3. The role of firms in the gender pay gap in Estonia

This section provides a cross-country analysis of the gender pay gap and its main parts. More specifically, it decomposes the gender pay gap into four components which capture respectively: i) differences in skills, i.e. differences in education (low, middle, high) and potential work experience (as proxied by age); ii) differences in pay practices between firms and industries across similarly skilled workers; iii) differences in pay practices within firms across similarly skilled workers due to differences in occupations and working-time status; and iv) a residual that reflects – within the same firm, occupation and working-time status – differences in pay across similarly skilled workers due to differences in tasks and responsibilities, but also differences in pay for work of equal value. The analysis covers 23 European countries, including Estonia, using data from the Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey for the period 2002-18.

In Estonia, women earn about 22% less than men on average, compared with 11% across European countries (Figure 3.1). Controlling for skills in terms of education and potential experience (age) increases the gender pay gap from 22% to 27% in Estonia and from 11% to 16% on average across European countries. This reflects the fact that working women tend to be better educated than working men on average (Chapter 2). Importantly, it implies that a better understanding of the gender pay gap requires focusing on differences in the characteristics of the firms and jobs in which men and women are employed rather than differences in their skills.

In Estonia as well as on average across European countries, approximately one-quarter of the gender pay gap between similarly skilled men and women can be attributed to the sorting of women into firms and industries that pay low wages (“horizontal segregation”). This mainly reflects differences in pay practices between firms within industries rather than differences in pay practices between industries (see Annex 3.A). The sorting of women into low-wage firms reflects to some extent differences in non-wage working conditions, as women may be constrained to opt for firms with flexible working time arrangements due to childcare responsibilities and unpaid homework, but may also reflect the role of discriminatory hiring practices by employers in high-wage firms (OECD, 2021[1]). The sorting of women into low-wage industries may in addition reflect the tendency of women to sort into economic activities that are compatible with their past educational choices (e.g. privileging literacy over mathematical skills), driven by gendered socialisation processes earlier in life, stereotypes and social norms (OECD, 2017[2]).

Another quarter of the gender wage can be attributed to the sorting of women into low-wage occupations within firms (“vertical segregation”). In Estonia, this accounts for 6 percentages points of the gender pay gap or 27%, compared with 2 percentages points or 20% on average across European countries. The relative importance of vertical segregation in Estonia could reflect the role of educational choices for the sorting of women into certain occupations or differences in the probability of being promoted to higher wage occupations. The latter could be a reflection of the role of motherhood for the career progression of women (see Section 3.3). Working-time arrangements, as measured by part-time work status, do not play a significant role in the gender pay gap in Estonia, which may not be surprising given its limited incidence. Part-time work status plays a larger role in countries where part-time is more prevalent such as Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The bulk of the gender pay gap between similarly skilled men and women cannot be explained by differences in the characteristics of the firms for which they work or differences in occupations and working time. This residual gender pay gap can reflect differences in pay due to differences in tasks and responsibilities, but also differences in pay for work of equal value. The latter are typically attributed to differences in bargaining or wage discrimination by employers.1 Employers’ greater tendency to exploit their wage-setting power when negotiating with a female job candidate or employee is compounded by women’s internalisation of traditional gender norms according to which they are not expected to be as assertive as men when bargaining. Meriküll and Mõtsmees (2017[3]) confirm that women ask for lower wages than men in online job portals in Estonia. Limited competition in product and labour markets tends to increase the scope for discrimination either because it allows costly discrimination to persist or because it may translate in stronger wage-setting power of firms and hence increase the scope for monopsonic discrimination (Box 3.1).

In sum, the cross-country analysis has shown that about half of the gender pay gap in Estonia reflects differences in pay between men and women with similar skills, occupations and working time status, who are employed in the same firm. An important question is to what extent the residual gender pay gap is due to any remaining differences in tasks and responsibilities and differences in pay for work of equal value (bargaining, discrimination). The analysis in this section accounts for differences in tasks and responsibilities between occupations, it cannot account for any such differences within occupations. Using linked employer-employee data for selected OECD countries, OECD (2021[1]) suggests that differences in tasks and responsibilities account for most of the gap in pay between men and women with similar skills, but that differences in pay for equal are also important role in some countries. The analysis in Section 3.2 uses state-of-the-art methods to provide a more precise decomposition of the role of pay practices within and between firms in the gender pay gap in Estonia.

The role of firms in the gender pay gap can be analysed in more detail by decomposing the gender pay gap between male and female employees with similar skills, tasks and responsibilities into a between-firm and a within-firm component. The between-firm component captures the role of differences in pay practices between firms due to the sorting of women into low-wage firms (labelled “sorting”). The within-firm component captures the role of differences in pay practices for work of equal value (labelled “discrimination and bargaining”). The decomposition is implemented empirically using comprehensive linked employer-employee data on the universe of workers and firms in Estonia from the Tax and Customs Board Register for the period 2002-18. For more detail on the methodology, see Box 3.2).

Masso et al. (2022[9]) showed that the firm component of the gender pay gap associated with differences in firm pay practices within and between firms is substantial in Estonia and larger than in other countries for which similar estimations have been conducted. The firm component of the gender pay gap explains 35% in Estonia as opposed to 11% in France (Coudin, Maillard and Tô, 2018[10]), 16% in the UK (Jewell, Razzu and Singleton, 2019[11]), 21% in Portugal (Card, Cardoso and Kline, 2016[12]) for 26% in Germany (Bruns, 2019[13]) and 30% in Italy (Casarico et al., 2019[14]) Moreover, in Estonia, the firm component of the gender pay gap reflects in equal measure the within-firm (discrimination and bargaining) and the between-firm (sorting) dimensions, while it mainly reflects sorting in other countries (the contribution of discrimination and bargaining to the firm component of the gender pay gap varies from zero in France and Germany to roughly one-third in Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom).

New OECD results confirm that firm pay practices play a large role in the gender pay gap in Estonia (Figure 3.3), consistent with earlier results by Masso et al. (2022[9]) for a somewhat different time period.2 According to OECD estimates, firm pay practices account for about half of the gender pay gap. Three-fifths of this is explained by the sorting of women into lower-paying firms (30% of the overall gender pay gap), whereas the remaining two-fifths (20% of the overall gender pay gap) reflect pay differences between men and women with similar skills, tasks and responsibilities (discrimination and bargaining). The sorting component is comparable in magnitude with that documented in the cross-country analysis in Section 3.1 (about 25%). While the component associated with discrimination and bargaining is sizeable it appears to be small compared with the unexplained component of the gender wage gap in Section 3.1. This suggests a significant part of the unexplained gender pay gap is due to differences in tasks and responsibilities within occupations.

The relative importance of bargaining/discrimination in Estonia resonates well with previous research. For example, previous research attributes women’s lower ability to negotiate salaries as assertively as men to traditional gender norms (Meriküll and Mõtsmees, 2017[3]). Traditional gender norms are also closely intertwined with the prejudiced and stereotypical view that women cannot perform as well as men at managerial- and executive-level positions. As such, they constitute an important driver of gender-based discrimination in the workplace. These harmful effects are compounded by a weak bargaining position of employees vis-a-vis employers in a context of flexible wage-setting institutions (Masso, Meriküll and Vahter, 2022[9]). Estonia is characterised by a low minimum wage, a low unionisation rate and a weak coverage of collective agreements.

The role of firms in the gender pay gap increases along the wage distribution, and particularly so over the bottom half (Figure 3.4). Among men and men and women in the top decile, firms account for as much as 70% of the gender pay gap. Differences in pay between firms explain about two-thirds of the firm component, whereas the remaining one-third is explained by differences in pay within firms. Among men and women in the bottom decile, the firm component of the gender pay gaps among low-wage workers is positive, as low-wage women tend to work in higher-wage firms than low-wage men, reducing the gender pay gap (this may also reflect the relative concentration of men in certain low-wage industries such as construction and agriculture, see Figure 3.6). There are no systematic differences in pay between low-wage men and women within firms.

Rising gender pay differentials along the wage distribution are not limited to Estonia, but tend to be present in the large majority of OECD countries (OECD, 2017[2]). However, so far the reasons for this pattern are not well understood. The present analysis suggests that gender wage gaps are higher for high-wage women because of their difficulty to access top jobs in high-wage firms. Indeed, top jobs in top firms are to a greater extent occupied by men than other jobs in top firms or top jobs in other firms (Chapter 2). This may also affect the bargaining position of high-wage women, and thus exacerbate differences in pay practices for work of equal value within firms.

Voluntary target setting, good management practices that make managers accountable and gender quotas for company boards are among the measures that could help to promote access for women to top jobs in top firms, while at the same time foster social norms that support gender equality. By contrast, the absence of a significant firm component among low-wage women or its tendency to reduce the gender pay gap suggests that strengthening collective bargaining or increasing the minimum wage is unlikely to be very effective in reducing the gender pay gap and potentially even counter-productive. Pay transparency measures hold more promise since these reduce the scope for discrimination against high-wage women and strengthen their relative bargaining position (OECD, 2021[15]).

The role of firm pay practices in the gender pay gap varies significantly across industries (Figure 3.5). The largest differences in firm pay practices are found in electrical, machinery and equipment and mining and quarrying, while the smallest differences are found in accommodation and catering, agriculture, and transportation. Differences in firm pay practices play an important role in explaining differences in the gender pay gap across industries. The correlation coefficient between the gap in firm pay practices and the overall gender pay gap across industries is 0.7. Differences in pay practices across industries mainly reflect differences in pay practices between men and women within firms (discrimination and bargaining) rather than differences in pay practices between firms (sorting). The corresponding correlation coefficients are 0.6 and 0.3 respectively.

Differences in firm pay practices tend to be larger in industries with high “rents”, i.e. industries with high labour market frictions and low job mobility. Industry “rents” are measured as the average firm wage premium for men in an industry, i.e. the part of the average firm wage that cannot be explained by the composition of its workforce (Box 3.2).3 A low responsiveness of job mobility to wages confers wage-setting power to firms and increases the scope for monopsonic gender discrimination (Hirsch, 2016[16]). The scope for gender discrimination may be amplified by weak competition in product markets (see Box 3.1). Frictions in product and labour markets thus have the potential to increase differences in pay practices between men and women within firms (discrimination and bargaining). This pattern is supported by the data. The correlation coefficient between industry rents (as measured by average firm wage premia) and within-firm differences in pay practices is 0.8 (discrimination and bargaining).

The large heterogeneity in the importance of differences in firm pay practices across industries suggests that sectoral initiatives may be a useful complement to nation-wide initiatives to tackle the gender wage gap. Targeted initiatives directed at specific sectors where discriminatory pay practices are more pronounced can be used to raise awareness about the extent of gender discrimination and provide information about its consequences for firms and workers. To the extent that discriminatory practices derive from weak budget constraints (product market competition) and are costly for firms, this can be used as an argument to make the business case for gender-friendly pay practices. By contrast, if discrimination derives from monopsony, this can be profit-maximising and there may be a greater role for public policies that enhance competition in the labour market.

The Estonian labour market is quite segregated across industries (Figure 3.6). Men are over-represented in industries such as construction, basic metals and mining, while women are over-represented in accommodation and food services, textiles, and education and health. Moreover, men tend to be overrepresented in industries paying above average wages, conditional on worker characteristics, whereas women tend to be overrepresented in industries paying below-average wages (see Section 3.1). In other words, there is a strong negative relationship between the share of women in an industry and the “average wage premium” (the correlation coefficient is equal to -0.5).

The sorting of women into low-wage industries is likely to reflect to some extent the role of past educational choices. While women outperform men in terms of the level of education (women are more likely to hold a tertiary degree), there are important differences with respect to the field of study. More specifically, fewer women than men complete Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) degrees (OECD, 2019[17]). To some extent educational choices may reflect the possibility that teenage boys on average still perform marginally better in mathematics than girls, but gender stereotypes also play an important role. This points to the importance of steering more girls in STEM and thus addressing stereotypes that drive the educational choices of girls.

Gender pay gaps evolve over the life-course, both between and within firms, and career breaks play an important role in explaining why childbirth entails slower wage growth for mothers than for fathers. Childbirth entails significant long-term motherhood penalties in labour income in all countries, but with significant differences in their magnitude (Kleven et al., 2019[18]; OECD, 2017[2]). The long-run motherhood penalty, defined as the shortfall in labour income growth of mothers since childbirth relative to fathers, ranges from 21-26% in Denmark and Sweden to 31-44% in the United Kingdom and the United States and 51-61% in Austria and Germany (Kleven et al., 2019[18]). There are also important differences across countries in the evolution of the motherhood penalty over time with regard to the components of labour income, i.e. employment, working time and hourly wages.

In a number of countries, including France, Italy, Japan, and Portugal, motherhood penalties in hourly wages, as opposed to labour income more generally, tend to increase with the time elapsed since childbirth, as fathers continue to progress to higher-wage firms and occupations, while women increasingly move to lower-wage ones (OECD, 2021[1]). Evidence for Germany suggests that about a quarter of the long-term motherhood penalty results from differences in the sorting of men and women across firms (Bruns, 2019[13]). Findings for France also point to an important role of sorting in the motherhood penalty and suggest that this is closely related to the tendency of young mothers to move to firms close to home and firms with flexible working-time policies (Le Barbanchon, Rathelot and Roulet, 2020[19]). However, in other countries, including Austria and the Slovak Republic, the rise in the gender wage gap around the age of motherhood is temporary (OECD, 2021[1]).

In Estonia, gender pay differences increase with age until the late thirties, but decrease afterwards (Figure 3.7). The gender pay gap peaks among workers aged 30-34, but is similar for workers aged 45-54 as those aged 25-29. Complementary evidence by Masso et al. (2022[9]) further shows that women with young children (between 0 and 6 years-old) earn less than fathers, but that the gap falls as children grow older. The gender gap in earnings among women with adult children (aged 18-24) is half that of women with a young children (aged 0-2). They also show that that the gender pay gap increases with the number of children.

The temporary increase in the gender pay gap around the age of motherhood does not appear to reflect the role of firms (Figure 3.7). Indeed, the components of the gender wage gap due to sorting across firms or bargaining and discrimination are surprisingly stable over the life-course. The temporary increase in the gender wage gap around the age of motherhood is more likely to reflect the possibility that some young mothers temporarily shift to part-time. This explanation cannot be considered here because of the absence of information on working time in the data. A complementary explanation could be that the temporary increase in the gender wage gap reflects the role of career breaks regarding the wage progression of women.

The role of career breaks for the motherhood penalty is analysed by focusing on the incidence of non-employment spells for men and women around the age of parenthood (25-34) and their consequences for wages. The analysis starts by documenting the gap in the incidence of non-employment spells between men and women as proxied by the number of years spend out of work (Figure 3.8). It shows that women aged 25-34 are much more likely than men to experience a non-employment spell of one or more years (by 2 percentage points), while the opposite is observed for older women aged 35-54 (the average age at which women in Estonia have their first child is 28) (Panel A). This suggests that non-employment spells provide meaningful information about the incidence of career breaks around the age of motherhood rather than differences in the risk of unemployment. Moreover, among workers around the age of parenthood (age 25-34), the gap in career breaks is larger between men and men and women with a high earnings potential (Panel B).

Career breaks tend to be associated with significant wage losses (Figure 3.9). Wage losses may reflect the slower upward mobility within firms due to a lack of experience and the possible depreciation of relevant skills or the sorting of women into lower wage firms following a career break. To examine this, the analysis separately considers changes in within-firm wages and changes in firm-wage premia. The evidence suggests that wage losses due to a lack of experience or human capital depreciation can be sizeable, particularly for women, and especially those with a higher earnings potential (Panel A). Sorting to lower wage firms does not appear to contribute to the motherhood penalty in Estonia (Panel B). This presumably reflects the possibility that most women return to the same firm following a career break. Career breaks after childbirth therefore tend to contribute the motherhood wage penalty by slowing their wage progression within firms.

In Estonia, women taking a career break following childbirth benefit from strong employment protection, with their position being guaranteed for up to 3 years. While this looks like a generous policy for women, the present analysis suggests that taking long career breaks involves considerable costs in terms of lower wages upon re-employment, with possibly long-lasting consequences for the quality of worker careers.

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Notes

← 1. Employers’ discriminatory behaviour may be rooted in conscious or unconscious biases against women (“taste-based discrimination”), may reflect the perceptions of employers that women are on average less productive than men (“statistical discrimination”) or be based on profit considerations by paying lower wages to women given that women enjoy more limited outside options than men due to their greater unpaid work burden (“monopsonistic discrimination”).

← 2. Masso et al. (2022[9]) focus on the period 2006-17 whereas the present paper focuses on the period 2002-18.

← 3. Using the average firm effects of women does not change the results. The correlation coefficient between the average firm fixed effects of men and those of women across industries is 0.94.

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