4. Family dynamics in return migration

Return decisions are rarely individual choices, but are shaped by social networks of migrants, including family and community ties. In literature, the determinants of return migration are mainly described through push and pull factors and, more recently, through deterrent and stay factors. Push factors can result from economic hardship and lack of social contacts in host countries. Return policies or specific programmes – including AVRR programmes – affect migrants at the macro level. Pull factors can be linked to the desire for family reunification or improvements in livelihood opportunities in origin countries (IOM, 2018[1]; Kox, 2011[2]; Black and King, 2004[3]).

Building on the push and pull model, stay and deterrent factors explain why some migrants decide not to return (Van Wijk, 2008[4]). Migrants are more likely to stay in host countries when economic opportunities are more promising compared to origin countries (Kox, 2011[2]; Song and Song, 2015[5]). Sociocultural integration and social networks are other important factors that increase the propensity to stay in host countries (de Haas and Fokkema, 2011[6]). Deterrent factors are often structural and may reflect unstable economic, political and security situations in origin countries. Migrants who have not been able to maintain social networks in origin countries, nor meet family and community expectations, are also less likely to return (Kox, 2011[2]; Van Wijk, 2008[4]).

The main driver for return migration to origin countries is family related. Homesickness, family reunification or formation, and family obligations are recurring reasons stated by migrants across countries (Fernandez-Sanchez et al., 2022[7]; Konzett-Smoliner, 2016[8]; Fleischer, 2008[9]). A review of evidence in Mexico suggests that most migrants returning from the United States cite the desire to be with family members or the wish to start a family in a familiar environment as the main reasons for return. The propensity to return is higher among migrants who are unable to travel back and forth due to immigration border enforcement (Hazán, 2014[10]; Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015[11]).

Similar patterns can be observed among respondents to surveys of Moroccan and Tunisian return migrants. In Morocco, approximately 60% reported their return as voluntary. Of these voluntary returns, 40% are for family reasons. Family reunification is the driving force for many return migrants, particularly those returning from North America (38%) and traditional European countries of immigration (24%) (Table 4.1).

In Tunisia, where a large proportion of the respondents are retired, family was still the main cited reason for returning (31%) (Table 4.2).

Migrants whose residence status does not allow family reunification in the host country may have a higher propensity to return for family reasons. A study on return intentions of Nigerian migrants in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), for example, underlines how the lack of physical proximity to children and spouses makes permanent settlement challenging for male migrants. They face the dilemma of returning to Nigeria to be with their family or staying in China for the economic well-being of the entire family (Adebayo, 2020[12]).

Family obligations to provide care can also push migrants to return to origin countries. In the Armenian context, female return migrants reported to have felt pressured to fulfil “their social duty” and responsibilities to care for family members (Fleischer, 2008[9]). Another study on return migration to Morocco draws similar conclusions: when the health situation of parents or in-laws deteriorates, female migrants feel obliged to return to provide care (Vantoni, 2016[13]).

Adverse family circumstances can also influence return decisions. When visas are linked to marital status, family migrants may have to leave host countries after divorce (Vantoni, 2016[13]). This depends on legal and temporal factors, as illustrated in the Dutch context by Bjiwaard and van Doeselaar, who examined the divorce and migration patterns of 100 392 family migrants. They categorised immigrants according to three Human Development Index (HDI) tiers of origin countries. Their results show that family migrants from developed countries are more likely to move after divorce despite having fewer restrictions on residence permits. There is an increase in the divorce rate for all groups after three years of marriage, when migrants have stayed long enough to obtain a permanent residence permit. For family migrants from less developed countries, the timing of divorce is crucial: migrants who divorce after two years in the host country, have a 20 percentage point higher probability of leaving within ten years than those who divorce after three or more years in the host country (Bijwaard and van Doeselaar, 2014[14]).

However, families in the origin country can also discourage migrants from returning. In low- and middle-income countries, the emigration of one family member is often co-financed by other family members as a collective investment. Migrants are expected to send remittances and return with capital and consumer goods. This may explain why rejected asylum seekers may refrain from returning to avoid family scrutiny and feelings of guilt and shame (IOM, 2018[1]). Families may expect migrants to preserve even when faced with great difficulties. During the workshop in Tunisia, social attachés who had previously worked in European consulates reported that some family members explicitly ask migrants to stay in the host country, even when there is little chance of the migrant obtaining a legal residence permit.

Families play a central but ambivalent role in the reintegration process of returning migrants, whether they are beneficiaries of AVRR or return without any support. In the first months after return, when returning migrants are still adjusting to the new circumstances, family support is particularly visible. However, families can also pose significant challenges to the reintegration process.

Family support can be summarised in four categories. On the one hand, families in origin countries provide moral and psychological support to returning migrants. Many studies confirm this, including interviews with 350 Armenian return migrants (Fleischer, 2008[9]). During the workshop in Morocco, the civil society organisation Fondation Orient-Occident described three stages in accepting return, for which family support is crucial.

  1. 1. The shock phase: Return migrants have mixed feelings and do not fully understand the implications of their return. Living conditions in Morocco can be very different from those in the host country. Return migrants often justify their return to family members and neighbours, while trying to understand how this is perceived by them.

  2. 2. The anger phase: Return migrants have doubts about their return and family tensions may arise. Attitudes towards family members and AVRR service providers can be aggressive, especially if the promised financial assistance does not materialise as quickly as expected.

  3. 3. The acceptance phase: Return migrants reflect on their priorities and take stock of their personal skills. They accept their return and move forward.

Mothers of returning migrants often provide moral support at all these stages. During the workshop in Tunisia, for example, implementing partners of AVRR support reported that it is common for mothers to accompany their returning child to preliminary interviews. Mothers also help with the administrative procedures involved in preparing the economic reintegration project, which allows return migrants to regain their place in the family and to contribute to the family’s expenses.

In addition, families help return migrants to establish social networks. Of the 350 return migrants interviewed in Armenia, 29% had family support to reconnect with local communities (Fleischer, 2008[9]) (Fleischer, 2008[9]), as in Tunisia, where families explain the evolving economic environment. In Morocco, families often provide practical guidance and assistance in dealing with administrative procedures that go beyond AVRR activities.

Where socio-economic conditions allow, families provide financial support to return migrants. In Armenia, a third of the return migrants interviewed received money from their families in the absence of unemployment benefits (Fleischer, 2008[9]) (Fleischer, 2008[9]). During the workshop in Tunisia, local civil society organisations also highlighted how parents incur debt to finance a safe migration route for their children. If the migration process fails, some parents go back into debt to cover the travel expenses for their children’s return. This observation was also echoed during the workshop in Morocco, where local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) explained that families usually cover basic needs, including for healthcare, in the first months after return.

Another area in which families support returnees is through income-generating activities. For those who start small businesses as part of the AVRR package, it is not uncommon for other family members to provide the physical space or contribute to rental costs. They may also undertake planning activities prior to the migrant’s return. This includes liaising with local implementing organisations to ensure that the economic reintegration project is operational upon the migrant’s return. During the workshop in Tunisia, however, implementers of AVRR support pointed out the risk of failure if the returning migrant gives up the project, becomes disabled or dies. In such cases, the provisions of AVRR programmes do not formally allow family members to continue the project as co-actors.

While reintegration assistance focuses on the individual returning migrant and, where relevant, the family unit, it could also benefit family members in countries of origin. By extending some of the services offered within the reintegration package, such as financial literacy training, family members could better support the returnee throughout the process of setting up a business (ERRIN, 2022[15]). The database on return migrants (DReM) illustrates the extensive support from family members for returnees in Tunisia, Mali and Armenia (Figure 4.1).

Despite the wide-ranging support, return migrants also face challenges in the family context. When family members perceive their return as a failure and an abandonment of the family project, return migrants often feel guilt and shame (IOM, 2018[1]). In some cases, this perception is linked to misrepresentation or lack of transparency about the migration experience. Difficulties are concealed by giving false information about material possessions and living conditions in host countries (Scarneci Domnisoru and Csesznek, 2017[16]). Upon return, family members may react with surprise to the apparent circumstances which could ultimately lead to rejection (Schuster and Majidi, 2015[17]).

Evidence suggests that family pressure is more prevalent among involuntary return migrants. They are often labelled as coming back “empty-handed”, especially when their return has significant livelihood implications for other family members (Kleist, 2017[18]; IOM, 2018[1]). In Mali, for example, out of 350 return migrants, more than 60% reported that family members had asked for financial support which they could not provide (Figure 4.2).

Family tensions are a particular challenge for vulnerable return migrants. Trauma, mental health problems or addiction are additional barriers to re-finding their place in the family. In the absence of overarching support mechanisms provided by public services, families can become overwhelmed by the situation and, in the worst cases, reject vulnerable migrants. Exchanges with psychologists from Doctors of the World have shown that returning migrants are often reluctant to talk about their experiences in host countries and may even deny that they are suffering from declining mental health.

Involving families in therapeutic care is one approach to restoring fragile family bonds, as highlighted by psychologists and AVRR implementers during the workshop in Tunisia. Family mediation has great potential to better inform and sensitise on a wide range of return issues but has not been mainstreamed in AVRR programmes. One way to mainstream family mediation is to include it as a tool of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPS) pillar in AVRR programmes. Concerns about family tensions or rejection could be identified and discussed during the return counselling sessions offered by AVRR to migrants planning to return to their origin country. This information can be shared with case workers in countries of origin, who can co-ordinate with available psychologists or other support resources. Upon return, and with the consent of all parties, a psychological pre-assessment could determine whether family members can make a positive contribution to the healing process of returning migrants.

Return decisions and reintegration outcomes are affected by the presence of children. Policy design and AVRR programmes usually focus on individual return migrants, or address children’s perspectives only when the parent has agreed to return. The return decision is also strongly influenced by partners, especially when the couple is mixed – and mixed couples are a major barrier to considering return.

Several studies indicate that the age of children influences the willingness to return. In the Netherlands, rejected asylum seekers living in family locations consider returning when their children are not yet of school age (IOM, 2018[1]). This is also the case in the Danish context, where Nikolka highlights that return is most likely when children are either very young or close to school age (Nikolka, 2018[19]). Avoiding potential disruptions in children’s lives when return migration is unavoidable explains why some Moroccan migrants choose to return when children are young (Vantoni, 2016[13]). Austrian migrants returning from EU and non-EU countries also report that their children’s age made it easier to reconnect with former friends. Bonding through parenthood helped to overcome feelings of alienation (Konzett-Smoliner, 2016[8]).

The type of education available to children in origin countries is another concern for families. Some migrant groups in Europe, such as Bosnians and Eritreans, are reluctant to return not only because of social and economic challenges, but also to ensure that their children complete their education in host countries (Al-Ali and Black, 2001[20]). Nikolka affirms that the propensity to return among migrants in Denmark is positively related to the quality of schooling in the origin country (Nikolka, 2018[19]).1 Half of the respondents in a large-scale survey of Latvian emigrants also expressed reluctance to return due to doubts about adequate support for children in adapting to the Latvian education system (Hazans, 2015[21]). This concern was higher among immigrants with lower education and from minority groups (59% and 57%) than among those with higher education and without minority background (49% and 46%).

Concerns about children’s well-being can influence return decisions in different ways. Some migrants may decide to return without their children. In such cases, the spouse remains in the host country and continues to work there. Table 4.3 illustrates this in the Moroccan context.

In other cases, migrants decide to return for the benefit of their children. During the workshop in Tunisia, AVRR implementers identified three scenarios in which children are the main reason for return:

  1. 1. Migrants have children born in the host country: The family faces hardship and precariousness (e.g. difficulties in obtaining legal residence status). To protect their children, migrants return to Tunisia.

  2. 2. Migrants have children born in Tunisia: The more difficult it is for the children to integrate culturally and academically in the host country, the more likely parents are to return to Tunisia.

  3. 3. Migrants are in the host country without their children: As a result of this separation, children may face challenges, including dropping out of school. When migrants become aware of these problems, they often decide to return to Tunisia.

While some parents decide to return for their children’s well-being, they have limited control over the unique challenges of reintegration. These challenges faced by children are well known, but interventions in this area are not comprehensive. AVRR programmes assign responsibility for mediating to ensure that children of returnees are enrolled in school, which can be complicated, especially for those arriving during the school year. However, the additional problems faced by children – especially if their language skills are below grade level or if they are accustomed to different pedagogical approaches – are not so easily addressed (OECD, 2020[22]).

Local structures are not always available to manage these reintegration issues. This raises the question of the extent to which parents can prepare for their children’s return. In the Moroccan context, Vantoni distinguishes between families that speak Arabic with their children in the host country and have gathered sufficient information about the school system before returning. In these cases, children reintegrate relatively easily. Conversely, when children do not speak their mother tongue, parents face difficulties in finding a suitable school upon return. Families are forced to invest in private tutoring, and it can take several years for children to catch up with their peers (Vantoni, 2016[13]). While readiness certainly influences children’s reintegration outcomes, parents do not always have the choice to decide when and under which circumstances to return.

In addition, migrants who have established relationships in the destination country may be deterred from return by the perceived difficulty of integration of their partner.2 In the Latvian context, there are indications that return intentions are lower among migrants with foreign partners. This is of consequence, since of the 136 000 Latvians living abroad with a spouse or partner in 2015, at least a third were non-Latvian. Table 4.4 shows that the propensity to return within five years is significantly lower among migrants with foreign partners, especially among women (Hazans, 2015[21]). The survey did not examine which specific factors act as a disincentive to return. The barrier represented by language, however, is one of the main ones raised by researchers on this topic (Wąsikiewicz-Firlej and Daly, 2023[23]; Hu and Pizzi, 2022[24]; Mukhamejanova and Konurbayeva, 2023[25]).

In conclusion, this section shows that families have a significant impact on migrants’ decisions to return. At each point in the return decision process and the return experience, they intervene with roles that can push the return migrant in one direction or the other. They are often the main driver for return, but they can also act as a disincentive if migrants fear that they cannot live up to family expectations. Once the migrant has returned, families support them in many ways, especially in the first months after return. However, certain family perceptions, such as return being a failure, can hinder reintegration outcomes. Returning migrants may isolate themselves out of shame and guilt, hampering their ability to rebuild social networks. Rejection by families can also be a barrier to economic reintegration of returnees, especially if income-generating activities require additional support from family members. Family pressure can particularly affect vulnerable groups, including those who have experienced trauma or have mental health and addiction problems. Families of returnees may be overwhelmed by the needs of the return migrant, but family mediation is rarely offered in return programmes or by public services in origin countries. Reintegration challenges are also prevalent for children, who may struggle with school integration and language barriers.

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Notes

← 1. Nikolka uses PISA test scores as reference category for schooling quality.

← 2. If mixed couples do decide to return to the origin country of one of the partners, they face specific reintegration challenges – the same which discourage return. The limited literature on this issue focuses primarily on return to developed countries of mixed couples where one partner is not from that country. Here, in mixed couples, structural obstacles to economic integration and the complexity of unfamiliar administrative procedures may lead the partners to physically separate to pursue their careers, with negative consequences for family composition, or renegotiate family roles (Konzett-Smoliner, 2016[8]). The specific Austrian example shows reintegration challenges for mixed couples can be linked to the organisational difficulties of rebuilding family life, especially when one partner is unfamiliar with the country. Similar to first arrival in the host country, finding suitable accommodation, opening a bank account, applying for insurance, organising childcare and finding a job for the partner are overwhelming tasks. The difficulty for non-EU/EEA spouses to obtain work permits and non-recognition of their qualifications create additional tensions in families.

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