Annex C. Field visit to Ghana and Cambodia

Ghana transitioned to multi-party democracy in 1992, and in 2017 witnessed its third peaceful transition with the inauguration of President Nana-Akufo Addo. The next elections will be held in December 2020.

Ghana is a lower middle-income country, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 6.5% in 2018 and gross national income (GNI) per capita of USD 2 130 (World Bank, 2019[1]). Ghana ranks 142nd in the human development index (slightly above Cambodia’s 146th ranking), with a value of 0.596 (UNDP, 2019[2]). Poverty in Ghana has fallen in the last two decades thanks to a better-educated workforce, increased profitability of cocoa and other cash crops, and improved access to infrastructure. However, at the same time inequality has intensified. The three northern regions and the Volta region have poverty rates of over 55% and 37% respectively (World Bank, 2018[3]).

Ghanaians’ new vision, Ghana Beyond Aid, calls for transforming the economy through investment to move the country away from aid dependency (Government of Ghana, 2019[4]). Today, the formal private sector plays a relatively small role in Ghana’s economy; foreign direct investment (FDI) has been around USD 3 billion in the past decade and is primarily in capital-intensive, job-poor sectors, while the government continues to partner with donors to fill the gap in delivery of basic services. Japan is the eighth largest donor overall in Ghana, and the fourth largest bilateral donor, providing 3% of overall ODA in 2018 (Figure C.1), with average disbursements of USD 60.7 million in 2017-18. One-quarter of Japan’s ODA disbursements was invested in the energy sector, 20% in health, 15% in fishing, 8% in agriculture, and 4% in education. A total of 29% of ODA was allocated across other sectors.

President Akufo-Addo of Ghana has shown global leadership on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), co-chairing together with Norwegian Prime Minister Solberg the 17-member Advocates for the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals group. Ghana presented its Voluntary National Review in 2019, and a parliamentary ad-hoc committee was set up at the end of 2019 to monitor Ghana’s performance in implementing the SDGs (Al-Hassan, 2019[5]).

The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement provided the basis for Cambodia to emerge from a period of political instability, conflict and the mass killings of the Khmer Rouge regime. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – which included Japan’s first participation in peace-keeping operations – was tasked with building a stable environment in advance of elections in May 1993. The 1993 constitution provided for a market-based economy anchored in a constitutional monarchy, with the Prime Minister as head of government and the Monarch as head of state. The Cambodian People’s Party lost the 1993 elections but refused to accept the results; its leader, Hun Sen, became second prime minister alongside Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the royalist political party, Funcinpec. Hun Sen seized power in a 1997 military incident, which saw Ranariddh temporarily leave the country, and Hun Sen’s administration has been in power since 1998. The Cambodia National Rescue Party narrowly lost elections in 2013 and in November 2017 was dissolved by the Supreme Court after a complaint that it was plotting to overthrow the government. The Cambodian People’s Party won all 125 seats in parliament at the July 2018 election.

Cambodia is the fastest-growing country in Southeast Asia with 7.0% estimated real GDP growth in 2019 driven by garment exports and tourism. A lower middle-income country, its GNI per capita was USD 1 390 in 2018 (World Bank, 2019[7]) and it ranks 146th in the human development index with a value of 0.581 (UNDP, 2019[2]). The national poverty headcount ratio has fallen rapidly, dropping from 50.2% in 2003 to reach 17.7% in 2012. Cambodia has a relatively low rate of urbanisation, and some 90% of the poor live in rural areas.

The National Strategic Development Plan 2019-2023 was approved by the government in July 2019. It is complemented by the Rectangular Strategy Phase IV for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency in Cambodia, which focuses on enhancement of the agricultural sector; rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure; private sector development and employment; and capacity building and human resource development. The need for good governance touches each of these areas.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has adapted the global goals to its national context, publishing the Cambodia Sustainable Development Goals (CSDGs) Framework (2016-30) (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2018[8]). These include an additional goal CSDG 18: end the negative impact of mines/explosive remnants of war and promote victim assistance, to which the Japanese Government’s support for the Mine Action Centre contributes. In its Voluntary National Review, presented in 2019, Cambodia noted three main challenges: financing the ambitious SDG agenda in a context where the public expects improved services but official development assistance (ODA) is declining; the threat of climate change and the need to combat environmental degradation; and gaps in governance and mobilising all actors to achieve the CSDGs (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2019[9]).

A Development Cooperation & Partnerships Strategy 2019-2023 outlines how the government aims to mobilise and manage development finance flows to ensure effectiveness and impact (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2019[10]). It is based on the principles of ownership, partnership and results, and outlines mechanisms and tools to be used with development partners, including technical working groups, sectoral multi-stakeholder dialogue, government and non-government organisation (NGO) consultations, and joint monitoring indicators. Cambodia received an annual average of USD 721 million in net ODA receipts (2016 prices) from 2010-17 (OECD, 2019[11]).1

Japan is the largest DAC donor in Cambodia, providing 11% of overall ODA, with average disbursements of USD 179 million in 2017-18 (Figure C.2). Forty-six per cent of Japan’s ODA was invested in economic infrastructure and services, 16% in other social infrastructure and services, and 11% in health and population, and multi-sectoral ODA. The remaining 16% was allocated across other sectors.

Ghana’s vision beyond aid aligns closely with the objectives of the TICAD goals: “to deepen trade and investment; capacity and skills development…” (MFA, 2019[12]). Japan, strongly encouraged by Ghana, is seeing an increase in its FDI and hopes to capitalise on the continent-wide free trade arrangement. While corruption is low, it is still an obstacle for businesses operating in or planning to invest in the country (Rahman, 2018[13]).2 Recently, Toyota decided to set up an assembly plant in Ghana.3 Official business delegations from Tokyo regularly explore opportunities, and an office of the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) will open in Ghana in 2020. Japan is adding value to sustainable development in Ghana, including through its promotion of Kaizen (continuous quality improvement), which is enhancing work practices across government and the private sector. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) financed a Japanese joint venture’s deepwater floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) unit to operate the T.E.N. (Tweneboa, Enyenra, Ntomme) offshore oil field. Opportunities abound for Japan to use its own experience to drive innovation, and transfer leading technology and skills to benefit start-ups and the creative industry in Ghana.

Beyond the private sector, a few Japanese NGOs operate in Ghana, notably in the northern regions. Japan also has about 50-55 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) volunteers who work with local NGOs and local government in the fields of information and communications technology, health, and community development. Finally, Japan provides scholarships for university students and government officials to study in Japan, as well as short term training opportunities. Ghana is a priority country for achieving universal health coverage (UHC), which Japan has promoted at the G20 and as part of the TICAD agenda. Japan’s long-standing commitment to sector budget support in Ghana has made an important contribution to UHC via the Ghana Health Service’s Community-Based Health Planning and Services (CHPS).

The Royal Government of Cambodia recognises there are challenges to its ambition of achieving diversification and creating value-addition in industry and services. These include high transport costs, inefficiencies in logistical systems, high electricity prices, informal fees and a complicated business environment. Expected liberalisation of goods, services and investment in the Asia-Pacific region will provide Cambodia, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an opportunity to absorb greater investment, in turn enabling it to create more and better-quality jobs. To do so, it needs to improve working conditions and promote investment (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2018[14]).

Japan is well-positioned to influence the business environment. A long-standing partnership with Cambodia gives Japan the ability to raise issues of concern with government – identified during engagement between the embassy, the Japanese Business Association of Cambodia, JICA, and JETRO.4 Resolving these issues in turn helps to improve the business environment, benefiting all foreign investors as exemplified in announcements by Prime Minister Hun Sen during a visit to Tokyo in May 2019.5 The presence of Japanese companies in Cambodia gives confidence to other investors, and is seen as raising the benchmark for labour and safety standards – e.g. for women in the garment industry – and improving management practices, as most large Japanese companies are required to apply the same standards abroad as they do in Japan. An opportunity exists for Japan to reinforce the importance of responsible business conduct amongst Japanese companies – to reinforce their reputation – and in Cambodia, for example by working with the government’s Anti-Corruption Unit to identify risks in specific sectors.

As is the case in Ghana, Japan collaborates with Cambodian civil society organisations and Japanese NGOs, and supports the work of JICA volunteers. It promotes collaboration between public and private sectors, supporting local government activities in Cambodia and offers scholarships for Cambodian officials to study in Japan; this offer of scholarships does not, however, extend to representatives from civil society.

Japan’s latest Country Development Cooperation Policy for Ghana was revised in 2020, after the mission to Accra took place. The previous one dated from 2012 (MFA, 2012[15]). A more recent internal country analysis paper identifies the priority sectors as health, education and governance (human capacity), infrastructure, and industry (including agriculture). A recent attempt to concentrate on fewer sectors was not successful. Sector budget support for the health sector was last committed in 2016, and is now being phased out. Japan does not articulate its commitment, philosophy, or strategy in Ghana beyond the very short country development co-operation policy. As a recent TICAD evaluation found, this is a missed opportunity to create synergies across programming and to build understanding for citizens in Japan and in partner countries about mutual benefits and how Japan intends to contribute to Ghana’s own development (Mizuho Information & Research Institute Inc., 2018[16]).

In most middle-income partner countries, Yen loans feature prominently in Japan’s portfolio. Yet in Ghana ODA consists primarily of grant aid and technical co-operation alongside scholarships, JICA volunteers, grassroots grants programme with NGOs, private sector support, and a recently signed Yen loan project. While Japan intends to design each co-operation in such a way as to create synergies across its development programme, there is an opportunity for Japan to achieve greater synergies across these modalities. In 2002, Japan stopped providing new ODA loans and shifted to grants when Ghana accessed the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to keep a strong foothold in the infrastructure sector. In December 2016, Japan and Ghana signed the first loan agreement in 17 years for the construction of a new bridge across the Volta River.6 Since Ghana is now at high risk of external debt distress and not eligible to borrow non-concessional loans, Japan is exercising caution in extending any further loans, which in fact limits the expansion of its country programme.

Ghanaian stakeholders appreciate Japan’s reliability and recipient-driven approach to development co-operation: annual needs surveys submitted by government counterparts are the basis for project formulation. Japan’s commitment to leave no-one behind is visible in its support to those hardest-to-reach areas in the upper regions where poverty rates are the highest. It works through sector budget support for the Ghana Health Service’s CHPS, the rehabilitation of a hospital, and embedding technical experts. Similarly, Ghana’s infrastructure investments focus on the “big impact” of trunk roads, connecting the port to the rest of the country and improving access to and from Ghana’s breadbasket. JICA has financed feasibility studies for seven different public-private partnerships in Ghana linked to nutrition and health, including between the Ghana Health Service and the Ajinomoto Group, a major Japanese food manufacturer. The goal is to improve nutrition through local soybean production to create a nutrition supplement added to porridge and widely used in Ghana (Japan for Sustainability, 2014[17]).

The overall goal of Japan’s 2017 Country Development Cooperation Policy for Cambodia (MFA, 2017[18]) is to help Cambodia establish the socio-economic foundations necessary to achieve upper middle-income country status by 2030. Its three priorities are promoting regional connectivity and industrial development;7 improving quality of life, particularly in urban areas through support for water supply and sewage systems;8 and strengthening governance. Japan provides a mix of technical co-operation, grants and Yen loans with the amount disbursed varying annually.9 It recently embarked on a significant public-private partnership in the water sector, and offers finance to explore small-scale investment opportunities. As noted for Ghana, achieving synergies across this mix of modalities could result in the whole being greater than the sum of the individual parts.

In 2010 China, a non-DAC member, replaced Japan as the top donor to Cambodia10 and by 2017, Chinese grants and loans far outstripped those of Japan in agriculture (USD 40.3 million versus USD 14.3 million), energy, power and electricity (USD 65.9 million vs USD 4.9 million) and transport (USD 86.4 million versus USD 60.8 million) (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2018[19]). In light of this, a recent evaluation of country assistance to Cambodia suggested that given it is no longer the “top donor”, Japan should look to become the “best donor”, focusing on quality infrastructure and quality co-operation (Waseda University, 2018[20]). Given the high cost of and time needed to prepare its projects, and the growing interest of development finance institutions in Cambodia,11 it will be important for Japan to make a strong case for its comparative advantage in relation to investments in quality infrastructure.

The recent evaluation of Japan’s support in Cambodia argued that the 2012 country assistance policy de-emphasised the nuance on poverty reduction included in the 2002 policy (Waseda University, 2018[20]). In this regard, the 2017 policy is very similar to its predecessor. Japan does not explicitly set out in its policy how its three priority areas improve the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable in line with the 2030 Agenda commitment to leave no-one behind. Investing in National Road 1 from the Vietnamese border to Phnom Penh and National Road 5 from Phnom Penh to the Thai border clearly contributes to the Greater Mekong Sub-region’s southern economic corridor, offering access to markets and providing a base for manufacturing and industry to generate more jobs. Price subsidies for poor people are included in Japan’s water supply investments. However, unlike in Ghana, Japan does not have a particular geographic focus enabling it to target specific areas in Cambodia where poverty rates are high. When Japan updates its Cambodia country analysis paper, it might consider drawing on IDPoor12 to identify opportunities to focus more explicitly on poverty reduction in its portfolio.

In both Cambodia and Ghana, working relationships between the embassy and JICA are open and collegial, formalised through meetings of the ODA Task Force. Meetings are held each month in Ghana and three times a year in Cambodia. While the embassy and JICA form the core membership of the task force, other Japanese agencies and NGOs can be invited to provide input. The task force reviews proposals submitted by partner governments through needs surveys and sends recommendations to Tokyo for approval.

Japan’s systematic approach to formulating, appraising and designing projects is appreciated by partner governments, as is the fact that it implements these to the agreed-upon specifications and delivers them on time. Nevertheless, partners speak of quite long project preparation phases, which can take up to one year for technical co-operation and two-to-three years for grant aid and in large part due to the preparatory survey and cabinet approval. This reduces Japan’s attractiveness when compared with other development partners, such as the multilateral development banks who have reduced their preparation times.

Preparation of ODA loans and grants is the responsibility of the government, while consultants (including Japanese consultants) support their preparation. In Ghana, the implementation of Japan’s grant aid for infrastructure is restricted to Japanese contractors, which has the benefit of encouraging technology transfer and building the capacity of Ghanaian engineers and employing local contractors. Ghanaian authorities are unlikely to refuse grant aid, particularly for quality infrastructure investment. However, the lack of international competitive bidding does not guarantee that Ghana is getting value for money for the services rendered.13 In Cambodia, Japanese firms have won the majority of international competitive bidding processes due to the requirement for specific experience and expertise. Nevertheless, a joint venture involving South Korean and Vietnamese companies was successful in winning a contract.

Since the last peer review, JICA has increased investments in the capabilities of permanent staff. Nevertheless, there are contracted Japanese staff who supplement JICA staff in country offices, and in the embassies in Cambodia and Ghana, though to a much lesser extent. Locally engaged staff lead most of the monitoring missions, are key to engagement with partner government personnel and retain institutional memory. While JICA provides locally engaged staff with a range of capacity building opportunities, investing in them more – including by improving the terms and conditions of their employment – could enhance their motivation and job satisfaction, enabling them to add even more value to Japan’s development co-operation. Looking to the future in Ghana and in order to align with the government’s own vision beyond aid, JICA will need further support from Tokyo to build the skills and capacity to roll-out private sector investment finance, and to find creative ways to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups for which no current scheme is available.

As noted in Chapter 4, JICA has introduced enhanced risk management procedures since the last peer review. In both Ghana and Cambodia it has a strong focus on internal financial controls and security risks, but could do more to address external risks specific to particular sectors – especially infrastructure where Japan plays a strong role – and the modalities it uses. Making information about complaints procedures more widely known would also help Japan ensure that it is seen to be committed to addressing corrupt practices. While it has made initial efforts to prevent and address the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse linked to development co-operation, discussions with Japan and other development partners indicate that there has been limited outreach to government and implementing partners to date. Japan includes provisions related to sexual harassment in codes of conduct. Extending beyond this focus on harassment to address sexual exploitation and abuse and to develop prevention mechanisms in relation to government and implementing partners will enhance Japan’s ability to adhere to the recently-agreed DAC Recommendation.

The governments of Cambodia and Ghana have systems in place for co-ordinating across government and amongst development partners. Well-established mechanisms in Cambodia include: bilateral consultations;14 20 Technical Working Groups, which have been in place since 2004 with Japan currently leading on gender, infrastructure and regional integration;15 joint monitoring indicators to track progress; sub-national partnership dialogue; a Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report; and an ODA and NGO Database to which Japan contributes (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2019[10]).

In Ghana the heads of co-operation meet monthly and sector group meetings involving the government and other development partners take place on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. Japan is a valued development partner in a number of sectors, and recently led the health sector working group, where it was recognised for the way it faithfully represented other development partners’ views in discussions with the Government of Ghana.

In both countries, a rolling plan provides clarity over Japan’s current and projected ODA expenditure and Japan shares its sector investments with government and other development partners through technical working groups. While Japan co-ordinates well with others, it prefers to manage its own contributions directly, working in parallel rather than co-financing, as seen in the water sector in Cambodia and the transport sector in Ghana. Japan’s technical co-operation is clearly appreciated by government and development partners working in the same sectors. It is primarily free-standing. However, in Ghana technical co-operation complements Japan’s infrastructure projects by building capacity on road and bridge maintenance, responding to a gap identified during project implementation. In Cambodia and other countries there is scope for Japan to support a more diverse mix of technical experts providing advice to government, particularly where Japanese approaches may not be the most appropriate in the context.

Multilateral partners appreciate JICA’s know-how and operational capacity. In Ghana, Japan helped develop, print, and disseminate a maternal and child health record book, and it initiated a new project with the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) bringing together civil society and the private sector. In Cambodia, Japan is supporting a two-year UNICEF programme to deliver on the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children. However, such examples are rare as Japan does not normally engage in joint donor support of multilateral programmes or co-financing arrangements. Most of the funding provided by Japan at country level through multilateral organisations originates from Japan’s supplementary budget, which is generally reserved for emergency contexts and ongoing crises (Chapter 7). Multilateral agencies submit proposals to the embassy and JICA to access supplementary funding in August, and decisions on these proposals are taken in Tokyo towards the end of the calendar year. Funding for successful proposals is disbursed in February or March (at the end of the Japanese fiscal year) and must be executed in the next 12 months. The process takes time and is inherently unpredictable and burdensome for multilateral partners, embassies, and Tokyo.

Japan’s long-term commitment to provide government-to-government aid is valued by ministries and their implementing agencies, as are its training and scholarship programmes for the public and private sectors. Japan could make better use of this alumni network and other stakeholders – academics, think tanks, local civil society organisations, innovators and other private sector actors – in discussions about how Japan might best support its partner countries’ paths towards sustainable development. Local NGOs appreciate Japan’s grassroots grant assistance. As noted in Ghana, Japan could do more to support NGO work at the community level, for example by allowing administrative costs (to manage, monitor and report) in project budgets, and working with the Government of Ghana to recognise the complementary nature of NGO services.

Japan has a clear monitoring system, with country office staff visiting projects at least every two months, and it uses government sources for baseline data and indicators wherever possible. While the application of the Plan, Do, Check, Act cycle has become more flexible, more of a shift towards managing for results would alleviate the need for mid-term reviews and systematic final evaluations, and allow for more timely adjustments during project implementation. Japan places high value and importance on conducting joint site visits and joint evaluations with official counterparts in ministries and implementing agencies and strengthening the capacity through its technical assistance; this was confirmed by government officials in Ghana and Cambodia. Evaluations play a role in informing subsequent phases and future project design.

References

[5] Al-Hassan, O. (2019), “Parliament Sets Up Committee To Monitor Implementation Of SDGs”, Ghana Crusader, https://www.ghanacrusader.com/parliament-sets-up-committee-to-monitor-sdgs/ (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[4] Government of Ghana (2019), Ghana Beyond Aid: Charter and strategy document, Government of Ghana, Accra, http://agricinghana.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Ghana-Beyond-Aid-Charter-and-Strategy-Document-April-2019_Agricinghana-Media-Copy.pdf.

[17] Japan for Sustainability (2014), Ajinomoto Provides Children in Ghana with Nutritional Supplements, https://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id034606.html (accessed on 7 February 2020).

[12] MFA (2019), Yokohama Declaration 2019. Advancing Africa’s Development through People, Technology and Innovation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/ticad7/pdf/yokohama_declaration_en.pdf.

[18] MFA (2017), Development Cooperation Policy for Cambodia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000476992.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2020).

[15] MFA (2012), Country Assistance Policy for the Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/ghana/kn09_01_index.html.

[16] Mizuho Information & Research Institute Inc. (2018), Evaluation of Japan’s ODA to Africa through the TICAD Process for the Past 10 Years.

[6] OECD (2020), Aid at a glance (Webpage), http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm.

[11] OECD (2019), Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region, 4. Asia, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/ (accessed on 10 March 2020).

[13] Rahman, K. (2018), Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Ghana, Transparency International and U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre.

[9] Royal Government of Cambodia (2019), Cambodia’s Voluntary National Review 2019 on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/23603Cambodia_VNR_PublishingHLPF.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2020).

[10] Royal Government of Cambodia (2019), Development Cooperation and Partnerships Strategy 2019-2023, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/dcps/dcps_2019_2023/docs/eng.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2020).

[8] Royal Government of Cambodia (2018), Cambodia Sustainable Development Goals (CSDGs) Framework (2016-2030), http://mop.gov.kh/DocumentEN/CSDG%20Framework-2016-2030%20English.pdf (accessed on 10 March 2020).

[19] Royal Government of Cambodia (2018), Development Cooperation and Partnerships Report, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/dcpr_images/docs/english.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2020).

[14] Royal Government of Cambodia (2018), Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency: Building the Foundation Toward Realizing the Cambodia Vision 2050. Phase IV, http://cnv.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Rectangular-Strategy-Phase-IV-of-the-Royal-Government-of-Cambodia-of-the-Sixth-Legislature-of-the-National-Assembly-2018-2023.pdf (accessed on 11 March 2020).

[2] UNDP (2019), 2019 Human Development Index Ranking, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[20] Waseda University (2018), Country Assistance Evaluation of Cambodia: Third Party Evaluation, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2017/pdfs/cambodia.pdf (accessed on 25 February 2020).

[7] World Bank (2019), Cambodia Data, https://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia?view=chart (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[1] World Bank (2019), Ghana Data, https://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana (accessed on 6 February 2020).

[3] World Bank (2018), Ghana: Priorities for Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity, World Bank Group.

Notes

← 1. ODA to Cambodia has increased steadily in the past three years, reaching USD 690 million in 2015, USD 728 in 2016 and USD 831 in 2017 (2016 prices).

← 2. Ghana ranked 80 out of 180 in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Source: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-ghana-2018.pdf.

← 3. A Toyota vehicle assembly plant is set to be operational in Ghana by August 2020. In discussions with the Government of Ghana, Toyota pressed the point that its investment would higher demand for new vehicles in Ghana. The Government said it would help incentivise this by banning the sale of used vehicles and the use of vehicles older than a certain number of years. Due to the presidential election expected later in 2020, it is unlikely that such a decision would be formalised before then.

← 4. The Japanese Business Association of Cambodia recently identified 21 obstacles to doing business in Cambodia, including the cost of electricity compared with Thailand and Viet Nam and regular outages, slow and duplicative customs clearance and border procedures, inconsistencies and differences in application of tax and labour regulations to Cambodian and foreign companies, and examples of corrupt practices.

← 5. At the May 2019 Cambodia Investment Seminar, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced the elimination of Camcontrol, reduced fees to scan containers, reduced rates for electricity and measures to stabilise supply. He later announced the abolition of the prepaid corporate tax. See www.jetro.go.jp/en/jetro/topics/2019/1905_topics1.html.

← 6. This is parallel financing with the African Development Bank responsible for the construction of the Ghana Eastern Corridor Road.

← 7. Strengthening the management and maintenance of irrigation facilities, and improving agricultural productivity, are also part of this priority.

← 8. Japan also invests in urban transport, and expanding access to power. Co-operation in the health and social security sectors aims to support universal health coverage in Cambodia.

← 9. In 2017, Japan disbursed USD 56.2 million, comprising grants of USD 6.8 million to 188 projects (17 of which received more than USD 1 million), and loans of USD 49.4 million to 9 projects. In 2018, it disbursed USD 169.1 million, comprising grants of USD 96.3 million to 301 projects (13 of which were received more than USD 1 million) and loans of USD 72.7 million to 10 projects.

← 10. According to the Council for the Development of Cambodia China provided USD 154.1 million in 2010 compared with USD 140.0 million from Japan; in 2017, China’s aid had risen to USD 223.5 million (16.57% of total ODA) followed by Japan on USD 126.4 million (9.37%).

← 11. In February 2020, the European Investment Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development and Royal Government of Cambodia launched a USD 125 million project to improve roads, road safety and resilience to natural hazards, as well as other key rural infrastructure, such as local markets. See www.eib.org/en/press/all/2020-038-eib-invests-eur-51m-to-improve-rural-infrastructure-and-economic-outlooks-for-200000-rural-families-in-cambodia. In addition, the International Finance Corporations committed portfolio in Cambodia stood at USD 266 million as of December 2017.

← 12. IDPoor was established in 2006 in the Ministry of Planning and is used to target pro-poor measures to the poorest and most vulnerable households. See https://mop.idpoor.gov.kh/.

← 13. Ghanaian authorities find that the length of time to prepare projects is a hindrance, but they tend to be ambivalent about the fact that aid is tied, given that the bulk of Japanese infrastructure investments are grant aid. Ghana is at high risk of debt distress, so authorities are not in a position to easily refuse grant investments.

← 14. A record of recent policy dialogues with Cambodia on Japan’s official development assistance can be found here: www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/japan.htm.

← 15. For details of the 20 technical working groups see www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/japan.htm.

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