

# STATES OF FRAGILITY AND OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

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# Working Paper

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# Abstract

This paper analyses official development assistance (ODA) to the 57 fragile contexts in the 2020 OECD fragility framework. ODA is a crucial, reliable resource for these fragile contexts and an indispensable part of their journey to sustainable development and peace. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members spent 63% of their net, country-allocable ODA in these contexts in 2018. Striving to protect this ODA, especially in light of the economic consequences of coronavirus (COVID-19), will be important to maintain sustainable development progress in fragile contexts as the 'Decade of Action' begins for Agenda 2030.

# Acknowledgments

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# Abbreviations and acronyms

CPA	Country programmable aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GNI	Gross national income
HDP	Humanitarian-development-peace
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	Public-private partnership
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UN	United Nations

# Executive summary

This paper discusses trends and approaches in official development assistance (ODA) to the 57 fragile contexts in the 2020 OECD fragility framework (OECD, 2020<sup>[1]</sup>). It is a background paper to *States of Fragility 2020*. It looks at ODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2018; analyses who is giving what, where and how using the latest data available from OECD DAC aid statistics (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>); and considers how DAC donors are differentiating their ODA across the 13 extremely fragile and 44 other fragile contexts.

The COVID-19 pandemic is having unprecedented economic, political and social consequences for fragile contexts. It will continue to put pressure on already weak health systems (OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>); exacerbate drivers of fragility that contribute to violent conflict and displacement, thus affecting prospects for sustaining peace (Monnier and Mayar, 2020<sup>[4]</sup>); and affect the resilience and human capital of these contexts in the long term. Author calculations, based on projections produced by the World Bank on 1 June 2020, suggest that 26 million additional people are expected fall into extreme poverty in fragile contexts by the end of 2020 due to the impacts of COVID-19 (Lakner et al., 2020<sup>[5]</sup>). In light of these challenges, the analysis in this paper can support the DAC as it strives to protect ODA budgets and allocate resources strategically to help fragile contexts respond to immediate humanitarian needs and preserve sustainable development gains in the long term. This analysis can also help DAC members target their ODA to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as address fragility as it manifests today and in the post-COVID-19 environment.

**ODA is a critical, reliable resource for fragile contexts, and DAC members recognise its importance.**

DAC member countries gave 63% of their net country allocable ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, which amounted to USD 60.3 billion. This is the highest share going to fragile contexts since 2013. In terms of volume, total DAC ODA to fragile contexts increased over 2017 but the mechanisms of distributing it changed: members' net bilateral ODA decreased slightly while their estimated multilateral ODA to fragile contexts has increased.

DAC members' ODA is critical to support fragile contexts' pathways to sustainable development and peace, especially when other sources of financing are not readily available. Its importance shows in clear relief when all resources going to fragile contexts are considered. Including bilateral ODA from non-DAC donors and outflows from multilateral agencies, fragile contexts received 2.3 times more ODA than foreign direct investment in 2018 but only 67% the value of remittances (113.5 billion) (Thompson, 2020<sup>[6]</sup>). However, in the 13 extremely fragile contexts, ODA outweighs both FDI and remittances by 11.5 and 2.5 times, respectively. Many fragile contexts are aid dependent, an assessment based on the ratio of all ODA to their gross national income (GNI). In extremely fragile contexts, the average ODA to GNI ratio is 19%. ODA is also heavily concentrated in certain fragile contexts, an asymmetry that creates so-called aid orphans and aid darlings. In 2018, 10 of the 57 fragile contexts received half of DAC members' net bilateral ODA to fragile contexts.

**The COVID-19 pandemic has had unprecedented economic effects on OECD DAC members and fragile contexts alike.** Acknowledging the pressures on public finances in all countries, members moved quickly to pledge to "strive to protect" ODA (OECD DAC, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>). In doing so, they recognised that ODA

is important to respond to immediate humanitarian needs in fragile contexts and to help such contexts build back better from the pandemic. DAC ODA to priority sectors for the COVID-19 response in fragile contexts such as health, education, social safety nets, water and sanitation, and gender is trending upward. While this is positive news and underscores good practices among DAC members, it is important to protect these gains to provide fragile contexts with the resources they need to safeguard their people's security and prosperity. This is not only in the interest of fragile contexts. It also aligns with members' broader priorities to provide global public goods and achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its aspiration to leave no one behind. ODA will be important to prevent the Decade of Action from becoming a lost decade by supporting developing countries, and especially fragile contexts, to protect sustainable development progress as they weather the pandemic and its associated socio-economic and political shocks.

**DAC members play a key role in fragile contexts through their ODA.** DAC members fund the multilateral system and are important actors in their own right. Through both their bilateral and estimated multilateral contributions, DAC members gave USD 12.7 billion in humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, of which 89% was delivered through either multilateral organisations or through nongovernmental organisations and civil society channels (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>). They also gave USD 55.5 billion in development and peace ODA, of which 73% was delivered through bilateral mechanisms. These allocations of ODA underscore the need for a coherent and co-ordinated effort by DAC members and their multilateral counterparts that strengthens complementarity across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.

**DAC members gave 25% of their bilateral ODA to humanitarian assistance, 62% to development and 13% to peace in fragile contexts in 2018** (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>). While the share of ODA allocated to humanitarian assistance has been declining since 2016, the share of ODA for development objectives increased in this period. Humanitarian ODA still makes up a sizeable portion of DAC members' ODA budgets, which is understandable given existing needs. However, there is potential to save and redirect money towards sustainable development by managing the root causes of humanitarian need, which is in line with the DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus. This calls for greater investment in a preventive and resilience-centred approach. As the analysis in this paper reveals, DAC members are adopting such an approach with their peace ODA, focusing on preventive measures in extremely fragile contexts and investing in efforts to reinforce basic state capacity in other fragile contexts.

**DAC members are adopting differentiated approaches to ODA across fragile contexts to respond to humanitarian needs and address drivers of fragility.** However, while ODA is addressing drivers of fragility to varying degrees, donors can do more to adapt financing to the specific needs of fragile contexts. This trend of differentiated financing is a positive development and reflects investments in context analysis. At the same time, 44% of DAC members' ODA in 2018 went to humanitarian assistance in extremely fragile contexts, compared to 12% in other fragile contexts. Only 12% of members' ODA went to environmental objectives in extremely fragile contexts, compared to 26% in other fragile contexts and 20% in non-fragile contexts. Similarly, the economic dimension received approximately half the proportion of the total ODA in extremely fragile contexts than it received in non-fragile contexts. In extremely fragile contexts, these allocations thus suggest a disproportionate targeting of humanitarian assistance relative to sources of risk and resilience to violent conflict and fragility that give rise to high levels of need. The OECD fragility framework can inform approaches that tailor financing to need across the five dimensions of fragility.

# 1 Official development assistance is a critical, reliable resource for fragile contexts

The focus of this paper is DAC members' official development assistance (ODA), which includes contributions from OECD member countries and European Union (EU) Institutions.<sup>1</sup> Fragile contexts also receive assistance from non-DAC donors. In 2018, all donors provided USD 76 billion in bilateral ODA to the 57 fragile contexts, which is a historical peak. Non-DAC donor countries contributed USD 13.4 billion, or 18% of this total.

DAC donors give ODA to fragile contexts in two ways: first, as bilateral ODA spent directly for their programmes in fragile contexts and second, as core contributions to multilateral organisations (multilateral ODA).<sup>2</sup> This chapter presents an overview of ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, considering both bilateral and multilateral ODA. A third category, multi-bi ODA, refers to bilateral ODA channelled to and through multilateral organisations that implement specific programmes on behalf of DAC member countries. Multi-bi ODA is discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. It should be noted that figures in Chapter 1 refer to net ODA unless otherwise specified, while Chapters 2 and 3 use gross ODA.<sup>3</sup>

Here are the key messages of Chapter 1:

- **ODA is a critical, reliable resource for fragile contexts, and DAC members recognise its importance.** DAC member countries gave 63% of their net country allocable ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, which amounted to USD 60.3 billion. This is the highest share going to fragile contexts since 2013. Member countries' estimated multilateral contributions to fragile contexts are driving this increase; while multilateral ODA has increased from the previous year, bilateral ODA has decreased.
- **ODA is vital to fragile contexts' pathway to sustainable development, especially when other sources of financing are not readily available.** Fragile contexts received 2.3 times more ODA than foreign direct investment in 2018 but only 67% as much ODA as remittances. However, in extremely fragile contexts, ODA outweighed both FDI and remittances by 11.5 and 2.5 times, respectively. The totals include ODA from all donors in addition to DAC members.


## DAC member countries gave USD 60.3 billion, or 63%, of their net country allocable ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, the highest amount since 2006

In both volume and as a share of country allocable ODA, DAC member countries increased their assistance to fragile contexts in 2018.<sup>4</sup> They gave a total of USD 60.3 billion in ODA to fragile contexts, including USD 38.2 billion of bilateral ODA and USD 22.1 billion of estimated multilateral ODA. This was the highest volume since 2006 and an 18% increase over 2015. This amount represented 63% of member countries'

global, country allocable ODA – the largest share allocated to fragile contexts since 2013. Figure 1.1 shows volumes of net ODA to both fragile and non-fragile contexts since 2000.

ODA will play an important role in the response and recovery to COVID-19. The precise implications of COVID-19 on the levels and delivery of ODA are unknown, although ODA levels have been resilient and stable across several crises in the past 50 years (Ahmad et al., 2020<sup>[8]</sup>). There are three possible scenarios for ODA in 2020: increasing budgets and supporting recovery; standing against headwinds; and struggling to maintain budgets (Ahmad et al., 2020<sup>[8]</sup>). It remains to be seen which of these scenarios will materialize in fragile contexts, but understanding current trends and patterns in the allocation of ODA is important to help members “strive to protect” gains in priority sectors.

**Figure 1.1. DAC ODA to fragile vs. non-fragile contexts, 2000-18**



Note: The total to non-fragile contexts does not include regional or unspecified ODA. The trend analysis is based on the same cohort of 57 fragile contexts defined in this report.

Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; (World Bank, 2020<sup>[9]</sup>), *GNI (current USD) (database)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD>.

### **DAC member countries are giving a larger share of their net ODA to fragile contexts through core contributions to the multilateral system**


Member countries' bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018 decreased by 3% from 2017, but their estimated multilateral ODA to fragile contexts increased by 12% in the same period (Table 1.1). The share of their ODA provided as core contributions to multilateral organisations also rose in 2018, to 37%, the largest since 2002. This allocation reinforces DAC members as key stakeholders in the multilateral system. It is even more pronounced in DAC member countries' ODA to the 44 “other fragile” contexts<sup>5</sup>, of which 42%, or USD 17 billion, is multilateral ODA – a historic high (Figure 1.2). As discussed in Chapter 3, this trend in multilateral ODA has implications for humanitarian, development and peace financing and the need for coherence and complementarity between bilateral donors and multilateral organisations in fragile contexts. In the 13 “extremely fragile” contexts, however, donors gave only 25% of their ODA through core

contributions to multilateral organisations. This difference suggests that multilateral organisations are targeting DAC members' core contributions to other fragile rather than extremely fragile contexts. Chapters 2 and 3 unpack the relationship between bilateral, multilateral, and multi-bi ODA by looking at how DAC members are implementing their ODA and specifically how they are doing so in the extremely fragile contexts through multi-bi ODA.

**Table 1.1. DAC countries' ODA to fragile contexts, bilateral vs. multilateral, 2017-18**

	Bilateral	Multilateral
Total ODA to fragile contexts	USD 38.2 billion	USD 22.1 billion
% change from 2017	-3%	+12%

**Figure 1.2. DAC countries' ODA to fragile contexts, bilateral vs. multilateral, 2000-18**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **Five donors account for 74% of DAC members' bilateral ODA to fragile contexts, with the United States remaining the largest single DAC donor overall to fragile contexts**


The United States provided USD 15.4 billion in overall ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, of which USD 13.3 billion was bilateral ODA. The next four largest DAC donors were the United Kingdom, Germany, EU Institutions and Japan. Together, these top five members gave nearly three quarters of all DAC bilateral ODA received by fragile contexts.

The United States delivered 86.5% of its ODA to fragile contexts through bilateral means in 2018, the highest proportion among DAC member countries. It was followed by Luxembourg (77%), Australia (75%), New Zealand (73%) and Iceland (72%). Including the EU Institutions, 17 of the 30 DAC members gave 50% or more of their total ODA to fragile contexts bilaterally. At the same time, many of the smaller donors gave the majority of their ODA multilaterally. France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain were the exceptions among larger donors in 2018, giving more than half of their ODA to fragile contexts as core contributions

to multilateral organisations. Figure 1.3 shows the amount of each DAC member's net bilateral and multilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 1.3. DAC ODA to fragile contexts by donor, 2018**

Net bilateral and (imputed) multilateral estimates




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **DAC members provide a significant proportion of their bilateral ODA to fragile contexts**

The share of each member's bilateral ODA given to fragile contexts varied across DAC members in 2018 (Figure 1.4). At the high end, Japan allocated 62%, or USD 3.8 billion, of its bilateral ODA to fragile contexts. It was followed by Luxembourg (53% or USD 182 million), Ireland (51% or USD 268 million), the United States (45%, or USD 13.3 billion) and Poland (44%, or USD 106 billion). In total, 14 DAC members gave more than a third of their total bilateral ODA in 2018, which includes both regional and bilateral, unspecified flows, to fragile contexts.

**Figure 1.4. DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts as a percentage of total bilateral ODA by donor, 2018**




Note: The denominator includes flows that are either bilateral unspecified or regional in nature.

Source: (OECD, 2020[2]), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

Figure 1.5 presents a measure of donor contributions to fragile contexts in 2018 as a share of their gross national income (GNI), which is a proxy for donor generosity. Among DAC member countries, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom and Denmark, in descending order, provided the most ODA to fragile contexts as a share of their GNI, including their bilateral ODA and estimated multilateral ODA. Fifteen DAC member countries gave more than 0.1% of their GNI as ODA to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 1.5. DAC ODA to fragile contexts as a percentage of DAC countries' gross national income by donor, 2018**



Sources: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; (World Bank, 2020<sup>[9]</sup>), *GNI (current USD) (database)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD>.

## ODA from both DAC and non-DAC donors makes up a significant portion of external financial flows to fragile contexts, highlighting its vital importance as support for sustainable development and peace


In 2018, fragile contexts received 2.3 times as much ODA as they did foreign direct investment (FDI) but only 67% as much ODA as remittances. However, in extremely fragile contexts, ODA outweighed both FDI and remittances by 11.5 and 2.5 times, respectively.<sup>6</sup> These estimates take into account bilateral ODA from all donors, including multilateral agencies and non-DAC donors, to provide a holistic perspective of financial flows going into each context. ODA is a stable and reliable resource compared to the volatility of these other financial flows (Thompson, 2020<sup>[6]</sup>). The relative weight of ODA as a resource for fragile contexts is likely to increase as the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are felt in capital flight and an expected decline in remittances from developing countries (Ratha et al., 2020<sup>[10]</sup>; UNCTAD, 2020<sup>[11]</sup>). This anticipated trend underscores the importance of striving to protect ODA (OECD DAC, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>).

### ODA is heavily concentrated in certain fragile contexts

In 2018, 10 of the 57 fragile contexts accounted for half of DAC members' net bilateral ODA to fragile contexts (USD 21.7 billion) and 20 contexts accounted for three quarters of their bilateral ODA. While ODA is slightly less concentrated than in 2016 and 2017, the trend has been relatively consistent over time and the distribution is consistent with the fragile contexts identified in previous States of Fragility reports (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>). The asymmetry in ODA allocation, which has resulted in aid darlings and orphans, is persistent and calls for greater co-ordination among ODA providers (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>).

The Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) received USD 9.9 billion of ODA in 2018, of which USD 6.8 billion was from non-DAC donor countries. Most of the ODA received by Syria was humanitarian assistance (USD 8.9 billion). The top five recipients of all donors' ODA to fragile contexts in 2018 were, in descending order, Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nigeria. Together, they accounted for 39% of total ODA to fragile contexts and 27% of DAC members' total bilateral ODA to fragile contexts. Afghanistan received the most bilateral DAC ODA to fragile contexts (USD 3.1 billion), followed by Syria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Iraq. Figure 1.6 shows the top ten fragile context recipients from all donors. A breakdown of 2018 ODA to all fragile contexts is provided on the States of Fragility Platform.<sup>7</sup>

**Figure 1.6. Total ODA by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Note: The figure includes ODA from DAC member countries, multilateral institutions and non-DAC donors.

Source: (OECD, 2020[2]), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

Syria also received the largest volume of ODA on a per capita basis (USD 591) from all donors to fragile contexts in 2018. As shown in Figure 1.7, the other contexts in the top five in terms of ODA per capita were West Bank and Gaza Strip (USD 490), the Solomon Islands (USD 299), Yemen (USD 280) and Djibouti (USD 187).

In terms of solely DAC members' bilateral ODA to fragile contexts, West Bank and Gaza Strip was the largest per capita recipient (USD 300), as it has been since 2013. The top five recipients per capita of DAC members' bilateral ODA in 2018 were consistent with the previous year. Additionally, both West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Solomon Islands have been the top two per capita recipients of DAC members' bilateral ODA since 2007. Several factors can explain their comparatively high per capita ODA: their small populations; the high per capita costs of aid delivery, for example in the Solomon Islands where the population is dispersed across numerous islands; and their exposure to crises, as is the case of West Bank and Gaza Strip. Operating costs to the delivery of ODA can be dramatically different in different contexts. The average fragile context in 2018 received USD 83 in ODA per capita from all donors and USD 49 per capita in bilateral ODA from DAC members. The ODA per capita figures also suggest that DAC ODA is concentrated in a few fragile contexts: 17 of the 57 fragile contexts received higher than the per capita DAC average in 2018.

Figure 1.7. Total ODA per capita by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018




Sources: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; (UN, 2019<sup>[13]</sup>), *2019 Revision of World Population Prospects (database)*, <https://population.un.org/wpp/>.

### **The top recipients of DAC members' bilateral ODA to fragile contexts are relatively consistent**

Afghanistan and Syria have been the top two recipients of net DAC bilateral ODA among fragile contexts since 2015 and Afghanistan has been the top recipient since 2009. In 2018, however, DAC members' bilateral ODA to Afghanistan fell by 7% from 2017. In the same period, their bilateral ODA to two of the other top five fragile contexts also declined: ODA to Ethiopia decreased by 7% (to USD 2.3 billion) and to Iraq by 13% (to USD 2.3 billion). The biggest decline in DAC bilateral ODA over 2017-18 was to Libya (by 38% to USD 265 million) and Kingdom of Eswatini (by 34% to USD 80 million). It is worth noting, however, that DAC ODA to Libya had increased by 219% from 2016 to 2017. The largest year-to-year increases in DAC ODA in 2018 were to Republic of the Congo (by 73% to USD 92 million) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (by 60% to USD 130 million); DAC ODA to Venezuela had increased by 124% from 2016 to 2017.

Aid dependent fragile contexts rely on ODA, and particularly DAC members' bilateral ODA, as an essential resource. A measure of fragile contexts' aid dependency is ODA as a share of their GNI. When total ODA from all DAC and non-DAC donors is included, the average ratio across the 57 fragile contexts is 8.5% in 2018. But this figure masks the significant variation among these contexts. For instance, the ratio is above 10% for 16 fragile contexts but above 20% for Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Central African Republic and Liberia, in descending order. For extremely fragile contexts, the average ODA to GNI ratio is 19%. This ratio, on average, is almost 3.5 times greater for low-income fragile contexts than for lower middle-income fragile contexts. Many of these aid dependent contexts are located in sub-Saharan Africa, and five fragile contexts in Western Africa – Liberia (20%), Gambia (15%), Sierra Leone (13%), Niger (13%) and Guinea-Bissau (11%) have an ODA to GNI ratio of more than 10%. Outside Africa, fragile contexts including Syria (74%), Yemen (30%), Afghanistan (19%), and Solomon Islands (15%) also have ODA to GNI ratios of 15% or higher. Figure 1.8 shows the ODA to GNI ratio for the top 20 most aid dependent fragile contexts in 2018.

Figure 1.8. Total ODA to GNI ratio of 20 most aid-dependent fragile contexts, 2018



Note: ODA to GNI ratios were calculated by the author for Eritrea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela to account for missing GNI statistics from source data.

Sources: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>; (UNSD, 2020<sup>[14]</sup>), "GNI at current prices – US dollars", *United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates*, <https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A103%3BcurrID%3AUSD%3BpcFlag%3A0>.

DAC members' ODA is an especially essential and reliable resource across a broad spectrum of fragile contexts. Members' bilateral ODA accounted for more than 10% of the GNI in seven fragile contexts. Moreover, the ratio of DAC members' bilateral ODA contributions comprises more than half of the total ODA to GNI ratio in 46 of 57 fragile contexts. As DAC members help fragile contexts transition away from ODA, it is important to consider in what ways these contexts rely on ODA as a source of finance and how ODA can help facilitate that transition (Piemonte et al., 2019<sup>[15]</sup>).

### What does this mean for DAC members?

ODA is a critical and reliable resource for fragile contexts that depend on donors for finance they cannot otherwise access. It thus plays an important role in these contexts' journey towards sustainable development. The consistency and magnitude of DAC members' contributions reflect this importance.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union Institutions, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. When reference is made in this paper to DAC member countries, these are the aforementioned members except the European Union Institutions.

<sup>2</sup> Multilateral ODA from DAC donors is imputed as an estimate. The DAC2a reports these flows as imputed multilateral ODA.

<sup>3</sup> Gross ODA is the amount that a donor actually spends in a given year. This amount becomes net ODA once repayments on the principal of loans are taken into account. While this chapter uses net ODA, Chapters 2 and 3 use gross ODA to discuss sectors, channels and purpose codes as such information is not available in net terms.

<sup>4</sup> Country allocable ODA excludes regional and bilateral unspecified flows to allow a clearer comparison of donors' allocations to fragile versus non-fragile contexts.

<sup>5</sup> Among the 57 fragile contexts on the 2020 OECD fragility framework, 13 are extremely fragile, while 44 are other fragile. Please see Desai and Forsberg (2020<sub>[61]</sub>) for further details on these categories.

<sup>6</sup> Thompson (2020<sub>[6]</sub>), *States of Fragility: Financing in fragile contexts*, provides estimates of FDI and remittances going to fragile contexts in 2018, using the most recent data available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database.

<sup>7</sup> The States of Fragility Platform has been updated to reflect ODA to the 57 fragile contexts in the 2020 OECD fragility framework as of September 2020. In the first quarter of 2021, the platform will be updated to reflect 2019 ODA statistics to the 57 fragile contexts. The methodological note in Annex 1 provides additional information on the methodology for calculating ODA statistics. The platform may be found in: <http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/overview/0/>.

## 2 Striving to protect official development assistance

The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic, social and political shocks will have important consequences for developing countries, including and especially fragile contexts (Marley and Desai, 2020<sup>[16]</sup>; OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>). It will affect both the allocation and delivery of ODA. The DAC Joint Statement on COVID-19 acknowledges this new reality, noting that “ODA is an important means of supporting national responses to the COVID-19 crisis” (OECD DAC, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>). DAC members are already using their ODA to respond to the “double hit of health and economic crisis” (OECD, 2020<sup>[17]</sup>; Moreira da Silva and Moorehead, 2020<sup>[18]</sup>). In their Joint Statement, DAC members affirm that they “will strive to protect ODA budgets” while also recognising that the crisis has brought unprecedented economic pressures on their countries. Members identified priority areas such as health, social safety nets and humanitarian needs, and they committed to support crisis transition and recovery.

An accurate picture of DAC members’ allocation of ODA is necessary to make the best strategic use of their funding in a post-pandemic world. Chapter 1 provides an overview of donors and recipients in fragile contexts. This chapter looks at where and how DAC members provided support in 2018, considering the distribution of gross ODA by sector and its means of delivery. It further focuses on ODA towards priority sectors in fragile contexts that will be and already are affected by COVID-19, with the aim of helping donors understand exactly what they are striving to protect.

Here are key messages of Chapter 2:


- Before the pandemic, DAC members’ ODA to fragile contexts was trending upwards in sectors that are especially relevant to the COVID-19 response including health, education, social safety nets, and water and sanitation, along with programmes that have gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective. This not only is positive news but underscores how important it is that members “strive to protect” these gains. In doing so, they support the security and prosperity of fragile contexts, which in turn serves the national interest of DAC member countries.
- Public sector institutions, multilateral organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society are the main channels of members’ ODA in fragile contexts. Multilateral organisations play an especially critical role in implementing bilateral ODA in extremely fragile contexts. Safeguarding these modes of delivery is important to ensure that ODA reaches the people who need it most in light of the impact of COVID-19.

### While DAC members reduced their gross bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, the decrease varied by sector

As noted in Chapter 1, DAC members’ gross bilateral ODA to fragile contexts declined by 3% in 2018 from 2017, amounting to USD 46.1 billion. Of that figure, USD 30 billion was country programmable aid (CPA), representing 65% of the total. Figure 2.1 shows the trend in DAC members’ CPA to fragile contexts

compared to their humanitarian assistance, which amounted to 25% (USD 11.4 billion) of DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. While the level of DAC CPA to fragile contexts has remained relatively consistent over time, with a 2% increase between 2010 and 2018, humanitarian ODA has increased by 44% in the same period.

**Figure 2.1. Country programmable aid compared to humanitarian assistance in fragile contexts, 2002-18**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

Despite the decline in DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts from 2017 to 2018, DAC members largely protected their ODA investments in certain sectors. ODA to social infrastructure and services declined by only 1%, humanitarian ODA by 8% and ODA to production sectors by 5%. Amid pandemic-induced pressures on ODA budgets and calls for greater humanitarian assistance, DAC members can continue to take stock of their sectoral investments and prioritise based on need and conditions in the coming months. Table 2.1 provides an overview of their gross bilateral ODA across categories and types of contexts.

**Table 2.1. Sectoral distribution of DAC members' bilateral ODA to fragile and non-fragile contexts, 2018**

Sector	Social infrastructure and services	Humanitarian	Economic infrastructure and services	Production sectors	Commodity aid/general programme assistance	Multi-sectoral responses
All 57 fragile contexts	USD 20.1 billion	USD 11.4 billion	USD 4.9 billion	USD 3.0 billion	USD 2.6 billion	USD 2.6 billion
13 extremely fragile contexts	USD 5.7 billion	USD 7.7 billion	USD 502 million	USD 569 million	USD 1.4 billion	USD 942 million
44 other fragile contexts	USD 14.4 billion	USD 3.6 billion	USD 4.4 billion	USD 2.5 billion	USD 1.2 billion	USD 1.6 billion

All non-fragile contexts	USD 17.2 billion	USD 2.3 billion	USD 12.8 billion	USD 3.2 billion	USD 920 million	USD 4.1 billion
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Note: This table does not include ODA to certain sectors.


Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Social infrastructure and services received 44% of DAC members’ gross bilateral ODA, or USD 20.1 billion

### Trends

The social infrastructure and services category includes the sectors of health, education, water and sanitation, governance, and conflict, peace, and security. In 2018, DAC ODA to social infrastructure and services constituted half the total in other fragile contexts but only one third of the total in extremely fragile contexts (Figure 2.2). In non-fragile contexts, social infrastructure and services received 41% (USD 17.2 billion) of total bilateral ODA, suggesting – at least preliminarily – a lack of differentiation of DAC members’ bilateral ODA to fragile versus non-fragile contexts in this category.

**Figure 2.2. Percentage of total DAC bilateral ODA to social infrastructure and services by type of context, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

In 2018, the leading DAC donors that gave to social infrastructure and services in fragile contexts included the United States (USD 7.0 billion), European Union (EU) Institutions (USD 2.5 billion) and the United Kingdom (USD 2.3 billion). The United States and the United Kingdom gave half or more of their bilateral ODA to fragile contexts towards social infrastructure and services. Together, ODA from the United States, EU Institutions and the United Kingdom comprised 59% of the total bilateral ODA going to social infrastructure and services. Figure 2.3 shows the top ten DAC donors to social infrastructure and services in fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 2.3. DAC ODA to social infrastructure and services in fragile contexts by top 10 donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Contexts

Analysis at the context level in 2018 suggests some differentiation. Of the 57 fragile contexts, 31 received more than half of their ODA from DAC members in social infrastructure and services, among them notably Zambia (78%) and the United Republic of Tanzania (62%). The majority of these 31 are other fragile contexts. However, Afghanistan, an extremely fragile context, received 60% of its ODA from DAC members (USD 1.9 billion) in social infrastructure and services and most of this in the sectors of governance and conflict, peace, and security. Figure 2.4 shows the top ten fragile context recipients of DAC ODA to social infrastructure and services in 2018.

**Figure 2.4. DAC ODA to social infrastructure and services by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **Humanitarian assistance made up 25% of DAC members’ gross bilateral ODA to fragile contexts, its lowest share since 2015**

DAC members provided USD 11.4 billion in bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, accounting for one fourth of their total bilateral ODA. While this is its lowest share since 2015, COVID-19 and the humanitarian challenges emerging from the pandemic may again result in a proportionate increase in humanitarian ODA in coming years. Chapter 3 analyses in greater detail trends in this sector in the context of humanitarian, development and peace ODA to fragile contexts.

### **Economic infrastructure and services (11%), production sectors (7%), commodity assistance (6%), and multi-sectoral responses (5.5%) received most of the remaining bilateral ODA to fragile contexts**


The category of economic infrastructure and services includes transport and storage, communications, energy, and banking (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), and it received 11% (USD 4.9 billion) of DAC members’ bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. The majority of this ODA went to transport and energy distribution. Among fragile contexts, only Bangladesh received a greater share of its total ODA (44% or USD 1.2 billion) in economic infrastructure and services than in other sectors. Japan was the largest DAC donor to economic infrastructure and services in fragile contexts in 2018 (USD 2.2 billion). ODA to economic infrastructure and services made up 3% (USD 502 million) of total bilateral ODA to extremely fragile contexts; in other fragile contexts, this accounted for 15% of the ODA (USD 4.4 billion) to other fragile contexts. By way of comparison, 31% of DAC members’ ODA (USD 12.8 billion) to non-fragile contexts went to the broad category of economic infrastructure and services, suggesting some differentiation relative to fragile contexts.

## **DAC members’ bilateral ODA to fragile states increasingly focuses on priority sectors and objectives related to health, education, water and sanitation, social safety nets, and gender**

COVID-19 presents a unique, multi-sectoral challenge to the security, stability, and development of fragile contexts (OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>). It will likely exacerbate the root causes and effects of fragility, and fragility will likely compound the impact of the pandemic. The OECD DAC (2020<sup>[7]</sup>) Joint Statement on COVID-19 highlights the need for investments in sectors related to the pandemic response including health, social safety nets and humanitarian needs. This section analyses ODA to these and additional sectors and objectives relevant to the COVID-19 response such as education, water and sanitation, disaster risk reduction, and gender. Such analysis is important to help ensure that ODA meets immediate humanitarian needs while also addressing the underlying drivers of fragility and capitalising on opportunities for a more sustainable and green recovery that builds forward better.

The volume of DAC members’ bilateral ODA towards health, education, social safety nets, and water and sanitation has trended upwards since 2010. Between 2010 and 2018, health ODA increased by 26%, ODA to social safety nets by 20%, and ODA to water and sanitation by 19%, education ODA by 6%. Striving to protect these investments is important as the COVID-19 crisis manifests in fragile contexts and precipitates economic and social shocks (OECD, 2020<sup>[1]</sup>). Figure 2.5 illustrates the volume of ODA in 2018 that went to four sectors particularly relevant for the pandemic response.

**Figure 2.5. DAC ODA to health, education, social safety nets, and water and sanitation in fragile contexts, 2018**



Note: The category of social safety nets includes the following purpose codes from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System: Social protection (16010), Basic nutrition (12240), Food assistance (52010), Emergency food assistance (72040), Employment creation (16020), Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries (24040), Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS (16064), Agricultural inputs (31150); and School feeding (11250), based on a schema introduced in Development Initiatives (2015<sup>[19]</sup>), with the addition of purpose code 11250.

Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **DAC members' bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts dipped slightly in 2018 but is still 26% higher than in 2010**


COVID-19 is likely to strain health systems in fragile contexts (OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>). In most fragile contexts, health systems are weak. They lack steady financing mechanisms, a properly trained and adequately paid workforce, well-maintained facilities, and access to reliable information (World Health Organization, 2020<sup>[20]</sup>). Furthermore, health facilities are often concentrated in capital or densely populated cities (OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>). Essential drugs are in short supply, and health infrastructure and personnel are often directly targeted in conflict-affected settings, which curtails health care capacity (Desai, 2020<sup>[21]</sup>). The World Food Programme (2020<sup>[22]</sup>) has warned of "multiple famines of biblical proportions" before the end of 2020 due to the pandemic, with the State of Food Security and Nutrition Report (2020<sup>[23]</sup>) estimating that the pandemic may result in an additional 83 to 132 million people being undernourished by the end of 2020. Moreover, evidence from previous pandemics suggests that as health systems are stressed and facilities have to prioritise certain health services over others, sexual and reproductive health services are scaled back (World Health Organization, 2020<sup>[24]</sup>). Such reprioritisation may increase the risk of maternal mortality and other adverse health outcomes for women and girls.

All of these challenges leave fragile contexts ill-equipped to cope with health crises such as COVID-19, especially amid conflict and displacement. It is thus useful to analyse how much DAC members are contributing to the strengthening of health systems in these contexts – not only to help fragile contexts respond to the health-related effects of COVID-19 such as on food security and nutrition, but also to prepare health systems in these contexts for future waves of COVID-19 and other pandemics.

### Trends

DAC members provided USD 7.1 billion of bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, amounting to 15% of their total bilateral ODA. This share reflects the average since 2010. Figure 2.6 shows that while the volume of health ODA declined from the previous year's historical peak, it was 10% higher than in 2015 and 26% higher than in 2010.

**Figure 2.6. DAC bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts, 2002-18**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

The United States was the top DAC donor to the health sector in fragile contexts in 2018, both in terms of volume (USD 4.3 billion) and as a share of its total bilateral ODA to these contexts (32%). It accounted for 61% of total DAC bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts. Other DAC members that provided significant health ODA include the United Kingdom (USD 722 million), EU Institutions (USD 325 million), Canada (USD 314 million) and Germany (USD 261 million). Figure 2.7 visualises the top 10 DAC donors of health ODA to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 2.7. DAC bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

Kenya (USD 644 million), Tanzania (USD 626 million) and Mozambique (USD 576 million) were the top three recipients of bilateral health ODA from DAC members in 2018. Adjusting for population, the top three recipients of health ODA per capita among fragile contexts were Eswatini (USD 48), Lesotho (USD 39) and the Solomon Islands (USD 29). It is notable that extremely fragile contexts were not among the top recipients either in total or per capita ODA; of these, only Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter DRC) was among the top ten recipients of health ODA in terms of volume and only Haiti was among the top ten in per capita terms. Figure 2.8 shows the top 10 fragile context recipients of health ODA from DAC members in 2018.

**Figure 2.8. DAC bilateral health ODA by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**

Top 10 fragile context recipients




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Purpose codes

The largest portion of DAC members’ bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts in 2018 (39% or USD 2.8 billion) was allocated for control of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS (Figure 2.9). The second largest portion (11% or USD 811 million) went to reproductive health care, followed by basic health (8% or USD 582 million). Of relevance to the COVID-19 response and recovery, basic nutrition (USD 421 million), infectious disease control (USD 245 million), and medical services (192 million) accounted for only 5.9%, 3.4%, and 2.6%, respectively, of DAC members’ health ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. While ODA for basic nutrition increased by 5% over the previous year, ODA for infectious disease control declined by 48%.

**Figure 2.9. DAC bilateral health ODA to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **DAC members’ education ODA to fragile contexts reached a new high in 2018**


The pandemic has precipitated a global learning crisis, with 1.2 billion children out of school due to lockdowns and other government measures (UNESCO, 2020<sup>[25]</sup>). Where possible, distance or virtual learning has replaced face-to-face engagement between students and teachers. These methods raise costs for education systems, even in the long term (Carvalho, Hares and Mundy, 2020<sup>[26]</sup>). School closures are also expected to widen existing inequalities, as many children do not have access to digital solutions at home (UN, 2020<sup>[27]</sup>). As of 1 September 2020, schools were still closed due to COVID-19 in 22 of the 57 fragile contexts (UNESCO, 2020<sup>[25]</sup>). These closures will affect children’s economic opportunities, livelihoods and human capital. For example, early evidence from Malawi’s National Public Commission suggests that closing schools for nine months will cost USD 5.2 billion in the long term. This cost dwarfs the expected benefits of these closures and of moderate restrictions on movement, which are projected to amount to USD 228 million (National Planning Commission of Malawi, 2020<sup>[28]</sup>). Projections from the United Nations Development Programme suggest that the average effective out-of-school rate for primary education in 28 fragile contexts (for which data are available) is expected to increase from 22% in 2019 to 34% in 2020 (UNDP, 2020<sup>[29]</sup>).

Even before the pandemic, education systems in fragile contexts were under stress and underfinanced compared to the scale needed to achieve learning for all, as called for in Sustainable Development Goal 4 (UN, 2019<sup>[30]</sup>; Steer et al., 2016<sup>[31]</sup>). The pandemic will exacerbate these disparities as domestic sources of education finance become more limited and households no longer have income to spend on education (Thomas, 2020<sup>[32]</sup>; Al-Samarrai et al., 2020<sup>[33]</sup>). Evidence from Madagascar and Malawi suggests that cuts in government spending on education led to declines in learning adjusted years of schooling (Al-Samarrai, Cerdan-Infantes and Lehe, 2020<sup>[34]</sup>). ODA will be a crucial resource to help fragile contexts continue to finance their education systems in light of the economic consequences of the pandemic.

### Trends

DAC members provided USD 3.6 billion of bilateral education ODA to fragile contexts, a historical peak (Figure 2.10). This represented a 3% increase over the previous year and 8% of DAC members' total bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. Indeed, DAC members' education ODA to fragile contexts in 2016, 2017 and 2018 were, on average, the largest ever. Striving to protect this progress will be important to support fragile contexts as they address the learning crisis triggered by COVID-19.

**Figure 2.10. DAC bilateral education ODA to fragile contexts, 2002-18**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

The top three donors to the education sector in 2018 were the United States (USD 782 million), Germany (USD 653 million) and the United Kingdom (USD 412 million). Together, they provided 52% of DAC members' total bilateral contributions to education in fragile contexts in 2018. France (USD 325 million) and the EU Institutions (USD 279 million) made up the rest of the top five DAC donors. Figure 2.11 shows the top 10 DAC donors of bilateral education ODA to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 2.11. DAC bilateral education ODA to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

*Recipients*

The 13 extremely fragile contexts received almost a quarter of DAC members’ ODA to education. Pakistan, which is not an extremely fragile context, was the top recipient of DAC education ODA (USD 356 million) among fragile contexts in 2018. Afghanistan (USD 251 million) and Syria (USD 163 million), both extremely fragile contexts, were the second and third largest recipients of education ODA (Figure 2.12) and also among the top ten recipients in per capita terms.

**Figure 2.12. DAC bilateral education ODA by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Purpose codes

DAC members targeted their education ODA to primary (USD 1 billion) and higher education (USD 953 million) in fragile contexts in 2018, and these two purpose codes accounted for 56% of total education ODA (Figure 2.13). Vocational training (USD 387 million) and education policy and administration (USD 379 million) each received 11% of the total in 2018. Notably, investments in school feeding (USD 249 million) amounted to 7% of the total education ODA. Given the links between schooling and children's nutrition, as noted by the World Food Programme (2020<sup>[35]</sup>), this purpose code may merit closer attention in DAC members' education spending.

**Figure 2.13. DAC bilateral education ODA to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.


### **DAC members' ODA for social safety nets in fragile contexts has trended upwards since 2010, reaching its highest level ever in 2018**

Social safety nets can be an important source of resilience against the economic and social shocks of COVID-19 (Bodewig et al., 2020<sup>[36]</sup>). As of 10 July, 2020, fragile contexts had implemented 113 social assistance measures in response to COVID-19 (Gentilini et al., 2020<sup>[37]</sup>). For example, in fragile contexts such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Republic of the Congo, governments have introduced or expanded cash-based assistance to alleviate the economic consequences of the pandemic, especially for the poor. With people in developing countries and fragile contexts facing lockdowns and other restrictions on movement, such measures can protect jobs and livelihoods, facilitate access to health care and education, help maintain trust and social cohesion between citizens and the state, and help countries prepare for future shocks (International Labour Organization, 2020<sup>[38]</sup>; ACAPS, 2020<sup>[39]</sup>). These safety nets are particularly important for women and other at-risk groups such as informal workers, children, and the disabled (Rutkowski, 2020<sup>[40]</sup>; UNICEF, 2020<sup>[41]</sup>). DAC members mentioned the importance of social safety nets explicitly in their Joint Statement (OECD DAC, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>).

### Trends

In 2018, DAC members allocated USD 6.9 billion (15%) of their bilateral ODA to fragile contexts for social safety nets. This was the highest volume historically to social safety nets and represented a 16% increase over 2010. Figure 2.14 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts over time. By comparison, non-fragile contexts received almost 5.5 times less ODA for social safety nets in 2018.

**Figure 2.14. DAC bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts, 2002-18**




Note: The category of social safety nets includes the following purpose codes from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System: Social protection (16010), Basic nutrition (12240), Food assistance (52010), Emergency food assistance (72040), Employment creation (16020), Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries (24040), Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS (16064), Agricultural inputs (31150); and School feeding (11250), based on a schema introduced in Development Initiatives (2015<sup>[19]</sup>), with the addition of purpose code 11250.

Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

The United States (USD 3.3 billion), EU Institutions (USD 1.1 billion), Germany (USD 766 million) and the United Kingdom (USD 745 million) were the top four donors of ODA for social safety nets, together accounting for 85% of DAC members' bilateral ODA to this sector. Figure 2.15 shows the top 10 DAC donors of bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 2.15. DAC bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

Yemen (USD 745 million), Syria (USD 674 million) and Ethiopia (USD 643 million) were the top three fragile context recipients of ODA for social safety nets in 2018, together accounting for 31% of members' ODA to this sector among fragile contexts. Seven of the top ten recipients of ODA for social safety nets were extremely fragile contexts. This is also the case for ODA in per capita terms, with South Sudan the top recipient (USD 54), followed by Syria (USD 40), and West Bank and Gaza Strip (USD 36). Figure 2.16 shows the top 10 fragile context recipients of DAC members' bilateral ODA for social safety nets in 2018.

**Figure 2.16. DAC bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Purpose codes

The social safety nets sector encompasses nine cross-cutting purpose codes. In fragile contexts in 2018, emergency food assistance received USD 4 billion in ODA, which was 58% of the total DAC ODA in that year allocated for social safety nets. The next largest amounts within this sector went to food assistance (USD 1.5 billion) and social protection (USD 427 million). Figure 2.17 depicts ODA for all nine purpose codes to fragile contexts in 2018. It is notable that ODA towards social protection, which is a subset of social safety nets, has trended downwards from 2010 to 2018, with the latter representing the lowest amount towards social protection in fragile contexts since 2007 (USD 427 million).

**Figure 2.17. DAC bilateral ODA for social safety nets to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **DAC members increased their bilateral ODA for water and sanitation in fragile contexts in 2018, the third consecutive year of ODA growth in the priority sector**


Access to proper water and sanitation facilities is important to prevent further transmission of the virus causing COVID-19 and to protect health and livelihoods. It is “the first line of defence” against COVID-19 (World Bank, 2020<sup>[42]</sup>). In the longer term, investments in water and sanitation infrastructure can bolster preparedness for more waves of COVID-19 and future pandemics. However, there is a lack of proper water and sanitation infrastructure in fragile contexts. For example, more than a third of the population of West Africa does not have handwashing facilities at home (OECD, 2020<sup>[43]</sup>). Additionally, the economic impact of the pandemic on livelihoods can mean limited access to essential sanitation products, such as soap, point of use water treatment, and menstrual hygiene products.

### Trends

Bilateral ODA for water and sanitation amounted to USD 1.9 billion (4%) of total bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018, an increase of 19% since 2010. Almost 80% of this ODA in 2018 went to the 44 other fragile contexts. While water and sanitation ODA to extremely fragile contexts had trended upwards since

2016, the amount they received was 3% lower than in 2010. Figure 2.18 shows DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA to fragile contexts over time.

**Figure 2.18. DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA to fragile contexts, 2002-18**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### *Donors*

France (USD 311 million), Japan (USD 274 million) and EU Institutions (269 million) were the top three donors of ODA for water and sanitation in fragile contexts (Figure 2.19). Nevertheless, flows from these three donors made up less than 50% of total ODA to this sector, which suggests that water and sanitation flows are diffused over a greater number of donors than is the case for other sectoral ODA. France, which allocated 12% of its bilateral ODA to fragile contexts for this sector in 2018, was the only donor among the top ten to spend more than 10% of its bilateral ODA for this sector.

**Figure 2.19. DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

West Bank and Gaza Strip (USD 141 million) was the top fragile context recipient of water and sanitation ODA from DAC members, followed by Bangladesh (USD 120 million) and Zambia (USD 107 million). ODA to the top five recipients comprised only 29% of the total, which suggests that not only are many donors providing water and sanitation ODA, but also that it is spread evenly across fragile contexts. Figure 2.20 shows the breakdown of the top ten fragile context recipients of DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA in 2018.

**Figure 2.20. DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Purpose codes

More than a quarter of DAC ODA for water and sanitation (USD 519 million) went towards water supply of large systems, followed by basic drinking water and sanitation (USD 402 million) and water supply and sanitation of large systems (USD 318 million). Striving to protect, and sustain, these investments in water supply and basic sanitation will be important to mitigate the transmission of the coronavirus in fragile contexts. Figure 2.21 highlights the distribution of DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA to fragile contexts across purpose codes in 2018.

**Figure 2.21. DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **DAC members spent 1.8% of their bilateral-allocable ODA on projects for which disaster risk reduction was a principal or significant objective**


COVID-19 has exposed systemic risks globally, and these risks have the potential to cascade and reinforce each other (Nadin, 2020<sup>[44]</sup>). Investing in disaster risk reduction (DRR) in fragile contexts can help ensure that meeting the immediate humanitarian impacts of the pandemic are complemented by longer-term investments in prevention, preparedness and the strengthening of resilience to future risks and shocks. The following discussion of ODA for this particular COVID-19 priority uses a policy marker<sup>1</sup> from the OECD Creditor Reporting System to analyse projects for which DRR was a principal or significant objective (OECD, 2017<sup>[45]</sup>).

#### Overview

In 2018, projects for which DRR was a principal or significant objective received USD 773 million of DAC bilateral ODA in fragile contexts. This amounted to 1.8% of total DAC bilateral-allocable ODA to fragile contexts; in non-fragile contexts, by comparison, such projects received USD 622 million, or 1.6% of the bilateral-allocable total (Figure 2.22). NGOs and civil society (USD 325 million) and multilateral organisations (USD 285 million) were the main channels for this ODA and together accounted for 78% of

the total ODA for which DRR was an objective. An additional 15% of the total (USD 115 million) was channelled through public sector institutions.

**Figure 2.22. DAC ODA for disaster risk reduction in fragile vs. non-fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### *Donors*

Sweden was the top donor of ODA with a DRR objective. It provided USD 348 million in ODA to such projects, accounting for 45% of total DRR ODA from DAC members. EU Institutions (USD 131 million) and Switzerland (USD 91 million) were the second and third largest donors. Together, these three donors account for about three quarters of DRR ODA. Figure 2.23 outlines the top five donors of DAC bilateral ODA with a DRR objective to fragile contexts in 2018.

Additionally, among all DAC members, Sweden gave the highest share of its bilateral-allocable ODA towards DRR projects (23%), followed by the Slovak Republic (23%) and Switzerland (13%).

**Figure 2.23. ODA for disaster risk reduction in fragile contexts by top five DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

ODA with a DRR objective was spread across a range of fragile contexts in 2018. Bangladesh was the top recipient (USD 67 million), followed by Ethiopia (USD 60 million), Afghanistan (USD 58 million) and Syria (USD 56 million). Haiti was the fifth largest recipient (44 million). The presence of three extremely fragile contexts in the top five recipients of ODA with a DRR objective highlights not only the need for such programmes but also their feasibility, even in crisis settings. Figure 2.24 outlines the top fragile context recipients of DAC bilateral ODA with a DRR objective in 2018.

**Figure 2.24. ODA for disaster risk reduction in fragile contexts by top five fragile contexts, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>

### *Pillars*

ODA with DRR as an objective was distributed evenly across humanitarian (47% or USD 365 million) and development projects (47% USD 363 million). The remaining 6% (USD 45 million), most allocated to land mine removal, is considered peace ODA.

### ***DAC members spent 45% of their bilateral-allocable ODA on projects for which gender equality and women's empowerment was a principal or significant objective, which is a historical peak***


Women are on the frontlines of the COVID-19 response and will be among the most heavily affected by the economic and social consequences of the pandemic in fragile contexts. Globally, they constitute two-thirds of the health care workforce and continue to bear the disproportionate burden of unpaid care and informal work, which has intensified during the pandemic due to out-of-school children, heightened needs for the elderly, and overwhelmed public health services (UN, 2020<sup>[46]</sup>; OECD, 2020<sup>[47]</sup>).

The pandemic has already affected women and girls' health outcomes and education opportunities globally and especially in fragile contexts. For example, for every three months that lockdowns continue, an additional 15 million cases of gender-based violence are expected to occur and an additional 2 million women may be unable to use modern contraceptives (UNFPA, 2020<sup>[48]</sup>). As mentioned above, sexual and reproductive health and services are likely to be deprioritized in responses to epidemics, with early survey evidence in West Africa suggesting that this has been the case, especially in urban centres (Laouan, 2020<sup>[49]</sup>). In fragile contexts such as Bangladesh and Tanzania, lack of mobility and information coupled with isolation and fear has discouraged women from reporting incidences of domestic violence (IRC, 2020<sup>[50]</sup>). Additionally, although early, sex-disaggregated evidence suggests higher mortality rates among men than women (World Health Organization, 2020<sup>[24]</sup>), the loss of primary income earners can indirectly affect women and girls' livelihoods. In Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, women reported a greater loss of income than men compared to a year ago, which also has adverse consequences for female-headed households (Hunter, Abrahams and Bodlani, 2020<sup>[51]</sup>). Finally, girls are more likely to be affected than boys from school closures and also less likely to resume attendance (Akmal, Hares and O'Donnell, 2020<sup>[52]</sup>). ODA will be an important resource to address women and girls' immediate needs and ensure that the recovery is centred on human rights and gender equality (van de Poel, 2020<sup>[53]</sup>).

### *Overview*

In 2018, projects for which gender equality and women's empowerment was a principal or significant objective received USD 19.6 billion, a 4% increase over 2017 and amounting to 45% of DAC, bilateral-allocable ODA to fragile contexts. However, only 11% of this ODA in 2018 is directed towards projects for which gender equality is a principal objective (Figure 2.25), which is the lowest share from 2010 through 2018. These findings align with the global trend among DAC countries (Bosch, Cerabino and Elgar, 2020<sup>[54]</sup>). In 2018, public sector institutions channelled 30%, or USD 5.8 billion, of this ODA to fragile contexts, followed by multilateral organisations (29%, or USD 5.6 billion) and NGOs and civil society (27%, or USD 5.2 billion). The fourth largest channel was the private sector, channelling 10% (or USD 1.9 billion) of such ODA.

**Figure 2.25. DAC ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts, 2010-18, by type of objective**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

The United States, providing USD 3.12 billion, was the top donor in 2018 of ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts. It was followed by the EU Institutions (USD 3.09 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 3.04 billion), Germany (USD 2.52 billion), and Sweden (USD 1.36 billion) as part of the top five DAC members (Figure 2.26).

On the other hand, among DAC members in 2018, Canada gave the largest share of its bilateral-allocable ODA towards gender equality and women’s empowerment (94%), followed by Iceland (94%), Greece (93%), and Sweden (89%). Ireland (83%) and Spain (74%) are also notable among donors giving more than USD 100 million towards gender equality and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts.

**Figure 2.26. DAC ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment in fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>

*Recipients*

Afghanistan (USD 1.6 billion) was the top fragile context recipient of gender equality and women’s empowerment ODA from DAC members in 2018, followed by Ethiopia (USD 1.4 billion) and Bangladesh (USD 1.3 billion). ODA to the top five recipients, which include Syria (USD 1.0 billion) and Iraq (USD 820 million), accounted for 31% of the total. Figure 2.27 shows the breakdown of the top ten fragile context recipients of DAC bilateral water and sanitation ODA in 2018.

**Figure 2.27. DAC ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Pillars

The majority of ODA towards gender equality and women's empowerment in 2018 went towards the development pillar, amounting to USD 12.5 billion, or 64% of the total. The humanitarian pillar received USD 3.7 billion of such ODA, or 19% of the total, while the peace pillar received USD 3.3 billion, or 17% of the total. These proportions have been relatively consistent since 2015. Figure 2.28 shows the distribution of gender ODA across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus from 2010 to 2018.

**Figure 2.28. DAC ODA for gender equality and women's empowerment in fragile contexts by the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, 2010-18**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Public sector institutions, multilateral organisations, and NGOs and civil society are the three main channels of aid delivery in fragile contexts

The final section of this chapter discusses channels of aid delivery in fragile contexts. The COVID-19 pandemic will affect aid delivery in different ways. Striving to protect ODA, as DAC members pledge to do, involves safeguarding these channels so that ODA reaches populations that need it. The seven main categories of channels are reviewed here and elaborated in Chapter 3 in the context of humanitarian, development and peace flows. Figure 2.29 provides a breakdown of the volume of DAC bilateral ODA across these channels in 2018. Beyond public sector institutions, multilateral organisations, and NGOs and civil society, DAC members channel their bilateral ODA through universities, colleges, or think-tanks, Public-Private Partnerships (PPs), the private sector, and other institutions. Together, these remaining channels account for 12% of DAC members' bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018.

**Figure 2.29. DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts by channel, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.


### **Public sector institutions**

Governments are adopting a range of measures to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, which is straining the capacity of governance structures worldwide (Hale et al., 2020<sup>[55]</sup>). The pandemic could affect the ability of public sector institutions, in both donor and recipient contexts, to deliver goods and services (Bteddini and Wang, 2020<sup>[56]</sup>; Khemani, 2020<sup>[57]</sup>). Supporting these institutions can help them mobilise the resources needed to respond to the pandemic and build back better in the longer term (Van de Poel, 2020<sup>[58]</sup>). Thus, it is important to consider to what extent DAC members are channelling their ODA through the public sector in fragile contexts.

#### *Trends*

In 2018, DAC members channelled 37% of their bilateral ODA (17.0 billion) to fragile contexts through public sector institutions, and more than half of this (USD 9.7 billion) was channelled through recipient governments. The proportion going through recipient governments varies in extremely fragile versus other fragile contexts. For instance, members channelled 22% of their ODA (USD 3.7 billion) to the 13 extremely fragile contexts through the public sector, but only 40% of this amount went through recipient governments. In the 44 other fragile contexts, members channelled 46% of their ODA (USD 13.3 billion) through the public sector, of which 62% went through recipient governments. This difference reflects donors’ willingness, or lack thereof, to use the recipient government as a channel in extremely fragile contexts. Figure 2.30 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA through the public sector in fragile contexts over time.

Figure 2.30. DAC ODA through the public sector to fragile contexts, 2010-2018




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

In fragile contexts, Japan (USD 3.7 billion), the United States (USD 3.3 billion) and EU Institutions (USD 3.2 billion) were the top donors channelling their bilateral ODA through public sector institutions (Figure 2.31). Together, these three donors accounted for 60% of the DAC bilateral ODA through the public sector in 2018. Japan delivered most of its bilateral ODA (84%) through the public sector in fragile contexts.

Figure 2.31. DAC ODA through the public sector to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

Bangladesh (USD 1.5 billion), Kenya (USD 875 million) and Iraq (USD 837 million) were the top three recipients among fragile contexts of bilateral ODA through the public sector (Figure 2.32). Bangladesh received 57% of its total ODA from DAC members through this channel. Only two of the top ten recipients, Iraq and Afghanistan, are extremely fragile. In the case of Iraq, 61% of the ODA it received through the public sector was channelled through the Iraq government. Among extremely fragile contexts, only Chad received more ODA channelled through its government, or 77% of its public sector ODA. In the case of both Iraq and Chad, public sector ODA reflected DAC members' budget support to the government.

**Figure 2.32. DAC ODA through the public sector by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Multilateral organisations


Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank are prominent actors in fragile contexts. There are many reasons why donors channel their ODA through these organisations. They are seen as having technical expertise, facilitating economies of scale with their global reach, and being politically neutral relative to their bilateral counterparts (OECD, 2018<sup>[59]</sup>). These characteristics make multilateral organisations important actors in the COVID-19 response, especially given the global scale of the pandemic. This section provides an overview of DAC members' bilateral ODA earmarked through multilateral organisations in fragile contexts.

### Trends

Multilateral organisations were the second largest channel of DAC members' bilateral ODA in fragile contexts, accounting for 28% (USD 13.1 billion) of the total in 2018. This ODA is termed multi-bi ODA. The majority of multi-bi flows (85% or USD 11.1 billion) went through different UN institutions, the highest ever share reported with the UN as the channel. The World Bank accounted for 11% (USD 1.4 billion) of multi-bi flows. In extremely fragile contexts, multi-bi flows accounted for 47% of bilateral ODA, with the UN channelling 87% and the World Bank channelling 9% of the multi-bi flows. The prevalence of this mechanism reinforces DAC members as key stakeholders in the multilateral system, especially in

extremely fragile contexts. In the 44 other fragile contexts, multi-bi ODA made up only 17% of the total, with the UN as the channel for 81% of this share. Figure 2.33 shows the volume of DAC multi-bi ODA to fragile contexts over time.

**Figure 2.33. DAC multi-bi ODA to fragile contexts, 2010-2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

The top four donors to fragile contexts – the United States (USD 3.4 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 2.1 billion), Germany (USD 1.8 billion) and EU Institutions (USD 1.7 billion) – also channelled the most ODA through the multilateral system (Figure 2.34). Almost half (46%) of the United Kingdom’s bilateral ODA flowed through multilateral organisations, while Germany channelled 37%, the United States 26% and EU Institutions 26% of their ODA through multilateral organisations. Among DAC donors, only Slovenia and Iceland channelled more than half of their ODA as multi-bi flows. In extremely fragile contexts, however, 14 of the 30 members delivered more than half as multi-bi ODA.

Figure 2.34. DAC multi-bi ODA to fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

Given members' focus on multi-bi ODA in extremely fragile contexts, as indicated by these figures, it is not surprising that all but one of the top ten recipients of multi-bi ODA are extremely fragile, with Zimbabwe being the sole other fragile context in the group. Five of these top recipients – Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen – received more than half of their ODA through multilateral organisations. ODA was delivered predominantly as multi-bi flows in 11 of the 57 fragile contexts. Figure 2.35 provides a breakdown of DAC multi-ODA to the top 10 fragile context recipients in 2018.

Figure 2.35. DAC multi-bi ODA by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.


## NGOs and civil society

NGOs and civil society remain at the front line of the COVID-19 response, especially in remote areas, where the capacity and reach of public sector institutions is limited (OECD, 2020<sup>[3]</sup>; Van de Poel, 2020<sup>[58]</sup>). In addition to filling gaps in service delivery, civil society plays an important role in sharing information about the virus, providing a sense of community and solidarity among people confined to their homes, and advocating for increased attention to groups disadvantaged by the pandemic (Brechenmacher, Carothers and Youngs, 2020<sup>[60]</sup>). At the same time, lockdowns and other government measures have the potential to disrupt civil society activity, particularly their ability to reach populations in need (Brechenmacher, Carothers and Youngs, 2020<sup>[60]</sup>). This section analyses the extent to which DAC members channel their bilateral ODA through NGOs and civil society in fragile contexts.

### Trends

DAC members channelled 23% of their bilateral ODA, or USD 10.5 billion, through NGOs and civil society in fragile contexts overall. The proportions are similar across both extremely fragile and other fragile contexts: civil society channelled 24% of DAC members’ ODA in extremely fragile contexts and 22% of their ODA in other fragile contexts. In fragile contexts overall in 2018, 65% of the bilateral ODA channelled through NGOs and civil society went through donor country-based NGOs, 27% through international NGOs and 7% through NGOs based in the context receiving the ODA. Figure 2.36 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA being channelled through NGOs and civil society in fragile contexts over time.

**Figure 2.36. DAC bilateral ODA through NGOs and civil society in fragile contexts, 2010-2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Donors

Contributions from the United States accounted for 39% (USD 3.4 billion) of all DAC bilateral ODA channelled through civil society in fragile contexts. This was three times higher than the share of the second

largest donor, EU Institutions, which accounted for 13% (USD 1.7 billion) of the ODA delivered through civil society. The other top five donors of ODA delivered through civil society were the United Kingdom (USD 861 million), Germany (USD 637 million) and Sweden (USD 546 million) (Figure 2.37).

**Figure 2.37. DAC bilateral ODA through NGOs and civil society in fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### *Recipients*

Syria (USD 897 million), Ethiopia (USD 685 million) and DRC (USD 567 million) were the top 3 fragile context recipients of DAC members' bilateral ODA to and through NGOs and civil society in 2018. Of the top 10 recipients (Figure 2.38), 5 are extremely fragile contexts and together, they receive almost half of all bilateral ODA that DAC members channelled through civil society in the 13 extremely fragile contexts. Civil society is the predominant channel of delivery in only 7 of the 57 fragile contexts, and only 2 of these 7 are extremely fragile.

Figure 2.38 DAC bilateral ODA through NGOs and civil society by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### What does this mean for DAC members?

This chapter highlights where and how – in which sectors, through what mechanisms (e.g., public sector institutions, multilateral organisations, and NGOs and civil society), and in what proportions – DAC members are delivering bilateral ODA to fragile contexts. Amid the uncertainties and unprecedented economic pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, this analysis can help to guide DAC members as they strive to protect ODA in the most strategic manner. The crisis will have an impact on the priorities in donors' ODA budgets. This chapter provides an evidentiary basis upon which DAC members can assess their ODA allocation to ensure it is reaching the contexts, and people, that need it the most.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> It is not possible to analyse trends over time with this marker, however, as it is only available for the most recent year of reporting, which is 2018.

# 3 Coherence across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus

The DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus, adopted in February 2019, calls for the coherence, complementarity and co-ordination of activities among actors in fragile contexts. Financing is an important aspect of this framework.

This chapter provides an overview of official development assistance (ODA) across the three pillars of the HDP nexus to inform members' financing strategy. It builds on the Chapter 2 analysis of mostly development-related sectors to compare this ODA to humanitarian and peace flows. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the extent to which DAC members' ODA is targeting the drivers of fragility. The analysis in this chapter focuses on DAC members' gross bilateral ODA, unless otherwise noted.

The COVID-19 pandemic will affect the scale and distribution of assistance across the HDP nexus, especially as donors look to balance funding for immediate humanitarian needs that arise from the pandemic with their support for long-term peace and development in fragile contexts. Anticipating this, the DAC Joint Statement on COVID-19 (OECD DAC, 2020<sup>[7]</sup>) calls for a coherent and co-ordinated HDP response, especially in least developed countries of which 36 are fragile contexts (Desai and Forsberg, 2020<sup>[61]</sup>). An analysis of ODA across the HDP nexus in 2018 can thus guide members' responses to ensure that they are complimentary and tailored to specific conditions in each fragile context.

- Coherence is important among bilateral and multilateral actors that are working across the humanitarian, development and peace nexus. Trends in the allocation of ODA reinforce the unique role of DAC members as both stakeholders in the multilateral system and actors in fragile contexts in their own right.
- The majority of assistance to fragile contexts is focused on the pillars of development and peace, though a sizeable portion still goes to the humanitarian pillar. DAC members gave 25% of their bilateral ODA to the humanitarian sector, 62% to development and 13% to peace in 2018.
- Based on the data and evidence below, DAC members are pursuing differentiated approaches to respond to needs and drivers of fragility across fragile contexts. While this is a positive sign, members could do more to calibrate their financing to specific risks and coping capacities to fragility within each context.


## **In fragile contexts, DAC member countries use multilateral organisations as a channel to deliver most of their humanitarian ODA and bilateral mechanisms as a channel for development and peace ODA**

DAC member countries, including through their core contributions to multilateral organisations, gave USD 12.7 billion in humanitarian ODA to the 57 fragile contexts in 2018, of which 89% went through multilateral and civil society channels. At the same time, they gave a total of USD 55.5 billion in development and peace ODA, of which 73% went through bilateral mechanisms. These figures underscore the need for a coherent and co-ordinated approach among bilateral and multilateral actors in fragile contexts. As noted

in Chapters 1 and 2, DAC members are key stakeholders in the multilateral system, both funding the core work of multilateral organisations and implementing programmes through these organisations. DAC members also are important actors in their own right. The DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus specifically recognises this, stating that “a more coherent and coordinated effort that strengthens complementarity across the ‘nexus’ must involve a central role for OECD-DAC members in their collaboration with the multilateral system” (OECD DAC, 2019<sup>[62]</sup>).


The following sections elaborate on DAC members’ bilateral humanitarian, development and peace ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 provide a comparative overview of these flows, both over time and across DAC donors in 2018. Understanding the distribution of these flows is important to inform coherent and co-ordinated financing strategies that complement each other in fragile contexts.

**Figure 3.1. DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts across the HDP nexus, 2002-18**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

**Figure 3.2. DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts across the HDP nexus by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### A majority of DAC members’ bilateral ODA to fragile contexts overall is development-focused, but the proportion varies according to the severity of fragility

This section presents a broad overview of trends in development-focused ODA as a basis for comparison with humanitarian and peace flows. Chapter 2 presents a more detailed discussion of trends in priority sectors that fall under development-focused ODA.

#### Trends


Of the three pillars of the nexus, development historically is allocated the most funding in fragile contexts overall. It received USD 28.7 billion in 2018 or 62% of total bilateral ODA, the highest share since 2014. This indicates that DAC members are increasingly directing their resources towards sectors that promote long-term, sustainable development. The share of ODA for development varied across different categories of fragility in 2018. In extremely fragile contexts, DAC members directed only 42% (USD 14.4 billion) of their ODA to development objectives; this was less than their humanitarian ODA, which amounted to 49% of the total (USD 16.7 billion). However, in other fragile contexts, 81% of ODA (USD 39.3 billion) went to development. Figure 3.1 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts for the development pillar of the nexus over time.

#### Donors

In 2018, the top three donors of development-focused ODA to fragile contexts were the United States (USD 8.1 billion), Japan (USD 3.9 billion) and European Union (EU) Institutions (USD 3.8 billion) (Figure 3.3). The United States’ share of the total (28%) is double that of the second largest donor (Japan) and together, these three DAC donors provided 55% of total development-focused flows. Additionally, half of all DAC donors gave more than 50% of their total bilateral ODA to the development sector, with France

(94%), Japan (89%), Korea (78%) and Australia (66%) giving the highest shares among the top DAC donors.

**Figure 3.3. DAC bilateral ODA to the development pillar of the nexus in fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Recipients

As seen in the analysis of priority sectors in Chapter 2, development-focused ODA was spread relatively evenly across fragile contexts (Figure 3.4). ODA to the top five fragile context recipients – Bangladesh (USD 2.11 billion), Ethiopia (USD 1.68 billion), Afghanistan (USD 1.53 billion), Kenya (USD 1.52 billion) and Tanzania (USD 1.47 billion) – made up only 29% of total ODA to the development sector, with the top recipient, Bangladesh, accounting for only 7% of the total. Development ODA amounted to more than three quarters of the total ODA in 31 of the 57 fragile contexts; contexts in which it makes up less than half the total ODA are predominantly extremely fragile. Exceptions among extremely fragile contexts were Haiti, where development-focused ODA accounts for 82% of the total, and Burundi, where it made up 70%. Libya was another exception. While it is not in the extremely fragile grouping, Libya also has the lowest share of development-focused ODA (18%) among all fragile contexts, which is explained by its high share of peace ODA.

**Figure 3.4. DAC bilateral ODA to the development pillar of the nexus by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sub>[2]</sub>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Humanitarian ODA comprised 45% of bilateral ODA in extremely fragile contexts, 13% in other fragile contexts and only 6% in non-fragile contexts

#### Trends

Donors’ humanitarian ODA in 2018 is responding to acute needs in crisis-affected, extremely fragile contexts including Yemen, Syria and Central African Republic. Such response-driven assistance often alternates with strategic investments to address drivers of fragility. This allocation leads to further cycles of increasing need and response (OECD, 2018<sub>[12]</sub>). Almost 70% of the humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts is concentrated in the 13 extremely fragile contexts. Figure 3.1 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts for the humanitarian pillar of the nexus over time.

Although the volume of DAC bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts declined by 8% since the 2017 historical peak of USD 12.3 billion, the 2018 total was still 44% higher than it was in 2010. This increase over time supports the argument in *States of Fragility 2018* that the humanitarian system is overstretched by demands to respond beyond its life-saving mandate (OECD, 2018<sub>[12]</sub>) – and especially so if non-DAC donors’ humanitarian assistance to fragile contexts in 2018 (USD 8.6 billion) is also taken into account. The increasing volume of humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts highlights the importance of an approach that prioritises prevention always, development when possible and humanitarian only when necessary.


As discussed in Chapter 2, it is likely that COVID-19 will exacerbate the need for humanitarian assistance in crisis contexts. In anticipation of need, the initial COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan called for USD 2.1 billion in additional humanitarian funding through December 2020 (UN, 2020<sub>[63]</sub>). The latest update to the plan raises funding requirements to USD 10.31 billion, of which 23.4% have been funded as of 4 September, 2020 (FTS, 2020<sub>[64]</sub>). COVID-19 calls for both flexibility in humanitarian financing, so that funding can be redirected to where it is most needed in the short term, and a complimentary approach of development and peace financing to address the drivers of crises and fragility, reduce humanitarian need over time, build resilience to risks and shocks, and generate more sustainable development outcomes.

## Donors

The United States accounted for a third of humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts (USD 3.8 billion) in 2018 and a third of all such ODA to extremely fragile contexts (USD 2.6 billion). Germany (USD 1.9 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 1.5 billion) and EU Institutions (USD 1.4 billion) were the next largest humanitarian donors, with Canada (USD 495 million) a distant fifth. Together, the top four donors accounted for three quarters of total humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts. Figure 3.5 shows the breakdown of DAC bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts by donor in 2018.

Slovenia was the only DAC member that gave more than half of its total bilateral ODA as humanitarian funding. The top donors, with the exception of EU Institutions, used the mechanism of multilateral organisations and delivered the majority of their humanitarian ODA as multi-bi ODA. For example, 60% of the United States' bilateral humanitarian ODA was multi-bi, as was more than 70% of the bilateral humanitarian ODA of Germany and the United Kingdom'. Among donors that gave more than USD 100 million in humanitarian ODA, Korea (88%), Japan (84%) and the United Kingdom (72%) allocated the highest share delivered using a multi-bi channel.

**Figure 3.5. DAC bilateral ODA to the humanitarian pillar of the nexus in fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Recipients

Among fragile contexts, four of the top five recipients are extremely fragile and together accounted for more than half of all humanitarian funding. Syria (USD 2.1 billion) was the top humanitarian recipient in 2018, followed by Yemen (USD 1.2 billion), Iraq (USD 1.2 billion), South Sudan (USD 792 million) and Nigeria (722 million), the latter being the only context in the top five that is not extremely fragile (Figure 3.6). Syria was also the top per capita recipient (USD 124), followed by South Sudan (USD 72) and West Bank and Gaza Strip (USD 69). Humanitarian ODA comprised more than half of the total ODA in 7 of the 57 fragile contexts. Among these were 2 contexts in which it accounted for more than 60% of ODA: Yemen (77%) and Syria (67%).

**Figure 3.6. DAC bilateral ODA to the humanitarian pillar of the nexus by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **Purpose codes**

Humanitarian assistance is covered in five OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) purpose codes, elaborated in Figure 3.7. DAC members' humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts in 2018 was evenly split between emergency food assistance, on one hand, and material relief assistance and services, on the other, with each receiving 35% (USD 4 billion) of total DAC bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts. Relief co-ordination and support services received 21% of bilateral humanitarian ODA (USD 2.3 billion) and immediate, post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation received only 7% (USD 764 million). The remaining 2% went to multi-hazard response preparedness (USD 222 million). Figure 3.7 provides a breakdown of DAC bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts by purpose code in 2018.

**Figure 3.7. DAC bilateral humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

## Peace ODA has increased since 2015, with 13% of total DAC ODA going towards peace-related objectives in 2018

DAC members spent 13% of their ODA to fragile contexts (USD 6.1 billion) in purpose code activities and sectors related to peace. This section examines trends in this ODA in line with thematic focus on peace actors in *States of Fragility 2020* (OECD, 2020<sup>[1]</sup>).<sup>1</sup> The definitions of peace ODA used here are drawn from *States of Fragility 2018* (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (2017<sup>[65]</sup>) report on the cost-effectiveness of peacebuilding that outlines 16 purpose codes from the OECD CRS that together comprise peace ODA. These purpose codes aim to capture core and secondary peacebuilding activities related to basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, and core government functions (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017<sup>[65]</sup>). There are alternative definitions, used by institutions such as the United Nations, to measure ODA contributions to peacebuilding (Jenks and Topping, 2019<sup>[66]</sup>). The OECD also will review and update these codes over the coming months to reflect recent developments and particularly will build on the analysis from *States of Fragility 2020*.

### Trends


DAC members’ peace ODA to fragile contexts has trended broadly downwards since the start of the decade, decreasing by 12% in real terms over the 2010-18 period. However, it has increased modestly since 2015. As a share of total ODA from 2015 through 2018, peace ODA was relatively stable, at 13.5% on average, in all 57 fragile contexts. During this same period, by comparison, the shares of ODA going to the humanitarian and development pillars shifted, with the latter increasing at the expense of the former in some contexts. In 2018, peace ODA made up 17% of total ODA in extremely fragile contexts and 11% of total ODA in other fragile contexts. It accounted for 14% of the total in non-fragile contexts, which was 3 percentage points higher than in 2017 and a historical peak. However, peace ODA as a share of total bilateral ODA in extremely fragile contexts declined by 12 percentage points between 2012 and 2018. This decline coincided with both a 19-percentage point increase in humanitarian ODA to extremely fragile contexts as a share of the total and a slight recovery of development-focused ODA as a share of the total

over the same 2016-18 time period. Figure 3.1 shows the volume of DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts for the peace pillar of the nexus over time.

### Donors

Top donors of peace ODA in fragile contexts (Figure 3.8) in 2018 were the United States (USD 1.5 billion), EU Institutions (1.2 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 737 million), Germany (USD 676 million) and Sweden (USD 342 million). Together, their allocations made up close to three quarters of peace ODA to fragile contexts, with the United States accounting for one quarter of the total. The United States' peace ODA represented only one tenth of its total bilateral ODA to fragile contexts in 2018. Poland, with half of its ODA going to peace, was the only DAC donor to spend more than one quarter of its bilateral ODA to fragile contexts on peace. Seven donors in addition to Poland spent more than one fifth of their total bilateral ODA on peace.

**Figure 3.8. DAC bilateral ODA to the peace pillar of the nexus in fragile contexts by top 10 DAC donors, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### Recipients

DAC members' peace ODA is distributed relatively evenly across fragile contexts apart from Afghanistan and Iraq (Figure 3.9). Afghanistan received 20% of total DAC bilateral peace ODA to fragile contexts, or USD 1.2 billion; Iraq received 8% of DAC members' peace ODA, or USD 457 million in 2018. Only 37% of DAC members' peace ODA globally went to the 57 fragile contexts, the lowest share since 2003. This decline reflects that peace ODA is going to countries such as Jordan (USD 881 million), Colombia (USD 602 million) and Indonesia (562 million) that, while conflict-affected or facing challenges sustaining peace, are not included as fragile contexts in the OECD fragility framework.

Peace ODA represented close to 50% (USD 130 million) of the total ODA received by Libya and a substantial proportion of total ODA to Afghanistan (38%), Guatemala (29%) and Honduras (26%). That these contexts are top recipients suggests there is regional diversity in peace ODA, as fragile contexts in South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Africa received similar proportions of peace assistance.

**Figure 3.9. DAC bilateral ODA to the peace pillar of the nexus by top 10 fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **Purpose codes and categories of peace**

Peace ODA is reported across 16 different purpose codes that correspond to activities related to governance and conflict, peace, and security (Figure 3.10). DAC members’ peace ODA funded similar activities across both extremely fragile and other fragile contexts. The majority of this ODA in 2018 went to four priority purpose codes related to justice, inclusion in peace processes and building state capacity: 19% (USD 1.2 billion) went for civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; 16% (USD 973 million) for legal and judicial development; 14% (USD 879 million) for public sector policy and administrative management; and 11% (USD 671 million) for democratic participation and civil society. Funding was distributed evenly to the remaining purpose codes. The purpose codes that comprise conflict, peace, and security ODA – an approximation for investments for conflict prevention (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>) – amount to USD 2.0 billion in 2018, or 4% of total DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts.

While DAC members emphasised these activities to different degrees across extremely fragile, other fragile and non-fragile contexts, the first three of the aforementioned priority purpose codes consistently received the most funding from DAC members. Notably, a higher proportion of peace ODA went for human rights in other fragile contexts (9%) than in extremely fragile (4%) and non-fragile (6%) contexts. Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution received a much greater share of peace ODA in extremely fragile contexts (26%) than in other fragile contexts (13%); funding for these activities also has increased significantly since 2012, both in volume and as a proportion of all peace ODA, in fragile contexts overall. In 2018, 34% of peace ODA went towards institution building (public sector policy and administrative management) in non-fragile contexts compared to 15% in extremely fragile contexts and 13% in other fragile contexts. However, DAC members gave a similar share of their peace ODA to legal and judicial development activities across contexts. It amounted to 17.5% of the total in extremely fragile contexts and 15% in both other fragile contexts and non-fragile contexts. Notably, the share of peace ODA for legal and judicial development has been consistent over 2010-18 in other fragile contexts but decreased significantly in extremely fragile and non-fragile contexts since 2015. Notably, despite various UN Security Council resolutions on children in armed conflict, ODA to the prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers is still underfunded relative to the other purpose codes in the peace pillar.


**Figure 3.10. DAC bilateral ODA to the peace pillar of the nexus to fragile contexts by purpose code, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

In sum, these trends suggest that DAC members are focusing their efforts on specific priorities, as shown by the concentration of peace ODA in a handful of purpose codes, and that funding for other types of activities has remained relatively even and constant over time. Part of the reason for this allocation could be definitional issues surrounding the ODA eligibility of peace and security activities. The distribution of peace ODA also suggests that in extremely fragile contexts, donors are focusing more on efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict, including on activities undertaken for post-conflict reconstruction such as the removal of landmines. In other fragile and non-fragile contexts, however, there is an emphasis on funding core functions of the state such as justice, public sector institutions, public financial management and even subnational governance. Figure 3.11, which shows the proportion of peace ODA across categories of peacebuilding in extremely versus other fragile contexts, further supports this analysis. It finds that the categories of inclusive political processes and basic safety and security are the most and least prioritised, respectively, across extremely fragile and other fragile contexts. However, while inclusive political processes receive 47% of DAC members' peace ODA to other fragile contexts, they only receive 32% in extremely fragile contexts. The share of funding towards core peacebuilding, which consists of activities related to the civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution purpose code, receives twice as much peace ODA in extremely fragile contexts than it does in other fragile contexts. Finally, basic safety and security receives seven-percentage points higher of a share of peace ODA in extremely fragile contexts than it does in other fragile contexts.

**Figure 3.11. Peace ODA across categories of peacebuilding in extremely fragile versus other fragile contexts, 2018**




Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements”, *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **ODA is addressing drivers of fragility to varying degrees, but donors can do more to adapt financing to the specific needs of fragile contexts**

This section looks at differences and similarities in ODA to extremely fragile and other fragile contexts and, as a basis for comparison, to non-fragile contexts as well. It also analyses how ODA is allocated across the five dimensions of fragility: economic, environmental, political, security and societal (OECD, 2020<sup>[1]</sup>). Applying a multidimensional perspective to financial flows and comparing how DAC members are allocating their ODA across both fragile and non-fragile contexts can help to inform financing strategies that more systematically target the root causes or drivers of fragility instead of only its symptoms (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>). Such strategies can then support prevention and resilience in fragile contexts by shifting focus away from firefighting and towards sustainable development. Figure 3.12 shows the breakdown of DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts across the five dimensions of fragility and the humanitarian pillar in 2018.

**Figure 3.12. DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts across the five dimensions of fragility and the humanitarian pillar of the nexus, 2018**



Source: (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>), "Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: disbursements", *OECD International Development Statistics (database)*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en>.

### **Extremely fragile contexts**

As noted, 44% of DAC members' bilateral ODA to extremely fragile contexts (USD 7.6 billion) in 2018 went to humanitarian assistance. ODA for the purposes of addressing economic fragility made up 21% (USD 3.5 billion) of total DAC bilateral ODA to fragile contexts; 13% (USD 2.3 billion) was allocated to achieving political objectives; 12% (USD 2 billion) went for environmental objectives, compared to 26% (USD 7.2 billion) of the total for such objectives in other fragile and 20% (USD 8.4 billion) in non-fragile contexts; and 7% (USD 1.2 billion) was allocated to societal objectives, compared to 13% (USD 3.7 billion) in other fragile contexts. Only 3% of the ODA to extremely fragile contexts targeted security fragility. This relatively small share may be explained by reporting rules for what counts as ODA for security purposes (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>). However, such a small figure is still surprising given the nature of protracted crises in these contexts, and it shows the value of multidimensional analysis to provide a more holistic picture of the issues that fragile contexts face relative to priorities that donors are targeting.

A context-level analysis offers additional details regarding how ODA is allocated in extremely fragile contexts:

- Afghanistan and Iraq were among the contexts driving the high levels of ODA to address the economic dimension of fragility. Much of this ODA was in the form of budget support and multi-sectoral programmes. Some attention also was paid to primary and higher education projects, which received 16% (USD 577 million) of the ODA allocated in 2018 to the economic dimension.
- Afghanistan was also a top recipient of ODA targeted to the political dimension of fragility, with 34% of its ODA (USD 1.1 billion) allocated to address this dimension in 2018. Iraq, Somalia and Syria also were top recipients of such ODA. Almost a third of this type of ODA is recorded for the purpose of civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
- Among extremely fragile contexts, Democratic Republic of the Congo (USD 383 million) and South Sudan (USD 338 million) received the highest volumes of ODA targeting the environmental dimension of fragility. The majority of this ODA for environmental fragility (USD 847 million) was food assistance.

### **Other fragile contexts**

The distribution of ODA across the five dimensions of fragility is significantly different in the 44 other fragile contexts than it is in extremely fragile contexts. While humanitarian ODA accounted for only 12% of total DAC bilateral ODA, this share is a 5-percentage point increase over 2013. This underscores that, like extremely fragile contexts, other fragile contexts are also facing humanitarian challenges. Nevertheless, DAC members were targeting the drivers of fragility more broadly in these contexts in 2018. In terms of objectives, the economic dimension received the largest share of bilateral ODA (37% or USD 10.8 billion), followed by environmental (25% or USD 7.3 billion), societal (13% or USD 3.7 billion), political (9% or USD 2.7 billion), and security (1% or USD 407 million). It is notable that objectives in the security dimension received the smallest share of ODA in both other fragile contexts and extremely fragile contexts. Among other insights:

- A smaller share of total ODA went to the political dimension in other fragile contexts than in extremely fragile contexts. In part, this reflects that in other fragile contexts, proportionately less ODA is invested in conflict prevention and more is invested in sectors related to justice and state capacity building and in the other dimensions of fragility.
- The environmental dimension received a significantly higher share of the total ODA in other fragile contexts (25%) than in extremely fragile ones (12%). In this dimension, 36% of ODA (USD 2.6 billion) targeted activities covered in purpose codes related to control of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS and 10% (USD 692 million) targeted food assistance.
- Rather than budget support, the top purpose codes in the economic dimension receiving ODA included road transport (11% or USD 1.2 billion), primary education (7% or USD 754 million), and agricultural development (7% or USD 712 million). This distribution reflects a diversity of priorities to bolster sustainable development in fragile contexts.

### **Non-fragile contexts**

ODA trends in non-fragile contexts provide a basis for comparing and analysing ODA distribution in fragile contexts. Overall, there was little difference in how ODA was distributed across dimensions in other fragile contexts and in non-fragile context. In 2018, objectives in the economic dimension received 54% of total ODA to non-fragile contexts, the lowest share since 2011. Environmental objectives received 20% and societal objectives received 7%. A slight difference was evident in the share of ODA allocated to the political dimension. While, as noted, objectives in the political dimension received 9% of ODA in fragile contexts this dimension accounted for 12% of total ODA in non-fragile contexts, an increase of 3 percentage points over the historical peak in 2017. More than a third of this ODA (USD 1.9 billion) went towards the development of public sector institutions in non-fragile contexts.

### **What does this mean for DAC members?**

This chapter analyses trends in ODA to inform a coherent and co-ordinated approach that strengthens complementarity across the HDP nexus. Two implications emerge for DAC members:

- DAC members are funding differentiated approaches across contexts, for the most part. Although this is not pronounced in financing for other fragile versus non-fragile contexts, it is apparent in how donors are providing finance to extremely fragile contexts relative to other fragile contexts. Such differentiated funding is a positive sign that DAC members are calibrating their ODA to the context, which reflects proper context analysis. The extent to which this is happening across each donor could be explored further in OECD peer reviews.
- Humanitarian assistance accounts for a significant percentage of DAC members' ODA to fragile contexts. It is normal and generous for DAC members to respond to humanitarian needs that arise in fragile contexts. However, members could save much of this ODA – and redirect it towards

sustainable development – if the root causes of humanitarian need, such as conflict, are managed through investments in addressing the drivers of fragility. This argument underpins the DAC Recommendation on the HDP nexus. It requires greater investment in prevention and resilience, a theme explored in other background papers for States of Fragility 2020.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> In addition, Desai (2020<sub>[21]</sub>), Forsberg (2020<sub>[68]</sub>), and Marley (2020<sub>[75]</sub>) elaborate on specific themes related to peace ODA, such as conflict prevention, peace operations, and peacebuilding, in other papers accompanying the 2020 States of Fragility report.



## Annex A. Methodological note

This paper uses the OECD DAC aid statistics database, specifically the DAC2a for information on aggregate statistics and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) for detailed official development assistance (ODA) statistics (OECD, 2020<sup>[2]</sup>). The latest available year of reporting is 2018. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures represent net ODA disbursements adjusted to USD 2018 prices. The notable exception is any information sourced from the CRS such as data on sectors, purposes, channels and ODA policy markers, all of which are reported as gross ODA disbursements in USD 2018 prices. Any trend analysis in this paper uses the same cohort of fragile contexts defined in *States of Fragility 2020* to allow consistency in comparison over time.

More information on the mapping of ODA purpose codes from the CRS to the dimensions of fragility from the OECD multidimensional fragility framework can be found in *States of Fragility 2018* (OECD, 2018<sup>[12]</sup>). This mapping has been updated by the author of this paper to reflect new purpose codes in the CRS schema. Additional information on the mapping of ODA purpose codes to each component of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus can be found on the States of Fragility Platform.

All caveats are included in the footnotes of each figure in this paper. When reference is made to OECD DAC members, these are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union Institutions, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. DAC member countries are the aforementioned members except for the European Union Institutions.

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