted, but likely permanent. Therefore, as a rising fixture in the future of our planet, climate-induced displacement demands a more structural, long-term, development-oriented approach, alongside short-term humanitarian responses, in the context of climate change adaptation efforts.

Countries must therefore integrate the reality of displacement into the priorities they define in their development and climate adaptation efforts.

How do countries set their priorities for climate adaptation?

National priorities on climate action are set by two separate commitments by countries, agreed upon during past Conferences of the Parties (COP).

- **National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)**, established in 2010 at COP16 in Cancún, are submitted by states to detail their medium- and long-term adaptation priorities and strategies. They are tools for identifying and prioritising adaptation needs, as well as for endorsing strategies and actions to address these needs.
- **Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)**, set five years later in 2015 at COP21 in Paris, are climate action plans to cut emissions and adapt to climate impacts. All countries are required to establish an NDC and update it every five years, as part of the Paris Agreement.

Importantly, NAPs and NDCs are designed to set national priorities, targets and commitments, and to justify and register needs for climate finance from international partners. They have political and operational significance for mobilising resources, including from development co-operation providers, such as members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), for action on climate change adaptation. Both NAPs and NDCs rest on the principles that we must adapt to climate change, and protect the places and livelihoods we value in anticipation of it. Crucially, they invoke the need to prepare and respond to, not only prevent, such changes. In the face of its growing importance, better preparing for climate-induced displacement is essential.

How is forced displacement addressed in climate change adaptation commitments?

Reviewing 42 NAPs and 166 NDCs, the analysis finds that only 36% of all countries mention forced displacement generally across both types of documents. The picture is brighter for NAPs, where 31 of 42

(74%) mention forced displacement and 48% include concrete provisions on climate-related displacement, compared to 43 of 166 mentions (26%) and 14% concrete provisions in NDCs. Such concrete provisions fall short, however. When NAPs and NDCs address forced displacement, they are not comprehensive in their response. In particular, they:

- lack concrete commitments, objectives, and tangible actions related to addressing climate related forced displacement;
- fail to address concerns of pre-existing refugees and internally displaced persons, who are amongst the most vulnerable and often live in areas at-risk of being affected by climate change;
- do not make the connection between displacement and loss and damage (L&D).

The inclusion of forced displacement in NAPs and NDCs is fundamental for achieving actual change. It requires mobilising political will, including by building trust through predictable multi-year development co-operation support.

How can this be achieved?

1. **By getting climate change and displacement experts to speak together.** NAPs and NDCs are typically co-ordinated by environmental or climate experts, not necessarily by those working on displacement, related finance and technical implementation. Addressing climate-related displacement is complex and multifaceted. It deals with a number of different contexts and therefore needs the input from specialists, and particularly from practitioners addressing current and future displacement.
2. **By seizing synergies between climate change adaptation, development and responses to forced displacement.** Extending *ongoing* climate change adaptation initiatives to displaced persons, and those tackling forced displacement to climate change, would generate immediate dividends. Beyond NAPs and NDCs, forced displacement should be explicitly included in development plans, as well as in disaster risk reduction and resilience agendas. *New* development programmes, whether on adaption or not, should include climate-induced displacement in its targets. And new programmes should consider already existing displaced persons, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
3. **By thinking more comprehensively and long-term.** Concerns related to climate change are a long-term issue. Addressing forced displacement in NAPs and NDCs is not just a matter of mainstreaming them across a policy document. It is about thinking of the long-term implications of people living in places they have little knowledge about. It is about connecting them to the future plans of the country. This implies addressing the root causes of climate-induced forced displacement, but also the socio-economic inclusion of populations into new territories, their social protection, health and education, as well as their livelihoods.
4. **By reaching beyond borders.** The concerns related to forced displacement due to climate change are not limited to national borders. People are displaced across borders and mix with refugee and migrant flows. As much as climate change is a global phenomenon, displacement sensitive adaptation planning should also be tackled regionally and globally, providing space for peer-learning, co-ordination and coherence.

The inclusion of climate-induced displacement in the priorities of countries and their partners must be monitored over time. Little is known about the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in national services and the formal economy. Supporting displacement-affected countries, by monitoring displacement disaggregated socio-economic data, will increase our awareness and inform good decision making, including for climate action.

1 Displacement matters for climate change adaptation

The lines between different push factors driving forced population movements have become increasingly blurred, particularly in a context of increasing climate change. The *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* in 1951 was adopted in the aftermath of World War II, with a very specific intention in mind: providing access to protection to those persecuted in other countries. Yet today, the context in which it was adopted has changed. In fact, people displaced by the effects of climate change are out of scope from the Convention.

There is a direct link between multi-dimensional fragility and forced displacement, as 78% of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) originate from fragile contexts (OECD, 2022). This means that a web of inter-linked economic, environmental, political, security, societal, and human factors force people to move.

Push factors of forced displacement are also inter-linked. For example, the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, which resulted in forced displacement, may have occurred without the contribution of environmental degradation and climate change, such as drought, desertification and deforestation. But these consequences of climate change aggravated the violent competition among different populations over access to water and arable land.

By the end of 2022, there were well over 108 million people were refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), including both conflict and disaster IDPs (UNHCR, 2023; IDMC, 2022c). Forced displacement driven by complex fragilities and climate change has accelerated, and the ability to provide refugee status to an individual for international protection from persecution and the effect of violence remains important. Whether the need for protection comes from one source or another, makes little difference from an individual perspective (Betts, 2013).


How can capacity to deal with forced displacement be enhanced, in a context where communities face escalating pressure to host people who are forced to move, many of them from the effects of climate change? Evidence points to a link between climate change and forced displacement, and this is why climate change adaptation efforts, and related development co-operation, must address this issue.

Climate change adaptation commitments, notably National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – are designed to set national priorities and targets, and to justify and register need for climate finance from international partners. **This paper analyses how forced displacement is addressed in NAPs and NDCs.**

Evidence suggests that climate change drives forced displacement

The impact of hazards is of particular importance when looking at the impact of climate change on displacement (Infographic 1).¹ Robust empirical evidence shows that *sudden-onset extreme events* have strongly contributed to displacements (Cattaneo and Robinson, 2020; Cissé et al., 2022; IPCC, 2022a). Although a variety of natural hazards, such as floods, have always affected humanity and compelled people to move (Mauelshagen, 2018), climate change renders these hazards more severe and frequent, and creates novel hazards, such as sea-level rise or glacier retreat.² At the same time, addressing the impact of different hazards on displacement in a siloed fashion is not sensible from a protection and developmental viewpoint (Nansen Initiative, 2015). The same holds true for settings where disaster and conflict drivers of displacement interact or overlap (Peters et al., 2021).

Infographic 1. A typology of displacement related to climate change



¹ Disaster displacement is defined as “situations where people are forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of an immediate and foreseeable ... hazard” (Nansen Initiative, 2015: 16).

² It is important to note that climate change does not influence all disaster displacement, such as earthquakes, among other hazards.

Worldwide, many people struggle to manage the effects of increasing environmental change in their places of usual residence and are threatened by displacement (IPCC, 2022b). Nowadays, 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change (IPCC, 2022a). Climate change acts as a multiplier to livelihood vulnerability and can, in interaction with other factors, compel movement of people. Foremost, it can lead to displacement by damaging - or threatening damage to - shelters, infrastructure, basic services, health, and ecosystems (IDMC, 2017b).

Data on climate-related displacement have improved over the past decades but significant gaps persist (IOM, 2023; Vinke and Hoffmann, 2020). Though both primary and secondary data sources exist, there is still no comprehensive, comparable, disaggregated, and georeferenced global overview of all types of climate-related displacements.

Most data are available for disaster displacement within countries. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) provides annual estimates of IDP flows. Between 2008 and 2021, more than 342.3 million instances of internal disaster displacements occurred worldwide, most of whom hosted in low- and middle-income countries (IDMC, 2021a, 2022a, 2022b; World Bank, 2017). 89% of these cases related to sudden-onset weather events, such as floods, whereas data on slow-onset disasters (such as droughts, sea-level rise, or glacier retreat, is still scarce (IDMC, 2019a).

The data on cross-border disaster displacement remains limited (IDMC, 2018; IOM, 2023). Data for conflict-driven displacement suggests that most of the climate-displaced persons who move across borders are hosted by LICs and MICs, and that their displacement is of prolonged nature in many cases (Devictor, 2019).

Climate change will significantly increase forced displacement in the future

The IPCC stresses with high confidence that climate change will continue to significantly increase displacement and the need for planned relocation (Cissé et al., 2022; IPCC, 2022a; Pörtner et al., 2022). While the accuracy of projections on climate hazards is greatly improving, projections on displacement dynamics stemming from such hazards remain more difficult to model (IOM, 2022).³ For example, floods and storms have been the major global driver of internal disaster displacement so far, and under climate change, such extreme weather events will continue to become much more frequent and more severe (IDMC, 2022b; Pörtner et al., 2022).⁴ The global population exposed to river floods will increase by 120% (400%) for 2°C (4°C) warming, while urbanisation and population trends expand this exposure even more (IOM, 2022). Conservative modelling estimates that these increasing floods will be a major driver of future displacement risk, accounting for an average of almost 10 million (of a total of 13.9 million) internal disaster displacements globally each year (Ginnetti et al., 2019).⁵

The IPCC projects that more than one billion people may be at risk of coastal climate hazards by 2050, a share of whom may be forced to leave homes if no sufficient adaptation measures are taken or possible. For instance, warming of 1.5 to 2.5°C may render land in small island development states (SIDS), home to more than 400 000 people, uninhabitable (IOM, 2022; Pörtner et al., 2022). Other modelling studies also

³ Recent reviews of predictive models for climate and disaster displacement risk point to limitations. This due to factors such as the overfocus on certain hazards and the lack of disaggregated data outputs at community and household levels (Barrett et al., 2021; Selby and Daoust, 2021). Multiple factors influence the magnitude of climate impacts, people's exposure and vulnerability to them, and differential displacement risks, adding to meso-level factors such as policies. Thus, it remains difficult to tease out specific dynamics of future forced climate movements.

⁴ While a heavy one-day precipitation event that occurred once in 10 years in a climate without human influence now likely occurs 1.3 times and is +6.7% wetter, it could likely happen 1.5 (2.7) times and be +10.5% (+30.2%) wetter for warming of 1.5°C (4°C) by 2100, see IPCC (2021).

⁵ This number excludes pre-emptive evacuations, which currently account for a large share of registered cases.

project that the warming climate will strongly affect displacements worldwide, predominantly toward less affected areas with more opportunities *within* countries, but with some possible spillover effects, and stepwise movement in border areas (Amakrane et al., 2023; Burzyński et al., 2022). For example, by 2050, cross-border climate migration is projected to account for about 10% of total likely international migration overall in Africa. Recent efforts have begun to assess climate resettlement capacities, for example in Bangladesh and Ethiopia (Kolstad, Lujala and Wiig, 2022; Walelign, Cutter and Lujala, 2021; Walelign and Lujala, 2022).

While disaster and climate change are already significantly influencing displacement, the evidence is also clear that not all affected people leave high-risk zones. The literature suggests that displacement is common but not the default strategy even during sudden, extreme disasters (Bergmann and Martin, forthcoming; Castellanos et al., 2022; Cissé et al., 2022). Immobility can occur over different spatial and temporal extents, before hazards hit, en route, and in destinations (Ayeb-Karlsson, Smith and Kniveton, 2018; Zickgraf, 2019). Therefore, policy and planning must prepare for significant increases in climate displacement and simultaneously identify solutions for people trapped in increasingly dangerous areas.

Climate change can exacerbate forced displacement driven by conflict and violence

Studies increasingly recognise climate-conflict links. However, these links are neither universal nor direct, nor are their outcomes predetermined (HPG, 2022; IPCC, 2022b). Climate change can indirectly affect conflict through food, water, and livelihood insecurity and human mobility. The effects are mediated by socio-economic and political factors, such as inequality and development, agricultural dependence, infrastructure, population size, governance and institutional capacity, exclusion, and pre-existing fragility (Levy, 2019; Mach et al., 2019; Owain and Maslin, 2018). Increasing pressure on livelihoods in climate-affected countries can fuel recruitment to militant groups (UNDP, 2023). In addition, robust evidence shows that inequitable climate action can further exclude or marginalise segments of the population, which can drive violent conflict (Birkmann et al., 2022).

When climate change intensifies or spurs conflict in the ways described above, new displacement can result. For example, in the Sahel, climate shocks and conflict are predicted to cumulatively drive new displacement and threaten to push people into poverty and increased vulnerability (OSCDs and UNHCR, 2022). Moreover, climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum-seeking, whereas little evidence exists for current influences of climate-related conflict on asylum numbers (Abel et al., 2019; Birkmann et al., 2022; Schutte et al., 2021).

Box 1. Climate change contributes to accelerating urbanisation

- While urbanisation has been a normal process of development in all parts of the world, climate change and related movements of people will pose new and significant challenges. Nowadays, at least 55% of the world's population lives in cities, and by 2050, the share could reach 66% (UNDESA, 2018b). However, while regions such as the EU and the US have urbanised over a long time, urbanisation in Africa, and partially in Asia, is happening much faster, part of which is driven by climate impacts. In some cases, displacement has doubled urban populations in a short period of time, whereas in others, they are a marginal addition compared to natural urban growth.
- Cities can provide many opportunities, but they are also rife with risks for displaced populations (Adger et al., 2020; Gemenne et al., 2020; Rigaud et al., 2018; Vos and Dempster, 2021). For example, cities can be centres of climate risks (Dodman et al., 2022). Particularly vulnerable are dwellers in informal settlements in rapidly urbanising cities in low- and middle-income countries (Satterthwaite et al., 2020). This includes displaced populations in cities, who often

reside in informal, overcrowded, and underserved settlements, with limited access to opportunities (IDMC, 2019b). Sudden-onset mass movements can also urbanise poverty (DePaul, 2012).

- For policymakers and planners, it is key to assess possible benefits and costs of climate displacement and enhance or mitigate them from the perspective of sustainable urbanisation. The responses also depend on cities' absorption capacities (Delazeri, da Cunha and Couto-Santos, 2018), including planning and institutional capacity (UNDESA, 2018b). Planning for, devising policies, and addressing the climate-mobility-urbanisation nexus while not losing sight of other development issues and climate risks in cities requires effective multilevel governance (Stojanov et al., 2021).
- It will be key to address constraints in municipalities, including low incomes, tax collection and planning capacity, and knowledge about displacement issues among municipal staff (Lustgarten, 2020). Equally important is strengthening regulatory environments and addressing planners' or policymakers' negative attitudes towards migration. Lastly, it is also key to integrate non-state actors in comprehensive response (Stojanov et al., 2021). Non-state actors include diaspora organisations and hometown associations, social institutions, grassroots movements, and the private sector (Lamba-Nieves, 2018; Smyth, 2017).

Climate change affects existing refugees and internally displaced persons

Climate impacts also strongly affect existing populations of refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs, as well as their host communities. Many forcibly displaced — regardless of the initial causes of their displacement — are located in “climate traps”, namely in settlements or camps that are exposed to climate risks (Birkmann et al., 2022). Over the last decade, more than four out of every five newly displaced have originated from countries that are highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (UNHCR, 2023).

It is estimated that highly climate-vulnerable countries host 40% of refugees and are home to 70% of people internally displaced by conflict or violence (UNHCR and OHCHR, 2022). For example, some of the worst floods in decades hit refugee camps in Eastern Sudan in 2021. Settlements for displaced persons in the Sahel are disproportionately concentrated in areas at risk of severe climate impacts. Many displaced Syrians live in areas significantly threatened by climatic impacts (Ahmed et al., 2021a; MedGlobal, 2022; OSCDS and UNHCR, 2022). In Bangladesh, displaced Rohingya are settled on land highly susceptible to monsoon-related cyclones, storm surges, flooding, and landslides (Ahmed et al., 2021b; Peters, 2018). Additionally, displacement is often directed to areas that climate change will render increasingly hazardous (de Sherbinin et al., 2012). Living in displacement in climate-vulnerable areas can have severe effects on multiple dimensions of people's well-being. For example, climate change is threatening the health provision for a large share of displaced persons who dwell in overcrowded and polluted living conditions (Yasmin et al., 2022).

Displacement can help cope with climate change but also create other forms of vulnerability

While *migration* can, under voluntary, safe, orderly, and protected circumstances, help people adapt to climate impacts that can no longer be avoided (Cissé et al., 2022; Vinke et al., 2020), the IPCC finds that *displacement* is also a form of coping that generates and perpetuates vulnerabilities, reproduces structural problems, and ultimately reduces well-being (Castellanos et al., 2022; IPCC, 2022b).

Climate displacement challenges people's well-being deeply in most dimensions of their lives. Those forcibly displaced by the impacts of climate change are more likely to suffer *loss of livelihood* (Cazabat, 2020), *health* (Hunter et al., 2021; Mazhin et al., 2020; McMichael, Barnett and McMichael, 2012; Schwerdtle et al., 2020), and *education* (UNESCO, 2020). Second, displaced persons often live in unfavourable areas without access to adequate housing or basic infrastructure (IDMC, 2020a; World Bank, 2017). While some succeed in reducing exposure to hazards by moving (Melde, Laczko and Gemenne, 2017), many have few choices but to settle in zones highly exposed to hazards (Cissé et al., 2022; IDMC, 2021b). Insecurity, including due to sexual and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation, is frequent after disasters and in displacement (Fleury, 2016; Melde, Laczko and Gemenne, 2017). Third, *social relatedness* is a key resilience factor in displacement (World Bank, 2017), yet social networks and family functions end up fragmented and deteriorating for many forced climate migrants (Schwerdtle et al., 2020). For climate-displaced persons in particular, climate change can have a strong bearing on mental health (Clayton, 2020).

Countries are generally vulnerable to displacement crises

Government social services and host communities risk being overwhelmed, triggering humanitarian crises

Displacement often takes place in remote areas where the state already has limited capacity to deliver. The inflow of forcibly displaced increases demand for goods, services and protection, and supply of such demand may therefore take time to adjust (World Bank, 2017_[1]). In the short term, the mass influx of forcibly displaced populations can create an enormous additional demand on essential services, including access to safe drinking water, sanitation, health services, waste management, social or specific services for vulnerable groups, schools, as well as demand to maintain public order. Weather-proof and safe accommodation, which provides a minimum of privacy for the displaced, is another need, where demand can outmatch supply. Municipalities and other local public service providers are usually at the frontline to deliver on these additional needs.

Failure to keep up with demand typically has severe consequences. First and foremost, such consequences are on the physical, and mental well-being of the displaced. It can also affect the extent and quality of services available to the host population. Failure to scale the provision of these essential needs can also trigger public outcry and criticism, as the initial reaction to displacement related suffering is usually one of solidarity and sympathy. Over time, initial public sympathy can turn into adversity when host communities have exhausted the resources they can, or are ready to, share with the displaced. Mass influxes into an area can increase pre-existing fragilities in host contexts such as ethnic fragmentation, political exclusion, and environmental resource degradation.

With early warning information, and structured preparedness planning, authorities can prepare for such demand to support and receive displaced populations. This can create capacity to rapidly scale essential services. Dispersal strategies, based on consent by the displaced, can also reduce pressure on specific local areas. Nevertheless, depending on scale, existing capacities, and slow or sudden-onset displacement (Box 2), there are limits to how far local authorities can prepare to fully cope with forced displacement movements. Usually, in the short-term, additional support by governments, the United Nations (UN), civil society organisations (CSOs) and humanitarian and disaster response capacities is required.

Box 2. Sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters shape different dynamics, and adaptation strategies

Sudden-onset hazards, such as storms and floods, materialise fast, often due to distinct events. They usually have immediate and longer-term impacts on communities, and can result in loss and damage and reduced habitability of places. Such abrupt events can both directly (for instance, by threatening life) and indirectly (for instance, through the economic repercussions of drought) contribute to forced displacement, evacuations, and relocations.

Conversely, slow-onset hazards develop more gradually and evolve over a longer period, with less clearly defined beginnings or ends. Examples include increasing temperatures, glacier retreat, sea-level rise, ocean acidification, salinization, desertification, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, drought, and precipitation changes. Slow-onset events can, over time, cause accumulating harm that forces people to move, that is, in search of livelihood options or for survival.

The speed of onset shapes the strategies available to affected people, including whether to migrate in anticipation, flee, or stay. Typically, sudden-onset events create more unplanned and rapid displacements that can become prolonged. By contrast, slow-onset hazards usually first lead to attempts to adapt locally but can involve increasingly permanent movement later on (IOM, 2020; Zickgraf, 2021).

The speed of onset also often determines the type of planning, policies, and responses needed by concerned actors. For example, planning for managed retreat from areas affected by sea-level rise requires a different approach (Carey, 2020) than planning for temporary evacuation related to increasing storms (McAdam, 2022), or displacement related to floods (Ginnetti et al., 2019), whereas drought displacement in drylands and pastoral areas again implies different modalities for prevention and responses (Amakrane et al., 2023; Hoffmann et al., 2022).

Forced displacement is a *development* concern

Addressing displacement in the era of climate change is not only a matter of providing humanitarian aid. It must take into account the longer-term development and peace aspects (Okai, 2023; Willitts-King and Spencer, 2021). Protracted displacement situations require longer-term development approaches, such as integration with local hosts, access to national social services, and local employment. In this way the response contributes to strengthening resilience and preparedness to creating lasting solutions, by addressing vulnerabilities, generating opportunities (World Bank, 2017), and enabling the agency and human capital of the displaced themselves.

Enhanced development effectiveness is associated with an approach focused on inclusion in forced displacement contexts. Labour markets and decent jobs are key for sustainable responses to forced displacement. To enhance self-reliance and inclusion, extending the coverage of national social protection systems to forcibly displaced persons in protracted situations is important (OECD, 2022c). Socio-economic inclusion approaches work for host communities and displaced persons, by mitigating the costs of forced displacement and contributing to sustainable development. Inclusion approaches promote investments in public services and infrastructure, allowing for livelihood recovery, strengthening security, safety, health, and social networks, and increasing overall resilience (Heisey, Sánchez and Bernagros, 2022). They also benefit host countries, by raising their ownership, lowering the costly transition from humanitarian action through recovery to development, creating domestic tax revenue, and reducing aid dependency (OECD, forthcoming).

Around a quarter of national development plans in LICs and MICs explicitly reference inclusion (OECD, forthcoming). Evidence across 45 countries suggests economic inclusion programmes, such as those that support access to employment, lead to positive outcomes for both hosts and displaced persons (Heisey, Sánchez and Bernagros, 2022). Bilateral development finance for refugee situations in 2018-19 continued to rely heavily on short-term projects and humanitarian assistance, which made up 71% of all official development assistance for refugee situations in developing countries (Hesemann, Desai and Rockenfeller, 2021; OECD, 2019b). Barriers for displaced persons to access even formally open social protection systems remain high, and without external assistance, extending such systems to displaced persons is difficult to achieve, especially in nascent systems (OECD, 2022c).

The main vehicles for adaptation planning: National Adaptation Plans and Nationally Determined Contributions

Countries must integrate the reality of displacement in their priorities they define in their development and climate adaptation. Countries have adopted different adaptation strategies and initiatives. For example, Indonesia moved its capital city from Jakarta to Nusantara, a green wall is being constructed across the Sahel and West Africa, water reserves in Mexico are being identified and protected and market-based financial disaster risk tools are being developed in Africa.

In the era of increasing climate change, adaptation planning has an important role to help prevent avoidable displacement and address displacement that cannot be averted anymore. On the one hand, adaptation planning can support populations already displaced by climate change, and other pre-existing refugees and IDPs living in environments adversely affected by climate change. As the climate displaced face severe vulnerabilities as a result of climate change, it is also connected to the concept and scope of *loss and damage* – a term used within the context of the UNFCCC to depict the harm caused by human-generated climate change (Box 3). On the other hand, adaptation planning can contribute to increasing coping capacity and preparedness for future, possibly increasingly regular, climate-related forced displacement movements. Such an approach contributes to reducing the occurrence and severity of a humanitarian crisis, as well as the need to rely solely on humanitarian capacities.

The annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have led to progress for addressing climate displacement, especially the integration of the issue under the *adaptation* and *Loss and Damage*. Climate-mobility links have figured in UNFCCC discussions early on, and the 2010 Cancún Adaptation Framework was a landmark catalyst for further integration (Nash, 2018). It was the first time members called for a better understanding, coordination, and cooperation related to climate displacement and planned relocation, as well as migration (UNFCCC, 2010). They situated this call among technical co-operation issues for *adaptation*, signalling that it would require policy, operational, and funding responses.

Cancún led to the creation of non-binding *National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)* as the core instruments for states to integrate adaptation into existing policies and activities, and to detail their medium- and long-term strategies for building resilience. These iteratively updated NAPs hold potential for addressing the risks related to forced climate movements; crucially, they are designed to justify and register demand for climate finance and thus have significant political and operational significance. The challenges for integrating climate displacement in NAPs are considerable, due to a dearth of data, good practices, as well as technical and operational knowledge (Nishimura, 2022).

The widely ratified 2015 Paris Agreement was a second milestone for integrating climate displacement in the adaptation sphere. The treaty institutionalized *Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)* as the signature vehicle for states to detail their post-2020 climate mitigation, financing, and technical efforts as well as their vulnerabilities. Although not mandatory, many states also include declarations of intent regarding *adaptation* (Serraglio, Schraven and Burgos Cuevas, 2022).

Box 3. Loss and Damage associated with climate displacement

Loss and Damage (L&D) concerns severe or irrevocable climate impacts that have not been avoided - or cannot be avoided anymore - and overwhelm people's adaptive capacity (Tschakert et al., 2019). The 20 member states of the *Climate Vulnerable Forum* estimate to have lost one fifth of their wealth or approximately USD 525 billion because of climate change over the past two decades (V20, 2020). Climate displacement can result from, and imply, significant L&D, including both economic and non-economic, such as (Bergmann, forthcoming; McNamara et al., 2021; PDD, 2022; Thomas and Benjamin, 2020):

- Direct economic costs, loss of income and livelihoods; loss of future outlooks and opportunities.
- Reduced access to education; reduced health and access to healthcare; trauma and psychological impacts; and food and water insecurity.
- Reduced safety; disruption of community and social networks; loss of sense of place or identity.
- Loss of cultural heritage, loss of Indigenous knowledge and traditions; loss of aesthetic, recreational, and spiritual ecosystem services.
- Reduced access to political representation.

In UNFCCC discussions, displacement was identified early on under L&D. States have started linking L&D and displacement in their climate policies under the UNFCCC. While members are not required to include any information on L&D in their NDCs, one third of them does so, and half of them through specific responses and initiatives (Ryder and Calliari, 2021). Expanding the linkages between L&D and displacement in climate policies is important. States strongly affected should explicitly link L&D and displaced persons in their climate strategies, to make sure that these groups are included in climate adaptation actions and financing.

The baseline analysis finds that various states include L&D and link it with displacement. Some of them do so through concrete provisions. For example, Nauru's NDC commits to conduct a long-term risk assessment on L&D, including on displacement. Similarly, Pakistan vows to improve knowledge and institutional mechanisms on L&D, mentioning how current estimates do not cover long-term and non-economic losses related to displacement. Further states make contextual references. For instance, Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Lucia stress the need to find solutions to L&D and call for international support. They recognize disaster displacement as a non-economic L&D and call for assistance and protection of affected people.

Support for the ongoing work by the Santiago Network for L&D to facilitate technical assistance for implementation in particularly vulnerable countries, and for the new L&D Fund, is an opportunity to address climate-related displacement more effectively.

2 Forced displacement in climate change adaptation plans


Key findings

- **There are few references to forced displacement in adaptation plans under the UNFCCC.**
 - Only 36% (74 of 208) NAPs and NDCs explicitly include climate-displacement dynamics in any manner, either through concrete provisions or contextual references. This translates to 31 of 42 NAPs (74%) and 43 of the 166 NDCs (26%). In addition, no Annex-I countries, which mainly consist of high-income countries, explicitly includes climate-related displacement in their NDCs.
 - 43 out of 208 NAPs and NDCs (21%) include **concrete commitments, objectives, or tangible actions (concrete provisions)** on climate-related displacement. That is, they make actionable points related to forced displacement. This breaks down to 20 NAPs (48%) and 23 (14%) NDCs separately.
- **The set of countries in which NAPs and NDCs lack concrete provisions represents:**
 - 21 million internal disaster displacements occurring in 2021;
 - Countries hosting over 26 million refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide in 2022;
 - 39 million people living in fragile contexts;
 - 71% of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world.
- **Nearly all NDCs (96%; 159 of 166) and 74% of NAPs (31 of 42) do not address the effects of climate change on existing displaced persons.** Several LICs and MICs with large numbers of refugees or IDPs still lack a NAP. Concrete provisions targeting existing displaced populations are also still rare, as they only exist in 7 NAPs and 4 NDCs.
- **The link between *Loss and Damage (L&D)* and displacement is nascent in climate plans under the UNFCCC.** While there are no requirements to do so, some countries include information on L&D in their NDCs, and some link L&D with displacement.
- **States seldom define if they mean internal or cross-border displacement. When these terms are defined, they mainly focus on internal displacement.** 19 NAPs and NDCs currently do not explicitly consider cross-border displacement dynamics in their NAPs or NDCs, including the majority of states affected by transboundary displacement.
- **Some NAPs/NDCs do not use explicit terms related to forced displacement, while referring to movements which can imply displacement.** 35 of countries explicitly address *planned relocations* through concrete provision. It is important to consider when such relocations can help avoid displacement, and when they themselves may imply force. Similarly, *evacuations* are a large share of the recorded internal displacements worldwide. They do not explicitly figure in 75% of NAPs and 93% of NDCs (concrete provisions in 3 NAPs and 5 NDCs).

Methodology for the baseline analysis

Overall, 42 NAPs and 166 NDCs were analysed for this paper, consisting of a combined 208 documents, submitted from 2015 to the end of March 2023, the majority of which were submitted after 2019 (Figure 1). The 166 NDCs analysed represent 193 countries overall, as the EU's 27 member states submitted one single common NDC. A full list of the countries and the analysed documents is available in the Annex.

Figure 1: Submissions of NAPs and NDCs per year



The set of 208 documents was searched for the inclusion of three topics (Table 1):

1. the *explicit*⁶ inclusion and references to *new*, climate-related displacement flows;
2. the *explicit* inclusion and references to climate effects on *existing* IDPs and refugees;
3. References to human mobility with fuzzy (in)voluntariness.⁷

Table 1: Searched terms and topics in NAPs and NDCs

Explicit forced displacement (searching terms related to refugees and IDPs)	1. <i>New</i> climate-related displacement
	2. Climate effects on <i>existing</i> displaced populations (independent of reason for movement, including those moving due to conflict and other reasons)
Fuzzy (in)voluntariness (searching terms related to evacuation and relocation, mobility, exodus).	3. Further forms of mobility for which the <i>degree of (in)voluntariness is unclear</i> in the policies, but which could mean or include instances of forced displacement, namely <i>evacuations, relocations, and fuzzy mobility</i>

The analysis categorised whether and how deeply countries reference and address climate-related displacement in their NAPs and NDCs, on three levels:

1. No provision or reference;
2. Contextual reference only in analytical sections;
3. Concrete provision included on forced displacement;⁸

⁶ Explicit inclusion refers to the fact that the documents use terms evidently related to displacement.

⁷ This refers to expressions that do not align with UNFCCC terminology or that might otherwise imply displacement.

⁸ A concrete provision in this context is an actionable point related to displacement, within the national adaptation plan or nationally determined contributions.

Documents that include both concrete provisions and contextual references were counted only once, specifically categorised as having “concrete provisions”.


Baseline analysis for forced displacement in NAPs and NDCs

Inclusion of climate-related displacement remains sparse. Few countries *explicitly include climate-related displacement* overall in NAPs and NDCs. Taken together as a group, only 74 of 208 (36%) NAPs and NDCs refer to climate-related displacement, representing 63 different countries. Breaking this down by type of document, the lack of references is primarily observed in NDCs, where only 43 of the 166 NDCs (26%) include climate-related displacement in any form. On the other hand, there were 31 of 42 NAPs (74%) with references to climate-related displacement.

Concrete provisions on climate-related displacement are few. Overall, NAPs and NDCs in only 40 countries have concrete provisions. Only 20 of 42 NAPs (48%) and 23 of 166 NDCs (14%) make concrete provisions on climate-related displacement (Figure 2)⁹.

No UNFCCC Annex I country, which primarily consists of OECD member countries, explicitly includes the topic in its NDC.¹⁰

Figure 2: Extent of explicit inclusion of displacement in climate adaptation plans



The lack of explicit referencing of climate-related displacement in NAPs and NDCs are amongst the world's most concerned individual LICs and MICs, including (Figure 3):

- the world's most extremely fragile countries;
- The world's most climate-vulnerable countries;
- Some of the countries with the most internal displacements;
- Some of the countries hosting the largest populations of refugees.

⁹ In total there are 43 documents with concrete provisions (20 NAPs + 23 NDCs), but three countries, namely Colombia, Timor-Leste and Sri Lanka, make concrete provisions in both NAPs and NDCs. This translates to 40 different countries overall with concrete provisions on climate-related displacement on either type of document.

¹⁰ Annex I Parties include the industrialised countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, as well as the Russian Federation and several Central and Eastern European States.

Figure 3. Omission of climate-related displacement in NAPs and NDCs, in notable low- and middle-income countries



Note: The analysis refers to all analysed NAPs and NDCs of low- and middle-income countries only. Countries selected according to ranking of metric in question (top 6), without explicit concrete provisions on displacement. ND-GAIN refers to a metric on climate vulnerability. Numbers cited on ND-GAIN represent the ranking out of 182 countries, with 182 representing the most climate vulnerable country in the world.

Altogether, developing countries that have not explicitly included references to climate-related displacement in their NAPs or NDCs represent a substantial share of the world's populations that are directly affected by climate change displacement dynamics directly (Figure 4). Specifically, countries that do not explicitly refer to climate-related displacement in either their NAPs or their NDC represent:

1. 21 million internal disaster displacements occurring in 2021;
2. Countries hosting over 26 million refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide in 2022;
3. 39 million people living in fragile contexts;
4. 71% of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world.

Figure 4. Omission of climate-related displacement in NAPs and NDCs, across key metrics



Note: The graphs show numbers for all UNFCCC members that have or have not made explicit, concrete provisions in NAPs and NDCs. Countries whose NDCs were not analysed in this paper were excluded. The ND-GAIN Country Index summarizes vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with readiness to improve resilience.

Amongst the 63 countries with reference to climate-related displacement, 40 countries (63%) explicitly include displacement through concrete provisions. Broken down, these provisions translate to the following (Figure 6):

- 35% of concrete provisions aim to address situations of climate-related displacement in specific policy areas.
- 23% have concrete provisions on preventing avoidable displacement, including through efforts in DRR/DRM, adaptation, and livelihood diversification.

- 21% of concrete provisions aim to enhance data and knowledge of how climate change affects displacement and use this information to inform policies and decision-making.
- 15% of concrete provisions deal with improving policies or institutions and a few states vow to develop capacities related to climate displacement.

While these concrete provisions are important, they do not represent a comprehensive approach towards addressing climate-related displacement.

A comprehensive approach to forced displacement in NAPs and NDCs entails an approach coherent with the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus¹¹, with a whole-of-government and whole-society approach. Of the 40 countries that include concrete provisions on climate-related displacement, no country includes provisions on preventing and addressing displacement guided by a long-term HDP-nexus approach, one that includes the concerns of host communities, and one that addresses displacement along the entire life cycle of displacement, that is, before, during, and after movement. Similarly, a comprehensive commitment includes provisions to improve the local and national governance structures of climate-related displacement. There have been attempts to be comprehensive, however. Vanuatu's NDC, for instance, presents a good example of an approach towards addressing forced displacement covering many important elements (Box 4).

Box 4. Vanuatu's NDC as a good approach for including new climate-related displacement

Vanuatu is a low-income Small Island Developing States with about 0.32 million citizens in the South Pacific Ocean (World Bank 2021). Livelihoods are mostly oriented toward subsistence or small-scale agriculture. The country is highly vulnerable to disasters and climate change (ND-GAIN 2023; Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft 2022; UNDRR and ADPC 2022). Its remote islands are often less than one meter above sea level and most people live close to the coast. The capital is severely exposed to hazards, partially due to rapid urbanization in low-lying areas (IDMC 2022a, 2021c). The small country experienced about 180,000 internal displacements between 2008 and 2021, mainly due to storms (IDMC 2023c). These displacements have taken a high toll (IDMC 2022a; UNDRR and ADPC 2022). A share of them were lifesaving, effectively executed evacuations (IDMC 2018a). Climate change significantly multiplies the displacement risk in Vanuatu significantly (IDMC 2022b).


Confronted with such great challenges, Vanuatu is considered a global leader for the comprehensive policies and measures it has implemented to manage disasters and displacement (IDMC 2022a, 2021c; GP20 2022; UNDRR and ADPC 2022). In 2015, the government introduced various policies that include efforts to prevent and respond to displacement. It also adopted a specific National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement that features robust norms on assistance and durable solutions, in line with international guidance (IOM 2018d). Relocations are included in the National Policy and considered an option of last resort. Vanuatu has also included policies relevant for disaster displacement into its National Sustainable Development Plan for 2030. The state's institutional setup for dealing with the issue is considered good practice, including the focus on community-level mechanisms and the efficient horizontal integration of DRR and climate adaptation. Moreover, it has invested significant resources for implementing these policies (IDMC 2022a).

Vanuatu's 2022 NDC under the UNFCCC comprehensively includes displacement. The country explicitly references its national policies related to displacement. It recalls that to address climate adaptation and loss and damage challenges, community-led approaches are to be prioritized. The goal is to increase

¹¹ In 2019, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members agreed on a legal document outlining the DAC's Recommendation on the HDP Nexus, aiming to promote more coherent action among the world's leading donors of humanitarian, development and peace programmes in fragile and conflict contexts (OECD, 2019a).

participation and ensure all people are given choices and make decisions about mobility options without coercion. The NDC specifies that Vanuatu aims to strengthen provincial and area level coordination for implementation. Moreover, it vows to map traditional knowledge of communities at risk of displacement and investigate ways for such knowledge to be used in adaptation efforts. Finally, it commits to addressing the needs of people affected by displacement and providing durable solutions for them as well as host communities. It also aims to apply insurance to provide safety nets to remedy loss and damage. Besides displacement, the NDC includes several valuable provisions on relocation and evacuation. Vanuatu does not have a NAP.

Figure 5: Specific policy areas in which NAPs and NDCs make concrete provisions on forced displacement



Note: The analysis was based on keywords around the term “displacement.” Provisions aimed at facilitating movement in safety and dignity, which could help to minimise displacement, rarely include such keywords, and therefore do not feature in the identified text segments. The search terms were not mutually exclusive for each country – several terms are represented within a same country.

Amongst the 63 countries analysed, 23 (37%) explicitly make contextual references without making concrete provisions related to it. Many countries that *only* make contextual references without concrete provisions are vulnerable to climate change, fragile, and/or already significantly affected by displacement dynamics. These contextual references signal progressive recognition of the topic but must become a steppingstone for specifying concrete measures in upcoming updates of the climate policies. The references revolve around similar categories as those made as concrete provisions:

- Identifying which climate hazards affect displacement.
- Increased vulnerabilities of people fleeing in the context of climate change.
- The political or institutional dimensions of the forced displacement and climate change.
- The higher climate vulnerabilities and/or a higher risk of displacement of certain groups, such as existing IDPs;
- A few countries also assert conflict dimensions of climate-related displacement.
- They mention that climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and frequently overlaps with conflict drivers of movement. In some cases, displacement is seen as leading to competition for resources and new tensions.¹²


¹² For example, South Sudan does not paint all climate-related displacement as negative but acknowledges that it could lead to tensions between neighbouring states. It therefore stresses the need for collaboration and alignment of adaptation and peace-building efforts.

In addition, several NAPs and NDCs express the need for measures to prevent displacement. These references usually frame displacement as something to be averted because it increases pressures on human and natural systems.

Most NAPs and NDCs reference internal displacement rather than cross-border movements

When they define the type of displacement, 63% of countries focus on internal rather than cross-border movement. Overall, this translates to 27% (internal) vs. 16% (cross-border), when all NAPs and NDCs are considered. This is because most of the text segments in the policies that explicitly deal with *displacement* or contain *mobility terms* do not clarify if they mean internal or cross-border movement (57%) (Figure 6, left). 91% of countries do not explicitly consider cross-border displacement dynamics in their NAPs or NDCs (Figure 66, right). While most climate-related displacement is internal, there are important exceptions. For example, stepwise movement in border areas or displacement across countries with strong ties. The greater magnitude of internal than external displacement in many regions does not minimize the need to address the latter, especially as it can be protracted in nature. Yet, most of the likely destination countries lack attention or political will to plan for and respond to cross-border displacement via UNFCCC adaptation policies. By doing so, they also miss key chances to access funding for supporting the displaced and host communities.

Figure 6: References to internal vs. cross-border displacement



Note: The charts show the percentage of coded segments with explicit displacement and mobility terms with fuzzy (in)voluntariness (left) as well as the percentage of UNFCCC members that integrate cross-border displacement in their NAPs or NDCs (right).

Only 18 countries consider persons displaced across borders, all of which are directly affected by the issue, and many of which are low income, climate vulnerable, and fragile. Chad, for example, details various projects that support the climate resilience of cross-border returnees, refugees, and host communities, among other things. Antigua vows to consider adopting policies on regional, climate-related displacement, and Uruguay plans to prepare a database on the magnitude and conditions of climate-related displacement from (and within) its territory, to improve decision-making and reduce the vulnerabilities of affected. Cabo Verde envisages expanding protection and support for externally displaced persons and hosts (as well as IDPs). Few states consider that they may become destinations for climate-displaced persons from abroad and reflect on their absorption capacities. Gabon, for example, notes

concern that climate change will increase regional instability and climate-related displacement into its land. It aims to prepare for and manage these flows.


Countries seldom detail whether they refer to temporary, prolonged, or permanent displacement.

It is important that climate policies identify more clearly where temporary solutions and where long-term HDP nexus approaches are needed. At least 5.9 million persons continued to live in displacement by the end of 2021 due to disasters (IDMC, 2022c). Large shares of cross-border displacement are prolonged (Devictor, 2019). Evacuations can, in some cases, be prolonged (McAdam, 2020; Burson et al., 2018; IDMC, 2018b); and relocations are often intended to provide long-term solutions.

Few NAPs and NDCs cover how climate change affects existing refugees and IDPs in their countries

Only 4% of NDCs and 27% of NAPs address the effects of climate change on existing IDPs or refugees in their countries (Figure 77). Most LICs and MICs with large numbers of forced displacement populations do not address their high vulnerabilities to climate change in NAPs or NDCs. Many of these countries are fragile and highly climate vulnerable. Nearly 1.6 million refugees in 2022 and 100 000 conflict IDPs in 2021 were living in Pakistan for instance, which does not include these populations in its NDC and does not have a NAP. Similarly, nearly 900 000 refugees in 2022 and 3.6 million conflict IDPs in 2021 lived in Ethiopia, which also does not address these issues in either its NAP or NDC.

Figure 7: Extent of reference in adaptation plans to existing refugees and IDPs




Most countries with contextual references do not integrate concrete, actionable provisions on existing displaced populations. Concrete provisions on existing displaced persons are few (7 of 42 NAPs, 17%; 4 of 208 NDCs, 2%)¹³ and do not reflect a long-term, climate sensitive HDP nexus approach. The identified provisions centre on five categories of action (Figure 8). There are a few contextual references, notably in 6 NAPs and 3 NDCs.¹⁴ South Sudan offers a good practice with detailed commitments (Box 5).

¹³ In NAPs: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Kenya, Niger, South Sudan, and Sudan. In NDCs: Colombia, Jordan, Myanmar, and Somalia.

¹⁴ NAPs: Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the State of Palestine. NDCs: Argentina, Cameroon, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 8: Actions identified in NAPs and NDCs in relation to existing refugees and IDPs



Box 5. South Sudan's policies are good practice for including existing displaced populations

South Sudan is a landlocked, low-income Sub-Saharan country with about 10.75 million inhabitants, ranked as lowest in human development worldwide, and considered as extremely fragile (OECD, 2022; UNDP, 2023; World Bank, 2021). Most people depend on climate-sensitive livelihoods and are highly climate vulnerable (ADB, 2018; SIPRI and NUPI, 2023). 4.8 million conflict and 1.9 million internal disaster displacements occurred between 2008 and 2021, the latter mainly driven by floods (IDMC, 2023b). Many persons that live in displacement face severe well-being declines and the impact of displacement represents more than 5% of the country's GDP (IDMC, 2021a, 2021b). Climate change will amplify disaster displacement in the country and could increasingly contribute to conflict and related displacement as well (SIPRI and NUPI, 2023).

In its 2021 NAP, South Sudan places an emphasis on existing displaced populations and includes several concrete provisions. It highlights that they are among the most climate vulnerable groups and envisages inclusive resilience building. Moreover, it vows to ensure that repatriated people do not end up in climate-vulnerable locations and thereby reinforce crises cycles. The NAP also aims to mainstream climate change concerns into the National Development Strategy and investments to ensure their resilience and help address vulnerabilities of at-risk groups, including IDPs. Finally, it commits to use synergies between climate adaptation and humanitarian assistance and relief programs as well as return of displaced persons. These commitments in the NAP are in line with others previously made, such as the Kampala Convention ratified in 2018 and the 2017 Framework for Return, Reintegration and Relocation of Displaced Persons in 2017. The latter focuses on durable solutions for conflict and disaster IDPs as well as hosts (but does not spell out measures to prevent displacement).

Beyond existing displaced persons, the NAP and NDC also include those newly displaced due to climate change. They recognize how conflict, floods, and drought, exacerbated by climate change, lead to new internal and cross-border displacement. The NAP discusses the transboundary implications and possible conflict links of climate displacement and calls for improved regional cooperation on the issue. It also commits to creating maps and buffer zones and relocating communities away from flood-prone into safer areas. Finally, in its NDC, South Sudan aims for policies to improve the livelihoods of pastoralists, whose livestock is increasingly forced onto irregular routes (resulting in pastoralist displacement), which contributes to conflict.


NAPs/NDCs include references to relocation, evacuation and other related mobility terms

The degree of (in)voluntariness of people's movements is often unclear in the NAPs and NDCs. First, NAPs/NDCs frequently employ undefined terms with unclear (in)voluntariness (such as "exodus"); expressions that seem to suggest voluntary movement but in situations where displacement is likely (such as "migration" due to abrupt extreme events); or umbrella terms (such as mobility), which might be meant to include displacement. Second, people legally or politically identified as "voluntary migrants" by states may still have been forced to move and thus share vulnerabilities or needs with those explicitly categorised as displaced. Research shows that relocations and evacuations can save lives but at times may imply an element of force. NAPs and NDCs seldom discuss how (in)voluntary such movements are.

45% NAPs and 11% NDCs specifically address relocations through concrete provisions (Figure 9). More states make provisions than contextual references only 5% of NAPs and 7% of NDCs. 76% NAPs and 93% NDCs do not explicitly mention evacuations (Figure 10). Only three states make specific provisions on evacuations in their NAPs and five in their NDCs.

In addition, 33% of NAPs and 22% of NDCs include mobility terms with unclear (in)voluntariness, which may imply displacement (Figure 9). Concrete provisions are included in 21% of NAPs and 7% of NDCs. This suggests that some countries may not be using explicit displacement terms but still be aware of the issue and attempt to address it. However, if states do not explicitly include displacement, the displaced populations risk falling through the cracks. It is necessary that states clarify these fuzzy terms to make displaced persons visible. By doing so, they could also address actors or audiences concerned with displacement more directly and receive easier access to funding specifically designated for displacement situations.

Figure 9: Inclusion of relocation, evacuation, and mobility terms with fuzzy (in)voluntariness in NAPs and NDCs



Box 6. Safeguards and protection measures are key when climate action itself generates forced displacement

Research shows that certain measures taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change can forcibly evict people (Lunstrum and Bose, 2022; Warner and Wiegel, 2021). This includes “green grabbing” for land-intensive climate action, biodiversity protection measures, and conservation (DeBoom, 2021; Kansanga and Luginaah, 2019); dam constructions (IDMC, 2017); and poorly planned or executed adaptation projects (Warner and Wiegel, 2021). Different views exist on the depth and breadth of the evidence (Lunstrum and Bose, 2022; Vigil, 2018). Development projects tend to displace around fifteen million persons each year (UNGA, 2022b; Tan, 2020). Much of this development-induced displacement and resettlement occurs in areas where people lack tenure security and can be relatively easily expropriated or evicted. Ineffective planning, implementation, and policies of such development projects have often negatively affected involved populations (Wet 2006). While short-term gains are possible, the long-term impacts often remain ambivalent and are expected to be similarly challenging as for other forms of displacement (Vigil 2015, 2018). Many development-displaced and resettled persons are faced with severe impoverishment risks (Cernea, 2004).

Therefore, safeguards and protection mechanisms are key when climate action might require people to move. Finance providers such as the World Bank have safeguards, and there are codes of conduct and principles for responsible agricultural investment that aim to protect affected populations; however, they are non-binding, and their implementation is difficult to monitor. Effective certification schemes could be one important way forward (Vigil, 2018).


3 Legal frameworks and policies to address climate-related displacement remain fragmented

Key findings

- **Existing commitments stipulate that states are required to prevent and respond to displacement related to climate change, but the extent of implementation is limited and unclear.** The international community has not developed a specific framework, strategy, or institutional responsibility to address this issue, despite some progress being made.
- **Efforts to address climate-related displacement are siloed and fragmented, with persistent gaps, overlaps, and no clear hierarchy.** The issue cuts across different sectors, localities, and actors, and does not fall squarely within the scope of current norms and mandates. This has led to calls for better coordination and governance for years. However, progress is slow due to the complexities of climate-displacement linkages, political obstacles, questions of authority, and a lack of resources for implementation.
- **Despite the gaps, some entry points exist.** While existing international norms specifically designed for human mobility are inadequate to address the issue effectively, regional, subregional, and soft law approaches offer better, although imperfect, entry points. Norms in other arenas, namely human rights, development, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian action, and conflict also provide some potential but come with their own limits and challenges. Finally, climate and environmental frameworks and plans offer scope to address climate-related displacement, but their potential needs to be leveraged more. Inclusion in NAPs and NDCs is key. Overall, many entry points are regionally fragmented, legally non-binding, and not implemented sufficiently, leaving those affected to provide for themselves for the most part without enough protection and support.

As a first entry point, international human rights law can help support disaster-displaced persons in theory but often fails to offer effective guidance and remedies in practice. As binding treaty law, it is applicable to all kinds of displacement situations. Moreover, it protects a wide range of relevant rights, such as the right to life and freedom of movement, while a prohibition to return people to areas at risk of extreme climate impacts may be nascent (Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; UNHCR and OHCHR, 2022).

Infographic 2. Entry points and gaps in existing frameworks to address climate displacement



Practically speaking, however, international human rights law has not managed to effectively reduce violations writ-large (Hathaway, 2001). Similarly, it is unlikely to offer substantial protection for the growing magnitude of climate-related displacement in marginalized or politicized contexts. Many persons at risk of displacement face restricted freedom to move; many already displaced persons lack effective protection; and both groups remain at acute risk of human rights violations in many contexts (Leckie 2008; McAdam, 2012a; Braun, 2023; Scott, 2022).

International, cross-border, mobility policies are fragmented and leave gaps

The governance of forced displacement in general is complex, multi-layered, and fragmented (Betts and Kainz, 2017), and the same holds true for climate-related displacement. Entry points range from complementary protection under refugee law and soft law provisions in the Global Compacts on Refugees and for Migration (GCR and GCM), as well as other instruments for cross-border movements, to several frameworks for internal displacement, some of which are binding. However, in its current form, the existing policy frameworks and structures are “entirely insufficient to cope with, let alone effectively respond to, the looming crisis of climate displacement” (Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; McCarney and Kent 2020, p. 652). The governance of human mobility is based on few legally binding international treaties, which only cover a small fraction of cross-border climate displacement. Climate-related IDPs are not covered by an international status. They have not left the country and in principle enjoy their full citizen rights, but actual protection and support are often insufficient. Meanwhile, the more common regional or bilateral manifestations of hard and soft law offer scope for addressing internal and international displacement but tend to lack robust compliance mechanisms.

Gaps are particularly salient for vulnerable people needing, aspiring, or factually fleeing across borders due to climate change. A legal status and linked rights are key to allow such affected persons to enter other countries in a safe manner, stay as long as needed, and have reasonable chances to live in dignity (EUCOM, 2022; Braun, 2023). Yet, binding international norms with suitable protection standards are mostly in the realm of refugee law, which—in its current form based on the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocols—is only applicable to few climate-related displacement situations (Ferris and Bergmann, 2017; Weerasinghe, 2018).¹⁵ It focuses on *persecution* based on membership of *particular groups* and does not recognize environmental factors as grounds to accord refugee status *per se* (McAdam, 2012a). The prospects for extending protection to climate-displaced persons under the current convention or a new one are low as the underfunded refugee system is already under political pressure and struggling to provide protection to the currently more limited group of eligible asylum seekers, (Aleinikoff and Zamore, 2019). Especially when people flee across borders because climate change *gradually degrades* their well-being, they often lack a right to enter or stay and are at risk of risky border practices (PDD and OHCHR, 2018).

Regional and national hard law so far offers the best chances for climate-displaced persons to reach safer havens, if they move in areas where such frameworks exist. First, regional refugee systems provide important entry points. In particular, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (together with the 2014 Brazil Plan of Action) are more readily applicable to climate-related displacement than the 1951 Refugee Convention, because they have more generous eligibility criteria that include events seriously disturbing public order, as many disasters do (UNHCR, 2020; Hansen-Lohrey, 2022; Braun, 2023).¹⁶ Although the references to broader protection

¹⁵ A few exceptions exist where refugee protection has been granted, for example, when persons were affected by both disasters and political persecution, see Braun 2023.

¹⁶ For example, the OAU Convention covers “events seriously disturbing public order” and the Cartagena Declaration people fleeing “other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. These provisions can

needs in the regional conventions could cover the effects of climate change, the conventions remain fragmented, vague and open to interpretation at national level.

Second, regional or national complementary protection mechanisms offer initial partial support for climate-displaced persons populations. For example, humanitarian admission programmes such as Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements (TPSAs) can facilitate temporary admission to other countries for those fleeing climate disasters. Resettlement, family reunification, and community sponsorship programs also fall under temporary or subsidiary mechanisms. For example, the Temporary Protection Status in the US was created in 1990 to offer humanitarian relief on the basis of protracted unrest and civil war, but also natural disasters. Yet, such protection measures are often applied at the discretion of authorities and thus not reliably available for people seeking protection from climate change in third countries. Furthermore, they usually have weak protection standards and often lack a route to long-term residence, which is needed when climate change renders homelands uninhabitable (Frelick, 2020; Braun, 2023).

Third, regular migration pathways provide another theoretical possibility for climate-displaced persons to enter and stay in other countries, yet their factual implementation and suitability to provide protection differ. Climate-displaced persons who cross borders face varying policies in the countries to which they move. Some states have formal policies of stay and residence; some have informal practices; many have no policies, relying on ad hoc measures in times of crisis. Regular pathways can include free movement protocols, and trade agreements, visa lotteries, skills partnerships, and temporary or permanent visa schemes (Dempster, Dal Pra and Chazalnoël, 2021). Free movement agreements, for example, exist in various regions. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) endorsed a Free Movement Protocol in 1979 and has discussed a Protocol specifically for disaster displacement. In East Africa, the 2020 Protocol by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) explicitly allows entry and stay for people affected by disasters. The East African Community (EAC) envisages visa-free movement, and the African Union (AU) has adopted a Free Movement Protocol at continental scale in 2018. Comparable agreements with relevance for climate-related displacement exist in Latin America. They are binding, have relatively broad eligibility criteria, and could provide chances for long-term recovery or circular movements of climate-affected persons; yet, their implementation in practice hinges on institutional, infrastructural, and political factors. The AU Protocol, for example, remains scarcely ratified (Milej, 2019; Kehinde and Olusola, 2019). Additionally, in regions such as ECOWAS, external pressure and action by the high-income countries to keep people far from their borders has contributed to undermining free movement (Castillejo 2019; Bisong 2019). Moreover, many free movement agreements are designed for economic development and lack specific provisions to respond to the humanitarian needs associated with climate-related displacement.

Finally, various non-treaty agreements have helped to advance norms and operational guidance regarding climate-related displacement, but they lack binding regulations and depend even more on scarce political will than hard law norms (Ferris and Bergmann, 2017). Foremost, states commit to a range of measures to avert, minimize, and address migration due to climate impacts in the comprehensive but non-binding 2018 Global Compact for Migration (GCM). The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) integrates climate and disaster displacement to a lesser extent, but also calls for similar measures. Countries affected by disasters and climate impacts can use the GCR's arrangements for burden- and responsibility-sharing (UNHCR, 2019).

While the GCM and GCR may improve cooperation on cross-border climate-related displacement (Martin et al., 2018a; Kälin, 2018), translating their non-binding global norms into practices on the ground has hinged on scarce political will and funding, resulting in uneven implementation and limited efforts to facilitate safe mobility in particular (Yildiz, 2022; Mokhnacheva, 2022; Braun, 2023). Climate-related

provide an entry point for protecting disaster-displaced persons and some member states indeed have applied this expanded definition in environmental cases, see Kraller et al. 2020; Braun 2023.

displacement has figured in the follow-up mechanisms of the Compacts, but since these are built on voluntary reviews and pledges rather than binding, sanctionable commitments, the likelihood that states will take the kind of transformational action required for the issue is low. A different soft law initiative that has spurred important developments on cross-border displacement is the 2015 Nansen Protection Agenda (Ferris and Bergmann, 2017). It provides widely endorsed, yet non-binding guidance for preparedness before, protection and assistance during, and solutions after displacement, and has helped spur regional action on the issue. Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs)—consultative and state-led meetings—in the Americas have developed specific guidance for cross-border displacement ensuing after disasters and migrants already living in disaster-affected member states. Though non-binding, these frameworks are based on existing policies and practices and have helped harmonize responses (Kälin and Cantor, 2017). Examples of other soft law initiatives relevant for cross-border (and internal) climate-related displacement include the 2016 Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster (MICIC); the 2021 Action Agenda on Climate and Migration by the C40 Cities and the Mayors Migration Council; and the 2022 Guiding Principles for Children on the Move in the Context of Climate Change.

Overall, such soft law initiatives have helped draw attention to climate-related displacement, develop guidance, and build a certain interest buy-in, but their impact remains insufficient to bridge persistent gaps (Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022). Most soft law frameworks applicable to cross-border climate-related displacement have low levels of obligations and weak control mechanisms. Non-compliance with such non-treaty agreements produces even less consequences than breaches of international hard law.¹⁷ States may still perceive it as beneficial to comply, especially in regional contexts, and soft law can be a precursor to the development of international customary law or new hard law, as seen in other realms. Nonetheless, overall, the plethora of soft law initiatives regarding displacement is an expression of states' unwillingness to assume new binding obligations in many regions. As such, there are significant doubts if such voluntary commitments will be met with an actual stepping up of efforts commensurate to the challenge.

Internally displaced persons often fall through the cracks and are not covered by international protection status

While most displacement occurs within countries, there is no global treaty on the issue. Protecting IDPs remains the primary duty of national governments, which poses a heavy weight on poorer countries in which most displacement occurs. It can also result in delicate questions when states are unable or unwilling to assist persons displaced within their countries, as many states are suspicious of interference in their affairs by external actors. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement—soft law standards but distilled from binding treaties—apply to disaster IDPs, offer relevant guidance, and have successfully supported norm development. At least 14 states have translated them into national law and 36 nations into non-binding policies, yet no country has fully implemented them, and only about one third of these frameworks addresses disaster displacement. Those national frameworks that reference disasters or climate change often remain general, focused on post-displacement phases rather than preventing avoidable displacement or reducing the effects of unavoidable displacement. Many countries where internal displacement is salient still lack policies (Ferris and Bergmann, 2017; Nicolau and Pagot, 2018). These persistent gaps have led to another soft law initiative, the 2022 UN Secretary General's (UNSG) Action Agenda on Internal Displacement. It proposes solutions to climate-induced displacement pressures, among others, and provides reasonable recommendations for accountability, financing, and resourcing reforms. Yet, while the Action Agenda fails to address questions of climate justice, states still lack

¹⁷ In theory, rules of state responsibility determinate liability and remedies when international law is breached.

willingness and do not invest sufficient resources to implement the recommendations that could improve protection and support (Elie, 2021, 2022; Braun, 2023).

Regional and subregional processes have yielded key, binding advances that could help improve the protection of climate-related IDPs, but their effectiveness hinges on implementation capacities (Kraler, Katsiaficas and Wagner, 2020). The Guiding Principles have inspired states to develop the 2006 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to IDPs, which explicitly references disaster displacement. Moreover, the 2009 Kampala Convention by the African Union recognizes climate change as a driver of displacement and stipulates related protection and assistance duties for member states. However, the implementation of many of these regional (or national) formal commitments remains insufficient, resulting in continued protection and assistance gaps for climate-related IDPs (Braun, 2023).

There are no binding international frameworks specifically on planned relocation or managed retreat. As preventative DRR measures or post-disaster tools for rehabilitation and recovery, they will become increasingly necessary but can entail severe risks to well-being. The 2015 Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation and a related 2017 Toolbox are non-binding, but build on soft and hard law as well as standards from related fields. They provide concrete information for implementing actors, may help improve practice, and provide a standard for holding governments accountable. However, the translation in binding regional or national norms as well as sufficient local resources are key requisites for having impact on the ground (Ferris and Bergmann, 2017).¹⁸

For evacuations, few international norms exist. Evacuations represent a large share of the internal displacement dynamics worldwide, yet as within-country movements, addressing such processes has remained largely in the realm of domestic affairs, and thus dependent on local resources and political will (McAdam, 2022). Non-binding guidance exists in the 2014 MEND Guide for Planning Mass Evacuations in Natural Disasters and several disaster frameworks that include evacuations as a subtheme, such as the 2015 Sendai Framework for DRR and the 2011 IASC Operational Guidelines. In addition, the non-binding 2015 Guidance on Relocations is also partially relevant for evacuations, especially for protracted cases.

The global development agenda can help address climate forced displacement

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes pivotal goals that, if implemented, could help address climate displacement. It stresses that climate change, disasters, and conflict, as well as related humanitarian crises and displacement seriously threaten the achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A specific SDG focuses on climate action and several Targets call for improved adaptive capacity and DRR. States also vow to take action so that “No One Is Left Behind”, including displaced persons, and to empower, protect, and assist them and their hosts (UNGA, 2022b; UN, 2017). They also pledge to ensure safe, orderly, and regular migration, to respect the human rights of all people on the move, including displaced persons, and treat them humanely.¹⁹ Several Goals do not directly mention displacement, yet their implementation would contribute to supporting people at risk of climate-related displacement or already displaced, and to finding durable solutions (IOM, 2018c).²⁰ Further,

¹⁸ Similarly, a Managed Retreat Toolkit was developed by the Georgetown Climate Center n.d.

¹⁹ Various indicators for progress on resilience-building include populations evacuated, displaced, and relocated in the context of disasters and climate change, see PDD 2018. While the Agenda does not have a specific Goal on mobility, it recognizes for the first time the positive development contributions of migrants, see Stojanov et al. 2021. Additionally, various Goals make references to mobility, see Wright et al. 2020.

²⁰ E.g. the Goals on poverty reduction, employment, education, clean water and sanitation, life below water and on land, gender equality, as well as safe cities and human settlements.

specific development Programs of Action also integrate climate-related displacement to different degrees.²¹ Finally, the 2016 New Urban Agenda—guidance for sustainable and climate-resilient development in cities—does not directly mention climate-related displacement but makes several relevant references. It repeats many of the vows for displaced persons made in the 2030 Agenda specifically for city contexts (PDD, 2018; IOM, 2018a).²²

The current development agenda could thus help integrate climate displacement among international development priorities but comes with limits and remains inadequately implemented. While the first time that climate change and human mobility figure to this extent in the world’s agreed development vision (IOM, 2018c), the references to displacement, and climate-related cases in particular, are not explicit (Wright, Tänzler and Rüttinger, 2020). Moreover, the SDG implementation is seriously lagging. Progress reviews warn that the 2030 Agenda is “in grave jeopardy”, and that too little too late is being done on climate change and displacement (UN 2022, p. 3).²³ This is even though several states’ Voluntary National Reviews note severe climate impacts and some link these to displacement.²⁴ During the SDG follow-up and review, many states have also urged improved action on climate change and displacement at the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (UNGA, 2019; UN ESC, 2022). Similarly, states have largely failed to fulfil the commitments to displaced persons made in the New Urban Agenda (UNGA ESC, 2022). Financing is a key weak spot. States commit on climate action in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the framework for financing the SDGs, but make no specific references to related displacement (UNGA, 2015; PDD, 2018).

Development actors have increasingly addressed climate-related displacement, both regarding causes and solutions (Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; Martin et al., 2018b), **yet more action is needed**. As one example, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are among the key donors for adaptation and displacement projects and have also advanced related knowledge products and policy support (Huang et al., 2022; Huang, 2022; Tänzler and Bernstein, 2022). The World Bank, for instance, with its aim to eradicate extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity, has advanced several knowledge and modelling pieces on people’s movements and their development implications in general (World Bank, 2017, 2020, 2022) as well as on climate mobility specifically (Clement et al., 2021; Rigaud et al., 2018). A recent portfolio review shows that the World bank has implemented a variety of projects with links to climate-related displacement; still, more needs to be done for moving from reactive interventions to increasingly anticipatory intervention (Rigaud et al., 2021). Finally, MDBs still provide significant finance to fossil fuels that are exacerbating the climate crisis and related displacement dynamics (OIC and FoEI, 2022; Neunuebel, Thwaites and Choi, 2022).

²¹ The most explicit integration of climate-related displacement is in the Doha Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for 2022-2031(DPoA), see UNGA 2022a. The SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway stresses migrants’ development contributions and calls for strengthening DRR, including for displaced persons, see UNGA 2014b. The Vienna Programme of Action for the Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2014–2024 stresses various climate challenges, but does not connect them directly to displacement, see UNGA 2014a.

²² States vow to “Leave No One Behind”; bring DRR and CCA elements into urban planning; develop policies that support potentials of mobility and facilitate safe movement while addressing problems; protect displaced persons; include them in planning; provide decent living conditions; and avoid evictions and displacement due to urban action.

²³ The latest Global Sustainable Development Report, produced by independent scientists, cautions that displaced persons are often invisible in statistics, see UN 2019. The UN also annually reports on SDG progress, and the latest publication highlights that drought alone is estimated to displace 700 million people by 2030 UN 2022, p. 20. The UNSG’s Report “Our Common Agenda” 2021 has one key proposal asking states to prevent, protect, and resolve environmental displacement.

²⁴ This is based on a precursory review of recent synthesis reports, see UNDESA 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.

Soft law on disaster risk reduction and humanitarian aid is an important entry point

Key global DRR and humanitarian instruments reference climate displacement and provide valuable entry points to address the issue. At the same time, climate-related displacement has remained politically sensitive in this arena, and the translation of non-binding global norms into policy and action has been uneven (Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; Braun, 2023).

Though climate-related displacement is not the main focus of the Sendai Framework 2015–2030 for DRR, it stipulates various targets and recommendations with direct relevance (Guadagno, 2016; Stojanov et al., 2021; Tänzler and Bernstein, 2022; Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; Cantor, 2022). They include a significant reduction of people affected by disasters by 2030 (including those displaced); improved cooperation to reduce displacement risk; preventing or relocating settlement in risk zones; conducting evacuation drills; integrating displaced persons in response and recovery; and strengthening DRR, land-use planning, and relief, which can help reduce the risk of avoidable displacement and risks ensuing from such displacement. Global and regional panels were created for exchange and collaboration on DRR.²⁵ UNDRR (2019) developed concrete guidelines to integrate disaster displacement in DRR policies and strategies.

In the 2016 Agenda for Humanity, certain states have vowed to strengthen humanitarian-development linkages and address protracted displacement, including due to climate change (IOM, 2018a). They explicitly committed to prepare for climate-related displacement; reduce new and protracted internal displacement by at least 50% by 2030; improve protection and inclusion of displaced persons; as well as to “Leave No One Behind” by supporting displaced persons and their hosts. The International Law Commission’s (ILC)²⁶ has elaborated Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, which include certain disaster-displaced persons. Operational guidance exists for states and others on how to protect people’s rights during humanitarian disaster responses, which also apply to disaster IDPs (IASC, 2011; The Sphere Project, 2011; IASC, 2006).²⁷ The IASC (2010) has also developed a non-binding Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, including for disaster cases.

The climate-conflict-displacement nexus features to some extent in security frameworks and fora

Several norms and processes in the security realm are relevant for climate-related displacement. For one, when armed conflict and disasters co-occur, international humanitarian law could be relevant for the protection of displaced persons. Moreover, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has debated climate-security links at various occasions in regions where it had been already active, though the topic, and if the UNSC should deal with it, have been the subject of controversy (Vivekananda et al., 2020; Aleinikoff and Martin, 2022; UN Press, 2023; Akhtar and Ganesan, 2022; ICG, 2021). The UNGA²⁸ and the UNSG²⁹ have recognized climate-security implications and encouraged the UNSC to prevent and address climate-related displacement. Similarly, various regional and national actors also address climate-security-displacement linkages, including organizations in Africa and Asia (Krampe, Scassa and Mitrotta, 2018; AU PSC, 2019),

²⁵ The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) support the implementation by states as well as the follow up and review.

²⁶ The ILC is a UN body tasked by states with developing hard law. It adopted a full draft with commentaries in 2016 and, on their basis, recommended to the UNGA to elaborate a convention, see ILC 2016.

²⁷ While designed for sudden-onset disasters, many of the IASC provisions are applicable to slow-onset events. The Guidelines mention IDPs but do not focus on cross-border displacement, see IASC 2011.

²⁸ UNGA [Resolution A/RES/63/281](#) (2009).

²⁹ [UNSG A/64/350](#). The UNSG’s Peacebuilding Fund 2020 mentions climate-related displacement as a driver of fragility and instability, and runs projects on climate-security links.

the EU (EUCO, 2022), and the White House (2021). Addressing climate-conflict linkages is key from a peace perspective. However, there are also serious concerns that a security approach can mean that persons fleeing from climate impacts are treated as threats rather than as deserving protection and support (Bettini, 2014; Baldwin, Methmann and Rothe, 2014; Bettini, Nash and Gioli, 2017; Geddes, 2015; McLeman, 2019).³⁰

Further norms related to desertification and sea-level-rise

Treaty law on desertification and norm development on sea-level rise offer further entry points. Members of the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) vow to address drought, land degradation, and desertification, assist environmentally-displaced persons, and investigate these relationships (PDD 2018). The UNCCD 2018-2030 Strategic Framework stresses that drought and desertification reduce climate resilience and lead to displacement, and aims to improve the living conditions of affected people to reduce such forced movements (UNCCD, 2017). Later reports have examined evidence on this nexus and identified relevant measures (UNCCD, 2022b; IOM and UNCCD, 2019). Although some normative and operational progress has been made, also specifically on forced displacement (UNCCD 2022a), states have failed to meaningfully reduce drought, desertification, and land degradation, while climate change continues to exacerbate the issue (Chasek et al., 2019; Shukla et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2020).

In another UN process, the ILC has begun work on the implications of sea level rise (SLR) for international law, with a focus on displacement (ILC, 2023). Among other things, it will investigate questions relating to the protection of people at risk of displacement due to SLR and those factually displaced, both internally and across borders, given the currently “fragmented and general” nature of available protection norms and the long-term or permanent consequences of SLR (UNGA 2022c, p. 5). The aim is to develop a final report that informs about future avenues for action to develop law within the ILC or other fora. However, significant roadblocks encountered in other ILC processes and states’ lack of will to assume new duties suggest that the process will take long, while the final form and potential impacts remain uncertain.

³⁰ For example, many UNSC members have explicitly expressed their views that climate displacement can be a risk multiplier of conflict, see Security Council Report 2021.

4 Addressing the funding gap

Greater investments in adaptation and resilience are urgently needed to respond to the growing vulnerabilities related to climate change (Songwe, Stern and Bhattacharya, 2022). No legal or voluntary commitment for addressing displacement in the context of climate change can be implemented without more adapted funding (Huang et al., 2022; Tänzler and Bernstein, 2022).

Adaptation to displacement should be financed as a component of other climate change adaptation priorities, inclusive and not through separate fragmented mechanisms. Access to finance is however particularly difficult for displacement issues, due to several factors:

1. Concerns with regards to financing climate-induced displacement are highly politicised, and many donors driving the finance agenda are hesitant to engage with it or only prioritise certain aspects, such as security implications related to climate change (Huang, 2022; Stojanov et al., 2021).
2. Concerned actors have reservations to invest in high-risk fragile and conflict contexts, even though climate-conflict-displacement linkages tend to be particularly salient there.
3. The business case for financing through loans is not yet well established (Huang, et al., 2022).
4. It is not yet well understood which interventions would be most effective (Huang, 2022). The often-challenging operational environment, lag times for delivery, as well as data gaps and knowledge constraints make designing projects and accessing funding difficult. Measuring the effectiveness of interventions can also be difficult.
5. Accessing funds to address climate change is often challenging for at-risk countries or communities due to substantial bureaucracy and a lack of institutional, technical, and human resources, which have resulted in unused resources (Braun, 2023; Huang, 2022; Lo, 2016).

This is why NAPs and NDCs are fundamental, as they can help mobilise political will and facilitate access to the necessary support. They are designed to justify and register demand for climate finance and thus have political and operational significance for mobilising resources needed for action on displacement. In fact, by not addressing the climate vulnerabilities of persons at risk of displacement and those already displaced in NAPs and NDCs, countries may miss significant opportunities to access funding for supporting these populations and host communities.

Overall finance for climate change adaptation remains in short supply

100 billion USD annually was deemed necessary to adequately address climate change at the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. This goal was re-endorsed by countries in Paris in 2015 (COP21). Adaptation assistance to developing countries would need to equal between USD140 and USD340 billion by 2030 and between USD565 and USD1.750 billion annually by 2050 (Chapagain et al., 2020; UNEP, 2022a) to meet needs. To cope with loss and damage, funding beyond adaptation would need to amount to at least USD50 billion in 2022 and USD200-400 billion by 2030 (Hirsch, 2021; Songwe, Stern and Bhattacharya, 2022).

Climate finance should be new and additional according to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, to avoid that the climate crisis diverts attention and needed action from other needs. Yet, studies suggest that much of the available climate finance has been directly diverted from official development assistance spending in

other regions and sectors, thus resulting not only in underfunded climate action but also jeopardizing other development goals (Hattle and Nordbo, 2022; Ritchie, Ritchie and Tahmasebi, 2021). Although both the absolute volume and the share of official development assistance for climate action have increased, they remain far behind the commitments made and factual needs of countries (Songwe, Stern and Bhattacharya, 2022). In 2020, DAC members allocated USD 44 billion or 33% of their total official development assistance to climate objectives (OECD, 2022a).

The current funding gap for climate adaptation puts the world at risk (UNEP, 2022a). Current financial commitments for climate action have barely included any funding for displacement projects (Schäfer, Jorks and Seck, 2021; Thornton, 2022; Wright et al., 2021). As a solution to the financing gap, various sources and instruments are in principle available to address climate change-related displacement. Potential solutions for financing can come from national, bilateral, multilateral, and private sources (Tänzler and Bernstein, 2022).

At national level, government budgets, loans, and financial tools such as bonds, provide the majority of financing for adaptation in many developing countries. In the international realm, development funding through multilateral funds or direct financing through development agencies are the key sources, besides humanitarian and relief funding. Private sources include philanthropy, remittances, and businesses, such as insurance providers.

Already-existing funding instruments are not being used enough to help address displacement in the context of climate change, including grants, loans, loan forgiveness, bonds, budget contingency, sovereign risk pools (SRPs), forecast-based financing (FbF), remittances, microinsurance or microcredit, relocation funds, and climate land banks (CLBs). The advantage here is that such instruments are designed for very different and specific purposes and contexts, ranging from risk reduction to relocation and to community resilience. Microcredit, for example, can be directly geared towards action and policies addressing displacement at smaller scales. Bonds on the other hand, are useful instruments at more national and structural levels.

Broadening the diversity of instruments allows for complementarity and a wide toolkit in addressing displacement, but it also increases the necessity to broaden technical capacities for governments. For example, potential funding instruments and mechanisms for relocations alone include a broad set of complicated instruments: dedicated taxes, utility fees, relocation incentives, government emergency assistance funds, insurance-linked mechanisms, community housing savings groups, trust funds borrowing/bonds, international cooperation, and grants (Boston, Panda and Surminski, 2021).

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are likely to become increasingly key actors in closing the funding gap for adaptation projects related to displacement. They can invest in large-scale projects with long-term timelines that may be needed to address displacement related to climate change in a transformative manner. In addition, MDBs have announced ambitious goals to raise their climate finance targets. In 2021, they committed USD 81 billion in climate finance, in addition to separately funded projects on displacement (Huang, 2022; Huang, et al, 2022; Tänzler and Bernstein, 2022). The portfolios through which MDBs work generally remain siloed, however. There are some adaptation projects that also address displacement objectives, and vice versa, but project staff is often not equipped with resources to deal with the linkages.

A recent World Bank portfolio review draws out operational experiences and lessons learned at the climate-mobility-development nexus (Rigaud et al., 2021). For 2006-2019, it identifies 165 projects, totalling to USD197.5 billion. It argues that substantial cross-learning would be beneficial between those projects that supported the short-term needs of people on the move on the one side, and those that dealt with broader and longer-term development issues on the other side (including climate adaptation and resilience projects), which also targeted people on the move as sub-beneficiaries. Yet, the review also identifies projects that have worked on extending social protection systems to address potential displacement before climate events become disasters; that have integrated the needs of the displaced using adaptation interventions; that have helped mobile pastoralists adapt to climate change and mitigate conflicts with

sedentary farmers; and that have supported relocation. Learning from these projects will be key to address the climate displacement nexus better.

The role of the Loss and Damage Fund

The new UNFCCC Loss and Damage (L&D) Fund can play a significant role in addressing the climate funding gap, by financing action to cope with or compensate L&D driving or ensuing from displacement. Affected states are beginning to mention L&D related to forced displacement in their NDCs, as the baseline mapping in this paper shows (Ryder and Calliari, 2021).

What impact the L&D Fund may have remains uncertain. Outcomes hinge on the Fund's negotiated form, magnitude, funders, and recipients negotiated by the Transitional Committee, and its ultimate implementation (UNEP, 2022b). The negotiations will likely be challenging due to the aforesaid contentious debates about assuming any liability, as well as questions on the growing emissions and responsibility of emerging states (Lo, 2022). There are also intricacies of delineating adaptation and L&D, and displacement likely partially falls into both categories. Moreover, identifying, quantifying, and compensating especially non-economic L&D will be non-trivial.

For the poorest countries, which have neither contributed substantially to emissions nor are projected to do so, it is urgent to solve these funding questions and address increasing volumes of climate-related displacement that results from, and can entail, substantial L&D. It will be key to avoid that the poorest countries and communities encounter similar accessibility obstacles known from other climate finance mechanisms under the UNFCCC, which have been underused for displacement issues. That said, vulnerable people will also experience L&D in the context of displacement outside of the least developed countries, to which the Fund is currently limited.

5 Policy recommendations

This section outlines policy recommendations on including climate displacement concerns in NAPs and NDCs. It is based on the textual analysis of NAPs and NDCs, on the relationship between climate change and forced displacement, and on existing legal norms, policies, and plans.

Climate action requires effective allocation of resources

NAPs and NDCs are fundamental, as they can help mobilise political will and open gates for accessing financing. They are designed to justify and register demand for climate finance and thus have political and operational significance for mobilising resources needed for action on displacement.

Concern is therefore tantamount as to the inclusion of climate-induced displacement into NAPs, NDCs and all related action addressing climate change. This ensures that mitigation and adaptation account for the fact that people will be forced to move in the future, that people that are currently displaced are not forgotten in climate action and that host communities are not left to their devices to cope but are handed the resources and skills to do so.

Addressing these populations in climate action is about inclusiveness, but also resource effectiveness. It ensures that efforts are coherent, and that action is not doubled, as many displaced persons will need to be nevertheless protected and supported in time.

Explicit inclusion with concrete provisions should be prioritised in NAPs and NDCs

A dedicated section in NAPs and NDCs should discuss and prioritise climate-related displacement in countries where the issue is already prevalent, or where the likelihood of being affected in future is high. This includes steps to assess and analyse climate-displacement links, identify national and regional displacement priorities, and to design appropriate actions and programmes. Provisions should be clear, concrete and establish action for both future displacement and current populations of IDPs and refugees.

Adaptation planning must address forced displacement along the entire life cycle of displacement, that is, before, during, and after movement. The agency of affected communities, their protection and support, and consultation must be considered in all measures. Measures should be integrated in cross-cutting policies and sectors, at the national and sub-national levels. Links should be made to regional dimensions, especially for cross-border displacement and conflict dynamics.

Humanitarian approaches to addressing climate displacement alone are insufficient. Inclusion should not be limited to NAPs and NDCs, and extend to development planning, such as national and local development plans and donor strategies, as well as other relevant legal and policy frameworks. Ensuring policy coherence and mainstreaming in all relevant policies is key. States should make use of existing entry points to protect and support people affected by climate displacement, such as refugee and human rights law, and close major gaps.

Capacity needs to be boosted

Implementation requires clear and effective governance responsibilities at international, national and local levels. Processes related to displacement and climate change should be participatory and inclusive. Long-term vision, technical, human, and institutional capacities for implementation, as well as access to financing, form a pre-requisite for addressing climate-related displacement.

To generate a common understanding about approaches which work and merit financing, and to inform related climate and development planning processes, all stakeholders should undertake more contextualised research and evaluation in this area. This should be coupled with deliberate efforts to disseminate findings. Particular attention should be paid to policy areas such as predictable governance and policy frameworks, urban displacement (urban areas receiving and generating displacement), and better preparedness to absorb the displaced in non-emergency mode into the existing socio-economic fabric of receiving local areas.

The inclusion of climate-induced displacement in the priorities of countries and their partners must be supported with capacity to regularly run diagnostics, such as projections of the impacts on populations. Without the capabilities to invest in such diagnostics and systems at country level, adaptation finance which is already quite scarce will continue to be challenging to access for many issues. Inclusion must also be monitored over time. Little is known about the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in national services and the formal economy. Supporting displacement-affected countries, by monitoring displacement disaggregated socio-economic data, will increase awareness, and inform good decision making, including efforts towards climate action.

Where do we start?

1. Get the right people speaking together

Knowledge and capacity on the links between climate change and forced displacement has largely remained within a tight group of experts and advocates, mostly with an environmental background. Governmental stakeholders charged with NAPs and NDCs, as well as the external partners supporting them, must be informed and trained on such links. They must also be part of the discussion on drafting, prioritising and implementing climate adaptation initiatives. In addition, capacity on the use of new forms of development finance must also be enhanced, to broaden access to finance. This fundamentally implies support at sub-national and local levels of government, where implementation occurs.

2. Find synergies

There are low hanging fruits. Extending ongoing climate change adaptation initiatives by different ministries, local governments and donors, to displaced persons, and those tackling forced displacement to climate change, will generate immediate dividends. New programmes should systematically connect climate action with displacement. Beyond NAPs and NDCs, forced displacement should be explicitly included in development plans, as well as in disaster risk reduction and resilience agendas. Concrete provisions and contextual references on displacement in NAPs and NDCs should be matched with specific programmes and project proposals for climate finance. Unlocking more financing is crucial for adequate responses to climate displacement.

3. Think long-term and comprehensively

Humanitarian approaches to addressing climate displacement alone remain insufficient. Concerns related to climate change are long-term. Addressing forced displacement in NAPs and NDCs is not just a matter of mainstreaming them across a policy document. It is about thinking of the long-term implications of people living in places they have little knowledge about. It is about connecting them to the future plans of the country. This implies addressing the root causes of climate-induced forced displacement, but also the sustainable integration of populations into new territories, their social protection, health and education, as

well as their livelihoods. Solutions are only possible in tandem with a development approach. Countries and actors need to adopt longer-term thinking regarding adaptation and sustainable development. This implies addressing root causes of displacement, but also the sustainable integration of populations into new territories, including their impact on existing and their inclusion in social protection, health and education services, as well as access to dignified livelihoods, such as decent employment.

4. Reach beyond borders

The concerns related to forced displacement due to climate change are not limited to national borders. People are displaced across borders and mix with migrant flows. As much as climate change is global phenomenon, displacement sensitive adaptation planning should also be tackled regionally and globally, providing space for peer-learning, co-ordination, and coherence.

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Annex A. List of all National Adaptation Plan (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) analysed

UNFCCC Party	NDC	NAP
Afghanistan	Only First NDC	none
Albania	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Algeria	Only First NDC	none
Andorra	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Angola	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Antigua and Barbuda	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Argentina	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Armenia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Australia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Austria	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Azerbaijan	Only First NDC	none
Bahamas	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Bahrain	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Bangladesh	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Barbados	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Belarus	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Belgium	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Belize	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Benin	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Bhutan	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Botswana	Only First NDC	none
Brazil	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2016
Brunei Darussalam	2020 NDC (First NDC)	none
Bulgaria	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Burkina Faso	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP, NAP 2015
Burundi	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Cabo Verde	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Cambodia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP Financing Framework and Implementation Plan + NAP Process Document + NAP Communication Strategy 2021
Cameroon	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2015

UNFCCC Party	NDC	NAP
Canada	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Central African Republic	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Chad	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP, NAP 2022
Chile	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC) + Chile's NDC Strengthening Annex	NAP + Biodiversity + Agriculture + Fisheries and Aquaculture 2017
China	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Colombia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC) + 2 Technical Annexes	NAP 2018
Comoros	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Congo	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Cook Islands	Only First NDC	none
Costa Rica	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Côte d'Ivoire	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Croatia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Cuba	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Cyprus	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Czechia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Denmark	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Djibouti	Only First NDC	none
Dominica	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Dominican Republic	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Ecuador	Only First NDC	none
Egypt	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
El Salvador	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Equatorial Guinea	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Eritrea	Only First NDC	none
Estonia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Eswatini	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Ethiopia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2019
European Union	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Fiji	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2018
Finland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
France	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC) + France First NDC-Complement (Updated submission)	none
Gabon	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Gambia	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Georgia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Germany	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Ghana	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Greece	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Grenada	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	NAP 2019
Guatemala	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2019
Guinea	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none

UNFCCC Party	NDC	NAP
Guinea-Bissau	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Guyana	Only First NDC	none
Haiti	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2023
Honduras	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Hungary	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Iceland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
India	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Indonesia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Ireland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Israel	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Italy	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Jamaica	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Japan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Jordan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Kazakhstan	Only First NDC	none
Kenya	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2017
Kiribati	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2020
Kuwait	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Kyrgyzstan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Latvia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Lebanon	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Lesotho	Only First NDC	none
Liberia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Liechtenstein	Only First NDC	none
Lithuania	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Luxembourg	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Madagascar	Only First NDC	NAP 2022
Malawi	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Malaysia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Maldives	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Mali	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Malta	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Marshall Islands	2020 NDC (Updated Second NDC)	none
Mauritania	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Mauritius	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Mexico	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Micronesia (Federated States of)	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Monaco	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Mongolia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Montenegro	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Morocco	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Mozambique	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none

UNFCCC Party	NDC	NAP
Myanmar	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Namibia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Nauru	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Nepal	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	NAP + Health National Adaptation Plan: Climate Change Health Adaptation Strategies and Action Plans (2017-2021) 2021
Netherlands	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
New Zealand	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Nicaragua	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Niger	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Nigeria	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Niue	Only First NDC	none
North Macedonia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Norway	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Oman	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Pakistan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Palau	Only First NDC	none
Panama	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Papua New Guinea	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
Paraguay	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP (Updated) 2020
Peru	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Philippines	2020 NDC (First NDC)	none
Poland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Portugal	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Qatar	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Republic of Korea	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Republic of Moldova	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Romania	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Russian Federation	2020 NDC (First NDC)	none
Rwanda	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Saint Lucia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2018
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Only First NDC	NAP 2019
Samoa	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
San Marino	Only First NDC	none
Sao Tome and Principe	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Saudi Arabia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Senegal	2020 NDC (First NDC)	none
Serbia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Seychelles	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Sierra Leone	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2022
Singapore	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Slovakia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Slovenia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none

UNFCCC Party	NDC	NAP
Solomon Islands	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Somalia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
South Africa	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
South Sudan	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	NAP 2021
Spain	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Sri Lanka	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2016
State of Palestine	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2016
Sudan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2016
Suriname	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	NAP 2020
Sweden	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Switzerland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC) + Switzerland submission Para 29 Glasgow Climate Pact	none
Syrian Arab Republic	Only First NDC	none
Tajikistan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Thailand	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Timor-Leste	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2021
Togo	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	NAP 2018
Tonga	2020 NDC (Second NDC) + Tonga Second NDC Review Report	NAP 2021
Trinidad and Tobago	Only First NDC	none
Tunisia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Türkiye	Only First NDC	none
Turkmenistan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Tuvalu	Only First NDC	none
Uganda	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Ukraine	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
United Arab Emirates	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	none
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
United Republic of Tanzania	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
United States of America	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Uruguay	2020 NDC (Second NDC)	NAP Agriculture + Coastal + Cities 2019
Uzbekistan	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Vanuatu	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Viet Nam	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Zambia	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none
Zimbabwe	2020 NDC (Updated First NDC)	none

Annex B. Depth of explicit inclusion of displacement in NAPs and NDCs

Legend								
concrete and contextual	contextual only	concrete only	none	No NAP				
Concrete and contextual	NDC	NAP	Concrete only	NDC	NAP	Contextual only	NDC	NAP
Colombia			Sri Lanka			Paraguay		
Uruguay			Chile			Sierra Leone		
Cabo Verde			Liberia			Algeria		
Antigua and Barbuda			Albania			Bahamas		
Argentina			Belize			Bangladesh		
Georgia			Gabon			Burundi		
Jordan			Nauru			Comoros		
Mexico			Pakistan			Dominica		
Myanmar			Senegal			Honduras		
Papua New Guinea			Seychelles			Malawi		
Somalia			Fiji			Mauritius		
Vanuatu			Grenada			Micronesia		
Timor-Leste			Madagascar			Nigeria		
Cameroon			South Africa			Saint Kitts and Nevis		
Kenya			Sudan			Viet Nam		
Saint Lucia						Zimbabwe		
South Sudan						Bosnia and Herzegovina		
Benin						Brazil		
Central African Republic						Burkina Faso		
Chad						Costa Rica		
Dem. Rep. of the Congo						Ethiopia		
Guatemala						State of Palestine		
Nepal						Togo		
Niger								
Peru								

Note: This table refers only to the countries that explicitly include displacement by the depth of inclusion, from concrete and contextual (left) to concrete only (centre) to contextual only (right). It also shows that only some countries align the inclusion of displacement in both NAPs and NDCs. Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste have concrete provisions in both.

Source: Authors' baseline analysis

Annex C. NAPs / NDCs with explicit contextual references to displacement, but no concrete provisions

UNFCCC Party	Income group	All internal displacement, 2021 (IDMC)	Internal displacement disasters only, 2021 (IDMC)	# hosted refugees + asylum seekers in 2022 (UNHCR)	Vulnerability Rank (ND-GAIN)	Fragility (OECD)
Algeria	Lower middle	6,645	6,645	101,820	99	Not fragile
Bahamas	Upper	0	0	10	87	Not fragile
Bangladesh	Lower middle	98,921	98,770	929,708	164	Other fragile
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Upper middle	314	314	483	80	Not fragile
Brazil	Upper middle	470,368	448,900	267,670	91	Not fragile
Burkina Faso	Low	682,245	0	34,569	161	Other fragile
Burundi	Low	86,979	86,885	85,858	165	Extremely fragile
Comoros	Low	0	0	19	158	Other fragile
Costa Rica	Upper middle	290	290	215,917	61	Not fragile
Dominica	Lower middle	0	0	NA	62	Not fragile
Ethiopia	Low	5,382,365	240,009	870,046	161	Other fragile
Honduras	Lower middle	811	262	275	136	Other fragile
Malawi	Low	602	602	54,800	163	Not fragile
Mauritius	Upper middle	0	0	10	46	Not fragile
Micronesia	Low	0	0	NA	151	Not fragile
Nigeria	Lower middle	399,918	24,366	84,302	158	Other fragile
Paraguay	Upper middle	0	0	6,067	93	Not fragile
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Upper middle	0	0	0	53	Not fragile
Sierra Leone	Low	0	0	10	155	Other fragile
State of Palestine	Lower middle	118,241	30	NA	NA	Other fragile
Togo	Low	0	0	11,205	129	Other fragile
Viet Nam	Lower middle	779,699	779,699	0	97	Not fragile
Zimbabwe	Low	2,354	2,354	21,779	174	Other fragile

Annex D. NAPS / NDCs that integrate cross-border displacement

UNFCCC Party	Cross-border displacement in NAP	Cross-border displacement in NDC	Income group	2022 # hosted refugees + asylum seekers (UNHCR)	Fragility (OECD)	Vulnerability Rank (ND-GAIN)
Benin	Yes	no	Low	2,342	Other fragile	152
Burundi	No	yes	Low	85,858	Extremely fragile	165
Cameroon	No	yes	Low	4,83,974	Other fragile	146
Central African Republic	Yes	no	Low	11,326	Extremely fragile	181
Chad	Yes	no	Low	5,85,061	Extremely fragile	182
Gabon	No	yes	Upper middle	304	Not fragile	115
Guatemala	Yes	no	Lower middle	2,083	Other fragile	119
Honduras	No	yes	Lower middle	275	Other fragile	136
Jordan	No	yes	Lower middle	761,804	Not fragile	73
Kenya	Yes	yes	Low	555,162	Other fragile	149
Myanmar	No	yes	Lower middle	-	Other fragile	156
Niger	Yes	no	Low	291,821	Other fragile	176
Paraguay	yes	no	Upper middle	6,067	Not fragile	93
Senegal	no	yes	Low	12,046	Not fragile	134
South Sudan	yes	yes	Low	341,376	Extremely fragile	-
Sudan	yes	no	Low	1,141,041	Extremely fragile	177
Uruguay	no	yes	Upper middle	14,091	Not fragile	51
Zimbabwe	no	yes	Low	21,779	Other fragile	174

Annex E. Inclusion of displacement in NAPs and NDCs of the top ten low- and middle-income countries hosting the largest refugee populations in 2022

State	Inclusion in NAPs	Inclusion in NDCs	Income group (WBG)	Number of hosted refugees + asylum seekers in 2022 (UNHCR)	Stock of conflict IDPs by the end of 2021 (IDMC)	Fragility (OECD)	Vulnerability (ND-GAIN Rank)
Pakistan	No NAP	none	Lower middle	1 564 283	103 602	Other fragile	146
Uganda	No NAP	none	Low	1 529 272	1 700	Other fragile	166
Sudan	specific	none	Low	1 141 041	3 175 000	Extremely fragile	177
Bangladesh	none	none	Lower middle	929 708	426 914	Other fragile	164
Ethiopia	none	none	Low	870 046	3 589 000	Other fragile	161
Lebanon	No NAP	none	Lower middle	844 389	50	Not fragile	117
Jordan	No NAP	specific	Lower middle	761 804	0	Not fragile	73
Chad	specific	none	Low	585 061	391 725	Extremely fragile	182
Kenya	specific	none	Low	555 162	190 000	Other fragile	149
Peru	none	none	Lower middle	542 921	59 846	Not fragile	86