copy the linklink copied!9.2. Influence in decision-making through lobbying and political finance
Influencing policymaking is a core part of a sound democratic system. Interest groups, including lobbyists, can bring much needed information to the policy debate. However, in the absence of regulations, they can also capture policy making. In fact, powerful interests can use their wealth, power or advantages to tip the scale in their favour at the expense of the public interest. In LAC, on average almost 75% of citizens perceive that a few powerful groups are governing their countries for their own benefit (Latinobarometro, 2017).
Lobbying public officials or financing political parties and candidates’ electoral campaigns are the most common ways of exercising uneven access to decision-making process. In LAC, although there is an increasing awareness and efforts to address the distorted effects of these practices, challenges and gaps persist.
The Index of Quality of Regulations Against Undue Influence, based on the 2018 OECD Questionnaire on Public Integrity in Latin America, measures the existence and reach of lobbying regulations, enforcing transparency of influence seeking and the regulation on conflicts of interest. The regional average for 2018 is 4.08 out of a maximum of 9.00 points, with 0 being the lowest possible quality of regulations and 9 the highest. Argentina (7.50), Chile (7.40) and Mexico (7.00) have the highest scores, while Paraguay currently scores 0.00.
Seven countries do not have a specific regulation on the influence of interest groups, such as companies. Only Chile, Colombia and Mexico have a lobbyist register, and out of these, Colombia does not impose sanctions for non-compliance. The average score on lobbying regulations is 0.89 out of 3 points, with six countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Uruguay) obtaining a score of 0.00.
Regarding transparency of influence seeking, LAC countries score an average of 1.27 out of 3. Only four countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru) require public officials’ agendas to be public, and five countries (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru) require disclosing the names of members of permanent advisory bodies. Argentina is the only country obtaining the maximum score (3.00) on this indicator.
Regulation on conflicts of interest is the indicator where LAC countries score the highest, 1.92 out of 3. Argentina and Mexico obtained the highest score followed by Colombia and Peru. Ecuador, Guatemala and Paraguay do not have any regulations for political positions (e.g. members of cabinet or of legislative bodies) and don’t establish cooling-off periods.
With respect to political finance, the general trend is towards introducing more regulations on political finance and the region is actually strongly regulated. However, data from the Questionnaire show the wide use of informal practices that are not covered by current regulations. For example, while most countries in the region forbid anonymous donations and political parties are required to reveal the identity of donors, contributions in cash are allowed in 92% and gifts in 33% of the countries. Sometimes, cash contributions are used to circumvent formal regulations, due to the complications associated with monitoring such transactions. Only 67% of the countries have requirements to disclose contributions online, and 33% require such data to be published within 30 days after the campaign.
Data are drawn from the 2018 OECD Questionnaire on Public Integrity in Latin America responded by 12 countries. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in central government, supreme audit institutions and electoral commissions.
The Index of quality of regulations against undue influence is based on the OECD theoretical framework on undue influence. It consists of three sub-indicators, lobbying regulations, transparency of influence seeking, and conflict of interest regulations, each one ranging from 0 (lowest) to 3 (highest). The total score corresponds to the unweighted aggregation of the three indicators, thus from 0 to 9.
Lobbying regulations covers the existence of such regulations and existence of register of lobbyists. Transparency of influence-seeking considers whether the agendas of senior officials are made public, the existence of a legislative footprint and the disclosure of members of permanent advisory bodies. Conflict of interest regulations considers the existence of such regulations and cooling-off periods for elected representatives.
Scores reflect the existence and scope of regulations on influence in a country. They do not indicate if these regulations are effectively implemented nor if the mechanisms put in place are achieving the desired impact.
Legislative footprint refers to being able to re-construct, based on publicly available information, who have influenced a regulatory process (e.g. contributed to the draft of a law) and with what interest.
A cooling off period is a period during which public officials are barred from engaging in lobbying and employment that could constitute a conflict of interest
For information on the methodology see Annex E.
Further reading
OECD (2018), Integrity for Good Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean: From Commitments to Action, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264201866-en
Figure notes
9.4 Data for Honduras are not available.
Source: OECD (2018) “OECD Questionnaire on Public Integrity in Latin America”.
Source: OECD (2018) “OECD Questionnaire on Public Integrity in Latin America”.
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