1. Integrity arrangements in Romania: Towards the consolidation of its legal and institutional framework
This chapter starts by providing an overview of the integrity system in Romania, including the various actors involved and their responsibilities. The chapter includes key recommendations towards the strengthening of the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest, the role of ethics counsellors within the integrity system and the mainstreaming of risk assessment in at risk sectors.
Integrity is essential for building strong institutions and assures citizens that the government is working in their interest, not just for the select few. Integrity is not just a moral issue; it is also about making economies more productive, public sectors more efficient, societies and economies more inclusive. It is about restoring trust, not just trust in government, but also trust in public institutions, regulators, banks, and corporations. A system of sound public governance reinforces fundamental values, including the commitment to a pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights, and is one of the main drivers for trust in government (OECD, 2017[1]; Murtin et al., 2018[2]).
In Romania, integrity policies have often followed a narrow legalistic approach focused on anti-corruption. Research and interviews carried out for this report showed a consensus amongst stakeholders, that although legislation and public policies have rapidly evolved, actual implementation remains stalled. Furthermore, while anti-corruption public messages have been broadly promoted, the actual implementation of such programmes has not received equal footing. This is particularly true, given the national clientelist environment, where social norms outmanœuvre legal constraints. Despite the growing number of anticorruption investigations and trials involving high-level officials, corruption is still perceived to be one of the major obstacles to obtain quality services. Furthermore, while cases of corruption need to be detected, investigated and sanctioned, more in-depth preventive actions are necessary to address systemic and institutional integrity weaknesses that facilitate corruption and other unethical practices in the first place. Put differently, countries face the challenge to move from a merely reactive “culture of cases” to a proactive “culture of integrity”, defined as a culture where there is a consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests (OECD, 2017[3]).
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity provides policymakers with a vision for a public integrity strategy. It shifts the focus from ad hoc integrity policies to a context dependent, behavioural, risk-based approach with an emphasis on cultivating a culture of integrity across the whole of society. Since the adoption of the OECD Recommendation, the Public Integrity Indicators (PII) applies a mixed methods approach, drawing on both administrative data and big data provided directly by governments and surveys to measure key aspects of the implementation of the Recommendation (OECD, 2017[3]). Romania was assessed in 2021 on Principle 3 (Quality of Strategic Framework) to benchmark the 2016-2021 NAS against OECD country practice. Amongst the issues covered by the PII is whether strategies for any of the following sectors: (a) infrastructure, (b) housing, (c) health, (d) education, (e) taxation, (f) customs have at least one first-level objective aimed at mitigating public integrity risks (“coverage”). In it, Romania scored 71.43, well above OECD average. This is partly the result of including sectorial policies within its National Anticorruption Strategy (NAS) (OECD, 2022[4]).
Source: (OECD, 2022[4])
Integrity actors are at the “core” of any integrity system. In Romania, the main actors of the current integrity system can be divided into prevention and enforcement. On the enforcement side is the Romanian National Anti-Corruption Directorate (Direcția Națională Anticorupție, DNA), the General Anti-corruption Directorate (Direcția Generală Anticorupție, GAD) and regular prosecutor’s offices who investigate cases of petty corruption. DNA is one of the most trusted institutions in Romania with a responsibility for medium and high-level corruption cases (World Bank, 2017[5]). On the prevention side, the National Integrity Agency (Autoritatea Națională de Integritate, ANI) conducts verification of declarations of assets and interests and has oversight and sanctioning functions over unjustified wealth cases. The Ministry of Justice is in charge of policies, strategies, and action plans in the field of justice, as well as preventing and combating corruption and other serious forms of crime. Thus, the Ministry of Justice oversees the technical secretariat of the National Anticorruption Strategy (NAS), which monitors and supports the implementation of the NAS. The General Secretariat of the Government is subordinated to the Prime Minister, with the role of ensuring the development of technical and strategic operations related to government acts. Furthermore, it represents the Government and the Prime Minister before the courts. Furthermore, co-ordinates issues such as open government, lobbying and the law on transparency and access to information. Even though said institutions implement somewhat co-ordinated efforts, interviews conducted for this report showed that the streamlining of preventive policies is still on a development phase and harmonisation between bodies is strongly needed (Box 1.1).
Integrity cannot be a function delegated only to integrity or anti-corruption agencies. In Romania, stakeholders were of the view that more should be done with respect to the role and engagement of prevention agencies in mainstreaming integrity policies through the entire public administration. Although many agencies have tried to trickledown policies through the sectors, integrity initiatives seem to lack a horizontal or cross-sector approach. This may be partly because, besides the ANI, most of these agencies have no leverage to implement integrity measures across the administration. This could be related to a limited interest of some sectors/ areas/ institutions in implementing many of these measures and an overly legalistic perspective where many actors only comply with the minimum requirements stated in legislation.
Main stakeholders of the Romanian Integrity System are:
Technical Secretariat for the 2021-2025 NAS at the Ministry of Justice: The Technical Secretariat, embedded in the Department for Crime Prevention, assumes responsibility for central co-ordination of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. It is charged with driving forward the implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the Strategy. Its responsibilities include producing annual monitoring reports, organising on-site evaluation missions and integrity training for both central institutions and local public administrations, convening the stakeholder platforms, providing methodological support for corruption risk assessments and integrity plans, and commissioning surveys and background research.
National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA): Established in 2002, the DNA is a prosecutor's office structure that focuses on tackling medium and high-level corruption cases. An independent entity operates at arm’s length from courts and other public authorities.
National Integrity Agency (ANI): The National Integrity Agency was set up in 2007 with the primary goal of conducting administrative verification of asset and interest declarations. It is responsible for collecting, monitoring and verifying these declarations to identify conflicts of interest, unjustified wealth and incompatibilities. The ANI is operationally autonomous and refers irregularities to the competent authorities to impose sanctions. The ANI is also in charge of the administration of the PREVENT system. In this system, more than 33 000 procurement procedures have been analysed and many integrity warnings issued that amount to hundreds of millions of euros worth of contracts (SGI, 2020[6]).
General Anti-Corruption Directorate (DGA): The DGA is a judicial policy unit in the Ministry of Interior is charged with investigating suspected corruption perpetrated by staff subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, including police, gendarmerie and border units. It supports the DNA in investigating complex criminal cases, acting as the Judicial Police. It also conducts preventive activities, including training and risk assessments for Ministry of Interior bodies.
National Agency of Civil Service (NACS): The National Agency of Civil Servants (NACS) was established by the Law Nr. 188/1999 on the Civil Servants Statute, with the purpose of ensuring the management of civil service and that of civil servants. It elaborates the frameworks of competence, policies and strategies, as well as draft normative acts in the field. It also has a permanent collaboration with public institutions and authorities in Romania by providing specialised assistance to human resources departments in the application of specific legislation, but also by monitoring and controlling the manner of its application.
Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM): The Superior Council of Magistracy is responsible for guaranteeing judicial independence. It is divided into two parts, one section dealing with judges, and another with prosecutors. It has exclusive competence to recruit and manage the careers of judges and prosecutors and can act as a disciplinary court.
Source: (Government of Romania, 2021[7])
Over the past years Romania has adopted measures aimed at consolidating its legal framework to enhance integrity in the country (Table 1.1). Crucial provisions on post-employment prohibitions, integrity mechanisms and whistle-blower protection have been in place since a significant number of years. Law 571 regulated the protection of whistle-blowers in 2004 and some post-employment restrictions have been introduced since 1996 all the way until 2016. Regulations on conflict of interest, accountability, declarations of gifts, assets and interest have been a part of the Romanian legal framework enhancing Romania’s commitment to the strengthening of its integrity framework.
Romania has taken significant steps to achieve progress and improved co-ordination in its public integrity system. However, to further consolidate it, it needs to work towards the integration and implementation of its anti-corruption and integrity legislation, reinforce institutions, and engage in further efforts to mitigate corruption risks. Indeed, the 2021-2025 NAS requires committed political support to spearhead technocratic reforms and progress its implementation.
In the past, a number of reforms have put in question Romania’s ability to maintain a robust integrity system. Amongst those, a few attempted reforms in the area of criminal law have had repercussions on the functional independence of the judiciary (GRECO, 2021[9]). More recently, Romania approved Law 49 of 2022, which puts in place a new structure for the investigation of criminal offences within the judiciary. However, this law has taken some criticism, particularly by the Venice Commission, who in Opinion 1079/2022 listed the advantages of calling on specialised prosecutors to investigate corruption offences, showing that the new mechanism may be more vulnerable in terms of its functional independence than the DNA (UNIO, 2023[10]). Other international organisations are of the view that the new arrangements would allow the transfer of cases to capable and able institutions (GRECO, 2023[11]). Since the new law entered into force less than a year ago, is still premature to assess its impact on Romania’s ability to investigate and sanction corruption.
Romania can also count on several positive benchmarks that have strengthen its integrity system. Investigation and judicialisation of high-level corruption cases has had increased attention since the establishment of DNA. Similarly, the strengthening of ANI, both institutionally and legally, has allowed Romania to accomplished progress in its conflict of interest and asset’s declarations regime (Ministry of Justice of Romania, 2021[12]). Finally, by the end of 2022, the European Commission adopted the latest report on steps taken by Romania to meet its commitments on judicial reform and the fight against corruption under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The report positively notes Romania's significant efforts to implement these recommendations through new legislation, policies, and tools to strengthen the judiciary and combat corruption (Council of Europe, 2022[13]) (European Commission, 2022[14]).
Romania could develop a strategy to increase support from top leadership in implementing the NAS
The 2021-2025 National Anticorruption Strategy (from now on 2021-2025 NAS) states that there is a “need to strengthen integrity and corruption prevention across the public sector in the country at all levels and puts emphasis on priority sectors for which special measures have been identified in addition to the cross-cutting nation-wide ones”. This stocktaking is based on the analysis of the measures of institutional integrity and corruption prevention anchored in the 2021-2025 NAS.
The Romanian government introduced its first national anti-corruption strategy for the period 2001-2004, in the context of widespread corruption concerns. Anti-corruption strategies are approved by government decision but stand under the overarching responsibility of the MoJ. Each strategy includes set of objectives, performance indicators and associated risks. Since 2012, strategies are subject to a “self-evaluation” conducted by the MoJ monitoring the progress made on individual objectives, as well as to an external evaluation aiming to assess the impact, efficiency and effectiveness of the implemented measures, and to propose recommendations for the next strategy (European Commission, 2021[15]).
In accordance with the interviews conducted for this report as well as reports from several international organisations, the following issues were identified by key stakeholders as challenges to the implementation of the current 2021-2025 NAS.
A consistent implementation of strategies has always been weak in Romania, even if driven by good intentions (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2020[16]).
There are continuous changes in politically appointed public officials, including ministers, as well as a high turn-over of staff associated with party affiliations.
Romania is characterised by a lack of evidence-based policymaking (OECD, 2022[17]).
The (too) many national and local strategies tend to have weak links with the budget process and thus “remain wish lists decoupled from reality” (OECD, 2022[17]; World Bank, 2017[5]; Council of Europe, 2010[18]).
However, there seems to be an increased trust in the latest measures taken by Romanian authorities to counteract these trends. As observed by international stakeholders:
On the fight against corruption, state institutions are joining forces to implement a new national anti-corruption strategy, and a positive track record in the effectiveness of the investigation and sanctioning of high-level corruption has continued through 2021 and 2022.
Important reforms include the recently adopted Justice Laws and a new strategy for the development of the judiciary. The Commission also notes Romania's commitment to take utmost account of the opinion of the Venice Commission, on the Justice Laws and more generally, if further actions are necessary.
Romania's objectives under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and further opportunities for assistance under other relevant EU programmes, in particular the Technical Support Instrument, will also help ensure that ongoing reforms, such as on the Criminal Codes, bridge existing gaps in the legislation and strengthen the effectiveness of the fight against corruption (Council of Europe, 2022[13]).
Furthermore, the 2021-2025 NAS was developed in a context of a recognised lack of political support for anticorruption (OECD, 2022[17]). Despite this, the technical capacity and committed leadership of the NAS secretariat in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) allowed to pull the NAS together at technical level with inputs from all sectors and institutions. This included a broad public consultation effort lead by the MoJ and that included a fair amount of representation of civil society and academia. However, due to the lack of high-level political leadership, the NAS fails to address some major current structural problems of corruption and capture. As stated by several stakeholders during the interviews for this report, the “ambition” of the measures proposed and the potential of the instrument to deal with structural underlying issues remains an issue. Similarly, interviews conducted for this report showed a generalised perception that the issue of lack of political engagement in the design phase of the NAS cannot unfortunately be fully compensated by political leadership during its implementation phase, trickling down into implementation shortcoming over time. At any rate, support from top leadership in implementing the strategy is even less visible. Therefore, Romania could benefit from top leadership endorsement, especially at sector level.
Moreover, even in its sixth edition, the NAS continues to lack an explicit theory of change (OECD, 2022[17]). The underlying assumptions on how the integrity measures will achieve to prevent corruption in a context of systemic corruption as well as institutional and policy capture are not made explicit. Additionally, even though the NAS recognises the role of organised crime and has attempted a systemic approach on integrity, it does not include actions to fight corruption-related organised networks at a sector level. The dynamics and actions of the corrupt networks can negatively affect and capture inter-institutional decision-making and resource allocation processes in the Romanian public administration. In line with this, it is crucial to develop a systems’ approach which recognises and addresses corrupt networks in all upcoming NASs. In any case, if Romania achieves a stronger level of political commitment combined with a willingness to increase its systemic analysis of underlying issues affecting integrity, Romania could consider amending the current NAS and including a more systemic analysis to start addressing some of these issues.
The current National Anti-Corruption Strategy contains an explicit matrix of performance indicators attached to the different objectives as well as an overall monitoring system. Most of the performance indicators, though, are numeric and outputs are focused on specific actions, instead of the expected change those actions will contribute to. This situation seriously limits accountability for results of the political leadership of Ministries, local authorities, and public entities at all levels of government. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, Romania has developed a few mechanisms to strengthen monitoring and reporting of, albeit as mentioned before, these only cover specific actions and do not include desired outcomes. For example, the current monitoring system, through the five co-operation platforms and peer reviews (where quantitively data is assessed against qualitive data) can be used as a backstopping mechanism to monitor implementation. Similarly, perception surveys such as the Eurobarometer or integrity incidents found in annual reports, represent an important tool to understand the institutional context. However, the absence of performance and outcome indicators remains a problem, as these can be quite useful when assessing perceptions, experience, and views of the public in general as well as organised non-state actors, including business, professional associations, civil society organisations and the media.
The promotion of public integrity would typically involve many different stakeholders that cover the various functions of an integrity system as defined in the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[3]) (Table 1.2). As explained in the following chapter, Romania is facing issues in the co-ordination of its integrity system that are partly a consequence of the disjointed and fragmented legal framework for integrity. As stated in the fact-finding mission by Romania’s officials, cohesiveness and guidance are necessary for institutions to navigate regulations. Not less because such fragmentation is the entry door for corruption practices. Furthermore, Romania needs to increase co-ordination mechanisms, beyond the cross-sector co-operation provided by the NAS platforms, since most institutions are now working in silos. An integrating perspective has been one of the most significant aims of the NAS’s, but as the interviews conducted showed this is far from accomplished. Similarly, Romania could benefit from making more visible success stories in integrity plans, as a way to inspire change in other sectors and areas.
When assessed against the 2017 OECD Recommendation, the integrity system in Romania could be improved in terms of coherence and scope. Even though the National Anticorruption Strategy (NAS) has provided a policy framework and actions to address systemic corruption, as well as some co-ordination, the system is fragmented, and policies disjointed. Interviews conducted for this report showed that closer co-ordination between actors especially in the preventive field could be further enhanced. Similarly, there is also need for more co-ordination between entities within the same sector under the stewardship of the lead sector authority, usually a Ministry. Evidence of this are the disjointed efforts between the NACS and ANI to promote preventive measures through the central administration. Integrity in human resource management has been challenging and officials mentioned that more training was needed on integrity tools, such as the PREVENT system (National Integrity Agency, 2022[20]). Moreover, even though integrity plans have helped shape integrity policies in the public administration, ANI could do more to work closely with HR offices to provide support for the management of integrity issues as well as with prioritised sectors and their lead entities. The interiorisation of ethical standards or the management of conflict-of-interest situations for resolving ethical dilemmas are at the core of developing a culture of integrity in the public sector. As further chapters will explain, this could be especially useful in at-risk sectors as well as local administrations. The mainstreaming of integrity policies through a culture of integrity might also require additional attention from both ANI and the Ministry of Justice. For example, Romania does not have a central authority to advice and counsel on integrity issues through the public administration.
As seen in Table 1.2, opening channels and implementing mechanisms for complaints and whistleblower protection is also part of the culture pillar of the 2017 OECD Integrity Recommendation. Unfortunately, in Romania, whistleblower protection measures are set-up formally, but not properly implemented. A situation that may be remedied once the EU Whistleblowers Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/1937) is transposed into national legislation. Overall, and as stated through this report, Romania could consider several measures to improve co-ordination in its integrity system as well as meaningful action to mainstream such actions at the selected at-risk sectors (health, education, SOEs).
Romania could consider using the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest as a way to mainstream ethics through the entire public administration, with a special focus on at-risk sectors
The upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest might provide an opportunity to address some of the co-ordination and fragmentation problems mentioned above. In Romania this is being done by way of re-organising the existing framework of ethics and compiling disperse legislation on the issue of conflict of interest in a unified Code of Ethics. Codes of Ethics are an essential tool in guiding the behaviour of public officials in line with and complementing the official legal integrity framework. Codes of Ethics make clear what kind of behaviour is expected of public officials and where the boundaries of behaving with integrity are even in grey areas, where legal frameworks are inexistent or ambiguous. To be effective, Codes of Ethics should clearly articulate the core values governing the public service. As with other OECD countries (Box 1.2), concentrating on selected principles achieves more clarity. For example, in 2013 the Australian Public Service reduced the number of Public Service Values from fifteen to five, with the aim of enshrining a smaller set of core values that are meaningful, memorable and effective in driving change.
Brazil
With support from the OECD, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (Controladoría Geral da União, CGU) led in 2020 a participative process to identify the core Values of the Federal Public Service in Brazil (Valores do Serviço Público Federal). After an extensive consultation process, civil servants identified which are today the seven Values of the Federal public service: Integrity, Professionalism, Impartiality, Justice, Engagement, Kindness and Public Vocation. Each value comes along with a brief description of what the value means, which provided the opportunity to add similar values that pointed into the same direction.
Colombia
In 2016, the Colombian Administrative Department of Public Administration (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, DAFP) initiated a process to define a General Integrity Code. Through a participatory exercise involving more than 25 000 public servants through different mechanisms, five core values were selected: Honesty; Respect; Commitment; Diligence; Justice. In addition, each public entity has the possibility to integrate up to two additional values or principles to respond to organisational, regional and/or sectorial specificities.
Source: Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/web/eva/codigo-integridad.
A code can also provide guidance to public officials on ethical dilemmas and on circumstances and situations qualifying as a conflict-of-interest situation. On the basis of the Code of Ethics, in interaction with primary laws, a regulatory integrity framework can be built which promotes public ethics and managing conflict-of-interest situations in a coherent manner across the public sector (OECD, 2017[3]). Indeed, Romania is at a critical junction in the developing of such a code and could strengthen this process by involving all relevant actors, including NACS, and providing them with a more relevant role in the development and execution of integrity measures.
In addition, international stakeholders have stated that the integrity legal framework needs to be further consolidated. For instance, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) Progress Report from November 2018 noted that “(…) a need for clarity on the rules on incompatibilities and conflict of interests in a way which fulfils the CVM benchmark of securing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken is required” (GRECO, 2015[21]) (European Commission, 2018[22]). Previous CVM reports had highlighted the continued challenges to the legal framework for integrity and the need for stability and clarity. For example, the fact that in the last 2 years, 5 legislative proposals modifying the integrity framework have been adopted, enhancing the fragmentation of the system (Lacatus and Sedelmeier, 2020[23]).
Although the latest CVM reports notes that work is well underway to prepare a comprehensive legislative framework on integrity to be adopted in 2023 (Council of Europe, 2022[13]), to develop a culture of integrity, further efforts are needed. In particular, to reinforce merit in the public sector and to build an open and trusting environment to encourage public officials to raise concerns and report corruption. Such efforts should be integrated into public management and not perceived as an add-on, stand-alone exercise (OECD, 2019[24]). Codes of Ethics can also be a useful tool for this integration because they are an essential tool in guiding the behaviour of public officials. As in other OECD countries, Romania could consider using the process of designing the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest as an opportunity for a participative assessment and promotion of public ethics in the public administration. This could include a consultation process that brings together all relevant stakeholders and takes into consideration the vision and opinions of public officials. Further guidelines, derived from upcoming legislation, could provide guidance on managing conflict-of-interest and could be adapted to sectorial needs. Similarly, as explain in consequent chapters, the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest may support and empower the role of ethics counsellors as spearheads in the implementation of the legislation and subsequent implementation tools and guidelines. As stated during the fact-finding mission, this is of particular importance in at risk sectors, where the role of the ethic counsellor has been weakened. Lastly, the SIPOCA 63 project, intended for including ethical competences in performance evaluations, has been left defunded and could be pick-up again to reinforce ethical competences in Romania’s public administration. Overall, one key component for the success of the integrity framework is high-level leadership, reinforced by support and leadership examples. Romania could aim at this by making all ministers and directors further responsible and accountable for the integrity frameworks of their respective institutions.
Romania could consider strengthening its “integrity plans” by enacting clearer guidance on risk assessments and consider establishing dedicated teams in institutions to enact and monitor its implementation
“Integrity plans” have been key to set the foundation for implementing integrity policies throughout the Romanian public administration. These include identification the management of possible remedies for corruption risks and vulnerabilities. To advance an organisational integrity environment, institutions ideally set up priorities and objectives in their respective agendas. This in turn, provides the milestones to be considered when drafting the specific integrity plans. The “integrity plans” are then approved by legal acts, such as orders or decisions issued by the management of the institution (Government of Romania, 2021[25]). In some sectors, these are well-developed exercises (Box 1.3).
GRECO noted the measures taken as part of the 2016-2020 Integrity Plan for the Judiciary, including training events for managers at courts and prosecution offices, as well as checks on 70 potential integrity incidents in courts. GRECO also appreciated the strengthening of supervisory powers of the Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM) and the Judicial Inspectorate and the apparent intention to dissolve the Department for Investigating Judicial Offences (the SIIJ). Nonetheless, the GRECO Report expressed a desire to see more specific measures to mitigate integrity risks in courts and prosecutor’s offices. Some activities were implemented during this period to address these concerns. This included the adoption of a multi-annual integrity plan for the judiciary, as well as the publication by the SCM of guidance material for magistrates on appropriate relations with lawyers, journalists and conduct on social media. In addition, the SCM reports providing guidance to magistrates on potential incompatibilities for judges and prosecutors, as well as delivering training on ethics to 194 magistrates.
Source: (GRECO, 2019[26]); (Ministry of Justice of Romania, 2018[27])
The 2016-2020 and 2021-2025 NAS’s included the strengthening and approval of “integrity plans” as part of the envisaged activities. In accordance with the strategy and Government Decision 599 of 2018, these plans should be “based on risk analysis” and a periodic self-assessment. Furthermore, the NAS 2016-2020 was insistent that the emphasis and evaluation of the plans and revisions must include “newly occurred risks and vulnerabilities”. The 2020 NAS Monitoring Report notes that during the period 2016 to 2020, the Ministry of Justice received and centralised a total of 780 integrity plans, of which:
Similarly, during 2021, the Ministry of Justice received and centralised a total of 1 108 integrity plans, of which:
9 came from independent authorities and anti-corruption institutions
502 came from the central public administration (25 developed by central institutions and 477 developed by subordinate structures)
489 came from local public administration (163 developed by Local Administration Units and 226 developed by structures subordinate to Local Administration Units)
The process of drafting the “integrity plans” runs in a very similar way for most institutions. It starts with a self–assessment, followed by the documents being sent to Ministry of Justice, who will then provide technical advice on these. Afterwards, a process of annual monitoring will be triggered. This annual report must include:
a narrative report on the status of the implementation of measures
an inventory of the measures of institutional transparency and corruption prevention
the list of integrity incidents and of the measures taken to remediate the situation that allowed the integrity incidents to occur
an update on the development and implementation of the process
a further analysis of the status of measures that are being implemented or partially implemented, for the updating every two years of the integrity plans
As stated, the MoJ provides feedback on these plans, on demand or following a prioritisation exercise. It also provides methodological support for the corruption risk assessments, when requested by entities and has developed some guidance for institutions to rely on (Box 1.4). The 2021 OECD survey of co-operation platforms showed overwhelming approval of the leadership and role of the Technical Secretariat (Figure 1.2) (OECD, 2022[17]). Overall, respondents were particularly satisfied with the provision of methodological support (92% satisfied) and provision of ad-hoc advice and guidance for those involved in implementing the NAS (90%). The lowest level of satisfaction relative to others, although still very high at 77%, was “ensuring the training of the institutions involved in the implementation of the NAS”.
Comparative analysis on whistleblower protection legislation providing proposals and recommendations.
Comparative analysis on pantouflage providing proposals and recommendations.
Infographics on integrity standards (Annex no. 3 to the National Anticorruption Strategy 2021-2025).
General training material on “integrity plans” in an e-learning format.
Source: Information provided by the MoJ of Romania
Source: (OECD, 2022[17]) – Stakeholders Survey, 2021
However, different organisations face different contexts and may also be faced with a variety of ethical dilemmas. Although the NAS Secretariat has always encouraged all public entities to develop custom made “integrity plans” and highlighting the risks of replicating documents, several issues still impede its correct functioning. First, a lack of commitment in the timely identification and assessment of risks has proved to be an issue. Although the NAS stresses that institutional integrity plans should be “based on risk analysis” they do not provide an assessment of public integrity risks nor does it identify specific types of relevant integrity breaches, the actors likely to be involved, or the expected likelihood or impact should the risks materialise (OECD, 2022[17]). Similarly, no inter-institutional body has prepared and published an analytical report on public integrity risks that formulates recommendations and sets priorities for the whole public integrity system, as requested by the OECD Public Integrity Indicator (OECD, 2022[17]). Second, fact-finding mission participants were of the view that enormous disparities existed on integrity plans and risk assessment at a sectorial level, in particular in the three sectors subject to this study. Stakeholders expressed the view that most sectors do only a tick-the-box exercise when it comes to identifying risk and the probability of its occurrence. Furthermore, a desire for further and more targeted training of public officials in charge of the integrity plans and guidance on how to cater to the specific needs of the sector was seen as a priority. Concerns also were raised about the general knowledge in different entities within the sector of the existence and use of the integrity plans. Third, there seems to be a lack of proper resources at the institutional level (human and technological) to properly identify, asses and follow-up on their implementation. Finally, the MoJ lacks the capacity to review the majority of plans, being the current practice to review them only every two years and rely on additional peer reviews for further guidance.
Considering this, Romania may consider conducting further awareness raising activities with entities on the identification and assessment of risks. Similarly, it could conduct an exercise to identify bottlenecks and resources needed to address the existing gaps in implementation, including the much-needed identification of necessary resources. Furthermore, Romania could consider developing custom-made guidelines that help ground the general framework of risk assessments at sector level. This will provide organisational contexts and an opportunity to include relevant and concrete examples from the organisation’s day-to-day business to which the employees can easily relate (OECD, 2017[28]). Each institution developing their own “integrity plan”, with the appropriate guidance, can help safeguard the achievement of other public policy goals, such as goals related to health, defence, education or infrastructure. In this endeavours, public entities could ask for the technical assistance of the MoJ, both in the use and adaptions of complementing tools.
The MoJ could also consider providing institutions with further guidance on integrity plans and their risk assessments, including by developing a national-wide study regarding specific types of relevant integrity breaches, the actors likely to be involved and the expected likelihood or impact of corruption risks (OECD, 2022[17]). Furthermore, consulting and actively involving external stakeholders – such as suppliers or users of the public services – in the process of identifying risks helps expands the universe and improve the quality of the assessment, so that it meets both public employees’ and citizens’ expectations. Similarly, Romania could consider establishing robust teams within Ministries (at the central level) and provide these as guidance to other sector-specific institutions. These teams could be in charge of conducting risk assessments, enacting the plan and then monitor implementation. In doing so, they could also provide sector specific guidance, training and awareness raising.
Finally, integrity plans at the subnational level should also be bolstered. In particular, the Ministry for Development, Public Works and Administration could provide further guidance in the design and implementation of these plans. The MoJ has supported the adaption and called for flexibility its design and execution as well as calling for local entities to go beyond a mere copying exercise. In any case, Romania could consider developing incentives for the subnational governments to ensure that local governments do not treat them as a tick-box, technocratic exercise and on the contrary, create incentives for a significant implementation of commitments. Furthermore, considering that capacities at local levels vary significantly, Romania could consider bringing back the “Champions network for the local public administration”, that promoted the exchange of good practices on integrity issues. Finally, Romania could consider developing awareness raising activities with a selected group of local administrations to encourage them to make further use of these plans and existing planning methodologies provided by both the MoJ and the Ministry for Development, Public Works and Administration.
Romania could further develop the role of ethics counsellors, in particular by providing them with regular guidance, resources and tailor-made training in at risk sectors
Integrity actors at organisational level contribute to mainstreaming integrity policies. Experience shows that goals that are not included explicitly into the organisational planning, budgets and internal accountability mechanisms are unlikely to be taken seriously by managers (OECD, 2019[24]). Furthermore, ethics counsellors may be a fundamental ally in the management of public ethics and in particular, of conflict-of-interest situations. While the individual public official is ultimately responsible for recognising the situations in which conflicts may arise, most OECD countries have tried to define those areas that are most at risk and have attempted to provide a contact point that can provide guidance to the public official (Box 1.5). For example, in Brazil, the established Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (SIPEF) aims at mainstreaming integrity policies with the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) as a central organ and Integrity Management Units (UGI) in all entities of the federal executive branch.
In Austria, the Federal Bureau to prevent and fight corruption (Bundesamt zur Korruptionspraevention und Korruptionsbekaempfung, BAK) created the Austrian Integrity Network (Integritaetsbeauftragten-Netzwerk) with the purpose to strengthen integrity by firmly anchoring integrity as a fundamental element in public sector.
To this end, the BAK trains integrity advisors to become experts in the field of integrity and corruption prevention within the framework of the Integrity Network. These integrity officers provide advice and guidance in their entities to strengthen integrity within specific entities.
The integrity officers can access further information on compliance, corruption, ethics, integrity and organisational culture. In addition to the Internet platform, the BAK also offers regular follow-up meetings for integrity officers on specific topics such as risk management and ethics and values.
Source: https://integritaet.info/
During the fact-finding mission, interviewees were of the opinion that in Romania, the role of the ethics counsellors in practice has become weakened over the last few years, with few resources, training, or decision-making powers within an entity. Furthermore, institutions seem to struggle to find the right person and giving him/her the time to fulfill its work properly, as this person usually has other functions within the institution. This, in turn, has limited the role they play when assessing and managing conflict of interest situations by public officials. Considering that some public officials operate in sensitive sectors with arguably a higher risk for conflict of interest, such as health, defence, education, police and SOEs, the situation becomes increasingly urgent. In Romania, guidance on management of conflict of interest is key, as there are frequent confusions between the subject of incompatibilities and that of conflicts of interest.
Similarly, conflicts of interest need to be actively managed and should be part and parcel of each entity. The ANI could / should be an organ for complaints or redress in case that public entities do not manage conflicts of interest correctly. However, the identification of conflict of interest is currently only centralised in the ANI, taking away the responsibility of the different sectors for the implementation of the management system. Furthermore, the law on conflict of interest does not expressly differentiate between potential conflict of interests (an official has personal interests that might lead to a conflict of interests on the occasion of a public decision) or actual conflict of interests (the official has to make/or makes a decision that generates a benefit for him/her or a relative) (GRECO, 2019[26]).
Considering these difficulties brought by the legislative framework and institutional realities, Romania could provide guidance on concrete sectorial cases. Instead of providing generic guidance, a sector approach allows to provide very concrete and realistic situations of conflict of interest (perhaps even based on examples from real life) that public officials can recognise and relate to their day-to-day work. Similarly, the identification and management of conflict of interest could be further decentralised, making the different sectors responsible and accountable for the implementation of their management system. Additionally, ANI could provide guidance to both HR offices and ethics counsellors on the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situation per sector. This could be discussed and later mainstreamed through the five (5) co-operation platforms of the NAS. Romania could also consider introducing a requirement to report ad-hoc disclosures to ethics counsellors when a conflict between specific private interests emerge or in other work related to their mandate. Finally, Romania could consider strategy for empowering the role of ethics counsellors within institutions and doubling up on the efforts of engaging senior officials to facilitate implementation and raise awareness of public ethics and values in practice. For example, ethics counselling could benefit from further support from NACS, both in terms of strengthening of their roles and tailor-made training, especially in at risk sectors. Similarly, Romania could consider incentivising ethics counsellors’ networks as a way to share good practices and difficulties amongst peers.
The recommendations detailed in this chapter provide input on ways through which Romania could develop and improve its integrity measures. These recommendations can inform current and ongoing reforms and strengthen Romania’s capacity to respond to corruption. Romania could consider taking steps to further strengthen its integrity system by:
Romania could develop a strategy to increase support from top leadership in implementing the NAS
Increasing political engagement in the design phase of the NAS and trickling down into implementation, especially at sector level.
Conducting a more systemic analysis to start addressing structural issues at sector level within the NAS, including a systemic analysis of underlying issues affecting integrity.
Making more visible success stories in integrity plans, as a way to inspire change in other sectors and areas.
Increasing co-ordination, including between ANI and HR offices to provide support for the management of integrity issues as well as with prioritised sectors and their lead entities.
Romania could consider using the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest as a way to mainstream ethics through the entire public administration, with a special focus on at-risk sectors
Consider using the process of designing the upcoming legislative framework on conflict of interest as an opportunity for a participative assessment and promotion of public ethics in the public administration. This could include a consultation process that brings together all relevant stakeholders and takes into consideration the vision and opinions of public officials.
Enacting further guidelines, derived from upcoming legislation, could provide guidance on managing conflict-of-interest and could be adapted to sectorial needs.
Supporting and empowering the role of ethics counsellors as spearheads in the implementation of ethics frameworks and subsequent implementation tools and guidelines.
Build on the efforts and activities of the SIPOCA 63 project to increase ethical competences in performance evaluations.
Consider making all ministers and directors further responsible and accountable for the integrity frameworks of their respective institutions.
Romania could consider strengthening its “integrity plans” by enacting clearer guidance on risk assessments and consider establishing dedicated teams in institutions to enact and monitor its implementation
Conducting an exercise to identify bottlenecks and resources needed to address the existing gaps in implementation of integrity plans, including the much-needed identification of necessary resources.
Developing custom-made guidelines that help ground the general framework of risk assessments at sector level. This will provide organisational contexts and an opportunity to include relevant and concrete examples from the organisation’s day-to-day business to which the employees can easily relate.
Providing institutions with further guidance on integrity plans and their risk assessments, including by developing a national-wide study regarding specific types of relevant integrity breaches, the actors likely to be involved and the expected likelihood or impact of corruption risks.
Establishing robust integrity teams within Ministries (at the central level) and provide these as guidance to other sector-specific institutions. These teams could be in charge of conducting risk assessments, enacting the plan and then monitor implementation. In doing so, they could also provide sector specific guidance, training and awareness raising.
Providing further guidance in the design and implementation of these plans to local entities to go beyond a mere copying exercise.
Developing incentives for the subnational governments to ensure that local governments do not treat integrity plans as a tick-box, technocratic exercise and on the contrary, create incentives for a significant implementation of commitments.
Bringing back the “Champions network for the local public administration”, that promoted the exchange of good practices on integrity issues.
Developing awareness raising activities with a selected group of local administrations to encourage them to make further use of these plans and existing planning methodologies provided by both the MoJ and the Ministry for Development, Public Works and Administration.
Romania could further develop the role of ethics counsellors, in particular by providing them with regular guidance, resources and tailor-made training in at risk sectors
Enhancing the identification and management of conflict of interest by making the different sectors responsible and accountable for the implementation of their management system.
Provide training and awareness raising on the different types and situations that may trigger a conflict of interest, including potential, actual and perceived conflicts.
Providing guidance on conflict of interest in concrete sectorial cases. Instead of providing generic guidance, a sector approach allows to provide very concrete and realistic situations of conflict of interest (perhaps even based on examples from real life) that public officials can recognise and relate to their day-to-day work.
Providing guidance to both HR offices and ethics counsellors on the identification and management of conflict-of-interest situation per sector. This could be discussed and later mainstreamed through the five (5) co-operation platforms of the NAS.
Introducing a requirement to report ad-hoc disclosures to ethics counsellors when a conflict between specific private interests emerge or in other work related to their mandate.
Developing a strategy for empowering the role of ethics counsellors within institutions and doubling up on the efforts of engaging senior officials to facilitate implementation and raise awareness of public ethics and values in practice, especially in at risk sectors.
Incentivising ethics counsellors’ networks as a way to share good practices and difficulties amongst peers.
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