2. The context of integration policy in Flanders

Abstract

This chapter provides the context for integration in Flanders, starting with an outline of the size and structure of the foreign-born population. Next, it presents the broader features of the Flemish labour market, and the opportunities and challenges these present for immigrants. The chapter ends with a discussion of the evolution of integration policy and the main stakeholders involved in integration.

Characteristics of immigrants

Priorities in integration policy are set in response to the characteristics of past and present waves of immigration. To understand the current state of labour market integration and the use of immigrants’ skills in Flanders, it is important first to take stock of the size and make-up of its immigrant population.1

The immigrant population is rapidly increasing and diversifying

Flanders’ foreign-born population has been growing fast over the past decade. In 2021, close to 14% of the Flemish population were born abroad, up from 10% a decade ago. While the share of immigrants in the total population is close to the EU and OECD average 2 (see Figure 2.1), growth has been relatively strong in international comparison and has outpaced growth in Belgium as a whole, France, the Netherlands and Germany.3

Figure 2.1. Immigrants account for 14% of the population in Flanders

Flanders has a long migration history, with successive inflows of immigrants coming from different countries and through different migration channels (see Box 2.1). Reflective of this long migration tradition, the foreign-born population is rather heterogeneous. In 2020, over 19% of the immigrants were born in Belgium’s neighbouring countries (the Netherlands, France and Germany), and an additional 8% were born in other countries that composed the EU prior to 2004 (mainly Italy and Spain) (see Figure 2.2). Following the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, immigration from the new EU member states (mainly Romania, Poland and Bulgaria) strongly increased and since 2010, it outpaced immigration from the old EU member states. As a result, the share of this group in the migrant population grew from 9% in 2010 to 15% in 2020.

Immigrants from North Africa (mainly Morocco) and Türkiye are historically large non-EU immigrant groups in Flanders and still accounted for 12% and 6%, respectively, of the foreign-born population in 2020. However, as immigration from Asia grew sharply over the past decade while immigration from Morocco and Türkiye largely stabilised, immigrants born in other Asian countries (top countries: Russia, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Iraq) constituted the largest non-EU immigrant group. In 2020, they accounted for 17% of the foreign-born compared to 12% a decade earlier. Due to continuous inflows of humanitarian migrants and, subsequently, their families (see Box 2.2), the share of immigrants born in other Asian countries (particularly Afghanistan and Syria) is set to increase further in the coming years. The number of immigrants born in sub-Sahara Africa (top countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Guinee and Rwanda) and Latin America (mainly Brazil) has also grown gradually over the last decade. As a result, in 2020, these groups accounted for 11% and 4%, respectively, of the foreign-born population. In contrast, the relative importance of immigration from other European (non-EU) countries (mainly from the former Yugoslavia) has declined; they constituted 8% of the immigrant population. Immigrants born in North America and Oceania are a small group in Flanders.

In 2020, 42% of the immigrants in Flanders were EU-born, a large proportion in international comparison. The non-EU immigrant population, however, grew slightly faster over the past decade (44% increase) than the EU immigrant population (37% increase); a trend which because of demographic factors is expected to intensify (Neels et al., 2020[1]). Women accounted for half of the immigrant and native-born populations in 2020, like the gender distribution a decade ago. EU immigrants are as likely as non-EU immigrants to be women.

Figure 2.2. The immigrant population has diversified over the past decade

Box 2.1. Migration to Flanders since World War II

Like many Western European countries, Flanders’ recent immigration history began with the arrival of so-called “guest workers” from the Mediterranean (Martiniello et al., 2010[2]; Lafleur, Martiniello and Rea, 2015[3]). From the 1960s until the mid-1970s, Belgian migration policy actively recruited low-skilled migrants from Southern Europe and later from North Africa and Türkiye to work in heavy industry sectors. Wallonia (the southern region of Belgium) represented the most important destination of immigration in that period, but many migrants were also contracted by the metal and mining industries of Limburg (one of five Flemish provinces). Immigration was exceptionally high in the early 1960s when, due to articulated labour shortages, migration was no longer restricted through work permits, and migrant workers were allowed to settle under tourist visas, with regularisation typically after medical screening. Due to the economic decline in reaction to the oil crisis in the late 1960s, labour migration decreased substantially, ultimately leading to a migration stop in 1974. Net migration fell sharply in the 1980s and even became negative, but Flanders never ceased to be a region of immigration. Labour migration continued but was controlled through the selective granting of work permits for highly educated profiles. Family reunification and family migration became the most important entry channels into Flanders. The late 1990s witnessed an increase of immigration (see Figure 2.3) and a diversification of origin countries, resulting from the free movement of individuals within the EU (Schengen treaty), continued family reunification and marriage migration, but also student and labour migration, accompanied by fluctuations in the number of asylum seekers and refugees. From the 1990s onwards, immigration flows to Belgium have increasingly affected Flanders, mainly due to Flanders’ more favourable economic situation. Since the 2000s, immigration to Flanders accounted for about half of the total inflow to Belgium. The increase in immigration from countries that joined the EU after 2004 represents the most impactful change in the Flemish immigration landscape since the 1990s. Other critical evolutions were a decrease in immigration from Western European countries, a significant reduction in immigration from Morocco and Türkiye, and an increase in asylum migration from Western Asia, particularly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Figure 2.3. Throughout the 20th century, Flanders increasingly became an immigration society

During the 2011-20 period, an average of 37 000 new permanent migrants settled in Flanders each year. Close to 60% of permanent inflow were made up of EU nationals who migrated under the framework of the free movement of workers, a high share in international comparison (see Figure 2.4). The top nationalities of EU immigrants were Romania (21%), the Netherlands (21%), Poland (15%) and Bulgaria (9%). Nearly six in ten EU immigrants were men.

The relative importance of migration for work-related reasons was comparatively small in Flanders (only in Belgium as a whole and Switzerland it was less important). Nevertheless, the number of incoming non-EU labour migrants is rising, with the share of work-related migration in the total permanent inflow increasing from 3% in 2011 to 5% in 2020 (see Box 2.4). Twenty-nine percent of the labour migrants coming to Flanders were born in India. Other important source countries were the United States (7%), Türkiye (7%) and Japan (5%).

Figure 2.4. Free mobility has constituted the main channel of immigration to Flanders

Family migration, composed of those who already have a family and those who want to establish a family, stood for 20% of the permanent inflow during the 2011-20 period. While migration for family reasons constituted the primary entry channel for non-EU immigrants in Flanders, its relative importance was lower than in many other European OECD countries, especially compared to Belgium as a whole. The origin of family migrants clearly reflects previous labour and humanitarian inflows, with Morocco, Türkiye, India, and more recently Afghanistan and Syria as main origin countries. While men accounted for the bulk of labour migrants (74%), most of those coming to join a family member were women (66%).

Finally, 16% of permanent immigration flows to Flanders were made up of humanitarian migrants, a much higher share than in many EU countries, including Belgium. Of the countries shown in Figure 2.4, only Sweden and Germany recorded a higher humanitarian share than Flanders. The main origin countries of humanitarian migrants were Syria (18%), Afghanistan (16%), Iraq (12%) and Somalia (5%). Men made up the majority (69%) of humanitarian migrants between 2011 and 2020.4

Box 2.2. Inflows of asylum seekers and refugees

It was not until 1990 that the number of asylum seekers became important in Flanders. As statistics on asylum seekers are not available for Flanders, this report uses Belgium’s asylum statistics. Asylum applications for Belgium peaked particularly in 1993 (34 000), 2000 (55 000), 2011 (32 000), 2015 (45 000) and 2022 (37 000). The fall of the communist regimes, the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo drove the peak in the number of asylum requests in 1993. The peak in 2000 resulted from conflicts in Kosovo , the resurgent struggle in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the second war in Chechnya. The peak in 2011 was primarily made up of asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Guinea, Iraq and Russia, but inflows from the Balkan countries remained important. In 2015, asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan accounted for 63% of the applications, followed by Somalia and Russia. According to recent figures, the number of applications has reached a new height in 2022. More than 36 000 applications were registered, with Afghanistan, Syria, Palestine, Burundi and Eritrea leading the top ten of applicants’ countries of origin.

Over the past decade, according to Eurostat statistics, Belgium has been at the top of EU countries taking in the most asylum seekers compared to its population (ranging between the 6^th and 12^th place). In 2021, asylum applications lodged in Belgium accounted for 3.6% of the total number of asylum requests registered in the EU. With 1.7 applicants per 1 000 inhabitants, Belgium was eighth on the list of EU Member States taking in the most asylum seekers in that year (Eurostat; European Migration Network, 2022[5]). However, not all persons who applied for international protection were granted that protection. Of the asylum decisions made in 2021, 44% were positive, which is higher than the overall EU recognition rate (34%). Nine in ten decisions recognised refugee status, whereas one in ten decisions granted subsidiary protection status. Resettlement of refugees is uncommon in Flanders and Belgium (with 949 persons in 2021). Despite their visibility in the media, refugee inflows still represent a small share of total immigration in Belgium. In 2016, for example, when the number of recognitions was at its peak, persons who got a positive decision on their asylum request accounted for 12% of the total inflow (see Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5. Asylum seeking is modest in comparison to overall migration

Box 2.3. Inflows of refugees from Ukraine

Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which started on 24 February 2022, generated a historic mass flight. By mid-September 2022, close to 5 million individual refugees from Ukraine had been recorded across the EU and other OECD countries, out of whom about 4 million had registered for temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. While the neighbouring countries of Ukraine have received most of the refugees, high numbers have also found refuge in other OECD countries, including Belgium. Relative to the size of the population, flows to Belgium have been lower than those reported in Germany, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Denmark, but can match those in the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway (see Figure 2.6).

Prior to the war, Ukrainian nationals benefited from visa-free travel allowing them to enter Belgium without an entry visa and stay for up to 90 days within 180 days. On 24 February 2022, Belgium suspended the exit obligation, allowing Ukrainian citizens who were in Belgium on permits or visa-free visits set to expire to ask their municipalities to extend their stay. Following the activation of the European Temporary Protection Directive on 4 March 2022, Ukrainian citizens and other third country nationals with international protection or stateless person status residing in Ukraine before 24 February 2022 and their family members can apply for a residence permit in Belgium based on temporary protection.2

To apply for temporary protection, individuals must visit the registration centre set up by the Immigration Office in Brussels. After registering the identity and biometric data, the Immigration Office issues a temporary protection certificate (before 13 March, there was an intermediate step of “pre-registration”). With the certificate of temporary protection, the person can turn to their municipality. After a positive residence check, the municipality will register the person in the aliens’ register and issue an electronic A card. People who are granted temporary protection in Flanders have immediate access to temporary crisis housing, social assistance, education, and health insurance, as well as the right to work (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). They can also reunite with their family in Flanders.

Figure 2.6. So far, Belgium has received 4.8 refugees from Ukraine per 1 000 inhabitants

By 9 November, more than 60 000 persons from Ukraine had applied for temporary protection in Belgium (see Figure 2.7), of whom approximately six out of ten applied for status in the Flemish region. The number is thus already well above the 45 000 asylum seekers registered in the previous record year 2015 and highlights the need for rapid scale-up of Flanders’s reception and integration system (for further discussion, see Chapter 3).

Figure 2.7. Inflows peaked at 2000 on 15 March 2022 and declined progressively since then

As in other European OECD countries, arrivals from Ukraine to Belgium were predominantly women with children. Until mid-November, 33% of arrivals from Ukraine to Flanders were at most 17 years of age, 18% between 18 and 29, 27% between 30 and 44, and 21% above 45 years. Overall, 62% of arrivals from Ukraine were women.

Before the war, immigration from Ukraine to Flanders was relatively small-scale. Between 2005 and 2021, around 3 700 Ukrainian immigrants settled permanently in Flanders, accounting for 0.6% of the total inflow. The modest immigration from Ukraine to Flanders contrasts with a sizeable presence throughout the EU, where Ukrainians were the third-largest immigrant group in 2020, behind Moroccans and Turks.

← 1. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

2. People who are not eligible for the temporary protection are channelled into the asylum procedure, which remains also accessible for Ukrainian citizens who are eligible for, have applied for or received temporary protection. However, the examination of an application for international protection is suspended for as long as the temporary protection scheme is still in place.

Note: The term “refugee from Ukraine” is used in this report to refer to persons who are fleeing from Russia’s war against Ukraine and have obtained some sort of international protection, including not only formal refugee status (as per the Geneva Convention) but also subsidiary and temporary protection (as in the case of most refugees from Ukraine).

Source: Immigration from Ukraine to Flanders: OECD Secretariat based on Crossroads Bank for Civic Integration data.

The share of the immigrant population with (very) low levels of education is high

Education is central in determining immigrants’ integration outcomes (Damas De Matos and Liebig, 2014[7]; FPS Employment and Unia, 2022[8]). Over the past decade, the educational attainment of the foreign-born improved considerably in Flanders, primarily because new arrivals were better educated than their predecessors.5 Still, as shown by Corluy (2014[9]) based on Labour Force Survey data for Belgium, the positive upskilling trend among the foreign-born did not keep up with the native-born trend. Consequently, immigrants continue to lag far behind their native-born counterparts in terms of educational attainment. In 2020, 39% of non-EU immigrants in Flanders had at most a lower secondary level of education, compared to 15% of native-born and 22% of EU immigrants (see Figure 2.8). The share of highly educated non-EU immigrants was well below the EU average, and the gap vis-à-vis the native-born was particularly pronounced, with only Greece having a larger gap than Flanders. While migrant women have higher educational attainment than men, the gap vis-à-vis native-born women remains large in Flanders. Hence, the educational attainment of non-EU immigrants in Flanders is not favourable in international comparison and taking adult skill proficiency as a measure instead of educational qualifications yields a similar picture. Indeed, data from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) shows a low performance in literacy and problem-solving skills of immigrants in Flanders in international comparison (OECD, 2019[10]).

Figure 2.8. The educational attainment of non-EU immigrants is not favourable in international comparison

A specific challenge for Flanders is the high share of non-EU immigrants with only elementary levels of educational attainment. In 2020, one in five non-EU immigrants had attained at most primary education, compared to 3% of the native-born. Of the countries shown in Figure 2.9, only Germany and Belgium record a similarly high proportion of immigrants lacking basic skills.

Figure 2.9. The share of very low educated among non-EU immigrants is high

Box 2.4. Labour migration to Flanders

Historically, Belgium’s federal government has been responsible for developing immigration legislation and policy, including policies for admitting third-country nationals. The federal government is also competent for enforcing policies regarding the entry and stay of migrant workers. The federal Immigration Office is responsible for issuing visas and residence permits to third-country nationals. As of 1 July 2014, however, the competence over employment-based immigration policy got transferred to the regional governments. Hence, each regional government has full decision-making authority over all matters related to the employment of immigrants in its region, including the issuance of work permits.

Flanders issues more work permits than the other Belgian regions. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of working permits and single permits (combined working and residence permit) issued increased from 7 000 in 2014 to 10 800 in 2019. Figure 2.10 shows that highly skilled workers and managers accounted for most of the work permits issued before 2019. However, permits issued for bottleneck professions and specialisations have consistently increased in recent years, up to 16% of the total issued permits in 2021. In the past, the labour migration channel was predominantly reserved for highly educated workers, but since January 2019, the Flemish Government eased work authorisation requirements for medium-educated workers in bottleneck professions and technically skilled staff, exempting them from a local labour market test. At the same time, the government lowered minimum salary thresholds and increased the maximum validity of work authorisation from one year to three years for highly educated workers. As of October 2021, the Flemish Region processes all single permit applications via the digital platform “Working in Belgium” to improve co-ordination between the federal (in charge of the visa and residence permit) and the regional level (in charge of the work permit) and reduce processing times.

Figure 2.10. Labour migration has recently opened to medium-educated workers in bottleneck professions

Labour market integration of immigrants

Immigrants account for a high and rising share of the population (14% in 2021) and form an essential mainstay of the labour force in Flanders. Immigration has accounted for the bulk of population growth in Flanders since the turn of the millennium and can play an essential role in counterbalancing the adverse effects of ageing on the labour force. That is, if immigrants are socially and economically integrated (Neels et al., 2020[1]). Successful integration of immigrants may also bring benefits in other areas, such as sizeable fiscal gains from higher employment (National Bank of Belgium, 2020[11]; Damas de Matos, 2021[12]).

Despite significant policy efforts, Flanders continues to rank among the most paradoxical countries in the EU regarding facilitating access to paid employment and reducing the burden of welfare state costs associated with an ageing population. With an employment rate of 75% in 2021, Flanders fell far short of the employment rate of 80% and over in leading EU countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Denmark. Almost a third of the working-age population in Flanders was not at work in 2021. At the same time, the swelling number of unfilled vacancies, in combination with a historically low unemployment rate (3.9% in 2021), has led to an increasingly tight labour market (Van Impe et al., 2022[13]; OECD, 2022[14]). According to Eurostat statistics on job vacancies, the Czech Republic is the only country to surpass Flanders in terms of unmet labour demand. Across different sectors of the Flemish economy, employers relentlessly express anxiety about the imbalance between skills demand and supply, which in turn has prompted policy makers to promote and facilitate labour migration to solve those pressures. Yet, despite economic expansion and the creation of new jobs, Flanders continues to struggle with a persistently high inactivity rate (27% in 2021) and significant employment gaps for vulnerable groups. To catch up with the top European OECD countries, the Flemish Government has set the goal of increasing employment to 80%. Achieving this objective will largely depend on Flanders’ ability to lessen the ongoing differences in labour market opportunities across different population groups, notably between the foreign-born and the native-born (Vansteenkiste and Theunissen, 2022[15]).

Despite improvement, non-EU immigrants’ employment outcomes remain poor in international comparison

Moderate but sustained economic growth in recent years, along with a growing imbalance between labour supply and demand, seem to have finally created the conditions that led to a long-awaited catch-up of the foreign-born in the Flemish labour market. Between 2016 and 2021, immigrants’ employment rate increased from 60% to 67%. Because progress was more substantial among the foreign-born than among the native-born, the employment gap between the two populations shrank from 14 to 10 percentage points. At the same time, the unemployment rate of immigrants decreased from 12.2% in 2016 to 7.8% in 2021. Consequently, the unemployment gap vis-à-vis the native-born nearly halved over the same period, from 8.3 to 4.5 percentage points Few European OECD countries experienced a similar improvement in immigrant labour market outcomes over the 2016-21 period.

This marked improvement, however, masks persistent employment differentials by place of birth and sex in the Flemish labour market. Over the 2006-21 period, the labour market position of EU-born immigrants gradually converged towards that the native-born. In 2021, EU-born men had an employment rate 6 percentage points above native-born men, while EU-born women lagged 4 percentage points behind their native-born peers. Hence, EU immigrants now have relatively high employment levels in Flanders, also from an international perspective.

For immigrants born outside of the EU, the picture looks much bleaker, largely because of poor outcomes among women. Due to a surge in non-EU immigrants’ employment levels between 2016 and 2019, the employment gap vis-à-vis the native-born shrank from 21 percentage point to 15 percentage points However, the COVID-19 pandemic hit non-EU immigrant women particularly hard, wiping out most of the progress that was made (see Box 2.5). In 2021, the employment rate of non-EU immigrant men stood at 73%, only 5 percentage points below native-born men. In contrast, only 48% of the non-EU migrant women were in employment that same year, a staggering 27 percentage points behind native-born women. While Flanders’ performance regarding employment outcomes of male non-EU immigrants thus climbed towards the EU average, outcomes among female non-EU immigrants hardly improved and remain among the poorest in international comparison both in absolute and relative terms. Together with Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, Flanders displayed the largest employment gap between non-EU and native-born women in 2021 (see Figure 2.11).

Figure 2.11. The employment gap vis-à-vis the native-born remains particularly large among non-EU migrant women

Outcomes for unemployment and inactivity in Flanders are essentially similar. While gaps vis-à-vis the native-born were strongly reduced for EU immigrants (with EU-born men outperforming their native-born peers), there remains a significant gap for non-EU immigrants, primarily because of weak progress among non-EU immigrant women. In 2021, the share of unemployed persons in the working-age population stood at 7.1% and 2.7% for non-EU-born and native-born men, and at 6% and 1.9% for non-EU-born and native-born women (see Figure 2.12). Still, unemployment outcomes of non-EU immigrants in Flanders are, in absolute and relative terms, better than in many other European OECD countries (including Sweden, Finland and Norway) and better than the EU average.

High inactivity among foreign-born women merits particular attention

However, where Flanders really stands out in international comparison is the high share of non-EU migrant women who are not active in the labour market. In 2021, close to half of the non-EU migrant women (46%) in Flanders were not at work nor actively looking for a job (only Belgium as a whole performs worse). The labour market attachment of non-EU migrant women is thus of particular concern in Flanders.

Figure 2.12. The low labour market attachment of non-EU migrant women is of particular concern

Effective activation begins with an analysis of the reasons for inactivity. In most OECD countries, immigrant women are slightly more prone to involuntary inactivity than native-born women. In 2021, the proportions in Flanders were 12% versus 7%. Still, both immigrant and native-born women were much less likely to be involuntary inactive compared to their peers in other European OECD countries (see Figure 2.13). As a reason for being economically inactive and not wanting to work, migrant women (aged 25 to 54) cite family responsibilities (52%) more often than native-born women (18%) in Flanders. On the other hand, reasons such as illness and disability and education and training were more frequently cited among native-born women than among foreign-born women.

Figure 2.13. Only a small share of migrant women is involuntary inactive

The difference in the profile of economically inactive women according to migrant status is also reflected in the benefit structure. Figure 2.14 shows that inactive native-born women are more likely to receive pensions or allowances for illness or invalidity, whereas foreign-born women are more likely to be inactive without benefits. Age is a very important factor to consider in this regard, as native-born women who are inactive tend to be older than immigrant women (52 years on average for native-born women versus 38 for EU and 32 for non-EU immigrant women, respectively). Other factors, such as the presence of young children in the household also help explain the imbalanced benefit distribution by place of birth.

Figure 2.14. The share of inactive women who receive benefits is lower among migrant women

A study by the Flemish Policy Research Centre for Work confirms that migrant women are overrepresented in the potential labour reserve, which includes discouraged job seekers (i.e. people who are available to work but not seeking employment), unavailable job seekers (i.e. people who are seeking work but not immediately available), and employable inactive persons (i.e. people who are not seeking work or not available for work, because of family responsibilities and because appropriate childcare is lacking or too expensive) (Sourbron and Vansteenkiste, 2018[16]).

More recently, VDAB has studied the employment-related hurdles faced by migrant women and their daughters who were economically inactive, contrasting their outcomes with control groups of job seeking and working women. Based on a semi-structured survey (N=95), focus groups (N=68), and in-depth interviews (N=68), the study shows that family responsibilities, discrimination, and the lack of language or digital competencies were the most commonly perceived barriers to professional life for inactive women (see also (Elloukmani and Raeymaeckers, 2022[17])). Family commitments stood in the way of job seeking and employment for six out of ten inactive women (compared to 27% of job seeking women) and was further aggravated by the lack of suitable childcare and part-time employment options (for further discussion, see Chapter 4). Close to half of the inactive women had felt discriminated against during their past job search (compared to 27% of job seeking women). Furthermore, close to four in ten mentioned that wearing a headscarf constituted an important barrier to employment (close to half of the women wore a headscarf). The lack of digital competencies also represented a more considerable challenge among inactive women than among job seeking and working women, whereas language difficulties were equally important. Prior bad experiences in the labour market were an essential driver in these women’s decision not to work. In fact, most economically inactive women were “active” in various ways, with 85% taking care of their children or other people’s children, 65% following a training or course, and 54% doing volunteering. At the same time, 37% were not registered with the PES but actively searched for work through other channels, and another 37% were planning to search for employment in the future (VDAB, 2020[18]).

Box 2.5. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrant employment

Across the OECD, the initial impact of the pandemic on the labour market outcomes of immigrants has been disproportionately negative, essentially eliminating the progress observed over the previous decade. However, 2021 labour market data showed a return to or near pre-crisis levels for most countries, including Belgium (OECD, 2022[19]; FPS Employment and Unia, 2022[8]).

In Flanders, there is a strong gender dimension to how the COVID-19 pandemic affected immigrant employment (see Table 2.1). Between 2016 and 2019, migrant women experienced a more substantial boost in their employment levels than native-born women and migrant men. The favourable trend was particularly evident among women born outside the EU; their employment rate increased from 43% to 53%. Consequently, the employment gap vis-à-vis their native-born peers was reduced by 7 percentage points To compare, the employment rate of non-EU immigrant men increased from 65% to 71%, and the employment gap was reduced by 4 percentage points However, migrant women were also disproportionally hit by the COVID-19 crisis in Flanders, and their employment recovery was slower than that of their male counterparts. Consequently, in 2021, the employment gap between non-EU immigrant women and native-born women bounced back to the 2016 level, at 27 percentage points In contrast, the employment gap for immigrant men continued to decline towards 5 percentage points Unemployment and inactivity outcomes confirm the disproportional effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labour market position of migrant women in Flanders.

Table 2.1. Immigrant women’s employment has disproportionally suffered from the COVID-19 economic shock
Employment rate and employment gap vis-à-vis the native-born, by sex and place of birth, 2016-21, Flanders
		2016	2019	2020	2021
Employment rate
Men	Native-born	77.4	80.0	78.9	78.7
	EU-born	77.8	81.4	82.4	85.5
	Non-EU-born	64.7	71.1	71.4	73.4
Women	Native-born	70.4	73.6	73.5	74.9
	EU-born	65.2	71.6	70.7	70.6
	Non-EU-born	42.9	53.0	47.9	47.9
Employment gap vis-à-vis the native-born
Men	EU-born	0.4	1.4	3.5	6.8
Men	Non-EU-born	-12.7	-8.9	-7.5	-5.3
Women	EU-born	-5.2	-2.0	-2.8	-4.3
Women	Non-EU-born	-27.5	-20.6	-25.6	-27.0
Note: Population aged 20 to 64. A negative figure refers to a higher employment rate among the native-born than the foreign-born.
Source: OECD Secretariat calculations based on the national LFS.

The success of integration is highly correlated with the purpose for migration

As elsewhere in the OECD, labour market outcomes in Flanders also vary markedly by reason prompting the decision to migrate (FPS Employment; Unia, 2019[20]; Lens, Marx and Vujić, 2018[21]). Humanitarian migrants tend to face considerable barriers to integration, stemming from their migration being driven by push rather than pull factors. They often had little to no time to prepare for migration, are more likely to suffer from health conditions like post-migration stress or trauma and are further hampered by asylum seeker-specific obstacles such as legal restrictions to access the labour market, protracted asylum procedures and a temporary or insecure residency status. In contrast to labour migrants, who often already have an employer upon arrival, refugees also arrive without a job. Moreover, unlike family migrants, refugees often have no family links to their host country and more limited networks to orient themselves and access information (OECD, 2016[22]; Herman et al., 2014[23]).

More than those who migrate for other reasons, refugees face a unique set of integration challenges, which is reflected in their employment figures (see Figure 2.15). In contrast to labour migrants, who perform relatively well in the Flemish labour market, refugees and family migrants have poor employment outcomes in international comparison. In 2021, the employment rate of refugees living in Flanders stood at 50%, lagging 32 percentage points behind labour migrants and 9 percentage points behind family migrants, respectively. Clearly, there are many attributes (particularly duration of residence) highly correlated with the reason for migration that may be driving the disparities across countries. Therefore, Chapter 3 builds on administrative data to further investigate the process of labour market entry and long-term outcomes among humanitarian and family migrants.

Figure 2.15. Refugees have low employment rates in Flanders

Many non-EU immigrants never search for work in Flanders, and those who do take longer to find work than elsewhere

International evidence seems to indicate that migrants in Flanders face more barriers on their road to first employment than in many other European OECD countries. According to the 2021 ad hoc module of the European Labour Force Survey, close to one-third of non-EU immigrants in Flanders found their first job in less than six months, one of the lowest rates in international comparison (see Figure 2.16). Across the EU, half of non-EU immigrants only take up to five months to find a first job, and migrants are particularly fast in finding employment in the Netherlands and Portugal. At the same time, one in three non-EU migrants in Flanders never looked for a job, which is one of the highest shares recorded in the survey.

Figure 2.16. Migrants need more time to find a job in Flanders

The return to education plays out differently for immigrants and the native-born

Flanders has an internationally high share of low-educated non-EU immigrants and poorer educational attainment goes some way to explain the weak labour market integration of immigrants. Nevertheless, studies for Belgium show that socio-demographic (age, gender, region of residence and type of household) and human capital characteristics (educational attainment) account for only a limited part (less than 20%) of the employment gap between non-EU immigrants and the native-born (Corluy, 2014[9]; National Bank of Belgium, 2020[11]; High Council for Employment, 2018[24]).

Differences in the return on education for employment are a particularly relevant factor. Indeed, studies for Belgium show that a high level of education is less beneficial for immigrants than for the native-born, whereas a low level of education is less detrimental for immigrants (National Bank of Belgium, 2020[11]; Corluy, 2014[9]; FPS Employment and Unia, 2022[8]). One explanation is that immigrants are more active in low-skilled sectors and are more inclined to accept lower wages, which boosts their chances of getting a job. Labour Force Survey data for the year 2021 confirm that the foreign-born and native-born population with an equal level of education still face very different labour market outcomes in Flanders. For the native-born, the employment rate increases significantly when they obtain higher degrees: from 52% for the low-educated to 79% for the medium-educated (+27 percentage points) to 91% for the highly educated (+12 percentage points). For EU immigrants, on the other hand, the penalty for being low educated is lower, whereas the return to higher education is higher. Low-educated EU immigrants have an employment rate of 64% while that figure reaches 75% for the medium-educated (+11 percentage point) and 90% for the highly educated (+15 percentage points). But for non-EU immigrants, the return on education is worse, as they combine a similar penalty for a low level of education and a smaller premium for a higher level of education compared to the native-born: from 45% for the low-educated to 70% for the medium-educated (+25 percentage points) to 75% for the highly educated (+5 percentage points).

These different returns to education result in an employment penalty of 15 percentage points incurred by tertiary-educated immigrants born outside the EU compared to the native-born, a large gap in international comparison (see Figure 2.17). The lower employment levels of highly educated immigrants indicate the difficulty of transferring human capital acquired in the home country to the Flemish labour market. Indeed, virtually every labour market in the OECD discounts foreign tertiary degrees, and the Flemish labour market is no exception. The employment gap between highly educated immigrants educated in the host country and those educated abroad is 11 percentage point in Flanders, and it rises to 18 percentage points for non-EU migrants with foreign qualifications. These differences are larger than the EU average, yet not more pronounced than in Belgium as a whole or its neighbouring countries (the Netherlands, France, and Germany). What is more, given that highly educated immigrants who received their training in the host country still experience employment gaps with the native-born, it is clear that other forms of Flemish-specific human and cultural capital, including host country language proficiency, are instrumental for labour-market insertion.

Figure 2.17. The employment gap vis-à-vis the native-born is particularly pronounced among high-educated non-EU immigrants

For the low-educated in Flanders, the employment gap between immigrants and the native-born stood at 7 percentage points in 2021. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the comparatively small disparity in the employment levels of low-qualified immigrants and native-born in Flanders is also due to poor outcomes of the latter group. Recent OECD work has shown that the low-educated population faces significant challenges in the Belgian labour market (OECD, 2020[25]). In 2018, only 47% of the low-educated aged 20-64 were employed, compared to 52% in France, 61% in Germany, and 63% in the Netherlands. With an employment rate for the low-educated of 53%, Flanders performed slightly better than Belgium as a whole and France, but still lagged far behind Germany and the Netherlands.

The challenges for raising the employment rate of the low-educated in Flanders are likely to heighten in the future. Projections on future labour market demand indicate that employer demand for highly skilled workers will continue to increase whilst the demand for low-skilled workers is expected to drop significantly (by up to 7 percentage points between now and 2030) (OECD, 2020[25]). Trends of job polarisation, which result in the displacement of low-educated workers in low-skilled jobs by medium-educated workers, further compound these challenges (High Council for Employment, 2020[26]). Given that, in 2021, 31% of the low-educated in Flanders were foreign-born (compared to 35% for Belgium as a whole), immigrants represent a particularly vulnerable group requiring special attention.

Besides lower employment, immigrants have less favourable job characteristics

Immigrants in Flanders are not only less often in employment, but they also tend to face less favourable job characteristics. Studies for Belgium show that, compared to the native-born, immigrants are more likely to work in low-skilled jobs with less favourable working conditions, in temporary work, and in jobs below their level of qualification (Lens, Marx and Vujić, 2018[21]; FPS Employment and Unia, 2022[8]). The disadvantage is the largest for non-EU immigrants, but there are also critical gaps in average job characteristics between EU immigrants and native-born. The quality of the jobs immigrants get into make them more sensitive to economic fluctuations and explain why they have more volatile careers (High Council for Employment, 2018[24]; Lens and Oslejová, 2018[27]). At the same time, poor employment prospects may lead to a slight overall utility difference between employment and non-employment, encouraging some immigrants who are (or could have been) capable of supporting themselves through employment to rely on social benefits. The following section highlights immigrants’ job characteristics in Flanders in an international context.

Collectively bargained minimum wages are high in Flanders and due to the high coverage of collective agreements, they effectively act as minimum wage floors (Fernandez et al., 2020[28]). The incidence of low pay (the share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings) is therefore relatively modest in Flanders (11.5% in 2020) compared to the EU as a whole (15.8%) (OECD, 2022[29]). Still, the incidence of low pay is higher than in countries like France (9.5%), Denmark (8.7%) and the Netherlands (5.9%).

Figure 2.18 highlights the concentration of the foreign-born and the native-born in low-wage work. With over 46% of non-EU migrant workers working for a gross monthly wage in the lowest quartile of the wage distribution, concentration in Flanders is higher than in most other countries with a minimum wage – such as the United Kingdom, Portugal, the Netherlands and France. As foreign-born workers (especially the low-educated) are often concentrated in low-wage work in Flanders, they are likely disproportionately affected by minimum wages. While the national minimum wage does not appear high in Flanders compared to neighbouring countries, it is superseded by much higher sector minimum wages which apply to almost the entire workforce, due to high collective bargaining coverage (OECD, 2020[25]). While high minimum wages help to prevent in-work poverty, they can create a barrier to the employment of low-educated workers, especially for groups with further real or perceived productivity handicaps, such as immigrants (Pina, Corluy and Verbist, 2015[30]). As such, the willingness of employers to hire immigrants with poor language skills and additional training needs may be more limited in Flanders than elsewhere.

Where employer reluctance to hire foreign-born workers stems from concerns over productivity in the context of high minimum wages, labour market policies can overcome these demand side hurdles through employer incentives such as wage subsidies. Flanders has been among the OECD countries making the most use of this type of active labour market policies in recent years (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).

Figure 2.18. Non-EU immigrants are heavily concentrated in low-wage jobs

Despite having a relatively knowledge-intensive labour market (OECD, 2019[10]), Flanders’ share of low-skilled employment (9% in 2021) is more extensive than in many other European OECD countries, particularly compared to Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland and Germany (where it makes up between 3% and 7% of total employment). An explanation for the higher prevalence of menial jobs in Flanders is the heavily subsidised Service Voucher Scheme (see Chapter 5 for further information). This scheme has been shown to account for around one-third of the low-skilled jobs in Belgium (High Council for Employment, 2020[26]).

Figure 2.19 shows that immigrants are heavily concentrated in low-skilled jobs in Flanders. While just 7% of the native-born in Flanders worked in low-skilled employment in 2021, this share rises to 18% for EU immigrants and 26% for non-EU immigrants. At the other end of the labour market, nearly half of the employed native-born held highly skilled positions, compared to 43% of EU immigrants and 28% of non-EU immigrants. In international comparison, Flanders has one of the highest shares of non-EU immigrants in low-skilled jobs and one of the lowest shares in high-skilled jobs.

Figure 2.19. A relatively large share of immigrants works in occupations requiring lower skills

Across OECD labour markets, education acquired abroad is often strongly discounted (Damas De Matos and Liebig, 2014[7]). A typical consequence of this is formal over-qualification. Over-qualification among the foreign-born frequently occurs when – uncertain about the value of immigrants’ foreign qualifications – employers are unwilling to offer employment at a commensurate level. Immigrants who are pushed to find work quickly to become self-sufficient or to support a family are particularly vulnerable to getting stuck in a job for which they are overqualified. As in most European OECD countries, over-qualification is more widespread among immigrants than the native-born in Flanders (see Figure 2.20).6 In 2021, 41% of non-EU immigrants worked in jobs for which they were formally over-qualified, compared to 21% of their native peers. Over-qualification rates among EU-born immigrants (27%) are also higher than those of the native-born, though by much smaller margins. The over-qualification gap between the native- and foreign-born in Flanders is relatively large in international comparison and considerably larger than in Belgium as a whole.

As expected, recent migrants are particularly affected by over-qualification in Flanders, with a formal over-qualification rate 14 percentage points higher than that of settled migrants. However, even settled migrants who have been in Flanders for ten or more years are 9 percentage points more likely than the native-born to be overqualified.

Figure 2.20. When employed, the qualifications of immigrants often remain underused

The lack of Dutch language skills is the main obstacle to getting a suitable job

According the 2021 Ad Hoc Module of the Labour Force Survey, around 30% of the non-EU immigrants living in Flanders in 2021 reported obstacles in getting a suitable job. This share is higher than the EU total (27%), but still well below countries like Norway, Finland and Sweden (see Figure 2.21). In most of the European countries, the lack of host-country language skills was the most mentioned obstacle. However, in Flanders, the lack of host-country language skills is – both in absolute and in relative terms – particularly important, with close to 16% of the non-EU immigrants reporting it as the main obstacle to getting a suitable job. Finland is the only European country where this share stood higher.

Still, there were significant disparities by sex and place of birth in the share of immigrants reporting difficulty in finding suitable work in Flanders. Non-EU immigrants and migrant women clearly stood out as the most vulnerable groups. Among immigrants who had ever worked or looked for a job in Flanders, the share who reported that they faced obstacles in getting a suitable job was three times higher among non-EU immigrants than EU immigrants. Moreover, 26% of migrant women said that they faced obstacles in the Flemish labour market, compared to 19% of men. While the lack of Dutch language skills was the most mentioned obstacle amongst all migrant groups, migrant women seemed to face this problem more often than men. The lack of recognition of a formal qualification obtained abroad, discrimination on the grounds of foreign origin, and the restricted right to work because of citizenship or residence permit prerequisites were other often-cited labour market obstacles for non-EU immigrants.

Figure 2.21. The lack of host-country language skills is a more critical obstacle to getting a suitable job in Flanders than in other countries

Immigrants are overrepresented in atypical work

In addition to earnings and job skill levels, non-standard work constitutes an essential dimension of employment. In international comparison, Flanders has a low rate of temporary employment but a high rate of part-time employment (Nautet and Piton, 2019[31]). Like most European OECD countries, immigrants in Flanders are hired on temporary contracts far more often than the native-born. In 2021, 8% of EU immigrants and 11% of non-EU immigrants in employment were working on temporary contracts, whereas the proportion of the native-born working on such contracts was just 6%.

Flanders does not stand out as an outlier in the extent to which foreign-born workers are employed on temporary contracts, rather to the contrary. Still, the relatively strict employment protection legislation for permanent employment means that temporary work may be particularly important to help new arrivals gain a foothold in the Flemish labour market (OECD, 2020[25]). The use of temporary contracts has increased substantially over the past decade (Nautet and Piton, 2019[31]), and the prevalence of new arrivals on this type of contract may also (partly) reflect this institutional evolution. Indeed, in 2021, 16% of recent migrants worked in temporary contracts in Flanders, which is more than twice as high as the share among their peers with more than ten years of residence (7%). As such, temporary work may provide new arrivals with a steppingstone into permanent work (for further discussion, see Chapter 5).

In international comparison, part-time work among employed women is relatively widespread in Flanders. In most European OECD countries (except for the Netherlands and Switzerland), foreign-born women have higher rates of part-time work than native-born women and this is also the case in Flanders. In 2021, around 47% of immigrant women (50% when born in a non-EU country) and 42% of the native-born women were part-timers. As in many other European OECD countries, involuntary part-time work is higher among foreign-born women in Flanders. In 2021, 17% of part-time working immigrant women declared that they wished to work more hours, against 12% of the native-born.

Box 2.6. Data collection for monitoring integration of immigrants and their children in Flanders

Administrative data

In Belgium, the Flemish and the Federal Government collect administrative data that have resulted in elaborated databases to measure the integration of immigrants and their children, such as the Crossroads Bank for Social Security (Belgium), the Crossroads Bank for Civic Integration (Flanders), and AGoDi (Flanders). By request, these administrative (and survey) databases can be linked using the individual national registration number.

The National Register is the main source for population and migration data in Belgium. It includes the population register (Belgians and foreigners with a permanent residence permit) and the register of aliens (foreigners with temporary residence permit for more than 3 months). Both registers contain data registered at the local level by cities and municipalities. The National Register also includes the waiting register in which asylum seekers are registered by the Service of Foreign Affairs (for further information, see Chapter 3). Based on the National Register, Statistics Belgium (Statbel) calculates the official population figures and international migration data.

The Crossroads Bank for Social Security is a key source for detailed longitudinal monitoring and evaluation research on integration of immigrants and their children in Belgium. For all inhabitants who are registered in the National Register, the data warehouse labour market and social protection of the Crossroads Bank provides detailed information at the individual and household level on the place of residence, (first) nationality and country of birth (also of parents and grandparents), immigrants’ category of entry, demographic information, socio-economic situation (unemployment, social assistance, retirement, sickness, invalidity and disability, and child allowances, measures to enhance the labour market participation and specific reductions of social security contributions), labour market situation (wages, employer and sector, social security contributions, labour regime), socio-economic mobility (trends in labour regime and activity and employment rate), and level of education. The Data Warehouse does not yet include direct information on participation in civic integration and public employment service measures. Furthermore, because the Crossroads Bank for Social Security is a collection of administrative data from different governmental departments, its data only becomes available with a delay of one or two years.

The Crossroads Bank for Civic Integration of the Agency for Home Affairs of the Flemish Government is an internal database containing information delivered by the integration agencies. The Crossroads Bank for Civic Integration works as client tracking system with data on the civic integration trajectory (including Dutch-as-a-second language training) and background characteristics (e.g. birth nationality, category of entry) of migrants following a civic integration process. It forms the main instrument for systematic monitoring of civic integration in Flanders. Based on this data, the administration allocates financial means to the integration agencies.

The AGoDI Database of the Flemish Department of Education and Training provides information on the educational track, school careers, delays in school trajectories, dropout rates, the number, age, and nationality of students in reception education, and the transition of these newly arrived minors to mainstream education. The data allow to systematically evaluate the outcomes of cohorts of students on a longitudinal basis. A limitation, however, is that native-born children of immigrants can only be identified through a proxy of the spoken language at home.

Finally, the Flemish PES VDAB has an internal database containing information on all persons registered as job seekers, including their unemployment trajectory (inflow and outflow), background characteristics (e.g. educational level, language skills), and participation in activation measures (e.g. classroom training, workplace training, job search assistance, vocational language training).

Monitoring instruments

Consistent with the decentralisation the integration policy, monitoring and evaluation of integration are primarily carried out at the regional level. However, the federal government still has important instruments to support and monitor the integration policies of the regions. Notably, every two years, the Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue and Unia undertake the Socio-Economic Monitoring; a state of integration of immigrants and their children in the Belgian labour market (including figures split by region) based on aggregated data drawn from the Crossroads Bank for Social Security.

At the regional level, the report Social position and participation of people of foreign origin by Statistics Flanders started in 2013 and systematically generates administrative and statistical data on migration and integration processes (linked to the themes of work, education, income, housing, health, and social participation) in Flanders. The Living together in Diversity survey is a large-scale survey conducted in 2017 and 2022 by the Agency for Home Affairs among approximately 5 000 people of Belgian, Moroccan, Turkish, Polish, Romanian, Congolese and Afghan parentage living in Flanders and Brussels. Additionally, in 2022, the Agency for Home Affairs conducted for the first time the Barometer Living Together, which surveys people of Belgian, EU and non-EU parentage about themes including citizenship, social networks, and equal treatment.

Finally, at the local level, the Local Integration Scan (part of the City and Municipal Monitor) gathers administrative data on the size and structure of immigrant populations and their native-born offspring for each of the Flemish municipalities. In addition, a selection of indicators charts the socio-economic position of immigrants and their offspring in terms of work, education, income, housing, and social participation, based on administrative data and citizen surveys.

Integration policy evaluation

Despite the need for evidence-based integration and labour market policy, comprehensive evaluations of the process, output, outcome, or impact of integration measures based on certain criteria of efficiency or effectiveness are – in comparison to the monitoring initiatives – not yet systematically embedded in Flanders.

University centres that were selected by the Flemish Government to evaluate the Flemish integration policy have been able to develop cross-domain microdata by connecting several administrative databases (De Cuyper, Vandermeerschen and Kuppens, 2017[32]; De Cuyper, Lambert and Pauwels, 2010[33]; De Cuyper, 2016[34]; Vandermeerschen et al., 2017[35]; Wood and Neels, 2020[36]). However, these processes have proven time-consuming and cumbersome. Given that high-quality administrative data on migration, integration, education and training, and job placement (all competencies in the remit of the Flemish Government) are available in Flanders, it seems highly appropriate to proceed with a structural integration of these data infrastructures in the short term. Such an administrative socio-economic panel would enable a continuous monitoring of integration outcomes and evaluation of policy interventions (Neels and Wood, 2019[37]).

Source: https://www.vlaanderen.be/publicaties/maatschappelijke-positie-en-participatie-van-personen-van-buitenlandse-herkomst; https://gemeente-‌stadsmonitor.vlaanderen.be/jouw-gemeentescan; https://samenleven-in-diversiteit.vlaanderen.be/; https://www.barometersamenleven.be/.

Development of integration policy

From a selective and voluntary reception policy towards a general and obligatory civic integration programme

During the past decades, OECD countries have responded to increasing immigration flows by designing and implementing integration and civic integration policies (OECD, 2023[38]). Compared to other North-West-European countries, Belgium has long been characterised by a lack of coherent integration policies (Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019[39]; Noppe et al., 2018[40]). Until the early 1980s, in the absence of a coherent political vision on integration, most of the integration support came from civil society organisations. The latter organised language classes, assisted in finding accommodation and set up various local experiments and projects related to reception policy for new arrivals. Between 1980 and 1990, after shifting integration to the regional level (see Box 2.7), civil and state actors collaborated closely to establish an integration policy in Flanders. Since then, new policy priorities have reformed the integration sector, shifting integration responsibilities from civil actors to the state. Throughout the 1990s, the Flemish Government created long-term project funds for civil initiatives and municipalities to develop local integration policies, which led to growing professionalism and specialisation of integration services.

By 2003, the formal integration policy in Flanders took shape (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009[41]; Noppe et al., 2018[40]; De Cuyper, Lambert and Pauwels, 2010[33]). The Act on the Flemish Civic Integration Policy (inburgeringsbeleid), which was adopted by the Flemish Parliament in 2003 and fully implemented one year later, was modelled after the Netherlands. The policy’s cornerstone was a training programme and one-on-one counselling for newly arrived migrants. The programme focused on proficiency in Dutch and generally – but not necessarily – consisted of Dutch language courses, lessons of introduction to Flemish society and democratic values, and some help for accessing the labour market (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). Reception offices (three urban and five provincial) were the central providers and they co-operated with the municipalities, the Dutch language houses (who co-ordinated the organisation of language courses), Dutch language training providers and the Flemish Public Employment Service (PES) for the implementation of the programme.

The programme’s target group has always been broader than the group obliged to undertake tuition. From 2004 onwards, the civic integration track became compulsory for refugees and for non-EU immigrants married to a non-EU national. Based on international regulations and European legislation, citizens of the European Economic Area and their spouses, children and parents are not compelled but entitled to go through a civic integration process. New arrivals aged 65 and older or seriously ill or disabled are also exempt from the requirement. Since its adoption, the Civic Integration Act was amended in 2006, 2008 and 2012, mainly to broaden the target group of the civic integration policy to other categories of newly arrived migrants, long-standing immigrants who receive social benefits or social housing, and even the native-born with immigrant parents. However, few long-standing migrants and native-born took up the programme, and from 2013 onwards, the focus moved back to new arrivals. The 2006 amendments additionally placed more emphasis on sanctions. Since 2009, a sanction system of administrative fines between EUR 50 and 5 000 is in place in case of non-participation when required, irregular participation, or not accomplishing the integration track without a valid reason (in practice, the fine is often around EUR 100).

As a result of higher immigration inflows and the programme’s maturation, the number of civic integration participants (inburgeraars) went from 8 000 to 20 000 between 2005 and 2014, while funding for the reception offices went from EUR 9 million to 36 million over the same period. The average cost per person finishing the civic integration training stood at EUR 2 400 in 2014 (Court of Auditors, 2020[42]).

Box 2.7. The political context of Belgium and the role of the federal government regarding integration issues

In most OECD countries, responsibilities for integration are shared by several actors, which has often resulted in a certain complexity of the structures for integration. In Flanders, this complexity is particularly pronounced due to Belgium’s federal structure (Martiniello, 2013[43]). Although Belgium is a relatively small country – with a little over 30 000 square kilometres and 11.6 million inhabitants, its historical north-south divide has led to a rather complex state structure. The country gradually transformed its unitary state into a federal one during six state reforms between 1970 and 2014, and it currently has three levels of government: a federal level, a linguistic level (the Dutch-speaking community, the French-speaking community, and the German-speaking community), and a regional level (the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region, and the Region of Brussels Capital). Every community and every region have their own government, complementary to the federal one. However, because the Flemish community and region largely overlap (except for the Flemish-speaking population in the bilingual city of Brussels), the Flemish community and regional governments have merged. That leaves the country with six governments and the same number of parliamentary assemblies. Post-1993 state reforms brought down a significant number of responsibilities from the federal to the lower levels. Integration policy has followed this trend; the lion’s share of responsibilities now lies with the communities. Consequently, legal aspects, practices, policies and budgets attributed to integration differ considerably from one entity to the other (Adam, 2013[44]; Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2009[41]).

Nevertheless, the federal government remains an essential player via its control over immigration and asylum policy and through various competencies, such as social security (unemployment benefits), taxation and employment regulations. Furthermore, the federal level houses anti-discrimination responsibilities (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).

Co-operation between the various policy levels does not always run smoothly for various reasons. To co-ordinate the policy of the federal government and the federated states, an Inter-Ministerial Conference was established in February 2021. To support a comprehensive and coherent integration policy across policy levels, the Inter-Ministerial Conference seeks to offer a consultation platform where issues that fall under different competencies and policy levels can be debated. A working group made up of representatives of the different governments tasked with policies that pertain to migration and integration will prepare the consultations.

Further changes centralised and professionalised integration policies

A structural reform laid down in the Integration and Civic Integration Act of June 2013 further centralised the integration landscape (Noppe et al., 2018[40]; Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015[45]). One of the most critical aspects of the 2013 Act concerned the creation of an autonomous government-controlled Agency for Integration and Civic Integration (Agentschap Integratie en Inburgering), as well as two local agencies for the cities of Ghent (IN-Gent) and Antwerp (Atlas). In 2015, all existing institutions and organisations of the integration sector (the centre of expertise on Migration and Integration, the reception offices, the integration centres, the Houses of Dutch, and the social services providing translation and interpretation) were merged and integrated into one agency, to improve co-ordination and achieve efficiency gains.

However, the move toward a centralised integration agency did not always go hand in hand with better co-ordination and efficiency, notably in small municipalities. In a recent report prepared for the Flemish Parliament, the Belgian Court of Auditors (2020[42]) showed that, while the reform was supposed to be budgetary neutral, the integration agencies were much more expensive than the former integration sector. Throughout the 2015-18 period, subsidies rose from EUR 35 to 43 million. As a result, between 2017 and 2019, the agencies underwent a significant restructuring including numerous layoffs and budget cuts. According to the Court of Auditors, part of these budgetary problems could have been avoided through better management of the agencies’ financial plan and staff. Challenges are also partly structural, as the financing model is not fully adapted to the agencies’ needs. It was based on a subsidy at the end of year based on the number of civic integration contracts in that year, which did not allow for a flexible response to the strongly fluctuating workload. Following the Court of Auditors’ report, the agencies now receive a subsidy based on the number of civic integration contracts and Dutch as a second language (Dutch L2) intakes in the year 2019, which is an important step forward.

Another modification concerns the level of Dutch that is aimed for at the end of the civic integration track. In 2014, this was raised from level A1 (i.e. breakthrough or beginner) of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) to level A2 (i.e. waystage or elementary). Additionally, the obligation to participate was replaced by an expectation to produce results. Before, one was obliged to attend Dutch classes, be present 80% of the time and thereby demonstrate the intention to learn Dutch. After the reform, not only attendance is obligatory, but to receive the attestation of civic integration, passing the exam of Dutch at CEFR level A2 is necessary. For illiterate integration participants, however, other targets apply (A1 written and A2 oral).

The emphasis increasingly shifted towards civic integration and language learning as a means for integration

In addition to the civic integration programme, which groups the instruments that explicitly enhance immigrants’ self-sufficiency, Flanders additionally advanced a broader-based integration policy, aimed at the mutual accommodation of immigrants and their receiving society (Noppe et al., 2018[40]). While civic integration was a direct competence of the Flemish Minister for Home Affairs, the integration policy was mainly realised through general measures within various policy areas of the Flemish Government. To streamline policies across different government departments and agencies, the 2013 Integration Act required every new legislation to publish a Horizontal Integration and Equal Opportunities Policy Plan, in which all agencies identify the planned steps to tackle integration issues. The Flemish Agency for Home Affairs co-ordinates, but each Agency is expected to contribute. Some horizontal co-ordination efforts were also taken up by the Flemish Committee for Integration Policy, headed by a Chief Diversity Officer with representatives from government agencies, local authorities, and interest groups. However, this committee was dissolved (and not replaced) in 2020, which led to a more splintered inter-agency exchange.

From 2014 onwards, policy makers’ emphasis shifted more and more towards civic integration and strengthening the knowledge of Dutch as a means for integration, and few structural actions on integration topics such as discrimination or anti-racism were developed in Flanders (Vandepol, Michielsen and De Cuyper, 2013[46]; Vandermeerschen, De Cuyper and De Rick, 2020[47]; Social and Economic Council of Flanders, 2016[48]). The fact that immigrants’ access to citizenship and social provisions and services was made dependent on their skills in Dutch is a clear consequence of this policy shift (Pulinx and Van Avermaet, 2015[45]). Migrants who want to apply for Belgian nationality need to prove, amongst other things, their societal integration (through a certificate that testifies to the successful completion of the integration programme, a domestic degree of upper secondary level or above, or a five-year continuous employment period) and their competence in one of the official Belgian languages (Dutch, French and German) at CEFR level A2. In addition, eligibility for social housing in Flanders has been made dependent on candidates’ proven knowledge of Dutch at CEFR level A2 (oral). Migrants who receive social security benefits but lack the necessary Dutch language skills (often based on the judgment of social service assistants) can also be obliged to take up language tuition. Finally, social services, such as the Public Centres for Social Welfare (PCWS), started monitoring immigrants’ attendance in language classes, and non-attendance or insufficient attendance sometimes leads to temporary discontinuation of social assistance benefits.

Recent reforms have made civic integration much more demanding

The redrafted Integration and Civic Integration Act, which was adopted by the Flemish Parliament in July 2021 and (will be) gradually implemented over the 2022-23 period, substantially modifies the organisation of the civic integration programme. This section provides an overview of the main changes this Act introduces, but Chapter 2 offers a more in-depth discussion.

The first round of policy adjustments went into effect in March 2022. First, the civic integration programme’s target group is defined more strictly. Asylum seekers with a pending request for international protection no longer qualify for the integration programme (before, they were entitled to participate four months after they lodged their asylum application). Also caravan dwellers and persons without legal residence are no longer explicitly subject of the integration policy. Second, the civic integration track is expanded with a third pillar: a compulsory registration at the Flemish PES for all working-age immigrants who have the right to work within two months after signing an integration contract. Before the reform, integration agencies referred only a small share of the integration participants (mainly those with a “professional perspective”) to the PES. Third, expectations of formal language learning after the integration track are heightened. Immigrants who have completed their integration training and are unemployed will need to independently acquire an oral competence of Dutch at CEFR level B1 (i.e. threshold or intermediate) within two years and prove this competence by showing attestation or taking a test. Only persons who worked or studied continuously for six months during the 24 months after finishing the integration track are exempted, as well as persons with limited learning capacities (i.e. who are physically or mentally unable to obtain an oral competence of Dutch at CEFR level B1). Fourth, the result requirements of the integration programme are tightened. For civic orientation and Dutch L2, passing a course is evaluated by a combination of process evaluation (i.e. active and consistent attendance in class, task completion) and taking a standardised test. Sanctions are imposed for test failures in case of irregular participation. While the Dutch L2 test will be implemented in September 2023, the civic orientation test was formally introduced in March 2022.

In January 2023, another important modification will come into effect. The civic integration programme is expanded with a fourth pillar: a social networking and participation project. In addition to the first three pillars (civic orientation, Dutch L2, and registration at the PES), the new pillar offers newly arrived migrants a tailor-made programme of 40 hours to strengthen their social network and to enable participation in society. The programme can be a buddy project, (language) internship in a company, association or local government, volunteer work, and community work. Local governments are a priority partner for this part of the civic integration programme, as they are required to facilitate access to a diverse set of participation initiatives.

Finally, from September 2023 onwards, integration training will no longer be free of charge. Immigrants will be expected to pay EUR 360 for integration measures (EUR 90 for language and civic orientation courses and EUR 90 per examination). However, some groups of immigrants entitled to participate in the programme will be exempted from payment, as well as integration participants who reside in Brussels.7

The integration sector, the Flemish social partners and a variety of civil society actors have expressed concerns that the revised Integration Act will impose additional challenges on newly arrived migrants, first and foremost by asking a financial contribution for integration training (Social and Economic Council of Flanders, 2021[49]; Flemish Educational Council, 2021[50]). The introduction of fees, as noted by the Flemish Education Council (Vlaamse Onderwijsraad), conflicts with the 2018 Adult Education Funding Act. This Act lowered and, in some cases, even abolished the education enrolment fee for vulnerable groups. It also introduced the contractual obligation for the PES to provide its services to job seekers without charge. Another concern expressed by the social partners is the discontinuation of the refund policy for integration participants’ transport and childcare expenses (since March 2022), formerly facilitating participation in the integration training, particularly of migrant mothers (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).

Other parts of the new Integration Act, notably the two new integration pillars, have been received positively (Social and Economic Council of Flanders, 2021[49]; Flemish Educational Council, 2021[50]). The compulsory registration at the Flemish PES is expected to boost and accelerate immigrants’ attachment to the labour market. The introduction of a networking programme is generally considered as an innovative and promising project, and many actors are looking forward to seeing its potential results. While similar projects exist in other OECD countries, they are not usually an integral part of the civic integration track (Reidsma and De Cuyper, 2021[51]).

Key actors in integration policy

Many actors are involved in shaping integration policy at all levels

Flemish integration policy is developed in different departments and agencies of the Flemish Government.8 The primary responsibility for integration lies with the Integration unit of the Agency for Home Affairs (Agentschap Binnenlands Bestuur). The Integration unit sets up a regulatory framework, co-ordinates the horizontal equal opportunities and integration policy, co-operates with international stakeholders, monitors the implementation of integration policy, supports scientific research and data collection, and initiates and finances innovative projects or organisations at the local level. It also works closely together with the executive agencies who are tasked with the implementation of integration policies, as well as other Departments (e.g. Work and Social Economy) and (semi-)public agencies (e.g. VDAB).

Three executive agencies implement ministerial policies on integration; IN-Gent for the city of Ghent, Atlas for the city of Antwerp and the Agency for Integration and Civic Integration for the remaining parts of Flanders and the Dutch-speaking community of Brussels (hereafter the report uses “integration agencies” to refer to all three agencies). For scale, in 2020, IN-Gent issued 7% of the civic integration certificates, Atlas 21%, and the Agency for Integration and Civic Integration 72%. Based on the distribution of the number of integration contracts signed, the Agency for Home Affairs funds all three agencies, and the cities of Antwerp and Ghent additionally support Atlas and IN-Gent. In 2018, the Agency for Integration and Civic Integration had more than 500 employees and a budget of EUR 53 million (Court of Auditors, 2020[42]). Notwithstanding some minor discretionary space to adapt to local circumstances, the three agencies work in a similar vein. Their primary responsibilities are organizing civic integration training, offering social translation and legal services, and supporting local authorities in developing integration-related initiatives. Integration agencies do not provide language classes themselves but look for the course and provider that offers the best fit for the migrant (for further discussion, see Chapter 3). The agencies also have a co-ordinating role in the provision of language training, amongst others by ensuring that the supply and demand of language courses are aligned.

The Department of Education and Training (Departement Onderwijs en Vorming) is involved in integration in multiple ways. First, the Department is a major player in offering formal education and Dutch L2 training. The 48 Centres for Adult Education (Centra voor Volwassenonderwijs) support the development of a wide range of skills, such as technical skills and languages, in modular and flexible formats (e.g. evening courses). Adults can also obtain a secondary education degree in these centres through “second chance education”. The 13 Centres for Adult Basic Education (Centra voor Basiseducatie) provide courses in basic skills (e.g. numeracy or digital skills) and Dutch L2, which is their most popular course by a large margin. The Department of Education and Training is also responsible for integrating newly arrived minors through the organisation of reception classes (Onthaalonderwijs voor anderstalige kinderen, OKAN). Finally, the Agency for Higher Education, Adult Education, Qualifications and Study Grants (Agentschap voor Hoger Onderwijs, Volwassenenonderwijs, Kwalificaties en Studietoelagen, AHOVOKS) runs the National Academic Recognition Information Centre (NARIC) which is in charge of the diploma recognition process. NARIC Flanders is a part of the broader NARIC network of organisations that compare academic qualifications across the EU and of the ENIC network that UNESCO and the Council of Europe spearhead with the same goal. Next to diploma recognition, AHOVOKS also has a programme for the Accreditation of Prior and Experiential Learning (Erkennen van verworven competenties, EVC) for immigrants and native-born to formally certify skills for which no diploma has been acquired.

The Flemish employment policy vis-à-vis immigrants has traditionally purported to sustain integration policy. The Department of Work and Social Economy (Departement Werk en Sociale Economie) prepares and monitors all policies related to the labour market and therefore, also deals with the integration of immigrants and their offspring. The Department additionally manages the European Social Fund (ESF) in Flanders, which funds innovative initiatives to tackle a range of social issues, including integration. Some policies, such as dual learning, are shared responsibilities between the Department of Education and Training and the Department of Work and Social Economy.

The Flemish public employment service VDAB (Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en Beroepsopleiding) is a central actor in the design and implementation of employment policies. VDAB is an external and autonomous agency under the supervision of the Flemish Minister for Work. It is managed by an independent executive board consisting of the Flemish social partners. More than 80% of the VDAB’s funding comes from the government budget, with additional funds from the European Social Fund and the organisation’s own resources. VDAB monitors the unemployed, assists them in their job search, and tries to increase their “employability” by offering various training programmes to remedy potential skill deficits. VDAB offers its services to all job seekers and employees in Flanders and not just immigrants, but it did gradually tailor its offer to immigrants, amongst others by setting up language training that combines classroom instruction with workplace experience (see Chapter 4 for further discussion). Flanders operates a relatively centralised PES, meaning that targets and performance measurements are set centrally based on the management agreement between the VDAB and the Flemish Government. However, local VDAB offices can implement and use the centrally provided measures with a certain degree of autonomy. VDAB has been designated as “labour market director”, meaning that it must stimulate collaboration with other labour market actors and create partnerships to align different services with each other. For example, VDAB works closely with employers, sectoral groups, and adult education centres to supply training to job seekers. Moreover, agreements with the integration agencies were struck to safeguard a smoother referral of newly arrived migrants to career guidance, job search programmes, and vocational training (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).

Another important actor is the Flemish Agency for Entrepreneurial Training Syntra (Vlaams Agentschap voor Ondernemingsvorming) which provides non-formal education (entrepreneurial training, sectoral training, and additional specialised training) to both immigrant and native-born clients.

While many policies relevant for immigrant integration are decided at the regional level, integration essentially happens at the local level. Municipalities and cities play a key role in welcoming and guiding immigrants when they first arrive in Flanders but are also essential stakeholders as they have a certain discretion over fund allocation to implement regional policies or their own integration projects (soon this will include the fourth pillar of the civic integration programme). In Flanders, local perspectives are represented by the Association of Flemish Cities and Communities (Vereniging Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten).

Municipalities in Flanders also play an essential role through their responsibility for social assistance. The Public Centres for Social Welfare (Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn, OCMW) are local government agencies which provide social assistance to individuals, including income support and guidance to those with insufficient or no social security rights. All people residing legally in Flanders have the right to social assistance if they cannot provide for themselves, and immigrants are heavily overrepresented (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). The Public Centres for Social Welfare (PCWS) are regulated by the regions but administered locally, and the 2017 Act for Local Governance has interlinked them very closely with municipalities and cities. Funding comes from various sources, but the municipal subsidy and federal refunds are the most important. The Centres also play a role in labour market policy through social inclusion and support employment for those confronted with severe difficulties concerning labour market participation. They develop their own activation, training and employment policies and initiatives. This is easier for large offices with larger budgets (cities or municipalities provide the means) or those who have partnerships established than for small individual operating centres. Some larger PCWS have their own employment agency, while smaller ones must cluster to organise such an agency.

Finally, the Flemish Housing Agency (Agentschap Wonen Vlaanderen) – part of the Flemish Ministry for Environment – offers another form of social assistance: it helps those in need with social housing or rental allowances.

Social partners are highly involved in integration policy

Flanders has a strong tradition of consensus-based decision-making in concertation with the government and its social partners. The tripartite discussion between government, employers, and labour within the Flemish Economic and Social Consultation Committee (Vlaams Economisch Sociaal Overlegcomité, VESOC) is an essential pillar of all Flemish policy making and integration policy. Two independent advisory councils exert a strong influence on the government’s approach to integration policy. The Flemish Education Council (Vlaamse Onderwijs Raad, VLOR) provides the Department of Education and Training with advice on all preliminary decrees related to educational matters. The Educational Council has different sub-councils for different levels of education, including one for lifelong (language) learning. Each council is composed of a wide range of stakeholder representatives (e.g. students, socio-cultural organisations, principals, VDAB, SYNTRA).

A second advisory council is the Social and Economic Council of Flanders (Sociaal Economische Raad van Vlaanderen, SERV). It negotiates agreements, conducts research, drafts reports, and provides advice to the Flemish Government a wide range of policy issues, including integration. The Social and Economic Council is composed of representatives of social partners (employers, unions). While the advice of these councils is non-binding, they have considerable influence on policy decisions.

Flanders has an active approach consulting civil society and immigrant organisations

In Flanders, most integration measures and support are funded and provided by the government. This sets Flanders apart in international comparison where non-governmental organisations often provide (though not necessarily fund) integration services (OECD, 2023[38]). While the Flemish Government – at all levels – continues to be the most important actor, civil society actors form an integral part of the integration sector. Already in 2000, the Flemish Government recognised the Minorities Forum, now known as LEVL, as an official discussion partner on all issues affecting immigrants and their children. LEVL is a network and participation organisation representing immigrants and their native-born offspring. The organisation offers policy advice and community outreach and is regularly consulted by the Flemish Minister for Home affairs, when drafting policy.

Because of Belgium’s rather complex institutional structure and the wide range of stakeholders involved, the activities of some NGOs or other organisations regarding the integration of immigrants and their children often fall in between the competencies of the federal, regional, or local levels. Moreover, many NGOs or local organisations in this field work project-based and are funded as such (directly or indirectly through, for example, the European Social Fund, European Integration Fund, or Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund). As a result, and as was evidenced by the OECD field mission, many civil society organisations lack a structural long-lasting co-operation agreement with the Flemish or federal government. Many non-governmental and non-profit organisations work on a local basis. Some of these organisations have a very broad target group such as immigrants in general, whereas others focus more on specific target groups (e.g. refugees, high-educated newcomers, migrant women).

Flanders is taking action to reappraise the role of the local governments in the integration process

Generally legitimated by the principle of subsidiarity, Flemish local authorities have always held an essential governance position, and in the integration policy field too they are considered key partners. In Flanders, municipalities and cities are expected to take up a “governing role” in the Flemish horizontal integration policy, following the awareness that integration needs to happen where people are – in their workplaces, their neighbourhoods, the schools to which they send their children and the public spaces where they will spend their free time (OECD, 2018[52]).

The Flemish Government supports cities and municipalities in various ways (Deprez, Platteau and Hondeghem, 2018[53]). Based on the 2009 Integration Act, municipalities could receive a subsidy for their local integration policy in addition to the resources from the Municipal Fund. At the time, receiving a subsidy depended on the municipality appointing an official responsible for integration policy and an alderman responsible for integration, concluding a co-operation agreement with a provincial or local integration centre, and making a financial contribution to the costs and operation of the integration service. In 2014, the modalities for receiving a subsidy changed. At least 10% of the inhabitants had to be of foreign-born parentage (or minimum 1 000 persons of foreign-born parentage had to live in the municipality), the municipality had to assume a “governing role” in the field of integration policy, and the municipality had to include integration policies in its strategic multi-year plan by subscribing to the Flemish policy priorities in the field of integration and by formulating indicators to monitor its integration policy. In 2014-15, 57 of the 308 municipalities received such a subsidy, which ranged between EUR 55 000 on average for smaller municipalities and EUR 132 000 on average for so-called “centre cities” (Deprez, Platteau and Hondeghem, 2018[53]).9 In 2016, in the context of reducing municipalities’ administrative burden, the integration subsidy was incorporated into the Municipal Fund so that resources were no longer earmarked and municipalities no longer had an obligation to report their expenses on integration. Between 2016 and 2018, based on the 2016 Flemish Government Act, 164 cities and municipalities could additionally apply for a subsidy from the Flemish Government to deal with the increased influx of refugees, which ranged between EUR 40 000 for smaller municipalities and EUR 532 000 for centre cities (Deprez, Platteau and Hondeghem, 2018[53]). Next to Flemish Government subsidies, local authorities can also directly apply for European funding, such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) of the EU. Research shows that most local authorities are aware of EU funding but have difficulties ensuring the continuation of funds for successful projects due to a lack of evaluation and project metrics (Ahmad-Yar, 2020[54]).

In addition to financial support, cities, and municipalities (as well as other public and private organisations) can rely on the expertise of the integration agencies to develop integration measures. The integration agencies’ offer is centred on language policy and promotion, social cohesion and accessibility of services, and image building and data-driven communication. To help local authorities devise informed policies, the Agency for Home Affairs additionally set up the City and Municipal Monitor. This Monitor provides a wealth of context-specific information on migration and integration, demographics, administration, education, the labour market, health and living conditions (see Box 2.6). In international comparison, the central support offered to local authorities in Flanders concerning integration is quite unique (Idea Consult, 2021[55]). Nevertheless, research demonstrates that the degree of communication and co-ordination among local authorities and key players of the integration process varies significantly across cities and municipalities (Deprez, Platteau and Hondeghem, 2018[53]). As the OECD field mission demonstrated, for many local governments (especially smaller municipalities) it remains highly unclear what their “governing role” to design local integration policies entails in practice, and without well-defined expectations from the regional level, much is left to municipalities’ own willingness and ability.

The creation of the Plan Living Together (Plan Samenleven) by the Agency for Home Affairs is a significant new development in this regard. As part of the revised Horizontal Integration and Equal Opportunities Policy Plan, the Flemish Minister for Home Affairs has allocated EUR 33 million over the years 2022-24 to focus on 24 projects that achieve seven clearly defined goals. These goals are to enhance city safety and quality of life, increase emphasis on learning Dutch, strengthen competencies, encourage more people to work, tackle discrimination, provide citizens with a network, and combat segregation. The Plan is intended for the 28 Flemish cities and municipalities with at least 7 500 non-EU-born inhabitants. Smaller municipalities can collaborate to reach the benchmark of 7 500. The minister will sign a separate contract with each municipality to decide which projects to carry out and which quantifiable objectives to pursue, with effectiveness and progress being regularly monitored. The requirement that municipalities need to co-finance at least 50% of their total integration budget is noteworthy. When implementing the Plan Living Together, local authorities can call on the expertise of the integration agencies.

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Notes

← 1. With Dutch as its official language, Flanders (Vlaanderen) is the northern region of Belgium. The Flemish Region covers 44% of the Belgian territory and hosts 58% of the population (6.63 million inhabitants). It is made up of five provinces (Antwerp, Limburg, Western Flanders, Eastern Flanders, and Flemish Brabant) and 300 cities and municipalities. It is economically the most important region, contributing to close to 60% of the Belgian GDP, 76% of the country’s foreign trade, and 60% of the country’s household consumption. It also concentrates close to 60% of employment in Belgium.

← 2. Given the large regional autonomy and structure of Flanders in the Belgian institutional context, Flanders is compared to Belgium as a whole and other European OECD countries (rather than to other regions).

← 3. This report uses the words “migrants”, “immigrants” and “foreign-born” synonymously. Unless mentioned otherwise, it includes all persons born abroad, regardless of their migration category, legal status, or nationality. Likewise, native-born include all persons born in the country, regardless of the country of birth of their parents or of the ethnic minority to which they may belong. Children of immigrants, in contrast, includes all persons with foreign-born parents. It thus includes children who are born in the country but have immigrant parents.

← 4. The term “humanitarian migrant” refers to asylum seekers who are minimum four months into the asylum procedure and to persons who have successfully applied for asylum and have been granted some sort of protection (either inside or outside the asylum procedure). For the sake of simplicity, this report considers all recipients of protection – be it refugee status, subsidiary, or temporary protection – to be humanitarian migrants, given that the groups benefit from similar (and often identical) integration measures.

← 5. Further analysis based on the Flemish Crossroads Bank for Civic Integration shows that this upskilling trend is driven by two evolutions: a gradual improvement in the educational attainment of new arrival cohorts relative to that of older arrival cohorts within countries of origin (especially among immigrants from new EU member states and non-EU countries), as well as an increase in immigration from countries of origin with higher overall levels of education (amongst others: India, Palestine, Brazil, Cameroon and the United States).

← 6. Using a rich employer-employee database for the Belgian private sector over the period 1999-2010, Jacobs et al. (2020[56]) show that, controlling for a rich set of worker and firm characteristics – highly educated immigrant workers are more likely to be over-educated than their native-born counterparts, especially when they were born in low-income countries. Workers’ years of tenure and citizenship acquisition moderate the effect. The decreasing level of over-education with the number of years spent with the same employer is compatible with a statistical discrimination story: asymmetrical information on the true productivity of immigrants diminishes as years of tenure increase. Finally, regarding the role of firm characteristics, they find that the likelihood for immigrants from low-income countries to be over-educated is significantly smaller in bigger firms and when working conditions are collectively renegotiated at the firm level.

← 7. The civic integration track of new arrivals in Brussels is dependent on the language community the persons integrating choose to belong to. As civic integration remains free of charge for the French Community, the Flemish Government decided to exempt people living in Brussels from paying the fee when they opt for the Flemish civic integration track.

← 8. There are ten policy domains in the Flemish Government, each consisting of a department supplemented by independent Agencies. With the formation of each new government, policy domains are distributed as portfolios across Ministers. Each policy domain has a corresponding Department. Since the composition of the portfolio under each Minister can change with each new government, it is custom not to refer to Ministries, but rather to Policy domains or Departments.

← 9. In the Spatial Structure Plan of the Flemish Government, the term “Centre city” refers to cities with a relatively high number of inhabitants that perform a central function in the areas of work, care, education, and culture.

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