5. Returning to local communities

Unlike the extensive study of the role of families, there is much less research on the extent to which local communities influence return decisions. The type of reception the returning migrant is likely to receive from community members has been studied. However, there is limited understanding of the potential role of communities in encouraging or discouraging return.

In literature, the concept of “community” is generally understood to encompass three dimensions:

  1. 1. A common place where return migrants and other members of society interact

  2. 2. Regular social support, especially during life-cycle events

  3. 3. Interdependence through shared resources and ideas (Wanki, Derluyn and Lietaert, 2022[1])

However, policy makers and development actors have limited access to community life in origin countries. Most interactions involve local civil society organisations that represent return migrants and other community members. These exchanges, while important, are not sufficient to capture the complexity of community dynamics. The way the term “community” is used in the context of return and reintegration is often reduced to refer to community organisations – principally those with which donors and contractors engage.

The regional context is another factor influencing the openness of local communities to engage in return and reintegration. Not all communities experience return migration on a scale that attracts special interest. Even in such cases, accompanying the reintegration of return migrants is less of a concern in particular when other forms of migration are more visible. In Morocco, for example, the region of Béni Mellal-Khénifra receives significant emigration flows from Sub-Sahara Africa, while the region of Oujda serves as a transit point for migrants (Jacobs, 2024[2]). Return migrants in this region may have access to services provided for immigrants to meet basic needs, but it is rare for these services to address their specific circumstances.

Community capacities also influence the level of support provided to return migrants. Those with strong social networks and access to resources tend to have fewer difficulties in supporting and protecting return migrants. It is more challenging for communities that lack resources and experience political and security upheaval. Competition for jobs, and strains on services and infrastructure in areas of high return, are significant barriers to reintegration (Sohst and Le Coz, 2022[3]; OECD, 2018[4]). Despite these limited capacities, AVRR programmes rely on community organisations as service providers (Figure 5.1). They implement most of the reintegration services, particularly those related to the economic reintegration of returnees. However, AVRR programmes rarely address the broader capacity challenges faced by local community organisations, which are often overwhelmed by providing services to different vulnerable groups simultaneously. During the workshop in Morocco, local community organisations highlighted a notable lack of co-ordination, as many of these organisations do not work with each other. This raises the question of whether the use of NGOs for AVRR support is truly helping to build their capacities or, conversely, distorting their core missions.

Another, less considered factor is the added value return migrants can bring to local communities (Box 5.1). Some migrants choose to return with the intention of making a positive impact in their origin country. This may be the case for migrants who have spent significant periods of time abroad, either for educational or professional reasons, and who seek to use the knowledge and expertise gained abroad to create local businesses (Gevorkyan, 2022[5]; Akom Ankobrey, Mazzucato and Wagner, 2022[6]; Mekonnen and Lohnert, 2018[7]). In other cases, the motivation to engage in meaningful work is shared by returnees who fled their countries because of conflict, persecution, or other circumstances that led them to seek refuge in host countries. Following the resolution of conflicts, it is not uncommon for migrants to express a desire to return to participate in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Schwartz, 2019[8]; Shindo, 2012[9]). Return driven by a commitment to make a meaningful contribution to local communities, however, is limited to a select group of returnees who have often acquired permanent residence or citizenship (Keles, 2022[10]). They have the flexibility to re-migrate or live between their home and host countries – a privilege that involuntary returnees and AVRR beneficiaries do not have.

When analysing the return of migrants to their local communities, one of the key dimensions is how return is perceived by community members. In literature, many reflections point to social stigma and possible impacts on the mental health of return migrants (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]; Wanki, Derluyn and Lietaert, 2022[1]; Suárez and Alaminos, 2020[12]; Kunuroglu, van de Vijver and Yağmur, 2021[13]). As these findings are based on ex-post analyses, it is unclear to what extent concerns about social stigma affect return decisions.

Social stigma tends to be more likely for involuntary return migrants. A review of evidence in Afghanistan suggests that involuntary return challenges the image of migrants as successful adventurers and of destination countries as places where individuals improve their own lives and those of their families. Those stigmatised often face uncomfortable questions about the reasons for returning “empty-handed” and comparisons with other “successful” return migrants are common. Community members in origin countries are often unaware that deportation is a risk for anyone who entered the country without legal documentation. It is easier to portray return migrants as lazy, unlucky or criminal than to discuss the actual factors that led to their return (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]). When the conditions in which returnees will arrive are unclear – for example, if there is uncertainty about their mental health – community members tend to be suspicious (ERRIN, 2022[14]) Evidence from Cameroon also underlines that deportation is associated with criminal behaviour, contributing to a collective feeling that return migrants do not deserve to be socially reintegrated (Wanki, Derluyn and Lietaert, 2022[1]). The stigma of “contamination” is another form of social exclusion. It often concerns return migrants who left at a young age and who show visible and invisible signs of cultural change (e.g. in clothes, behaviour or accent). Community members may interpret these changes as “contamination” by a foreign culture (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]).

Return migrants cope with social stigma in different ways. They sometimes deny their involuntary return to avoid scrutiny, as shown in country studies on Afghanistan, Cameroon, and Mexico. This includes hiding their identity from the public or pretending to be visiting and leaving soon. In other cases, return migrants internalise social stigma: they succumb to their own frustration and shame at having “failed” by isolating themselves. It is also possible for return migrants to reverse the stigma by pointing out rampant corruption in their origin country (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]; Wanki, Derluyn and Lietaert, 2022[1]; Suárez and Alaminos, 2020[12]).

In addition to social stigma, community members may have specific expectations towards return migrants. In most cases, community expectations are based on perceptions of what constitutes a successful and unsuccessful return. This categorisation is partly linked to the experiences return migrants share with community members. A study of return migration to Romania, for example, describes how return migrants construct the reality of their lives abroad to meet the expectations of their friends, relatives, and communities. They display their experiences with expensive clothes and cars that they can barely afford (Scarneci Domnisoru and Csesznek, 2017[15]). Self-imposed expectations of tangible outcomes, such as returning with capital and material assets, can also fuel the image of successful return (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]).

Community members often measure successful return by economic success. In Cameroon, return migrants are expected to be visible by spending lavishly, driving luxury cars, donating, and building houses in local communities. Communities can also expect return migrants to create a positive impact with their financial resources. By maintaining networks with community members and visiting families regularly during their time abroad, return migrants are expected to understand local realities to accompany any changes in the community. Other expectations include engaging in community activities, linking communities of origin with the “outside world” to facilitate the receipt of donations, investing in businesses and teaching income-generating skills to community members. Unsuccessful return, on the other hand, implies returning “empty-handed”. In these circumstances, return migrants have neither the financial means to help family or community members, nor have they acquired new skills to create local businesses. This may force return migrants into businesses that require limited skills, capital and technology (“survivalist businesses”) (Wanki, Derluyn and Lietaert, 2022[1]; Adebayo, 2020[16]).

The ability of return migrants to meet community expectations has a significant impact on their reintegration outcomes, including social status. Assessments from community members can be an obstacle to finding employment through networks and, in some cases, starting a family (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[11]). In the Turkish context, Kunuroglu et al. explain how the social status of return migrants gradually evolved: in the early stages of emigration, Turkish migrants lacked formal education and came from economically less developed regions. When they returned to Türkiye, their contributions to local communities were therefore limited. Third-generation return migrants, however, have little in common with the stereotypes of guest workers. Speaking several languages, being actively involved in the business sector and Turkish social life contribute positively to the social status of return migrants (Kunuroglu, van de Vijver and Yağmur, 2021[13]).

Despite the evidence that community expectations and social stigma negatively affect return migrants, very few OECD countries have awareness-raising campaigns as part of their return programmes.1 Germany is among the few countries that has targeted campaigns for communities in origin countries, with the overall aim of promoting social cohesion at the community level (Box 5.2).

In addition, some civil society organisations in Tunisia are undertaking activities to raise awareness among community members. The association Shanti,2 for example, has organised theatre performances in the city of Gabes to challenge the narrative that return is a failure and to reinforce the legitimacy of family and community support for returning Tunisians.

In the context of AVRR, reintegration services are often delivered with the support of local community organisations. The involvement of community members and local partners can have a positive impact on individual reintegration outcomes, as local actors can reach return migrants more easily, including those who settle in remote areas. The skills of local NGOs and civil society organisations are often complementary to those of the lead reintegration service, such as e.g. providing information in the local language (Sohst and Le Coz, 2022[3]). Of the 19 OECD countries that responded to the policy questionnaire, 10 assign formal roles to local community organisations as part of their AVRR programme (Figure 5.2).

Community organisations in origin countries are the partners for implementation of assistance. As defined by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the services provided by local community organisations fall into three broad areas of reintegration:

  1. 1. Economic reintegration support: Services in this area aim to engage return migrants in income-generating activities. In many origin countries, activities focus on small-scale agricultural projects and other small ventures. Collective projects are useful where significant initial investment and working capital are required, as return migrants can pool their resources. Return migrants who lack the skills to start individual projects can benefit from the expertise of other return migrants or community members. Complementary financial support, such as financial literacy training and advice, micro-savings programmes, and collective investment schemes, can also help return migrants to become self-reliant.

  2. 2. Social reintegration support: Services in this area aim to improve the accessibility and availability of social services in return communities. This type of assistance is particularly important where physical and language barriers prevent return migrants from accessing services, or where community services are unable to meet the specific needs and vulnerabilities of return migrants. Social reintegration assistance covers many areas, including housing, education and training, health and well-being, public infrastructure, and social rights.

  3. 3. Psychosocial reintegration support: At the individual level, interventions aim to help return migrants with mental health problems or trauma to access therapeutic care, sometimes facilitated by local community organisations. At the community level, this includes activities to strengthen social networks to promote wider acceptance of return migrants. Community mobilisation activities (e.g. storytelling, theatre, visual arts) and peer support mechanisms are ways to promote inclusion and address potential stigma (IOM, 2019[17]).

Several challenges in providing these services were identified through exchanges with local community organisations in Tunisia and Morocco, who had the perception that standard AVRR packages rarely tailor services to the profiles and needs of return migrants. These profiles can vary considerably, as illustrated in the Moroccan context: First-generation Moroccans, usually of retirement age, typically need assistance in managing their pension and real estate assets. Moroccan return migrants wishing to start their own business need support understanding business practices, market dynamics and legal frameworks. Moroccan return migrants with a family strategy can rely on their social networks and the support of extended family members but may need additional support for their children. Communication can be a particular challenge for third and fourth generation Moroccans, who may not have a strong command of the Arabic language (Belghazi, Bouazzaoui and Malki, 2023[18]).

The workshops in Tunisia and Morocco also revealed that local community organisations report limited scope for action, as the intervention framework for AVRR activities is mainly defined by donor countries. Economic reintegration is often a priority, and local NGOs help return migrants identify a micro-business and advise them on how to get started (e.g. location, suppliers and costs). While focusing on micro-businesses is beneficial for return migrants wishing to become self-employed, there are few alternatives for those with other goals (e.g. enrolling in vocational training or higher education). Diversifying economic reintegration projects beyond micro-enterprises could have a positive impact on the sustainability of AVRR programmes. Another gap identified was the lack of regular follow-up once the micro-business was established and the quarterly visits were completed within the first year.

Not all local community organisations can meet the administrative requirements set by donor countries to implement reintegration assistance. This requires project management skills and human resources that smaller organisations may not have. As a result, the available pool of local community organisations remains limited, leading to recurrent reliance on the same entities by donor countries. Integrating training modules on administrative procedures into capacity-building initiatives for local community organisations could help to broaden the pool of implementers.

An integrated approach to reintegration seems elusive when most interventions focus on income-generating activities. In the Tunisian and Moroccan contexts, gaps have been identified in the accompaniment of retired return migrants (Belghazi, Bouazzaoui and Malki, 2023[18]; Belhaj, 2023[19]). In Morocco, they represent 25% of all returnees, yet the association Migrations & Développement is one of the few non-governmental actors in Morocco to assist them. Since 2016, the association has opened 11 migrant welcome and orientation offices in rural communes where retired return migrants tend to settle. These offices assist in accessing administrative rights, providing information on local investment potential, and helping to strengthen links between the region and diaspora groups. A comprehensive guide helps return migrants understand what services are available to them and their family members (Migrations & Développement, 2016[20]). As highlighted in the previous section, streamlining psychosocial support in AVRR programmes remains a challenge in many origin countries (Kroll and Veron, 2023[21]). Local civil society organisations have little leeway and may refer return migrants to public services for therapeutic care, which are not always available.

Outside the AVRR context, local community organisations actively participate in broader developmental initiatives within their countries. Collaborating, at times, with international development partners, local community organisations implement interventions targeting prevalent developmental challenges such as high unemployment, fragmented social protection systems, and multidimensional inequality (Nguyen and Rieger, 2017[22]; Quispe Fernández, Ayaviri Nina and Maldonado Vargas, 2018[23]). In specific cases, national governments extend support to these grassroots initiatives. An illustrative case is the Centre des Très Petites Entreprises Solidaires (CTPES) in Morocco, established in 2015 and operational in multiple cities. CTPES provides workshops and spaces for young Moroccans in precarious situations with entrepreneurial skills and viable projects. Additionally, CTPES manages a separate and more restricted support programme specifically designed for selected Moroccan return migrants. While there is no dichotomy between assisting AVRR beneficiaries and contributing to broader development goals, the question is which should be prioritised when local organisations have limited resources.

Local community organisations further play a key role in post-conflict countries such as the Western Balkans. From addressing security concerns to promoting economic recovery and social reconciliation, local communities in the former Yugoslavia have played an essential role in shaping the trajectory of post-conflict return migration. In the early stages of return, they have advocated for property rights, provided legal assistance and guided return migrants through the restitution process. Economically, they have set up co-operatives, small businesses and agricultural initiatives to create employment opportunities for return migrants. Grassroots organisations and community-led initiatives have also facilitated inter-ethnic dialogue to promote social cohesion among diverse communities (Vracic, 2023[24]).

In conclusion, this section argues that returning to local communities is not a homogeneous concept, but varies according to national and regional contexts, community capacities and possible links with diaspora groups. Relationships between community members and returning migrants can be challenging due to differing perceptions (“successful” and “unsuccessful” return), and high expectations. If these expectations cannot be met, it can lead to social stigma and rejection. Many OECD countries rely on local community organisations to provide return and reintegration services. Although local community organisations should, in theory, take an integrated approach to reintegration, many of their interventions focus on economic reintegration. These economic reintegration projects prioritise the creation of small businesses, as defined by the intervention frameworks of donor countries. However, this approach may limit the flexibility of local community organisations to propose alternative solutions.

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Notes

← 1. Only four countries (Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) out of 19 countries that responded to the policy questionnaire report having campaigns addressing community issues in origin countries. Recurrent topics include social stigma, fostering social cohesion, discussing the different types of return.

← 2. For more information: https://shanti.tn/

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