Chapter 2. Norway’s policy vision and framework

This chapter assesses the extent to which clear political directives, policies and strategies shape Norway’s development co-operation and are in line with international commitments, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Norway’s vision and its commitment to development co-operation are closely aligned to the 2030 Agenda, benefitting from high-level bipartisan political support. Strengthening the linkages between political directives and policies, and strategic management, will ensure that this vision is translated into effective programming. Norway’s approach to cross-cutting issues and its strategic approach to increasing support for the multilateral system and civil society organisations need further clarity. The increasing focus on fragile and crisis-affected contexts will also require more coherence between Norway’s diplomatic and development efforts.

    

Framework

Peer review indicator: Clear policy vision aligned with the 2030 Agenda based on member’s strengths

Norway’s vision and its commitment to development co-operation is closely aligned to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and is clearly evidenced by high-level bipartisan political support, including through the Government of Norway’s manifesto – the Granavolden-platform – and several thematic policy papers. Strengthening the linkages between its political directives and policies, and its strategic management, will ensure this vision is translated into effective and coherent programming.

Norway has made significant progress in clarifying its overall vision, linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with the objective of “leaving no-one behind”

The Government of Norway’s development policy aims to save lives, promote democracy and human rights, and contribute to lasting poverty reduction. The government has stated that “if we are to achieve sustainable poverty reduction, we must find solutions to economic, social and environmental challenges” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2018). Since 2015, Norway has made significant progress in setting the policy vision for its aid programme. This has included efforts to align with SDGs, recognising that development is primarily a national responsibility, and that aid alone is insufficient to achieve development – it must be used strategically to mobilise other financial flows, including private-sector investment and domestic resources.

“Leaving no one behind” is clearly articulated as a guiding priority of Norway’s vision for development co-operation, which has a long-standing focus on poverty eradication and people most in need. The vision brings a renewed and welcome focus on reaching the poorest and most marginalised people, working through key sectors like education, health, business development, the environment and humanitarian assistance (OECD, 2018).

Following the formation of a new coalition government in 2019, Norway’s commitment to international development was highlighted in the government’s Granavolden-platform (Office of the Prime Minister, 2019), which emphasises aid quality and policy coherence. It builds on previous government platforms, including the 2017 Jeløya platform (Office of the Prime Minister, 2018) and the 2013 Sundvolden-platform (Office of the Prime Minister, 2013), which stressed the need for an increased focus on results. This has further helped strengthen bipartisan political support for Norway’s overall vision.

Norway’s vision and political-level commitment is successfully complemented by increasingly knowledge-based policy frameworks

Norway has sought to complement the overarching vision for its aid programme with a range of policy white papers covering priorities including security, private sector approaches, trade, human rights and education, amongst others.1

In particular, Norway is intent on narrowing the geographic and thematic scope of its aid, originally discussed in the white paper “Common Responsibility for Common Future” (Government of Norway, 2017b) and subsequently elaborated in the white paper “Partner Countries in Norway’s Development Policy” (Government of Norway, 2018b). This has allowed for a more strategic focus and progress has been made in both reducing the number of grant agreements and in prioritising partner country selection (Chapter 5). In addition, a new humanitarian strategy was launched in August 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The strategy successfully builds on Norway’s commitments at the World Humanitarian Summit. Aligned with other policy documents2, it articulates and operationalises a stronger link to conflict prevention, stabilisation and resilience, as well as a focus on humanitarian diplomacy and concrete actions to better manage refugee flows (Chapter 7).

These frameworks are also aligned with Norway’s stated efforts to ensure that its aid efforts are informed by a knowledge-based development policy, complemented by initiatives such as the “Knowledge Bank”. This represents an important strategic shift in Norway’s development policy, which aims to strengthen and coordinate technical assistance in areas where Norway has relevant competencies, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of aid and technical co-operation (Chapter 5).

Further efforts are needed to ensure that Norway’s vision and policies are translated into effective and coherent programming

Norway’s effort to clarify its vision for development co-operation is complemented by a range of policy white papers. The white papers have helped clarify the geographical and thematic focus and the overall principles – including that aid must be catalytic and work towards leveraging other financial flows for development. Nevertheless, Norway would benefit from further linking its political directives and policies, and its strategic management, operational approaches and administrative systems. As outlined further in Chapter 4, strengthening appropriate governance frameworks and structures at senior levels would help Norway improve incentives and oversight, to ensure the vision and accompanying policies are translated into effective and coherent programming.

Principles and guidance

Peer review indicator: Policy guidance sets out a clear and comprehensive approach, including to poverty and fragility

Norway has developed a comprehensive set of policy guidance that clearly establishes the priorities for its aid programme. However, further efforts may be needed to ensure this is translated into practice, and Norway’s approach to cross-cutting issues needs clarifying. The government’s growing focus on fragile and crisis-affected contexts will also need to be more coherent with its diplomatic and development efforts, supported by risk-management approaches that systematically inform strategic decision making.

Translating policy into practice

The 2016-17 white paper “Common Responsibility for Common Future” (Government of Norway, 2017b) defines five thematic priority areas for Norwegian development policy: (i) education; (ii) health; (iii) private-sector development and job creation; (iv) climate, renewable energy and the environment; and (v) humanitarian aid. It stipulates that climate and environment, global health, and peace and security are the most important global public goods in the context of Norway’s development policy, and supports these priorities with a clear set of policy guides.3

Norway’s focus on five thematic priority areas was clearly evidenced in its development assistance priorities in Uganda, where education, private sector development and renewable energy are areas of focus throughout the programme (Annex C).

Norway’s full set of guidance defines a clear approach to its aid programme. However, it does not feature guidance that directly outlines how Norway addresses poverty reduction and the “leaving-no-one-behind” commitments of the 2030 Agenda, nor does it assess whether existing guidance is effectively translated into decision-making processes. This weakness, along with relatively complex and centralised management structures, is an area that Norway could address – both to ensure policy guidance is effectively translated into practice and to strengthen the way learning informs policy development.

Norway’s approach to cross-cutting issues is not well understood and may limit opportunities to address sensitive issues and go beyond “do no harm”

Norway’s cross-cutting issues – human rights, women’s rights and gender equality, climate and environment, and anti-corruption – are also areas of co-operation in their own right. Strengthening gender equality, and the rights of women and girls, is a particular priority, with its own budget line (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Similarly, the environment is both a cross-cutting issue and a priority area in Norwegian development co-operation. Norway funds a range of climate initiatives, including on renewable energy, tropical-deforestation reduction and climate-change adaptation for developing countries. The 2019 budget proposes further increases in funding for development assistance targeting climate and the environment.

With regard to anti-corruption, as observed in Chapter 1, Norway has championed global efforts to fight illicit financial flows and corruption, and takes its domestic obligations seriously. Norway has an elaborate and multi-layered policy approach to tackling issues of corruption, and calibrates this to context. The range of measures includes anti-corruption risk assessments, zero-tolerance, ‘following the money’ and third party monitoring, which allows Norway to take a differential, tailor-made approach towards integrity in ODA. There are nevertheless further efforts that would continue to strengthen Norway’s approach (Chapter 4).

Norway’s approach to cross-cutting issues has recently shifted from “mainstreaming” these issues – which had proved challenging with regard to effective implementation – to adopting a “do-no-harm” approach. This is not well understood by staff or partners, either in headquarters or within Norway’s programme in Uganda. As such, the approach appears to be hampering implementation and does not emphasise the opportunities Norway could exploit to better leverage its strong relationships, as well as its engagement in strategic sectors and perceived neutrality, to scale up its dialogue with governments on sensitive issues (e.g. corruption and human rights). Furthermore, it may limit opportunities to go beyond “do no harm”, to actively pursue positive outcomes on these priority issues where appropriate and possible.

These limitations were also raised in the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) report, Quality of Reviews and Decentralised Evaluations in Norwegian Development Co-operation (Norad, 2017), which assessed the way in which cross-cutting themes were considered in reviews and decentralised evaluations of Norway’s programmes. The report concluded that cross-cutting themes were not adequately considered and that anti-corruption, in particular, was inadequately addressed.

Norway is scaling up its engagement in fragile and crisis-affected contexts

Norway’s white paper on global security challenges sets the government’s intention to strengthen Norway’s aid and development efforts in areas featuring a clear link between security, diplomacy and development (Government of Norway, 2015a). The opening of a Norwegian Embassy in Mali reflects a concrete engagement in that direction. While this approach makes sense, Norway has not yet started to apply a conflict lens to its overall programming in fragile contexts. Based on its experience in several countries, a more systematic use of conflict analysis would help ensure that Norway identifies and utilises the most appropriate diplomatic and development instruments in fluid environments.

As elaborated in Chapter 7, Norway’s humanitarian assistance is increasing, with an initial proposal of USD 630.5 million in 2019 (Government of Norway, 2018c). A significant part of Norway’s humanitarian funding is channelled through global funds, Country-based pooled funds, and core funding to multilateral agencies. While contributions to core funding for humanitarian assistance is good practice, it may entail a trade-off of limiting Norway’s visibility as an aid provider – particularly in fragile or sensitive contexts – and thereby have an impact on Norway’s ability to “leverage” its development co-operation to support political dialogue and diplomacy. Aware of this challenge, Norway designed in 2017 a framework for working in fragile contexts, which should strengthen the coherence of its diplomatic and development objectives in such contexts.

Norway’s commitment to scaling up its work in fragile and crisis-affected contexts is supported by a good understanding of risk management, including recognition of the potential impact of fiduciary, programmatic and reputational risks on the continuity and effectiveness of development co-operation. This commitment creates considerable risk tolerance throughout the aid programme. However, further efforts could be made to ensure that risk monitoring at a project and programme level systematically informs portfolio management and strategic decision making.

Basis for decision making

Peer review indicator: Policy provides sufficient guidance for decisions on channels and engagements

Norway’s policy is translated into increasing support for the multilateral system and civil society organisations. This approach would be better supported by a clear strategy to guide multilateral partnerships and clarify the synergies between multilateral and bilateral assistance. Furthermore, there is a risk that Norway’s approach and use of soft earmarking and “vertical funds” may contribute to fragmentation within the multilateral system.

Norway is prioritising its thematic and country focus, moving these partnerships “beyond aid”

The recent white paper “Partner Countries in Norway’s Development Policy” (Government of Norway, 2018a), highlights the need to develop clear criteria for partner-country selection. The white paper proposed concentrating on 16 countries, focusing either on strategic long-term co-operation on the basis of Norway’s competence and comparative advantage; or on highly fragile and unstable countries. In addition to aid, these partnerships should include all areas of co-operation relevant to development. The white paper, with its recommendations, was approved by the Storting in December 2018 and the proposed selection of partner countries and overall priorities was endorsed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now in the process of developing multi-year strategies for each of the 16 partner countries, which will further guide the development of the partnerships and provide an opportunity for Norway to strengthen its allocation policies and whole-of-Norway approach, thereby ensuring that its development co-operation reaches the most impoverished, disadvantaged and at-risk populations.

Beyond these efforts to reduce the number of partner countries, Norway is also focusing on fewer thematic areas, while continuing to pursue its development co-operation priorities through thematic initiatives targeting global public goods. Norway has also undertaken to reduce the number of grant agreements. The number of grant agreements fell from 7 000 in 2013 to 3 300 in 2017, however consultations with staff suggested that the number of agreements is still perceived as high, in light of staff administrative constraints (Government of Norway, 2018a).4

Elements of Norway’s use of multilateral channels are good practice, however, others could be strengthened with further policy guidance

Efforts to prioritise its focus on partner countries and thematic areas are complemented by Norway’s stated strategy of increasing support and use of multilateral channels to deliver its ODA. Norway’s aid also includes a relatively high proportion of funding for civil society organisations (CSOs), which implement a significant portion of its bilateral assistance (Chapter 3). The remaining share of bilateral ODA is mostly implemented by Norwegian embassies and Norad in the context of country programmes, and by other implementing agencies.

Norway’s emphasis on working through the multilateral system rests on strong support for the value of collective action, and the perception it can help magnify Norway’s voice and impact. It complements this approach through active participation in the executive boards of several multilateral development banks and UN agencies. It uses its influence to promote increased multilateral co-ordination and strengthened results-based reporting; it also participates actively in donor fora, such as the Utstein Group5 and the Geneva Group.6 Together with its Nordic partners, Norway played an instrumental role in shaping the policy negotiations in recent replenishments of the World Bank International Development Association (IDA); indeed, IDA17 is sometimes referred to as the “Nordic Replenishment.” Declaring contributions early reflects Norway’s consistent commitment to multilateral instruments.

Norway is a member of the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) and has contributed productively to developing common guidelines for governing bodies of the United Nations (OECD, 2013). Active participation in MOPAN has helped ensure the domestic need for accountability does not undermine nor duplicate its multilateral partners’ accountability structures. Interviews with multilateral partners have also shown that Norway is increasingly using joint evaluations; its policy of not duplicating structures or adding to administrative processes – except in instances where Norway is the sole donor to a programme or project – should be commended.

Although Norway’s approach represents good practice, synergies between multilateral and bilateral assistance are not adequately considered and systematically factored into decision-making processes. Furthermore, the development of clear criteria for core funding allocations could help to ensure that these investments are strategic and aligned with Norway’s stated priorities. Norway has an opportunity to address this in developing a new policy paper to guide its engagement with multilateral organisations, expected in January 2019.

Norway also needs to clarify its growing tendency to use soft earmarking and “vertical funds” to target specific thematic areas that are in line with its stated priorities; this approach has the potential to undermine the core development function of UN organisations and contribute to the fragmentation of the multilateral system by proliferating instruments (Chapter 5). Norway’s stated priorities in maintaining investments focusing on improving maternal health and reducing child mortality, for example, are largely pursued through such partnerships (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Together with Canada, the United Nations and the World Bank, Norway launched the Global Financing Facility (GFF) in 2015, to increase investment in maternal and child health in developing countries. While the GFF coordinates closely with the World Health Organisation and is seen as an important instrument in the fight against maternal and child mortality, engaging other donors in the facility has been slow in what is perceived by some as an already crowded space.7 Norway should continue to use its influence on the executive boards of multilateral organisations to promote core funding to UN agencies and thereby limit instances where its initiatives contribute to fragmentation.

By contrast, Norway’s strong engagement with CSOs is framed by a clear policy framework, and there are also clear commitments to strengthen partnerships with a diverse range of stakeholders – particularly the private sector and academia. This is in line with the Minister of International Development’s address to the Storting in April 2018 (Government of Norway, 2018a) that “aid alone is insufficient to achieve development and must be used strategically to mobilise other financial flows, including private-sector investment”. The emphasis on diversifying partnerships is also elaborated in Norway’s Research Strategy for the Foreign Service and Norad 2017-2024 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017) which articulates the need to foster high-quality research to help reduce poverty and promote sustainable development.

References

Government sources

Government of Norway (2018a), “Address on Norway's international development policy 26 April – Speech by Minister of International Development Nikolai Astrup”, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/address_policy/id2599458/.

Government of Norway (2018b), “Increase of NOK 250 million to humanitarian crises”, press release, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/humanitarian_crises/id2613687/.

Government of Norway (2018c), “Partnerland i utviklingspolitikken” (Partner Countries in Norway’s Development Policy), Meld. St. 17 (2017–2018), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-17-20172018/id2604526/sec1.

Government of Norway (2017a), The place of the oceans in Norway’s foreign and development policy, Meld. St. 22, Recommendation of 24 March 2017 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approved in the Council of State the same day (Solberg Government), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-22-20162017/id2544710/sec1/.

Government of Norway (2017b), “Common Responsibility for Common Future: The Sustainable Development Goals and Norway's Development Policy – Report to the Storting (white paper)”, Meld. St. 24, English summary, Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-24-20162017/id2547573/sec1/.

Government of Norway (2017c), Setting the Course for Norwegian foreign and security policy, Meld. St. 36 (2016-17), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-36-20162017/id2549828/.

Government of Norway (2017d), “Strategic framework for Norway’s engagement in conflict prevention, stabilisation and resilience building”, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/saarbare_stater/id2563780/?q=strategisk (in Norwegian).

Government of Norway (2015a) Global security challenges in Norway’s foreign policy: Terrorism, organised crime, piracy and cyber threats, Meld. St. 37 (2014-15), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/bdf4bd40d57d4dc79409de87419a2217/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150037000engpdfs.pdf.

Government of Norway (2015b) Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation, Meld. St. 10 (2014-15), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/261f255d028b42cab91ad099ee3f99fc/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150010000engpdfs.pdf.

Government of Norway (2015c), “Working together: Private sector development in Norwegian development cooperation”, Meld. St. 35, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e25c842a003d4892986ce29678102593/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150035000engpdfs.pdf.

Government of Norway (2015d) Globalisation and trade: Trade policy challenges and opportunities for Norway, Meld. St. 29, Report to the Storting, English summary, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/5927c017d6734983aec2103765c80c6a/en-gb/pdfs/stm201420150029000engpdfs.pdf.

Government of Norway (2014), “Education for Development”, Meld. St. 25, Report to the Storting (White paper), Government of Norway, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/118ab85ad919493699f9623aad5652fb/en-gb/pdfs/stm201320140025000engpdfs.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018), Norway’s humanitarian strategy – An effective and integrated approach, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/dokumenter/hum/hum_strategy.pdf.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017), “Research Strategy for the Foreign Service and Norad, 2017-2024”, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/research_strategy/id2571111/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), Freedom, empowerment and opportunities: Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy 2016-2020, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/fn/womens_rights.pdf.

Norad (2017), The Quality of Reviews and Decentralised Evaluations in Norwegian Development Cooperation, Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, Oslo, https://norad.no/contentassets/41a0207f132c4e69a338791bac88dda7/the-quality-of-reviews-and-decentralised-evaluations-in-norwegian-development-cooperation.pdf.

Office of the Auditor General of Norway (2018), The Office of the Auditor General of Norway’s investigation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative, Document 3:10, Delivered to the Storting 15 May 2018, Office of the Auditor General of Norway, Oslo, https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/en/Reports/Documents/NorwayInternationalClimateAndForestInitiative.pdf.

Office of the Prime Minister (2019), Granavolden-plattformen, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/politisk-plattform/id2626036/#samferdsel.

Office of the Prime Minister (2018), The Jeløya-platform, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/political-platform/id2585544/?q=political-platform.

Office of the Prime Minister (2013), Political platform for a government formed by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party Sundvolden, 7 October 2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/political-platform/id743014/.

Other sources

OECD (2018), Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-en.

OECD (2013), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review: Norway 2013, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Norway_FINAL_2013.pdf.

Notes

← 1. See recent white papers on “The place of the oceans in Norway’s foreign and development policy” (Government of Norway, 2017a); “Setting the Course for Norwegian foreign and security policy” (Government of Norway, 2017c)); “Global security challenges in Norway’s foreign policy: Terrorism, organised crime, piracy and cyber threats” (Government of Norway. 2015a); “Working together: Private sector development in Norwegian development co-operation” (Government of Norway, 2015c); “Globalisation and trade: Trade policy challenges and opportunities for Norway” (Government of Norway, 2015d); and “Education for Development” (Government of Norway, 2014).

← 2. See, for instance, “Common Responsibility for Common Future” (Government of Norway , 2017b) as well as the “Strategic Framework for Norway's engagement in conflict prevention, stabilisation and resilience building” (Government of Norway , 2017d)

← 3. See, for instance recent white papers on “The place of the oceans in Norway’s foreign and development policy” (Government of Norway, 2017a); “Setting the Course for Norwegian foreign and security policy” (Government of Norway, 2017c)); “Global security challenges in Norway’s foreign policy: Terrorism, organised crime, piracy and cyber threats” (Government of Norway. 2015a); “Working together: Private sector development in Norwegian development cooperation” (Government of Norway, 2015c); “Globalisation and trade: Trade policy challenges and opportunities for Norway” (Government of Norway, 2015d); “Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation” (Government of Norway, 2015b); and “Education for Development” (Government of Norway, 2014).

← 4. The reduction in the number of grant agreements has primarily been due to the closure of past or ‘inactive’ agreements that were awaiting the fulfilment of final reporting requirements, rather than a reduction in new or ‘active’ agreements.

← 5. The Utstein group is a loose association of six donor governments – Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – committed to promoting increased coherence, co-ordination and co-operation on various issues, including activities variously characterised as conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding.

← 6. The Geneva Group has existed since 1964.  Permanently co-chaired by the United States and United Kingdom, it consists of 17 members that possess “like-mindedness” on administrative and financial matters. The current members are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

← 7. The 2018 Global Financing Facility replenishment in Oslo saw Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Japan, Qatar and the United Kingdom contribute, along with Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. For Swedish concerns about fragmentation in the global system on health see https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)61049-2/fulltext.

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