Annex A. OECD 2022 Survey on Primary Markets Developments
This annex belongs to the OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2022.
Thirty-seven of the 38 OECD countries responded to this survey.
Countries which responded to the survey but did not provide comments to a question may not appear in the table of answers. The requested date for a response to the survey was 10 October 2022.
Source: 2022 Survey on Primary Markets Developments by the OECD Working Party on Debt Management.
Table A A.1. Overview of issuing procedures | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Auctions: Long-Term | Auctions: Short-Term | Auction Type: Single-Price | Auction Type: Multiple-Price | Tap Issues: Long-Term | Tap Issues: Short-Term | Syndication | Private Placement |
Australia | X | X | X | X | ||||
Austria | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Belgium | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Brazil | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Bulgaria | X | X | X | X | ||||
Canada | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Chile | X | X | X | X | X | |||
Colombia | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Costa Rica | X | X | X | |||||
Croatia | X | X | X | X | ||||
Czech Republic | X | X | X | X | X | |||
Denmark | X | X | X | X | X | |||
Estonia | X | X | X | |||||
Finland | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
France | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Germany | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Greece | X | X | X | X | ||||
Hungary | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Iceland | X | X | X | X | ||||
Ireland | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Israel | X | X | X | |||||
Italy | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Japan | X | X | X | X | ||||
Korea | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Republic of Latvia | X | X | X | X | ||||
Lithuania | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Luxembourg | X | |||||||
Mexico (Local) | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Netherlands | X | X | X | X | ||||
New Zealand | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Norway | X | X | X | X | ||||
Poland | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Portugal | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Romania | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | |
Slovak Republic | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Slovenia | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Spain | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||
Sweden | X | X | X | X | X | |||
Switzerland | X | X | X | X | ||||
Türkiye | X | X | X | |||||
UK | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Table A A.3. Q2 Have you issued or plan to issue any new types of securities like inflation-linked bonds, variable rate notes, green bonds, and longer dated securities? | ||
---|---|---|
YES, new types of securities were/will be issued | NO new types of securities were/will be issued | |
Australia | Both | |
Austria | Both | |
Belgium | Both | |
Brazil | Both | |
Bulgaria | Both | |
Canada | Last 12 months | Next 12 months |
Chile | Last 12 months | |
Colombia | Both | |
Costa Rica | Both | |
Croatia | Both | |
Czech Republic | Both | |
Denmark | Last 12 months | Next 12 months |
Estonia | Both | |
Finland | Both | |
France | Last 12 months | |
Germany | Last 12 months | |
Greece | Last 12 months | |
Hungary | Both | |
Iceland | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Ireland | Last 12 months | |
Israel | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Italy | Last 12 months | Next 12 months |
Japan | Both | |
Korea | Both | |
Republic of Latvia | Last 12 months | |
Lithuania | Both | |
Luxembourg | Both | |
Mexico (Local) | Both | |
Netherlands | Both | |
New Zealand | Both | |
Norway | Last 12 months | |
Poland | Last 12 months | Next 12 months |
Portugal | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Romania | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Slovak Republic | Both | |
Slovenia | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Spain | Both | |
Sweden | Both | |
Switzerland | Next 12 months | Last 12 months |
Türkiye | Both | |
UK | Last 12 months | Next 12 months |
Table A A.4. Q2 New type of instrument issued over the last 12 months or planned to be issued in the next 12 months | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inflation-linked bonds | Longer dated securities | Variable rate notes (such as floating rate notes) | Retail bonds | Green bonds | Social bonds | Sustainability bonds | Sustainability-linked bonds | Infrastructure bonds | Sukuk | Other | Last or next 12 months | |
Australia | Both | Both | ||||||||||
Austria | Last 12 months | Green Austrian Treasury Bills / Commercial Paper | Next 12 months | |||||||||
Belgium | Both | Both | Both | |||||||||
Brazil | ||||||||||||
Bulgaria | ||||||||||||
Canada | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Chile | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Colombia | Last 12 months | Both | Next 12 months | Next 12 months | ||||||||
Costa Rica | Both | Both | Next 12 months | Next 12 months | Next 12 months | Next 12 months | ||||||
Croatia | ||||||||||||
Czech Republic | ||||||||||||
Denmark | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Estonia | ||||||||||||
Finland | ||||||||||||
France | Green inflation-linked bonds | Last 12 months | ||||||||||
Germany | ||||||||||||
Greece | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Hungary | Both | |||||||||||
Iceland | Green bonds are possible | Next 12 months | ||||||||||
Ireland | ||||||||||||
Israel | Next 12 months | |||||||||||
Italy | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Japan | ||||||||||||
Korea | ||||||||||||
Republic of Latvia | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Lithuania | ||||||||||||
Luxembourg | ||||||||||||
Mexico (Local) | Last 12 months | Last 12 months | Next 12 months | SDG-aligned bonds | Both | |||||||
| SDG-aligned bonds | Both | ||||||||||
Netherlands | ||||||||||||
New Zealand | Last 12 months | Next 12 months | ||||||||||
Norway | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Poland | Last 12 months | |||||||||||
Portugal | Next 12 months | |||||||||||
Romania | Next 12 months | |||||||||||
Slovak Republic | ||||||||||||
Slovenia | Last 12 months | Both | ||||||||||
Spain | ||||||||||||
Sweden | ||||||||||||
Switzerland | Next 12 months | |||||||||||
Türkiye | Last 12 months | Last 12 months | Next 12 months | Next 12 months | ||||||||
UK | Last 12 months |
Table A A.5. Q3 Major challenges experienced over the last 12 months | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Increase in governments funding needs | Understanding investor behavior | Decrease in government’s funding needs | Lack of investor demand | Cash flow forecasting | Communication with fiscal authorities | Operational challenges | Communication with monetary authorities | Market volatility | Communication with market participants | Significant rise in yields | |
Australia | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Austria | X | X | X | ||||||||
Belgium | X | ||||||||||
Brazil | X | X | X | ||||||||
Bulgaria | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Canada | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Chile | X | X | X | ||||||||
Colombia | X | X | X | ||||||||
Costa Rica | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Croatia | X | X | X | X | X | ||||||
Czech Republic | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Denmark | X | X | |||||||||
Estonia | X | X | X | X | X | ||||||
Finland | X | X | X | ||||||||
France | X | X | |||||||||
Germany | |||||||||||
Greece | X | X | X | ||||||||
Hungary | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Iceland | X | X | X | ||||||||
Ireland | X | X | X | ||||||||
Israel | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Italy | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Japan | |||||||||||
Korea | X | X | |||||||||
Lithuania | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||||
Luxembourg | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Mexico (Local) | X | X | |||||||||
Mexico (External) | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Netherlands | X | X | X | ||||||||
New Zealand | X | X | X | X | X | ||||||
Norway | X | X | |||||||||
Poland | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Portugal | X | X | X | X | X | X | |||||
Republic of Latvia | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | ||||
Romania | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Slovak Republic | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Slovenia | X | X | |||||||||
Spain | X | X | X | ||||||||
Sweden | X | X | |||||||||
Switzerland | X | X | X | X | |||||||
Türkiye | X | X | X | X | X | ||||||
UK | X | X | X | X |
Table A A.6. Q3 Specified OTHER major challenges | |
---|---|
Australia | |
Austria | |
Belgium | |
Brazil | |
Bulgaria | |
Canada | |
Chile | |
Colombia | |
Costa Rica | (i) Cyberattack on Government on April 2022. |
Croatia | |
Czech Republic | |
Denmark | |
Estonia | |
Finland | |
France | |
Germany | |
Greece | |
Hungary | |
Iceland | |
Ireland | |
Israel | |
Italy | |
Japan | |
Korea | |
Lithuania | |
Luxembourg | |
Mexico (Local) | (i) Capital outflows (ii) short-term refinancing needs |
Mexico (External) | |
Netherlands | |
New Zealand | |
Norway | |
Poland | |
Portugal | |
Republic of Latvia | |
Romania | |
Slovak Republic | |
Slovenia | |
Spain | |
Sweden | |
Switzerland | |
Türkiye | (i)Global Risks |
UK |
Table A A.7. Q3 Major challenges experienced over the last 12 months – Country notes | |
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Australia |
|
Austria | In the light of various government relief-packages - that aim to mitigate the effects of the persistent inflation - and thus an increase in the government’s funding needs, cash flow forecasting remains a major challenge. Another challenge has been the market volatility, which is primarily caused by alternating market-worries between inflation and a recession and the central banks reaction. We have made the observation that primary market participants tend to be more cautious, thus making careful movements in their positions. |
Belgium | So far, despite diverging impacts, overall funding needs appear to be close to initial estimates. Detailed cashflow forecasting remains challenging in the current extremely high inflation environment. |
Brazil |
|
Bulgaria |
|
Canada | The Government of Canada has decreased its planned gross issuance by CAD 17 billion compared to last fiscal year, from CAD 442 billion (FY2021-22) to CAD 425 billion (FY2022-23). The planned issuance in the bond sector has gone down significantly from CAD 255 billion to CAD 212 billion in FY 2022-23, mainly due to reduced financial requirements, which continue to trend downwards. The planned issuance in bills has been increased to CAD 213 billion compared to CAD 187 billion for FY2021-2022, to support a liquid and well-functioning market for Canadian federal government treasury bills, which helps investors, as a whole, who need access to short-term, interest-bearing securities in lieu of cash. |
Chile |
|
Colombia |
|
Costa Rica |
|
Croatia |
|
Czech Republic |
|
Denmark | The investor demand has been somewhat impaired by the high volatility and increased duration in the Danish mortgage market. |
Estonia |
|
Finland |
|
France |
|
Germany |
|
Greece |
|
Hungary |
|
Iceland |
|
Ireland | The changing economic backdrop has made it difficult to forecast cash flows and funding requirements |
Israel |
|
Italy | Please refer to the point 4. |
Japan |
|
Korea |
|
Lithuania |
|
Luxembourg |
|
Mexico (Local) | Local Market Debt The greater challenges for the local debt market in the last 12 months have been the foreign capital outflows for MXN 83 billion (Mexican pesos) (~USD 4.15 bn). |
Mexico (External) |
|
Netherlands |
|
New Zealand | Over the last 12 months, the government funding needs were formally reviewed and updated. In the first review, funding needs decreased. In the subsequent review, funding needs increased. |
Norway | Lack of investor demand led to reducing the allocated amount from the announced target amount in a Treasury bill auction in June 2022. High market volatility has led the DMO to allow primary dealers to set a wider price spread than normal in the interdealer market for both government bonds and Treasury bills |
Poland |
|
Portugal |
|
Republic of Latvia |
|
Romania |
|
Slovak Republic | Issuance plans of Slovakia must be in line with prudent Act on Fiscal Responsibility (Debt Brake). |
Slovenia |
|
Spain | On market volatility, it is quite linked with the significant rise in yields. Similarly to other sovereign issuers, we have seen a sudden increase in our financing costs. This increase in rates was widely expected by the market and ourselves, but the suddenness of the increase was not. This sudden increase in yields and the general uncertainty in the current global context have led to significant volatility in the European Government Bond (EGB) space. This volatility has affected the liquidity of the secondary market for Spanish government bonds. This is a challenge for us and many other sovereign issuers. Regarding cash flow forecasting, there are two main factors that pose a challenge for the Spanish Treasury. On the one hand we have more uncertainty in cash flow forecasting due to the implementation of Spain’s Recovery Plan under the NextGenerationEU program, because the Recovery Plan’s investments may need to be financed before Spain receives its disbursements from NGEU. On the other hand, given the global context, there is uncertainty regarding the Central Government’s funding needs. For example, new government spending could be approved to aid households in response to the energy crisis, which makes cash flow forecasting more difficult. |
Sweden |
|
Switzerland | The multiple challenges that arose during the last 12 months (e.g. inflation, energy prices, and war) and the ongoing effects of the pandemic have made cash flow forecasting very difficult. We had to adjust our (internal) scenarios multiple times during this time. As the uncertainty also affected our investors, it was also challenging to understand investor behavior. With the return to positive interest rates, we are also confronted with increasing outflows, in particular from funds temporarily parked with the federal government (mainly delayed withholding tax refunds |
Türkiye |
|
UK | In sharp contrast to the previous financial year, 2021-22 saw two large downward revisions to the UK DMO’s gilt financing requirement, by GBP 43.3bn in April 2021 and by GBP 57.8 (to GBP 194.8 billion) in October 2021 as higher than anticipated government revenues reduced its cash needs. The initial forecast of gilt sales for 2022-23 published in March 2022, was lower still at GBP 124.7bn, but this rose slightly to GBP 131.5bn in April 2022. From January 2022, the Bank of England ceased reinvestment of redemption amounts from its holdings of gilts in its Asset Purchase facility, marginally increasing the net supply of gilts to the market. In the context of ongoing challenging conditions in the sterling money markets, the DMO has also worked closely with HM Treasury and the Bank of England to identify ways in which the DMO’s cash management responsibilities can be further supported. |
Table A A.9. Q4 major risk factors/events that your DMO faced last 12 months or might affect your operations in the next 12 months – Country notes | |
---|---|
Australia |
|
Austria | We foresee the biggest factors/events in the next 12 months that might affect our operations to be the uncertainties around the further development of the inflation and the consequential central bank response (changes in monetary policy to counter a recession) as well as possible effects on the funding requirement (potentially necessary additional inflation relief packages à higher government borrowing needs). |
Belgium | The main uncertainties are now linked to a broad mix of geopolitical risks, (energy) price inflation, the reaction of central banks and uncertainty with regard to the Government’s borrowing needs to the impacts of all of the above on people’s purchasing power. Cyber risks remain a point of attention. |
Brazil |
|
Bulgaria |
|
Canada | While the last 12 months were largely characterized by risks stemming from COVID-19, going forward we expect geo-political and macroeconomic factors to contribute to market risk more |
Chile |
|
Colombia |
|
Costa Rica |
|
Croatia |
|
Czech Republic |
|
Denmark |
|
Estonia |
|
Finland |
|
France |
|
Germany |
|
Greece |
|
Hungary |
|
Iceland |
|
Ireland |
|
Israel |
|
Italy | The main macroeconomic factors that may affect our strategy are related to geopolitical issues and the uncertainties regarding the trend of inflation and the attitude of central banks in the coming months (e.g. the end of the Central Banks' bond purchase programs). |
Japan |
|
Korea |
|
Lithuania |
|
Luxembourg |
|
Mexico (Local) |
|
Mexico (External) |
|
Netherlands |
|
New Zealand |
|
Norway | Norwegian interest rates are highly correlated with foreign interest rates. |
Poland |
|
Portugal |
|
Republic of Latvia |
|
Romania |
|
Slovak Republic | Government too conservative in fiscal projections – higher budgeted deficit compared to reality – higher liquidity buffer |
Slovenia |
|
Spain | The current global context brings uncertainty to the operations of DMOs around the world. In the case of the Spanish DMO, we have seen a rise in our cost at issuance due to the changes in large central banks’ monetary policies, largely brought about by rising inflation. This poses a challenge for our debt management strategy, because we must continue striving towards our mandate of minimizing both the cost of debt and the risks associated with our debt portfolio in this new environment. Moving forward, the possibility of gas supply shortages in Europe could also pose challenges for our operations as a DMO. Although Spain is not directly exposed to gas cuts from Russia, some of our trading partners are, and we could be indirectly affected by higher energy prices. This could lead to higher funding needs, if government spending were approved to combat a worsening of the energy crisis in Europe. |
Sweden | |
Switzerland | We expect the challenges in the upcoming 12 months to be similar as in the last 12 months. For the DMO, the main challenge will most likely again be the accurate cash flow forecasting, due to macroeconomic uncertainties and the geopolitical challenges. |
Türkiye |
|
UK | International geopolitical risks have escalated since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This has prompted a sharp rise in (energy price driven) inflation globally, sharply tightening of monetary policy in the major economies and a corresponding major increase in government bond yields. The yield on the UK 10-year gilt for example has tripled in 2022 to-date (7 September 2022) from approximately 1% to 3%. The financing of the costs associated with mitigating the energy price crisis in the UK and anticipated fiscal measures by the incoming administration are expected to increase the size of the gilt issuance programme over the next year-18 months. A fiscal event to begin to address these costs is expected by the end of September. On 23 September 2022 the UK DMO’s financing remit was revised following the publication of the Government’s Growth plan. The UK Government’s Net Financing requirement rose by GBP 72.4 billion to GBP 234.1 billion. The increase is to be financed by additional gilt sales of GBP 62.4 billion, taking the planned total in 2022-23 to GBP 193.9 billion and additional net sales of Treasury bills for debt management purposes of GBP 10.0 billion, taking the planned increase in 2022-23 to GBP 40.2 billion. From the first week of October 2022 the Bank of England will commence sales of its holdings of gilts in the Asset purchase facility at the rate of GBP 10.0 billion per quarter – further adding to gilt supply to the market. |
Table A A.12. Q7 Do you have a full business continuity and disaster/incidence recovery plan for the DMO? | ||
---|---|---|
Answer | Comment | |
Australia | Yes | Annually |
Austria | Yes | There is a full disaster recovery plan in effect. This plan is reviewed every year. Every three months there is a test of the fallback system. |
Belgium | Yes | An internal workgroup discusses and reviews the plans every 1.5 – 2 months |
Brazil | Yes | Once a year or more if needed |
Bulgaria | No |
|
Canada | Yes | Reviewed/revised/tested every 6 months. |
Chile | No |
|
Colombia | Yes | Annually |
Costa Rica | Yes | The National Treasury of the Ministry of Finance has a business continuity plan, which involves the activities and functions it performs in terms of debt management. The plan was drawn up in 2019, to date it has not been updated, given the cyberattack situation this year it will be updated at the beginning of 2023. The Ministry of Finance has a contingency protocol in place to ensure business continuity. |
Croatia | No |
|
Czech Republic | No |
|
Denmark | Yes | As part of the Danish Centralbank we use the disaster recovery plan for the Centralbank. |
Estonia | No |
|
Finland | Yes | Annually |
France | Yes | It is revised at least every year. |
Germany | Yes | on a continuous basis |
Greece | Yes |
|
Hungary | Yes | Annually |
Iceland |
|
|
Ireland | Yes | annually |
Israel | Yes | Annually. |
Italy | Yes | The DMO relies on the Treasury Department ICT infrastructure, based on an Active/Active Data Centers architecture. The Data Centers are physically located in two different sites more than 10 km away. Load balancers are used to split the workload and synchronous replication is adopted to maintain data alignment between the two Data Centers. Further, a local tape backup is performed on a daily basis to provide a recovery point in case of a severe out-of-service affecting both the Data Centers. The plan is reviewed yearly. |
Japan | Yes | We formulated the Business Continuity Plan including Operation Guidelines on how to carry out high priority operations in the event of a disaster and revise it every year |
Korea | Yes | Review and revision are made when the crisis situation is expected to occur. |
Republic of Latvia | Yes | Yes, the plan has been regularly revised and updated according to the most actual situation |
Lithuania | Yes | Annually |
Luxembourg | Yes | On an annual basis |
Mexico (Local) | Yes | We do have a continuity plan, we have alternate offices and we have the possibility of work remotely |
Mexico (External) |
|
|
Netherlands | Yes | Annually |
New Zealand | Yes | The Business Continuity Plan is reviewed and revised on an annual base. |
Norway | Yes | Annually |
Poland |
| Ministry of Finance (MoF) implements a business continuity management system. Some business processes carried out by Public Debt Department have been identified as critical for MoF. Business continuity plans have been developed for these processes and will be tested after the comprehensive implementation of business continuity solutions in MoF. The planned date of the tests is the second quarter of 2023. In addition, IT services are provided to the MoF by a specially established unit - IT Center of the Ministry of Finance. Some of its tasks include providing and maintaining IT services at the MoF and managing the availability, continuity and capacity of IT services (including disaster recovery plans for IT systems). |
Portugal | No | IGCP has a Disaster Recovery Center where backup of critical system is hosted and daily updated. |
Romania | Yes | Annual |
Slovak Republic | Yes | Annually. |
Slovenia | Yes | There is no prescribed period for the review/update of the plan. |
Spain | No |
|
Sweden | Yes | At least once a year. |
Switzerland | Yes | The DMO is part of the Federal Finance Administrations business continuity management. On top of that, we conduct yearly business continuity testing in a second location to test all our processes. |
Türkiye | Yes | There is an ongoing for establishing an Emergency Action Plan within the Ministry for the front office operations. Besides, there is an business continuity and disaster/incidence recovery plan for the whole mid (risk) and back office operations and the plan is reviewed at least once in a year. |
UK | Yes | The DMO has a detailed Business Continuity Plan together with supporting documentation which are reviewed and updated regularly. DMO staff have received a copy of the Incident Management Team’s two-page guide that explains how incidents will be managed. The Incident Management Guidance is reviewed quarterly. The Incident Management Team works through exercises on a quarterly basis to ensure its readiness to manage future incidents when they arise. The Incident Management Team successfully managed three incidents caused by external factors throughout financial year 2021-22. The DMO carried out quarterly communication tests for the whole organisation so we have confidence that we can communicate with all staff during an incident |
Table A A.13. Q8 How are your cyber security measures managed/structured? | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Comment | Use/share arrangements with your Government | Custom arrangements used specifically by the DMO | Country additional notes (comments might include e.g. purchased security software but managed by DMO staff, or outside security company manages arrangements etc.): |
Australia | Large liquidity buffer provides the flexibility to step away from markets for a number of weeks without impeding capacity of Government to meet its obligations. Overdraft facility available through the central bank as well. | X |
| as AOFM systems are housed within the Commonwealth Treasury's network we rely on their cyber security arrangements and leverage their reporting measures. Additionally, we comply with and report on the Attorney-General's Department's Protective Security Policy Framework, which requires us to monitor the cyber security arrangements of our service providers. |
Austria | There is a fallback data center which houses the fallback system. In the case of an emergency this will be utilized to continue the regular business of the DMO. | X |
| Internal network ranges, applications and clients are managed by DMO staff. |
Belgium | All of our payments are made by our national bank, so we mostly rely on their systems and the Target infrastructure. Our internal business continuity group does take into account situations where the normal exchanges and communications with our central bank are hampered. | X |
| The BDA relies on IT material, network and safety measures (a.o. firewall, parallel servers, …) of the Belgian State |
Brazil | The major IT payments systems use a dedicated network environment, preventing from general cyberattacks. Also, there is a strong backup strategy to prevent data loss. | X |
|
|
Bulgaria | The Bulgarian National Bank acts as a fiscal and paying agent of the government and organizes the government securities auctions. The Ministry of Finance has established links with the Bulgarian National Bank. | X |
|
|
Canada | Cyber threats represent a continued vulnerability given the interconnected nature of the financial system. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, state-sponsored cyber-attacks are occurring with greater frequency and sophistication, increasing the risk of a successful attack on a Canadian financial institution or financial market infrastructure. Such an attack could have far-reaching effects on the broader financial system. The following measures are in place to address these contingencies: • Multiple Data Centres able to be leveraged. • Internal Cyber Response Team provides 24/7 monitoring and response capabilities and fully integrated into the Bank’s Incident Management Team. • DMO has contingency plans in place for alternate processing capabilities in the full/partial absence of technology. |
| X | • Fully functioning internal Cyber Security group. • Internal Cyber Response Team provides 24/7 monitoring and response capabilities and fully integrated into the Bank’s Incident Management Team. • We also work hand-in-hand with our federal governments Cyber Security departments and employ various third parties providing additional cyber protection (e.g., DDOS protection, etc.) |
Chile | The back office functions are performed by our Treasury Department, which has a business continuity plan in case of cyberattack |
| X |
|
Colombia | There is an alternate site that has connection with the Central Bank. In the event of a cyberattack, operations will be carried out through the alternate site. |
|
|
|
Costa Rica | The service providers for negotiation, placement, registration and payment of internal debt (and external only payment), which are the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the National Stock Exchange, activated contingency or business continuity mechanisms, so as not to interrupt the service at the country level. The internal processes of affectations and budgetary records, suffered problems, and delays due to the fall of internal systems of the Ministry of Finance. The Technology Department of the Ministry of Finance immediately activates containment and recovery protocols for the systems, which have been implemented in environments with reinforced security measures to guarantee business continuity. |
| X |
|
Croatia |
| X |
|
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
|
|
Denmark | It’s outside our domain – But sufficient contingencies is in place. | X |
| The Centralbank handles these risk. |
Estonia | Government owned IT systems have a central protection by government agencies. DMO operations depend also on the general internet connectivity (although some contingency procedures are also in place) and cyber security level of commercial banks/national central bank that are used for debt and other payments. | X |
|
|
Finland | We have implemented various measures to safeguard funding and payments during possible cyber attack. | X | X |
|
France | We regularly improve our cyber security lines of defense. | X |
| Our cyber security is directly managed by the ministry of finance and economy. |
Germany | We take several actions to prevent, detect and stop cyberattacks and to restore systems and data in case of incidents following the BSI IT-Grundschutzstandards |
| X |
|
Greece | Follow the procedures of the disaster plan | X | X |
|
Hungary |
| X |
| |
Iceland |
|
|
|
|
Ireland | Large cash balances Business continuity site |
| X |
|
Israel | The Government Debt Management Unit has emergency protocols; during cyberattacks there are alternative methods in place to maintain critical functionality | X |
|
|
Italy | Through a structured and collaborative model (with all government Entities in charge), which makes use of suitable professionals, custom software and hardware and software market products, all the activities that affect the infrastructures are analyzed daily and those not recognized as reliable are blocked in advance. Furthermore, to ensure the continuity of services, the infrastructure is distributed over two datacenters, located in two distinct geographic locations, which operate under business continuity. The Department of the Treasury can therefore bear the loss of an entire datacenter plus half of the infrastructure of the second datacenter without interruption of service. Finally, in the unlikely event that both datacenters become unavailable, the Department of Treasury has updated copies of all data, stored in special fireproof safes, available for immediate recovery of systems, services and data. | X |
| Although the Department of the Treasury makes use of dedicated technologies and services, the cybersecurity strategy, the measures to be adopted and the other aspects relating to cybersecurity are always shared with the relevant government Entities, in a bidirectional collaborative regime. |
Japan | Based on the government information security regulations, we implement the security measures. And, we operate systems related to JGBs, including the JGB auction system, in an offline environment. In addition, we are prepared to respond to unforeseen circumstances by applying software security patches and implementing their version upgrades, updating anti-virus software and conducting regular scans, and backing up data | X |
|
|
Korea |
| X |
| BOK-Wire+ (financial network of the Bank of Korea) is used for the issuance process |
Republic of Latvia | We have taken precautions to protect sensitive information against unauthorized access and its processing. Also we have certification to the International Information Security Standard ISO 27001 which provides reassurance | X |
|
|
Lithuania |
| X |
|
|
Luxembourg |
| X |
|
|
Mexico (Local) | In Mexico exists the National Digital Strategy 2021-2024, which among other objectives promotes a general information security policy that seeks to preserve the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the information protected by the Institutions, for this, it has been implemented an Approved Protocol for the Management of Cyber Incidents among all the Institutions of the Public Sector, in addition, security evaluations are coordinated in the Institutions for the detection of threats and thus improve the management of information security risks. There is also the National Cyber Incident Response Center that promotes good prevention and reaction practices. | X |
|
|
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
|
Netherlands | Business continuity plan, including back-up and recovery, as well as alternative procedures for doing transactions and settlements. |
| X | Shared arrangements with the government/ministry, with exceptions on specific areas such as security monitoring |
New Zealand | In addition to a range of technology controls, we would look to our transactional banker and other government financial institutions to initiate payments under our instruction. | X | x | Security is actively managed by DMO staff, leveraging cross-government and vendor capability. |
Norway | The DMO is organized as a separate unit in Norges Bank and we share cyber security measures with the rest of the central bank. |
|
| The DMO is organized as a separate unit in Norges Bank and we share cyber security measures with the rest of the central bank. |
Poland | 1) Information security management system and solutions regarding rules of information security are developed 2) As far as the debt payments are considered in the case of cyberattack (understood as WAN failure) agreements between MoF and National Depository for Securities and State Treasury Payment Agents (National Bank of Poland and Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) make it possible to deliver payment instruction using alternative channels to provide information. It is also possible to deliver the instructions in paper form, duly signed and stamped. | X |
| Public Debt Department is a part of Ministry of Finance. There are 2 Departments responsible for cyber security: Security and Data Protection Department (sets the rules) and IT and Projects Management Department (coordinates tasks related to cybersecurity). Ministry of Finance cooperates with IT Center of the Ministry of Finance, Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT GOV) and the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity. |
Portugal | Data backup A Disaster Recovery Center where backup of critical system are hosted and daily updated Redundant connections (different routes). | X | x | Among others SIEM, endpoint security, network segregation, security awareness, strong authentication |
Romania | The Ministry of Finance owns a secondary data center from which payment operations can be carried out. In addition, the auctions are carried out through the NBR, which has the necessary infrastructure to carry out these operations under the conditions of a cyberattack |
| X |
|
Slovak Republic | 2 back up sites. Continuity plan | X | X | We are using both or mixed arrangements |
Slovenia | The legal basis of information security and regulation of measures to achieve a high level of network and IS security: Information Security Act (ZInfV) - http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO7707 Resolution on the national security strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (ReSNV-2)- http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=RESO124 Adopted cyber security strategy, which establishes a system for ensuring a high level of cyber security- https://www.gov.si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/URSIV/Datoteke/Dokumenti/2022-03-NOKI.pdfhttps://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MJU/DID/Cyber_Security_Strategy_Slovenia.pdf National Cyber Incident Response Plan- https://www.gov.si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/URSIV/Datoteke/Dokumenti/2022-03-NOKI.pdf Cyber risk assessment https://www.gov.si/assets/organi-v-sestavi/URSIV/Datoteke/Dokumenti/Ocena_kibernetskih_tveganj_v1_0_Fina_P.pdf
| X |
| The Government Information Security Office (GISO) is the competent national authority in the field of information security, which acts as a government office. Its core mission is to increase resilience to cyber threats that can threaten individuals, businesses, government and society at large. GISO connects stakeholders in the national information security system and coordinates the operational capabilities of the system at a strategic level. It pays particular attention to subjects under the Information Security Act (ZInfV) from the group of essential service providers in the fields of energy, digital infrastructure, drinking water supply and distribution, healthcare, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, food supply and environmental protection, from a group of digital service providers and from a group of state administration authorities. GISO is also the single point of contact to ensure cross-border cooperation with the relevant authorities of other EU Member States and with the European CSIRT Network and other international cooperation tasks. Through its own inspection service, it oversees the implementation of ZInfV. Due to being tasked with informing the Government and the National Security Council (NSC) in the case of critical incident or cyber attack, GISO is also placed within the national security system. SI-CERT (Slovenian Computer Emergency Response Team) is a designated national computer security incident response team (CSIRT) that operates within the framework of the ARNES (Academic and Research Network of Slovenia) public institute. According to tasks and responsibilities identified by NIS Directive it monitors incidents at a national level, provides early warning, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information to relevant stakeholders about risks and incidents, responds to incidents and provides risk and incident analysis and situational awareness. SI-CERT performs risk and incident handling in accordance with Article 28 of the Information Security Act, which defines following responsibilities: To the subjects for which it is responsible SI-CERT offers methodological support, help and cooperation in case of an incident; Accepts data about risks and vulnerabilities in the area of information security, shares the data with the affected systems administrators, and issues warnings; Cooperates in the network of CSIRT groups and also in other international cooperation networks; Cooperates with CSIRT groups and security-operations centers in the Republic of Slovenia and CSIRT groups in other EU Member States; Raises awareness of users in the area of information security; Issues warnings about the risks and vulnerabilities in the area of information security; Cooperates with the competent national authority and offers information upon request about performing SI-CERT’s competencies on the basis of this Act. SI-CERT also independently operates the Safe on the Internet national awareness programme on information security and participates in the SAFE-SI project. The SI-CERT response centre’s services are available to the general public. SI-CERT is financed from the fund provided to the Arnes public institute by the Government Information Security Office, which is the competent national authority in the field of cyber-security. Measurement and monitoring of incidents is published in semi-annual reports |
Spain | The Spanish Ministry for Economic Affairs has multiple cyberattack measures put in place, with secure internal networks, 2-factor authentications and secure digital signatures, among others. Additionally, as our financial agent, the Bank of Spain also contributes other cyber-security measures. They have protocols put in place to guarantee the safety of our primary market issuance, with all transactions occurring inside their own safe networks. Similarly, with payments on our outstanding debt, there are multiple measures put in place together with the Bank of Spain as our payments agent, so that we can guarantee the safety of these procedures. Despite the safety of the measures currently in place, there are also contingencies in the case our network were compromised. The fact that we use an internal network would allow us to isolate from any problems. And in the case the private network itself were compromised, there are redundancies in place to continue operations as normal, both for payments and for primary market issuance. | X |
| The management of our cyber security is something done on the level of the entire Ministry for Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation. The Spanish Treasury has its own IT staff, but they function as a part of the Ministry for Economic Affairs. Aside from our Ministry, the Bank of Spain’s cyber security is also key for the DMO. Since they act as our financial agent, their security measures are vital for our operations. Their cyber security management doesn’t fall under our control, but since they’re a part of the Eurosystem, their security measures are up to the highest standards and we coordinate with them on this topic. |
Sweden | Dialogue with Central bank and commercial counterparts | X | X |
|
Switzerland | The Swiss DMO is part of the Federal Administration and uses the infrastructure of the Federal Government. The DMO is not responsible for cybersecurity on its own. For our funding activities, we mainly use the infrastructure provided by the SIX Swiss Exchange and the Swiss National Bank. | X |
| The Swiss DMO is part of the Federal Administration and uses the infrastructure of the Federal Government. The DMO is not responsible for cybersecurity on its own. |
Türkiye | General Directorate of Information Technologies is responsible for ensuring the continuity of operations in case of a cyberattack event. | X |
|
|
UK | The DMO has implemented number of security controls and contingency measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the DMO IT systems that support the business operations. The DMO has two data centres. Additionally, the DMO has a Cyber Incident Response retainer - an external cyber incident management service provider to help restore and recover from cyber-attack incidents. The DMO has also put in place security tools to identify, detect, protect, respond and recover from cyber incidents |
| X | The DMO has purchased security software but managed by the DMO internal security team. Security measures are verified by external assessments like SWIFT CAF, penetration testing, third party reviews and Departmental Security Health Checks (DSHC). |
Table A A.14. Q9 Has your DMO been involved in experimental projects on blockchain / distributed ledger technology (DLT)? | ||
---|---|---|
Answer | Comment | |
Australia | No | |
Austria | Yes | 1) The OeKB - which acts on behalf of OeBFA as the auction agent for government bonds and bills - introduced a Blockchain-based data notarization for the government auction in October 2018. Blockchain-based data notarization involves using an encryption method for documents to derive a unique electronic fingerprint, known as the hash. This hash is unambiguously assignable to the original document, but conversely does not allow conclusions to specific data content. This notarization service provides a trail to verify the authenticity of data, thereby ensuring the greatest possible degree of data security. Notarization is a new additional support element for the auction process. 2) DELPHI In July 2021, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) joined forces with the OeKB CSD, the Austrian Treasury (OeBFA), Raiffeisen Bank International and Erste Group Bank to launch a joint research project (DELPHI / Delivery vs. Payment Hybrid Initiative) to simulate both the issuance and settlement of Austrian government securities as security tokens on a blockchain platform. Besides exploring digital bond issuance and related processes, DELPHI addresses the legal requirements – with a view to assessing compatibility with applicable EU and national law. Moreover, another DELPHI substream evaluates the potential for tailoring the project’s solution to evolving market needs. |
Belgium | No |
|
Brazil | No |
|
Bulgaria | No |
|
Canada | Yes | The Bank of Canada began experimenting with blockchain in 2016 with a series of experiments under the name Project Jasper. In Phase 1 and 2, in partnership with Payments Canada and the large Canadian banks, we built interbank wholesale payments systems using Ethereum and Corda, respectively. In Phase 3 we built a securities settlement system for DvP settlement of equity transactions in central bank wholesale money. In Phase 4, with the Bank of England and Monetary Authority of Singapore, we investigated frictions in cross-border payments and built a cross-border payment system between Singapore (using a Quorum platform) and Canada (using a Corda platform). We are continuing to investigate blockchain for possible use in securities settlement or possibly in a retail CBDC. All of this work has been to better understand the technology, its benefits, and its limitations. No decision has been made about using blockchain for any use case. Reports summarizing our research and conclusions can be found at https://www.bankofcanada.ca/research/digital-currencies-and-fintech/projects/. |
Chile | No | The Central Bank of Chile has made an assessment of the pros and cons of implementing a Central Bank digital currency, but it is not related to DMO initatives |
Colombia | No |
|
Costa Rica | No |
|
Croatia | No |
|
Czech Republic | No |
|
Denmark | No |
|
Estonia | No |
|
Finland | No |
|
France | Yes | In June 2021, the Agence France Trésor has participated in the simulation of a permssioned blockchain issuance of bonds, followed by several secondary market operations. The experimentation was conducted in relation with the Banque de France as well as with primary dealers and the French CSD Euroclear. |
Germany | No |
|
Greece | No |
|
Hungary | No |
|
Iceland | No |
|
Ireland | Yes | ECP blockchain project |
Israel | Yes | The Government Debt Management Unit, in partnership with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), is formulating a joint project to test the business and technological feasibility (Proof of Concept or “POC”) of issuing State of Israel government bonds in a digital format. The digital bonds would be issued on a new platform for trading and clearing digital assets, based on Distributed Ledger Technology (“DLT”), smart contracts, and tokenization. The POC will be carried out by a joint working group that includes representatives from the Accountant General’s Office, technology suppliers, as well as a select number of Market Makers. As part of the project, a new process for issuing digital government bonds will be defined. From this process, certain segments will be selected to run the POC feasibility test. The POC may include crediting the accounts of the selected Market Makers with digital bonds, clearance of digital bonds, etc. It is important to note that at this stage any digital bonds issued would be dummy bonds, purely for POC purposes, no actual securities and/or funds will be transferred. The TASE and the Accountant General's Office will, at the project’s conclusion, examine the added value and relevance of the innovative processes tested and developed. With the hope that the project will help improve how those processes are carried out today. |
Italy | Yes | The Department of the Treasury has participated in various study groups related to distributed ledger technology and blockchain. Although there is no practical implementation yet, these technologies are points of interest for the foreseeable future. |
Japan | No |
|
Korea | No |
|
Republic of Latvia | No |
|
Lithuania | No |
|
Luxembourg | No |
|
Mexico (Local) | Yes | The Development Bank have explored this type of opportunities. As an example, in november 2021, Nafin successfully placed 10 billion pesos, through 3 stock certificates in the local market, 2 of them sustainable with a digital focus. The financial design of this bond is unique in its kind as it incorporates a digital approach to safeguard the sustainability criteria associated with the issue. With this issue, Nafin contributes to the development of a local market for sustainable instruments by establishing market benchmarks for corporate sustainable financing programs. The resources will be allocated to priority investment projects to promote national and regional economic development, with special emphasis on those that contribute to achieving a balance between social, economic and environmental factors. This issuance is in line with Nafin's accreditation as a Direct Access Entity with the Green Climate Fund. |
Mexico (External) |
|
|
Netherlands | Yes | The project we are involved in tries to use Blockchain technology to compact the settlement process of Euro Commercial Paper (ECP) issuance from a couple of hours with a lot of manual steps into an automated process that takes only a couple of seconds. This will lead to more possibilities for T+0 settlement of ECP and therefore longer access to daily liquidity. Within the project multiple issuers and investors are involved as well as legislators and other governing bodies. More generally we are monitoring developments around digital (blockchain) bonds and potential benefits and costs but do not have concrete plans to issue (pilot) digital bonds in the near future |
New Zealand | No | We engage with peers, and keep across developments in this space, but have no active projects to leverage DLT. |
Norway | No |
|
Poland | No |
|
Portugal | No |
|
Romania | No |
|
Slovak Republic | No |
|
Slovenia | No | Legislation that would comprehensively regulate blockchain technology has not yet been adopted in Slovenia. Due to the risks that exist in dealing with virtual currencies, this area is partially regulated by the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (ZPPDFT-2). Article 3 of the law defines the concept of virtual currency. Research or a comparative review within the framework of the Parliament on the subject of Blockchain technology exists. |
Spain | No | The Ministry for Economic Affairs in Spain, to which the Spanish Treasury belongs has recently also incorporated the Digital Transformation under our Ministry’s responsibilities. The Spanish Treasury participates in talks regarding the development of a Euro-area Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), but the DMO is not directly involved in these discussions. |
Sweden | No |
|
Switzerland | No | The Swiss DMO does not have a mandate in this area; this is part of the mandate of other parts of the Federal Administration and the Swiss National Bank. The Swiss National Bank as well as the Swiss Exchange SIC with their Swiss Digital Exchange SDX – the world’s first regulated DLT-based financial market infrastructure – are active in the field of DLT. E.g. BIS, SNB and SIX have successfully tested wholesale CBDC settlement with banks (“Project Helvetia”). Another Example is “Project Jura”, where Banque de France (BdF), SNB and BIS have successfully completed an experiment in cross-border wholesale CBDC. |
Türkiye | No |
|
UK | No | Ministers at HM Treasury have announced that the UK government is undertaking a programme of work to understand how Distributed Ledger Technology could be applied to the lifecycle of a sovereign debt instrument. The UK DMO is working with HM Treasury on this project, which will take place over a multi-year programme of work. |
Table A A.15. Q10 From a public debt management perspective, what are the potential advantages of the use of a wholesale CBDC? | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Facilitate tokenized securities | Safer processing of securities settlement | Quicker processing of securities settlement | Reduce counterparty risk | Improve non-residents’ demand at auctions | Improve confidentiality and traceability of transactions | Specify (i): | Specify (i): | Specify (ii): | Specify (ii): |
Australia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Belgium |
| x | x |
|
| x |
|
|
|
|
Brazil |
|
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
Bulgaria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chile | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Colombia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Croatia |
| x | x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark | X |
|
|
|
|
| Not sure there is any specific advantages for a wCBDC compared to the existing system. | X |
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
|
|
|
| We have not explored this topic and cannot specify any advantages at the moment | X |
|
|
Finland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
France | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
Germany |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Greece |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hungary |
|
|
|
|
|
| such instruments are in the very early phase of development and testing, the potential advantages for public debt management cannot be seen clearly at this stage yet | X |
|
|
Iceland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Israel | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Italy | X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Japan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia |
|
|
|
|
|
| Currently, this is not a topical issue for Latvia’s DMO | X |
|
|
Lithuania |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New Zealand |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Norway |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
Portugal | X | X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
Romania |
| X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
Slovak Republic | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia | X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Spain | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sweden |
|
| x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Türkiye |
| x | x | x | x | x |
|
|
|
|
UK | X | X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
Table A A.16. Q11 How has the maturity structure of your 2022 issuances changed compared to 2021? | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Longer on average | Shorter on average | Around the same | Country additional notes |
Australia |
|
| X |
|
Austria |
|
| X | Austria has the longest sovereign debt portfolio in the Eurozone with an average tenor of over 11 years. Because of the volatile market conditions and uncertainties regarding the further monetary policy development we decided to not increase the tenor further and continued with our conservative funding strategy. With an average tenor of around 13.70 years the bonds issued in 2022YTD* were slightly shorter than in the previous year (2021: 14.96 years). *As of September 22, 2022 |
Belgium |
|
| X | The average maturity of our debt is already very long (>10 years) and has even increased a little further. This is still in line with our debt management strategy. |
Brazil | X |
|
| The perception of local risks has been decreasing throughout 2022, especially due to the Brazilian Central Bank signaling the end of the monetary tightening cycle, data showing a disinflationary process and an electoral scenario that brought little volatility to the market. |
Bulgaria |
|
| X |
|
Canada |
| X |
| The Government of Canada manages its funding plan according to the annual Debt Management Strategy (DMS). The funding plan for fiscal year 2022-23 was released in April 2022 and can be found here: Annex 2: Debt Management Strategy | Budget 2022 Canada will continue, as much as possible, to fund the remaining COVID-19-related debt through long-term issuance. This strategic direction will provide security and stability to the government balance sheet by lowering annual debt refinancing needs and providing more predictability in public debt charges. Over the course of 2021-22, federal government allocation of long bonds was about 45 per cent. The government is now proposing to target about 35 per cent in long bond issuance in 2022-23 to fund the remaining COVID-19-related debt through long-term issuance while also maintaining a well-functioning market in other issuance sectors. |
Chile | X |
|
|
|
Colombia | X |
|
| The average life of our debt increased from 9.54 years in August 2021 to 9.90 years in August 2022. |
Costa Rica | X |
|
|
|
Croatia |
| x |
|
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
| The average time to maturity of newly issued medium-term and long-term government bonds was 8.8 years in 2021, while this year (end of September) it is approximately 7.6 years. A lower average time to maturity of newly issued medium-term and long-term government bonds is mainly given by the persistent uncertainty in the financial markets due to the situation in Ukraine and increased issuance activity at the short end of the yield curve in the second quarter of 2022. |
Denmark |
| X |
| Less demand for duration have shortened the average maturity for issuances in 2022 |
Estonia |
|
| X | Estonia has minor funding needs. |
Finland |
|
| X |
|
France |
| X |
| Average maturity of bond issuance has shortened by around 1 year on average in 2022 vs. 2021, when it was exceptionally long given the launch of a new 50 year bond. |
Germany |
|
| X |
|
Greece |
| X |
|
|
Hungary |
| X |
| In the domestic wholesale bond market the ATM of new issuances is roughly the same (only slightly lower, partly due to the fact that the central bank stopped its QE in December 2021). T-bill issuance is higher in 2022. Foreign currency bond issuance is done with shorter maturities than in 2021. |
Iceland | X |
|
| Two new series were issued in 2022. A 20 year nominal bond and a 15 year inflation-linked bond. |
Ireland |
|
| X |
|
Israel |
|
| X |
|
Italy |
|
| X | Despite the worsening of market conditions in recent months, the average life of our debt remained stable compared to last year. At the end of September , the average life relative to the stock of government bonds was equal to 7.12 years, slightly above 7.11 years at the end of 2021. This was attributable to various issues on the long end of the yield curve, carried out both through auctions and with the launch - through a placement syndicate – of new benchmark securities (30-year BTP, 15-year BTP, 10-year BTP€I, 12-year BTP green, 8-year CCTeu ). |
Japan | X |
|
|
|
Korea | X |
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia | X | X |
| Change in maturities represent change of investor demand and general market situation |
Lithuania |
| X |
| Average maturity increased from 12.4 years in 2021 to 6.1 years in 2022 YTD. |
Luxembourg |
|
| X |
|
Mexico (Local) | X |
|
| Local Market Debt Given the maturity requirements of the domestic debt portfolio, the Federal Government had a preference to offer longer duration instruments to the investors. The average time to maturity (ATM) of local debt issuances has slightly increased, in 2021 was of 7.3 years; while for 2022, it was 7.8 years. |
Mexico (External) |
| X |
| External Market Debt Given the global macroeconomic situation, with rising interest rates and the possibility of a recession, many investors changed their investment strategies leading to a demand for a lower duration in their portfolios. The average term to maturity of external debt issuances in 2021 in US dollars was 35 years and 19 years in euros; while for 2022, it was 18 years in US dollars and 8 years in euros. |
Netherlands | X |
|
|
|
New Zealand |
|
| X | There are no plans to extend the New Zealand Government Bond curve beyond the 30-year point. With regular issuance into tenors across the curve, the average weighted term to maturity is expected to stabilise around current levels. |
Norway | X |
|
| For the first time Norway has issued a 20-year bond, in line with the borrowing plan for 2022 released in December 2021 |
Poland |
| X |
| In the period from January 2022 to August 2022 the average maturity of new issuance slightly decreased from 7 years to 6.4 years. |
Portugal |
| X |
| The average maturity of medium-and-long-term issuance in 2022 dropped from 14.2 year in 2021 to 12.3 years |
Romania | X |
|
| Due to the market developments and monetary policy stance, the structure of maturities changed from mainly medium to long term |
Slovak Republic |
|
| X | Both years the average maturity of new issuance in each year around 15 years. |
Slovenia |
|
| X | On the long end of the curve a 60 year bond was issued in Q1 of 2021, while in 2022 the longest maturity issued has been a 40 year bond and the likelihood of a new ultra long new line is uncertain in the coming months /years. |
Spain |
|
| X | We have made significant efforts over the past years to lengthen the average life of our debt portfolio. We finished 2021 with an average life of 8 years and we plan to finish 2022 with a similar number. This is achieved by a similar maturity structure in our issuance. One of the ways we will achieve this is with a negative net issuance of short-term issuance of 5 billion euros for 2022. |
Sweden | x |
|
| Limited supply of bonds has meant we have to focus more on 10y part of the curve in order to build up the outstanding stock. |
Switzerland | X |
|
| The average time to maturity of the bonds tapped in 2022 is longer than in 2021. This is mainly due to the changes in interest rates (higher yields, longer end of yield curve in positive territory whereas this part offered negative yields in most of 2021) and corresponding higher demand for long-term bonds. |
Türkiye | x | x |
| Türkiye’s one of the main pillars of borrowing strategies for 2022 is to increase maturity of domestic borrowing. In domestic market, we have chosen to go with longer maturities in 2022. As of August 2022, cumulative domestic borrowing maturity is 65.6 months which was 53.5 months at the end of the 2021. However, due to the increased volatility in global markets, we have chosen to go with shorter maturities in international capital markets in 2022. |
UK |
|
| X | The skew of issuance, which shows the amount of issuance of short (1-7 years), medium (7-15 years) and long nominal gilts (15+ years) as well as that of inflation-linked gilts is decided on a financial year basis. The planned maturity structure of conventional issuance in 2022-23 at the start of the financial year was very similar to that planned in 2021-22. The initial share of shorts rose by 0.4 percentages points (pp) compared to the start of 2021-22, that of mediums fell by 1.0pp, and the share of longs rose by 0.5pp). The proportion of planned index-linked issuance rose by a slightly larger amount by 3.8pp (to 14.9%). In the past year the UK DMO has lengthened both its real and nominal yield curves, with the launch of 0?% Index-linked Treasury Gilt 2073 in November 2021 (which lengthened the real curve by five years) and of 1?% Treasury Gilt 2073 in February 2022 (which lengthened the nominal curve by two years). In 2021-22 the weighted average maturity of issuance was 17.4 years, whereas for 2022-23, as at 7 September 2022, the weighted average maturity of issuance stands at 16.1 years. |
Table A A.17. Q12 Have you changed your funding strategies during 2022 compared to any original 2022 funding plan? | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 1/2) | |||||||
Country | Please cross: | Number of issuance of securities across the yield curve | Volume of issuance of securities across the yield curve | Issuance of money market instruments (i.e. T-Bills and repos) compared to issuance of long-term bonds | Introducing new maturity lines | Issuing new types of securities (e.g. FRNs, Green bonds, Linkers) | Auction calendar |
Australia | Yes | No change | Lower | Lower | Yes | No | Yes |
Austria | Yes | No change | No change | Higher | No | Yes | No |
Belgium | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brazil | Yes | No change | No change | No change | Yes | No | Yes |
Bulgaria | Yes | Higher | Higher | No applicable | Yes | No | Yes |
Brazil | Yes | No change | No change | No change | Yes | No | Yes |
Canada | Yes | Lower | Lower | Higher | No | No | No applicable |
Chile | Yes | No change | Lower | Lower | No | Yes | No |
Colombia | Yes | No change | Lower | No change | No | No | No |
Costa Rica | Yes | No change | Higher | No applicable | Yes | No | No |
Croatia | Yes | No change | No change | Lower | Yes | No | Yes |
Czech Republic | Yes | Higher | Higher | Higher | Yes | No | Yes |
Denmark | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Estonia | No | Higher | Higher | No change | No applicable | No applicable | No applicable |
Finland | No | No change | No change | No change | No | No applicable | No |
France | No | No change | No change | No change | No | No | No |
Germany | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Greece | No | Lower | Lower | No change | Yes | Yes | No |
Hungary | Yes | Higher | Higher | Higher | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Iceland | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland | Yes |
| Lower |
|
|
|
|
Israel | Yes | Lower | Lower | No applicable | No | No | No |
Italy | No | No change | No change | No change | No | Yes | No |
Japan | Yes | No change | No change | No change | No | No | No |
Korea | Yes | No change | Higher | No applicable | No | No | No |
Republic of Latvia | Yes | Lower | Higher | No change | No | No | Yes |
Lithuania | Yes | No change | Higher | No change | No | No | Yes |
Luxembourg | No | No change | No change | No change | Yes | No | No applicable |
Mexico (Local) | No | Higher | Higher | No change | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Mexico (External) | No | No applicable | No applicable | No applicable | No applicable | No applicable | No applicable |
Netherlands | Yes | Lower | Lower | Higher | No applicable | No applicable | No |
New Zealand | Yes | No change | No change | No change | No | Yes | No |
Norway | No | No change | No change | No change | No | No | No |
Poland | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Portugal | Yes | No change | Lower | No change | No | No | No |
Romania | Yes | No change | Higher | No change | No | No | Yes |
Slovak Republic | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia | Yes | Higher | No change | No change | No | No |
|
Spain | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sweden | No |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland | Yes | No change | No change | Lower | No | No | No |
Türkiye | Yes | Higher | Higher | Lower | Yes | Yes | No |
UK | No | No change | Higher | Higher | Yes | No | Yes |
Table A A.19. Q13 Have you observed any changes in investors behaviour in participating in auctions or/ Syndications (e.g. oversized orders)? | |
---|---|
Australia | Oversized orders from Hedge Funds in syndications remain a feature. Behavior of markets participants (investors/intermediaries) broadly unchanged from recent experience. |
Austria | In 2021 the bid/cover ratio normalized with an average value of 2.29x, close to its long-term average of 2.33x (2009-2022YTD). In 2022YTD the average bid/cover ratio at government bond auctions was 2.12x. The syndicated bond issuances oversubscription was 8.18 in 2021 (='highest' value ever recorded) and 6.65 in 2022YTD |
Belgium | We haven’t observed any changes in auctions. The oversubscription in the syndicated transactions was a little less than in previous years, but still high compared to pre-QE years. |
Brazil | Yes. The end of the monetary tightening cycle brought strong local demand for fixed rate bonds. In addition, data showing a disinflationary process in recent months led to a decrease in demand for inflation-linked bonds. |
Bulgaria | The investor demand has decreased due to higher global debt market volatility. |
Canada | None |
Chile | During the last years, we have observed new accounts coming with an ESG mandates, which are less price sensitive than vanilla accounts. |
Colombia | There have not been any changes in investor behavior in the participation in the auctions. |
Costa Rica | Preference for Inflation-linked bonds, significant pressures on interest rates, as a result of increases in the Central Bank monetary policy rate. Uncertainty about the local and international macroeconomic situation, and significant dispersions in the bids received in auctions. |
Croatia | Lower investor demand |
Czech Republic | There was a temporary shift in demand to the shorter end of the yield curve in the first half of 2022. |
Denmark | The increased volatility have led to more volatile demand at the auctions. At some auctions the event risk is very high as it might coincide with other market moves (e.g. extraordinary ECB meeting at the same time as one of our auctions.) |
Estonia | Estonia is a very infrequent issuer. There was less competition in the latest T-bills auction in June 2022. |
Finland |
|
France | No significant change |
Germany | No |
Greece | No |
Hungary | Number of PDs interested in FRNs has slightly increased; syndications for the foreign currency denominated government bonds have been harder (more flexibility, transparent communication is needed, proper timing and volume is crucial). |
Iceland | Due to steep increases in policy rates investors have been reluctant to buy longer dated T-bills (6-12 months) |
Ireland | No significant changes |
Israel | No significant changes |
Italy | During the past syndicated transactions, in some circumstances we have noted an inflated amount of orders coming from fast money accounts that misrepresented the underlying value of the book. However, in the recent transactions, we observed a significant reduction of this phenomenon |
Japan | Auction participants’ behavior such as “successful Bids Share for JGBs by Investor type” and “bid-to-cover ratio” at the time of auctions has not changed in particular. |
Korea |
|
Republic of Latvia | Yes, the demand of longer tenors mostly is limited due to the market volatility, increasing yields and geopolitical risks |
Lithuania | Significantly smaller demand both in auctions and in syndicated deal, very limited oversubscription. |
Luxembourg | No specific observations |
Mexico (Local) | Local Market Debt Due to current market conditions, we have observed participants have shown higher demand for floating rates instruments. Foreign investors are focusing on instruments on the long-end side of the curve, revealing preferences for 10 and 30 years bonds on the run, but also on inflation-linked bonds. Additionally, some local participants have shown a preference for liquidity, demanding instruments on the short-end of the curve. |
Mexico (External) | External Market Debt Due to current market conditions, we have observed that investors are currently showing more appetite for short and medium term debt than long term debt; also, they require higher liquidity premiums. |
Netherlands | We don’t have information on this for tap auctions as we only see the end orders from primary dealers. On the DDA side we do have more information and there seems to be no change in behavior as compared to previous years |
New Zealand | No |
Norway | We experience some challenges in investor demand in bill auctions. In general, high market volatility and lower liquidity will affect investor behavior to some extent. |
Poland | Due to monetary policy tightening cycle and geopolitical risks, market sentiment has worsened and investors demand in auctions has decreased compared to the same period of 2021. We have not observed any changes in Syndications on foreign market. |
Portugal | During 2022, the order size of the books has decreased (approx. half of 2021’ book size). IGCP has witnessed a drop in large orders in syndications, mostly from real money accounts and Hedge Funds (the HF accounts have dropped the relative participation more in April syndication than in January syndication). This past behavior led to a certain difficulty in assessing the quality of the demand and consequently to set the final price for new issuance. |
Romania | A very high volatility of the submitted orders was observed, influenced especially by the news in the market. In addition, there were significant differences between the amounts attracted in the same month, similar auctions registering different interest. There is also a concentration of investors' interest in bonds issued in the medium and long term, especially maturities longer than 5 years and bonds included in the regional indices |
Slovak Republic | Investors more cautious in placing bids in auctions because of the environment with increasing yields. |
Slovenia | Less interest for taps of longer dated lines recently |
Spain | Similarly to what we reported last year, we have noticed larger orders from certain investors in our syndications. Also, we have noticed a slight general upward trend in New Issue Premiums in syndications across the European Government Bond space, when compared with 2020 and 2021 funding conditions. |
Sweden |
|
Switzerland | Participation in our auctions was more or less on the same level as in the previous year. It was surprising to see that demand for long-term bonds was higher than for medium-term bonds even though volatility was high, the yield curve was inverse in that part of the curve and monetary policy got more and more restrictive over the last 12 months. |
Türkiye | Due to the higher amount of FX denominated borrowing operations in domestic markets, we have revised the total amount to be raised via international capital markets operations. |
UK | Market participation at gilt auctions, as measured by the average cover ratio, has continued to remain relatively robust. The average cover ratio at gilt auctions in 2022-23 to-date is 2.49x (compared to 2.41x in 2021-22). It had been reported to us anecdotally, and we had observed, oversized orders placed at syndicated offerings (i.e. where bidders submit bids that are larger than the amount they want/expect to be allocated in the transaction). We also understand that this experience was not unique to the UK. We communicated to our primary dealers that we did not find this approach to submitted orders to be helpful, in that it may make allocations more difficult for the dealers themselves, whose responsibility it is to decide the allocations based on the DMO’s high level steer. Following this communication, we have noted that the practice of overbidding has diminished. |
Table A A.20. Q14 In your view, which aspects of your primary market operations might be impacted by monetary policy quantitative tightening (QT)? | |||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Issuance techniques | Instruments choice | Management of refinancing risk | Borrowing costs | Investor base | Investor demand | Markets absorption capacity of funding needs | Market volatility | Communication with fiscal authorities | Communication with market participants | Communication with monetary authorities | Other (i) | Other (i) | Other (i) | Other (ii) |
Australia |
| X |
| X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
|
|
| X | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Belgium |
|
|
| X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brazil |
| X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bulgaria |
| X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada |
|
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chile |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Colombia |
|
| X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
| X | X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Croatia |
| x | x | x |
| x | x | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
| X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark |
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
| X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finland |
|
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
France |
| X |
| X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Germany |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Greece |
| X |
| X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hungary |
| X |
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Iceland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X | QE has been very limited in scope in Iceland. Thus, QT will not have much impact. |
|
|
Ireland |
| X |
| X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Israel |
| X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Italy |
| X | X | X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Japan |
|
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Korea |
|
|
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia |
| X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lithuania |
|
|
| X |
| X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg |
|
|
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (External) | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New Zealand |
|
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
Norway | X |
|
| X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Portugal |
|
|
| X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Romania |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovak Republic | X |
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia |
| X |
| X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spain |
|
|
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sweden |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland |
|
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Türkiye |
| x |
| x |
| x |
| x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UK |
|
|
| X |
| X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
| X |
|
Table A A.21. Q15 Do you have a liquidity buffer? | ||
---|---|---|
Answer | Comments | |
Australia | Yes | Broadly similar |
Austria | Yes | There have been no changes to the liquidity buffer practice since its implementation in the light of the uncertainties around the exact cash flows surrounding the Austrian government corona package in mid-March 2020. The liquidity buffer is the financial buffer used for the daily cash flow management to deal with normal mismatches of cash inflows and outflows within a month. In 2022 it was also used to cover uncertainties surrounding the funding of anti-inflation/energy support packages by the Austrian government |
Belgium | No | We typically do not hold a formal liquidity buffer. However, in 2021 the liquidity we held was higher than usual (cf 5) |
Brazil | Yes | The Brazilian National Treasury built, throughout 2021, a liquidity buffer capable of paying more than 10 months of obligations, to be prepared for a period that seemed to be increasing in uncertainties (global inflation, Ukraine-Russia, domestic elections). Throughout 2022, it was possible to maintain the liquidity buffer at the same level. |
Bulgaria | Yes | The country keeps a high level fiscal reserve in the central bank |
Canada | Yes | There have been no changes to the liquidity buffer practice. The liquidity plan is composed of government deposits held with financial institutions and the Bank of Canada, as well as the liquid foreign exchange reserves and are managed to provide one month's worth of coverage |
Chile | Yes | We don’t have a formal buffer, but the Treasury normally maintains transitory cash, which in practice work as a liquidity buffer, but with no formal rules. |
Colombia | Yes |
|
Costa Rica | No |
|
Croatia | No | No |
Czech Republic | Yes | Liquidity buffer within single treasury accounts has been quite stable last years. There have been no changes in cash management. |
Denmark | Yes | We maintain a large cash buffer, and it has been somewhat higher than anticipated due to better than forecast public finances. No questions has been asked for the desire to maintain a cash buffer. |
Estonia | Yes | There have been no changes in our liquidity buffer practice. The liquidity buffer is the financial buffer used for the State’s daily cash flow management to deal with normal mismatches of cash inflows and outflows within a month. |
Finland | Yes | No changes to size of the liquidity buffer |
France | Yes | No significant change |
Germany | Yes | At the beginning of the pandemic, we significantly expanded our buffer. Since then, we have been smoothing it back. |
Greece | Yes | No. |
Hungary | Yes | No change in the methodology of setting the optimal liquidity buffer levels, but it resulted in higher liquidity buffer target for the year 2022 than for 2021. The volume of cash placement by the DMO has decreased in 2022, due to the abundant liquidity of banks and monetary policy measures and developments. ÁKK introduced stand-by credit lines to increase liquidity buffer in 2022. There have been no problems in managing or communicating the use of the liquidity buffer. |
Iceland | Yes | No |
Ireland | Yes | No |
Israel | Yes | The state increased its liquidity buffer. There have been no problems managing or communicating the use of the liquidity buffer. |
Italy | Yes | Any change in our liquidity buffer practice has not been introduced in the last 12 months. |
Japan | Yes | Although the fund balance on the Government Debt Consolidation Fund (GDCF) had decreased by reducing the amount of front-loading Refunding Bonds according to the 3rd revision of the issuance plan for FY2020, it has recovered because of the subsequent increases in the amount of front-loading Refunding Bonds and other factors. |
Korea | No |
|
Republic of Latvia | Yes | Increased liquidity buffer is maintained not only due to geopolitical risk and high market volatility, but to manage changing funding needs. Liquidity buffer was maintained to mitigate fiscal impact of Covid-19 pandemic, and is being kept in increased volumes at this moment No difficulties in managing or communicating the use of the liquidity buffer have been observed. |
Lithuania | Yes | No changes |
Luxembourg | Yes | Liquidity buffer has been increased, no problems encountered |
Mexico (Local) | Yes | There has not been any changes in our liquidity buffer. The Treasury has a minimum liquidity threshold that functions as a contingency buffer. Also, Mexico has access to the IMF’ Flexible Credit Line and other International Financial Institutions resources. Regarding the short-term zero coupon bonds, there is always a buffer in order to capture more resources; furthermore, zero coupon bonds are on a range and they are communicated to participants on a weekly basis. |
Mexico (External) | Yes |
|
Netherlands | No |
|
New Zealand | Yes | NZDM has reviewed the level of the liquidity buffer to hold on an ongoing basis to meet core objectives. The minimum liquidity buffer has been set at NZD 15 billion, which is complemented by the NZD 5 billion overdraft facility with the Central Bank. This is up from the pre-pandemic minimum liquidity buffer of NZD 2 billion, although we had recently been holding an elevated buffer due to the pandemic risks. The buffer comprises of cash and liquid highly rated financial assets denominated in New Zealand Dollars (NZD). We have had no challenges in managing or communicating the use of the new liquidity buffer. |
Norway | Yes | The central government has the liquidity buffer as deposits at the central bank. There are no changes in practice over the last 12 months. |
Poland | Yes | Due to elevated budget and market uncertainty the level of cash buffer remained at relatively high level. |
Portugal | Yes | No changes to the liquidity buffer practice. This year’s increased uncertainty of government revenues and expenditures has put additional pressure on cash forecasting. Excess cash has been surpassing the target significantly. As a result, the 2022 funding program needed to be adjusted by reducing net issuance |
Romania | Yes | The policy of the Ministry of Finance is to maintain a buffer in foreign currency to cover up to 4 months the gross financing needs. The volume of this buffer may fluctuate during the year a s a result of various repayments and new Eurobond issuances. The currency buffer is hold at NBR and is not used for other purposes than budget deficit financing and repayment of the government debt. |
Slovak Republic | Yes | Higher liquidity buffer due to conservative budgetary process |
Slovenia | Yes | In the last period, there were no changes regarding the liquidity buffer practice. The Republic maintains a sizeable liquidity buffer which is well communicated to the market as well as mentioned by rating agencies |
Spain | Yes | As mentioned in the answer of question #5, we have increased our liquidity buffer over the last 12 months. This has been done in response to an increase in uncertainty given the global context. The increase of geopolitical tensions, the risk of gas and energy shortages for certain European countries, the changes in the monetary policy of large central banks, all of these factors could have an impact on our funding needs and financial markets in general. To mitigate risks and maintain flexibility in this new context, we have decided to increase our liquidity buffer. Additionally, the suspension of the 0% cap on sovereign deposit remuneration at the ECB has reduced the opportunity costs of maintaining this liquidity buffer. |
Sweden | No |
|
Switzerland | Yes | No, there was no change. As we have had a liquidity buffer for multiple years, there were also no problems in managing or communicating our liquidity buffer. |
Türkiye | Yes | Keeping a strong level of cash reserve in order to reduce the liquidity risk associated with cash and debt management is one the main pillars of our borrowing strategy. |
UK | No |
|
Table A A.22. Q16 Among the following indicators of market-risk exposure, please indicate the ones you calculate (1), publish (2), or use as a benchmark in your medium-term funding strategies (3)? | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 1/3) | ||||||||||||
| Average Time to Maturity (ATM) | Debt maturing in X months | Share of FX debt to total debt | Average time to re-fixing (ATR) | ||||||||
| ||||||||||||
Country | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) |
Australia | X | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
Belgium | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
Brazil | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
Bulgaria | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X | X |
|
Canada | X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
Chile | X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Colombia | X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Croatia | x |
|
| x | x |
| x | x | x |
|
|
|
Czech Republic | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Denmark | X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
Estonia | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
Finland | X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
France | X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
Germany | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Greece | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Hungary | X | X | X | X |
|
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
Iceland | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Israel | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
Italy | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X |
|
Japan | X | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X |
|
Lithuania | X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
|
Luxembourg | X | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) | X | X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (External) | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
Netherlands | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X | X |
New Zealand | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Norway | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X | X |
Poland | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
Portugal | X | X |
| X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
Romania | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
Slovak Republic | X | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
Slovenia | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X |
|
|
Spain | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
| X |
| X |
Sweden | x | X |
|
|
|
| x | x |
|
|
|
|
Switzerland | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Türkiye | x | x |
| x | x | x | x | x | x |
|
|
|
UK | X | X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table A A.23. Q16 Among the following indicators of market-risk exposure, please indicate the ones you calculate (1), publish (2), or use as a benchmark in your medium-term funding strategies (3)? | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 2/3) | ||||||||||||
| Macaulay duration | Modified duration | Share of fixed rate debt to total debt | Debt re-fixing of rate within X months | ||||||||
| ||||||||||||
Country | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) |
Australia |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
|
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
Belgium |
|
|
|
|
|
| X |
| X | X |
|
|
Brazil | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
Bulgaria | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X | X |
|
Canada |
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
| X | X |
|
Chile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Colombia | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Croatia | x |
|
|
|
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
| X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X | X |
Denmark | X |
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
Finland |
|
|
| X | X |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
France | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Germany | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Greece | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| X |
Hungary | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
Iceland | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Israel |
|
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
Italy |
|
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Japan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia | X | X | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
Lithuania |
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) |
|
|
| X |
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
Mexico (External) |
|
|
| X |
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
Netherlands |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New Zealand | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Norway |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland | X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Portugal |
|
|
| X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
Romania |
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
Slovak Republic | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
Slovenia | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
| X |
|
|
Spain |
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X | X | X |
| X |
Sweden | x | x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Türkiye | x | x |
|
|
|
| x | x | x |
|
|
|
UK |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table A A.24. Q16 Among the following indicators of market-risk exposure, please indicate the ones you calculate (1), publish (2), or use as a benchmark in your medium-term funding strategies (3)? | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 3/3) | ||||||||
| Other (i) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) | Other (ii) | Calculated (1) | Published (2) | Used as a benchmark (3) |
| ||||||||
Country | ||||||||
Australia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Belgium |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brazil | Share of floating rate debt to total debt: | X | X | X | Share of inflation linked debt to total debt: | X | X | X |
Bulgaria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chile |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Colombia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Croatia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
France | Shared of index-linked debt to total debt | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
Germany |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Greece |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hungary |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Iceland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Israel |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Italy |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Japan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia | Average life: | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
Lithuania |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
New Zealand |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Norway |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Portugal | Cost at Risk | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
Romania |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovak Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spain |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sweden | Share of Index linked debt | x | x |
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Türkiye |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UK |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table A A.25. Q17 Do you plan to review the long-term funding strategy as a consequence of increased debt levels and rising uncertainty in funding conditions? | ||
---|---|---|
Answer | Comments | |
Australia | Yes | The long-term funding (and liquidity management) strategy evolves as circumstances change. It is reviewed at least annually. It would be reviewed irrespective of whether debt levels had increased or decreased |
Austria | No | We do not plan to review/change our long-term funding strategy as we are confident that we are well equipped well for future challenges. The cornerstones of the Austrian funding strategy are: |
Belgium | No | It is however possible that our strategy will be adapted as a result of the ongoing high inflation and the rising rates. |
Brazil | No | That scenario has been incorporated in our strategy already |
Bulgaria | No |
|
Canada | Yes | Treasury bills, medium term (2Y, 3Y, 5Y) and long term (10Y and 30Y) nominal bonds issuances are expected to be reviewed in light of projected debt levels and market conditions. Issuance of inflation linked bonds and Green bonds are not considered in consequence of these factors. |
Chile | Yes | One of the risk factors is the Pension Reform, which could later the way in which the Pension managers work in this moment. Thus, in case of a regulatory change that affects demand coming from pension managers investors, it could mean a change in the maturities (likely: shorter maturities) and even the procedures of issuing. |
Colombia | No | The long-term funding strategy (published every 4-5 years) will be reviewed and updated according to an annual revision of Financial Plan and the Medium Term Fiscal Framework. |
Costa Rica |
|
|
Croatia | No |
|
Czech Republic | No |
|
Denmark | No | At the moment we have lower public debt than before Covid. |
Estonia | No |
|
Finland | No |
|
France | Yes | Our base strategy to be transparent, predictable and to respond to investor’s demand all along our rate curve has remained unchanged for decades and has been resilient to many different market situations. The modalities of its implementation are reviewed twice per year by our Strategic Committee. |
Germany | No | reviewing strategy is an ongoing process |
Greece | Yes |
|
Hungary | Yes | We use a stochastic optimal debt portfolio model to set the financing structure; the results will be available in November and they will be the basis for the strategy review. |
Iceland |
|
|
Ireland | No |
|
Israel | Yes | Revising the debt maturity structure |
Italy | No | The Italian Treasury funding plan is already inspired by the principles of transparency and predictability. In order to handle possible risks deriving from a national and international geopolitical scenario, the funding strategy is oriented toward managing interest rate and refinancing risks, so as to continue to keep exposure to such risks under control. Moreover, the Italian treasury has focused its debt management policy in increasing the average life of the debt to mitigate the risk of refinancing by diluting over time the volumes to place on the market and to decrease the issuer’s exposure to sudden increases in interest rates. However, the above-mentioned factors are characterized by a level of uncertainty which makes difficult to predict their evolution over time. Therefore, the Treasury funding strategy keeps a sufficient degree of flexibility in order to quickly response and adapt its funding plan to the evolution of the market context |
Japan | No |
|
Korea | Yes |
|
Republic of Latvia | Yes | Annual funding strategy envisages that aside the core capital market instruments, the loans from international financial institutions or targeted EU loan facilities for member countries (like SURE) is good alternatives. In additions there are markets in other currencies that remain available. Latvia’s general government debt level is forecasted to be slightly above 40% in medium term. Current debt levels ensure sufficient fiscal space to implement the scenarios that would require additional borrowing needs |
Lithuania | No |
|
Luxembourg | No |
|
Mexico (Local) | No |
|
Mexico (External) | No |
|
Netherlands | Yes | We extensively review our funding strategy and interest rate risk framework every six years. Every two years we conduct a smaller assessment. In these assessments we take debt levels and market conditions into account. The next smaller assessment will take place in 2023. |
New Zealand | Yes | We continue to review our funding strategy. |
Norway | No |
|
Poland | No |
|
Portugal | No | We are not planning to revise our long term funding strategy in terms of maturities or debt instruments due to the current funding conditions. |
Romania | No |
|
Slovak Republic | No | We believe in our current funding strategy thus no need for reviewing |
Slovenia | No |
|
Spain | No | We will maintain the same overarching long-term funding strategy that we have had until now, among which we can highlight the following: We will continue to maintain a benchmark program, which allows us to provide liquid reference points across our yield curve. We will continue to diversify our investor base, through investor outreach and the issuance of instruments such as green bonds or inflation-linked bonds. We will continue to maintain a long average life of our debt portfolio, to reduce our refinancing risk and improve our portfolio’s resilience. We will continue to listen to the feedback from investors and our Primary Dealers, and make sure to issue into demand, to improve the stability and efficiency of the Spanish Public Debt market. |
Sweden | No |
|
Switzerland | No | Debt levels of the Swiss Confederation have not increased by a large amount; therefore, there is no need to change our long-term funding strategy. The changes in monetary policy might have a more prominent effect on our funding strategy |
Türkiye | No |
|
UK | Yes | We keep our future funding strategy in terms of the mix and maturity of issuance and the mix between types of operation under review on an ongoing basis. The major occasions at which such a review may be implemented are (i) when designing the financing remit for the forthcoming financial year (usually each March) and (ii) at an Autumn fiscal event when new forecasts of the public finances are published |
Table A A.26. Q18 Do you consider ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) factors in your debt management operations? | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Yes | No | 18.1 If yes, what is your motivation? | 18.2 If yes, what are the areas of activities that you consider ESG factors? | ||||||||
Diversification of investor base | Aligning with government’s ESG policy | Supporting the market for sustainable finance instruments (e.g. by signaling and benchmarking roles) | Positive market story | Impact on sovereign creditworthiness | Accountability and transparency (e.g. quality of internal control and risk management functions, timely and adequate dissemination of data) | Other (i) SPECIFY | Country additional notes: | Communication and investor relations strategy (e.g. presenting information on country’s initiatives related to ESG in annual reports, newsletters, PD meetings and roadshows) | Instrument choice (e.g. green bonds, certificates etc.) | |||
Australia | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| We consider Australian environmental and climate responses in our provision of data to our investors, in order to provide them with the Australia’s official view on these issues. Investors having been requesting this information from Australia consistently for the last three years. |
| X |
|
Austria | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
Belgium | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
Brazil | X |
| X |
| X | X | X | X |
| The Brazilian National Treasury is building up a sustainable framework for external issuances, but this process is not finished yet. | X | X |
Bulgaria |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
| Canada issues only green bonds as ESG debt. | X |
|
Chile | X |
| X | X | X | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
Colombia | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Costa Rica | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
| There could be a financial benefit at the interest rate level. Due to the international image of our country (migrating towards carbon neutrality), there could be a benefit in terms of yield | X | X |
Croatia |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark | X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
Estonia | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
| Estonia has a holistic approach to ESG factors and focuses on government level targets and performance of budget spending. Thematic bonds are currently not part of the strategy. | X |
|
Finland | X |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
| X |
|
France | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
Germany | X |
|
| X | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
Greece | X |
| X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
Hungary | X |
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
| In line with international efforts, Hungary is strongly committed to fighting climate change and biodiversity loss. The Hungarian government is implementing wide and overreaching climate, energy and environmental policies to transition the country to a low-carbon and environment-friendly economy. The Green Bond Framework of Hungary, created in 2020, contributes to support the government’s commitment and to raise a part of the necessary funding from the capital markets. The Green Bond Framework contributes to further diversify Hungary’s investor base. | X | X |
Iceland | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Iceland has issued a sustainable financing framework but has not yet issued a labelled bond. That is though on Treasury´s agenda when it is deemed feasible. | X | X |
Ireland | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
Israel | X |
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X |
Italy | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
| ESG factors, and in particular green bond issuances, are taken into consideration when defining the issuance strategy to diversify both the investor base and the central debt securities. The issuance of green bond is aimed at financing green expenditures with positive environmental impact. |
| X |
Japan |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
Lithuania |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
| X |
Mexico (Local) | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
| The issuance of SDG Bonds follows several motivations. On the one hand, the Government of Mexico is committed to work towards attaining the SDG. This effort comes in hand with the commitment of closing social gaps and transit to a more sustainable society and economy. On the other hand, by issuing these instruments, as a sovereign, Mexico develops a sustainable yield curves that serves as a reference to both external and local markets, and promote the development of capital markets in sustainability. Finally, parallel to engaging with a new investors’ base, Mexico is promoting transparency in public spending and a better monitoring for the fulfillment of the commitment of the 2030 Agenda. | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands | X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
New Zealand | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
Norway |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland | X |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
| X |
Portugal | X |
| X | X | X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X |
Romania | X |
| X | X | X |
| X | X |
| Romania is in the process of creating its Green Bond Sovereign Framework and the Ministry of Finance has requested technical assistance from the World Bank regarding this project. | X | X |
Slovak Republic |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
|
| X | X |
Spain | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
| Spain issued its inaugural green bond in 2021. In 2022 we have tapped the green bond via auction. We will soon publish the impact and allocation reports for our 2021 green bond issuance. We carry out roadshows and meetings related to our green bond program. Additionally, when we talk with investors we also highlight Spain’s ESG efforts, especially regarding the green transition, which is a key element of our Recovery Plan, financed with the NextGenerationEU program. | X | X |
Sweden |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Switzerland | X |
|
| X | X | X |
| X |
| We will issue the Confederation's first green bond in the 4th quarter. By issuing a green bond, the Federal Council mainly aims to strengthen the position of the Swiss financial markets, set a benchmark for other issuers and increase transparency over green federal expenditures |
| X |
Türkiye | X |
| x | x | x | x | x | x |
|
| X | X |
UK | X |
| X | X | X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
Table A A.27. Q19 Do you observe an interest in government’s ESG related activities from market participants (e.g. institutional investors and rating agencies)? | |||
---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | Comments | |
Australia | X |
| There has been considerable interest from investors in sovereign ESG and particularly Australia’s environmental policies over the last few years. There has been interest, but to a much lesser extent in Australia’s S & G credentials |
Austria | X |
| To a certain extent |
Belgium | X |
|
|
Brazil | X |
| Foreign investors have shown a meaningful interest in ESG aspects during roadshows and investors meetings. |
Bulgaria |
| X |
|
Canada |
| X | While there was much interest and outreach around the time of Canada’s inaugural 2022 green bond issuance, such outreach and interest has declined since. |
Chile | X |
| We have observed during the last years the development of special departments related to ESG form the side of investors, as well as an increased interest of rating agencies to include ESG factors. |
Colombia | X |
| There is interest from market participants regarding ESG activities. In fact, we have participated in many panels, forums, events, and bilateral meetings regarding ESG with local and international investors. Additionally, on August 5th of 2022 Colombia published the Green Bonds, Social and Sustainable Framework. |
Costa Rica | X |
| For the local public debt market, there is little demand for ESG issues. In the last 24 months, ESG issues have boomed in the domestic market in Costa Rica. |
Croatia | X |
|
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
|
Denmark | X |
| Most investors is moving towards a higher focus on ESG related factors. With the launch of our green bond we have started a much more direct conversation with our investors on ESG issues. |
Estonia | X |
|
|
Finland | X |
|
|
France | X |
| Investors tend to show an increased interest in our environmental activities, notably when they investigate our green bonds. We observe that ESG is now a pillar as such in the country rating methodology of most agencies. |
Germany | X |
|
|
Greece | X |
|
|
Hungary | X |
| There are frequent meetings with investors to discuss potential opportunities and risks in the ESG field. |
Iceland | X |
| We´ve seen increased interest from investors and rating agencies. |
Ireland | X |
|
|
Israel | X |
|
|
Italy | X |
| Market participants takes positively into account that the Republic of Italy has been at the forefront of international developments in the field of sustainable finance, committing itself to making finance flows commensurate with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development |
Japan | X |
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
Republic of Latvia | X |
| After the issuance of the first Sustainability Bond in December 2021 (the 1st in Baltics and Scandinavia), we have been receiving increased interest from investors for re-openings or new lines. |
Lithuania | X |
| There is interest from both investors and rating agencies |
Luxembourg | X |
| Strong interest during issuance preparation/process |
Mexico (Local) | X |
| The interest comes from different investors (asset managers, pension funds, among others), rating agencies, institutions and other governments that want to integrate the ESG on their investment decision making. |
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
Netherlands | X |
| The Netherlands has issued its first green bond 4 years ago, and has seen a healthy appetite from investors since. Our green bond, including our EU taxonomy aligned framework, is part of the dialogue we have with our investors. |
New Zealand | X |
| In the investor engagement activities, most investors ask questions about New Zealand’s climate risks, and they are increasingly wanting to see that issuers are aware of, and are appropriately managing, ESG related challenges. |
Norway | X |
| We receive questions from investors whether Norway will issue ESG-bonds, and in particular green bonds. Rating agencies are incorporating ESG considerations in their reports on Norwegian government debt. |
Poland | X |
| Interest from rating agencies |
Portugal | X |
| IGCP has observed an increased interest in a Green bond by investors. That is mainly perceived in roadshows and in one to one meetings |
Romania | X |
| From discussions with investors, this type of instrument would generate a high interest, better cost conditions compared to classic instruments |
Slovak Republic | X |
| Mostly primary dealers who would like to arrange such issuance |
Slovenia | X |
|
|
Spain | X |
| We notice that both investors and rating agencies show an interest on the Spanish public sector’s efforts in the ESG-space. Because of this, we have made additional efforts to compile this information for investor outreach efforts, especially green projects, which are related to our green bond program. |
Sweden | X |
|
|
Switzerland | X |
| Strong demand for sustainable financial instruments from investors and increased interest from rating agencies on ESG issues and risks. |
Türkiye | X |
| We have witnessed a strong appetite from investors during various meeting towards a potential ESG bond issuance from Türkiye |
UK | X |
| Investors get greater visibility on government’s climate spend through the green financing framework and our annual allocation reports which details the projects the proceeds of the green gilt financing programme have been allocated to |
Table A A.28. Q20 In your view, do you think investors consider your country’s ESG performance when pricing your sovereign risk/creditworthiness? | |||
---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | Comments | |
Australia | X |
| Yes but only by a small number of investors at this stage. Most investors are beginning to apply an ESG lens across their sovereign portfolios or strategies but for many this remains at a relatively early stage particularly when grappling with sovereign debt. For a smaller and more sophisticated group (usually private sector fund managers) they have developed or are developing more rigorous |
Austria |
| X | There has been no clear indication yet that investors consider ESG ratings and performance when pricing our sovereign risk/creditworthiness. However, we recognize increasing interest from investors/rating agencies on this topic |
Belgium |
| X |
|
Brazil | X |
| Some “G” (Governance) aspects related to the rating agencies assessments with a considerable weight in the final score. |
Bulgaria |
| X |
|
Canada |
| X | Not to our knowledge |
Chile |
| X |
|
Colombia | X |
|
|
Costa Rica | X |
|
|
Croatia | X |
|
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
|
Denmark | X |
| Some investors consider it more than others. |
Estonia | X |
|
|
Finland |
| X |
|
France |
| X | Sovereign credit worthiness remains mostly at this stage a matter of debt sustainability. |
Germany | X |
|
|
Greece |
| X |
|
Hungary | X |
|
|
Iceland | X |
| Investors do most likely consider ESG factors but whether it affects the pricing is not clear. |
Ireland | X |
| Important for our green bond |
Israel | X |
|
|
Italy |
| X | Fort the time being existing green bonds tend to trade with some small premium versus conventional bonds but this has not been factored in the pricing of green bonds at issuance |
Japan |
|
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
Republic of Latvia | X |
| That is proved by: 1) the statistics of investor`s portfolios (dedicated to ESG assets), when investing in Latvia’s Sustainability Bonds. 2) detailed questions in the Road show and during bilateral discussions with investors |
Lithuania | X |
|
|
Luxembourg |
| X |
|
Mexico (Local) |
| X | As these criteria are still quite innovative, we have not yet rely on them for creditworthiness. As long as these performance evaluations develop, we expect that in the future, Mexico’s ESG performance will be taken into consideration |
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
Netherlands |
| X | Not yet, might become relevant in the (near) future |
New Zealand | X |
|
|
Norway |
| X |
|
Poland |
| X |
|
Portugal |
| X | This has not been evident yet for Portugal but we believe it will be in the future. |
Romania | X |
| While ESG performance is not yet a factor when pricing Romania’s government bonds, potentially investors may consider it in the future |
Slovak Republic |
| X |
|
Slovenia | X |
|
|
Spain |
| X | For the case of Spain, we don’t believe that ESG-performance is linked to investors’ perception of sovereign creditworthiness. The main reason is that we do not have significant ESG-related risks that could affect our creditworthiness. For other countries, which are subject to significant ESG-risks, there could be a correlation between ESG-performance and sovereign risk indicators. |
Sweden | X |
|
|
Switzerland | X |
|
|
Türkiye | X |
| We expect the ESG performance of country would be an instrumental indicator especially for pricing of ESG related debt instruments. |
UK |
| X |
|
Table A A.29. Q21 Do you observe a correlation between your country’s ESG performance with your sovereign risk indicators (e.g. spreads, CDS)? | |||
---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | ||
Australia |
| X |
|
Austria |
| X | Again, there has been no clear indication that our ESG ratings and performance correlate with our sovereign risk indicators |
Belgium |
| X |
|
Brazil |
| X | Although we understand some investors consider ESG aspects in assessing sovereign risk, we don´t see a meaningful correlation in the day-to-day operations. |
Bulgaria |
| X |
|
Canada |
| X | Not to our knowledge |
Chile |
| X |
|
Colombia |
|
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
Croatia |
| X |
|
Czech Republic |
| X |
|
Denmark |
| X |
|
Estonia |
| X |
|
Finland |
| X |
|
France |
| X |
|
Germany |
| X |
|
Greece |
| X |
|
Hungary |
| X |
|
Iceland |
| X |
|
Ireland |
| X |
|
Israel |
| X |
|
Italy |
|
| Being the sovereign risk indicators influenced by several factors (macro dynamics, national and international geo-political events), It is difficult to detect a specific relationship with the ESG performance. |
Japan |
|
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
Republic of Latvia |
| X | It is very hard to prove by certain numbers or b.p. |
Lithuania |
| X |
|
Luxembourg |
| X |
|
Mexico (Local) |
| X |
|
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
Netherlands |
| X | We haven’t investigated this, but we do not think there will be such a correlation |
New Zealand |
| X |
|
Norway |
| X |
|
Poland |
| X |
|
Portugal |
| X | This has not been evident yet for Portugal but we believe it will be in the future |
Romania |
| X |
|
Slovak Republic |
| X |
|
Slovenia | X |
|
|
Spain |
| X | For the case of Spain, we don’t believe that ESG-performance is linked to our sovereign risk indicators. The main reason is that we do not have significant ESG-related risks that could affect our creditworthiness. For other countries, which are subject to significant ESG-risks, there could be a correlation between ESG-performance and sovereign risk indicators |
Sweden |
| X |
|
Switzerland |
| X | So far, we did not observe any correlation. This might also be because there have been very few changes in Switzerland’s ESG ratings to date and the methodology of different rating providers is hard to compare for investors. |
Türkiye | X |
| We expect the ESG performance of country would be an instrumental indicator especially for pricing (i.e. spreads) of ESG related debt instruments. |
UK |
| X |
|
Table A A.30. Q22 In your opinion, how are the ESG labelled bond demand and supply dynamics evolving? | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 1/2) | |||||||||
Country | Investor demand for ESG-labelled bonds | Pricing and liquidity conditions | Borrowing needs | ||||||
| |||||||||
Increase/Improve | Remain stable | Decline | Increase/Improve | Remain stable | Decline | Increase | Remain stable | Decline | |
Australia | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Austria | X |
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
Belgium | X |
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
Brazil | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Bulgaria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Chile |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
| X |
Colombia | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Costa Rica | X |
|
|
|
|
| X |
|
|
Croatia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Finland |
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
France | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Germany |
| X |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Greece |
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Hungary | X |
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
Iceland | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Ireland | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Israel | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Italy | X |
|
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
Japan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Republic of Latvia | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Lithuania | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Luxembourg | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Mexico (Local) | X |
|
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
Netherlands |
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
New Zealand | X |
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
Norway |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland |
| X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Portugal | X |
|
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
Romania |
| X |
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
Slovak Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovenia | X |
|
|
| X |
| X |
|
|
Spain | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Sweden |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
Switzerland | X |
|
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Türkiye | x |
|
| x |
|
| x |
|
|
UK |
|
| X |
|
| X |
| X |
|
Table A A.31. Q22 In your opinion, how are the ESG labelled bond demand and supply dynamics evolving? | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 2/2) | |||||||
Country | Size of eligible expenditures | Government’s willingness to issue ESG bonds | Country additional notes: | ||||
| |||||||
| Increase | Remain stable | Decline | Increase | Remain stable | Decline | |
Australia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria | X |
|
| X |
|
| We expect both, demand and supply to increase steadily over the coming years. |
Belgium |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Brazil |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
Bulgaria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada |
|
|
|
| X |
| Canada has committed to a permanent green bond program with regular issuances. Difficult to opine on future eligible expenditures at the given time. |
Chile |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
Colombia | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Costa Rica | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Croatia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denmark |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
|
|
|
| Estonia has not issued any ESG labelled bonds |
Finland |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
France |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Germany | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Greece |
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
Hungary | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Iceland | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
Ireland | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
Israel | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Italy | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Japan |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Korea |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Republic of Latvia | X |
|
| X |
|
| As Latvia has issued only one Sustainability bond, it is hard to comment the dynamics for Latvia. Therefore, answer for this question is more of general nature and our observation. |
Lithuania |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Luxembourg | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) |
| X |
| X |
|
| Mexico intends to keep developing the sustainable yield curve in the local and external market due to the Government’s priority on addressing the most vulnerable population and promoting sustainable development |
Netherlands | X | X |
| X | X |
| We see investors caring more about liquidity in the current market, thus pricing green bonds more in line with regular bonds (i.e. the greenium decreases, but this is more liquidity driven). We are willing to issue more green bonds, but only if this is in line with our framework and high standard of issuing green bonds, which will depend on the government budget (i.e. how many new expenditures we can label as dark green, also considering the DNSH-criteria, for our bond) |
New Zealand | X |
|
| X |
|
| In the short term while there is much greater demand than supply for ESG bonds we expect ESG bonds may have a cost advantage. In the long term, as supply grows this advantage may erode to the point where the pricing benefit doesn’t materially offset ongoing programme costs |
Norway |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland |
| X |
|
| X |
| On the one hand, the emphasis is on ecological and social projects, on the other hand, as a result of the energy crisis, the regulations on fossil fuels have been loosened. These two factors balance each other. |
Portugal | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Romania | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Slovak Republic |
|
|
|
|
|
| We have not issued any ESG instruments and do not intend to issue. Government has many ways how to achieve the ESG goals without the complexity of these instruments. We expect the ESG instruments at sovereign level to be a dead end. |
Slovenia |
| X |
| X |
|
|
|
Spain | X |
|
| X |
|
| In the past years there has generally been a scarcity of sovereign green bond supply in financial markets, which led to “greeniums” appearing both in primary and secondary markets. However, as more sovereign issuers have started and developed their green bond programs, this scarcity has decreased. This is evidenced by the general downward trend in “greeniums”, especially in primary market issuance. We believe that there is still a “greenium” linked to sovereign green bond programs, which means that they provide a cost advantage over nominal issuance. Additionally, even if this “greenium” were to disappear as sovereign green bond supply increases to meet market demand, there would still be advantages to these programs, especially due to their contribution in diversifying debt managers’ investor base. |
Sweden |
|
|
|
|
|
| Limited overall funding need, focus on keeping existing lines liquid. |
Switzerland | X |
|
| X |
|
| Green bond issuance results indicate that demand remains high and is trending upward. At the same time, there are more and more issuers issuing sustainable bonds |
Türkiye | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
UK |
| X |
|
| X |
|
|
Table A A.32. Q23 In your view, what are the main drawbacks or challenges associated to ESG-labelled bond issuance for debt managers? | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 1/2) | ||||||||||
Country | Lack of eligible expenditures | Allocation reporting (ex-ante) | Impact reporting (ex-post) | Complexity of issuance process | Timing consideration (e.g., issuance) | Changes in regulation | Changes in taxonomy | Interaction with other governmental entities | Additional operational costs | Potential impact on existing instruments |
Australia |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Austria |
| X | X |
|
| X | X | X | X |
|
Belgium | X |
| X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
|
Brazil |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
Bulgaria |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Canada | X | X | X |
| X | X | X | X | X | X |
Chile | X |
| X |
|
|
|
| X |
|
|
Colombia |
| x | x |
|
|
|
| x | x |
|
Costa Rica | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
Croatia | x | x | x | x |
| x | x | x | x |
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
Denmark |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X |
Estonia | X | X | X | X |
| X | X |
| X |
|
Finland | X |
|
| X |
| X | X |
|
|
|
France | X |
| X |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
Germany |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
Greece | X |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
|
Hungary | X | X | X |
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
Iceland |
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ireland |
|
|
|
| X |
| X | X |
|
|
Israel | X |
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
Italy |
| X | X |
|
| X | X | X |
|
|
Japan |
| X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X |
|
Korea | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X |
|
Republic of Latvia | X | X | X |
| X | X | X |
|
|
|
Lithuania | X | X | X | X | X |
|
| X | X | X |
Luxembourg | x | x | x | x | x |
| x | x | x | x |
Mexico (Local) |
| X | X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Netherlands | X |
|
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
New Zealand |
| X | X |
|
|
|
| X | X | X |
Norway | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Poland |
|
| X |
|
| X | X |
|
|
|
Portugal |
|
| X | X |
|
| X | X | X |
|
Romania | X | X | X |
|
|
| X | X |
|
|
Slovak Republic | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Slovenia | X |
| X | X | X |
|
| X |
|
|
Spain | X |
|
|
|
|
| X |
|
|
|
Sweden |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X |
Switzerland |
|
| X |
|
| X | X | X | X | X |
Türkiye | x | x | x |
|
| x | x | x | x |
|
UK | X | X | X |
|
|
|
|
| X |
|
Table A A.33. Q23 In your view, what are the main drawbacks or challenges associated to ESG-labelled bond issuance for debt managers? | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
(Table 2/2) | ||||
Country | Other (i) | Other (i) | Other (ii) | Country additional notes: |
Australia |
|
|
|
|
Austria |
|
|
| Possible changes to the EU taxonomy and regulations do pose a challenge regarding the adaptation of our framework. Resources and additional costs with respects to allocation and impact reporting that are necessary to guarantee full transparency are also worthwhile mentioning. |
Belgium |
|
|
|
|
Brazil |
|
|
| The greatest challenge in ESG-labeled issuances is to build the policy framework and the interaction with other governmental entities such as the line ministries. |
Bulgaria |
|
|
| We cannot comment this topic as we don’t have direct observation of this process |
Canada |
|
|
|
|
Chile |
|
|
|
|
Colombia | it requires a full time team dedicated to ESG instruments | X |
|
|
Costa Rica |
|
|
|
|
Croatia |
|
|
|
|
Czech Republic |
|
|
|
|
Denmark | A green bond could be detrimental to the liquidity of other issues. | X |
|
|
Estonia |
|
|
|
|
Finland |
|
|
|
|
France |
|
|
|
|
Germany |
|
|
|
|
Greece |
|
|
|
|
Hungary |
|
|
| In our view, the main obstacle to the spreading of ESG solutions in the EU is the lack of clear, predictable set of rules, of which evolution is not hampered by a tangled web of interests. |
Iceland | It can be challenging to consider sustainable financing without compromising debt management objectives concerning a deep, active market, and regular issuance. | X |
|
|
Ireland |
|
|
|
|
Israel |
|
|
|
|
Italy |
|
|
| Allocation and impact reporting represent a challenge inasmuch collecting the suitable information is extremely complex and articulated. |
Japan |
|
|
|
|
Korea |
|
|
|
|
Republic of Latvia |
|
|
|
|
Lithuania |
|
|
|
|
Luxembourg |
|
|
|
|
Mexico (Local) |
|
|
| Timing consideration and complexity of issuance process might be a bottleneck for issuances at early year. As a sovereign issuer, in order to issue SDG Bonds, the selection process of eligible expenditures is subject to the federal budget cycle, and prior Congress approval; thereafter, the selection criteria can be applied to the pool of eligible expenditures and undergo the verification process by the SPO provider, according to the SDG Sovereign Bond Framework. On the other hand, the elaboration of the allocation and impact report depends on the data availability provided by the different ministries who manage the eligible expenditures, so a good coordination, communication and time consideration is needed to get the best information available for the report. |
Mexico (External) |
|
|
|
|
Netherlands |
|
|
| The green bond market is developing, thus regulation/taxonomy is also still developing. |
New Zealand | demonstrable additionality of ESG spend | X |
|
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Norway |
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Poland |
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Portugal |
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Romania |
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Slovak Republic |
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Slovenia |
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Spain |
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| One of the most important challenges the Spanish Treasury faces in its green bond program is that it doesn’t have as much eligible expenditure as it would like, despite substantial public spending in Spain on ESG issues. This is because our public sector is very decentralized, which means that much of the ESG-related spending is done on a regional level, not by the central government. This means that the regions have more eligible expenditure than the Central Government, and some of them carry out their own green bond programs. Additionally, NextGenerationEU has also absorbed a significant part of the Central Government’s possible eligible expenditure. The ESG-related spending in the Spanish Recovery Plan is financed by NextGenerationEU. This means that the European Commission will issue green bonds which use eligible green expenditure from investments being carried out in Spain. Therefore, this eligible expenditure is also not available for the Central Government’s green bond program. Lastly, to touch on the changes in taxonomy, this is also a challenge for debt managers who wish to issue green bonds. The taxonomy being approved by the EU will set the standard to which European debt managers must adapt their green bond programs. The problem here is that when public sector green expenditure is planned and executed, its design doesn’t take into account the reporting needs for a green bond program or a specific taxonomy. This means that even if public sector green spending did follow the principles guiding a specific green taxonomy, there could still be difficulties in proving this with the correct reporting, because these reporting needs were not taken into account when designing the green expenditure. |
Sweden |
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Switzerland |
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| The issuance and especially the reporting on green bonds leads to a considerable administrative effort. This is further increased when taxonomies or market standards are adapted and the framework consequently has to be changed. Moreover, Switzerland's relatively small debt volume means that additional financing instruments have a negative impact on existing instruments (cannibalization, lower liquidity). |
Türkiye |
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UK |
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