1. Bridging the political-administrative interface

Democracy is inherently messy and requires trade-offs and compromises. Helping navigate this, through bridging and fostering relationships between the political and administrative layers of government, is a key role of the CoG. Centres perform this work to translate government agendas into whole-of-government strategies to help governments work on complex issues and make policy trade-off decisions (OECD, 2018[1]). It is essential for both domestic and global policy, and responses to complex and layered geopolitical issues (Cairney, 2012[2]).

The CoGs’ bridging role is critical to ensuring coherent and co-ordinated government action and smooth transitions and decision-making. In this sense, CoGs function to ensure that the public administration upholds and implements government’s priorities in a way that follows the principles of openness, integrity and fairness. In doing so, CoGs can influence the overall perception of government competency and values, which drive trust in public institutions (Brezzi et al., 2021[3]). The complex issues and geopolitical shifts currently facing many governments make this role even more challenging.

This chapter will explore the role of the CoG as a bridge and an interface between the political and administrative spheres of government through the following structure:

  • The political-administrative interface.

  • Mechanisms used by the CoG as a bridge.

  • Building the skills of CoG officials at the interface.

  • Managing challenges at the interface, including coalition governments and transitions.

A shared understanding of the delineation of roles between the political and administrative spheres and between the CoG and line ministries is essential. In most democratic systems, the political sphere holds primary policy decision-making authority, while the administrative sphere operates on behalf of the government in operational and related matters (Favero, 2022[4]). Yet, relationships between the political and the administrative can be challenging due to distinct cultures, competing objectives, forms of accountability and power. Under many democratic systems, politicians have the authority to decide policy that shapes action. The public administration can be bound to implement the wishes of the elected government but retains power over information and organisational resources (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi, 2014[5]). Yet, a lot more policy design interactions must occur in practice. While clear roles are important, processes must allow both actors to monitor (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi, 2014[5]) and meaningfully interact with the other (Demir, 2022[6]).

Formal agreements, the codification of relationships and roles, or cabinet manuals can be used to clarify roles (Box 1.1).

Negotiation among both sides of the interface is critical to reaching a common framework and is an important part of the CoG’s role. There is always tension between political and administrative accountability, which blurs the roles of each actor. Balancing goals, autonomy and accountability of ministers with regard to senior public officials is always a careful balance (Giauque, Resenterra and Siggen, 2009[8]; OECD, 2023[9]).

One of the primary reasons for CoGs to play a bridging role is to ensure that the public administration implements the government agenda. This involves alignment between strategic priorities, public administration objectives, and institutional, financial or legal capabilities. To bridge potential gaps, act as an interface and effectively translate the political vision into action, CoGs can use several mechanisms. Box 1.2 discusses mechanisms used in Australia, Denmark, Finland and Hungary. The most common mechanisms which emerge from these examples include:

  • Joint consideration of objectives between the line ministries and CoG.

  • Performance work which anchors government priorities.

  • A detailed articulation of strategies.

  • An agreement to proceed (e.g. memorandum of understanding).

A key enabler for the CoG to effectively function as a bridge between the political and administrative spheres is a skilled workforce that has good relations with the rest of government. The CoG needs a diverse and well-trained set of staff to achieve successful policy outcomes in a range of areas. Administrators must serve elected governments and yet remain non-partisan. In order to so, CoG staff must be skilled in consistently interpreting, establishing and defending the line between appropriate responsiveness and inappropriate partisanship (Grube and Howard, 2016[10]). Staff should also be skilled mediators to facilitate conversation at the interface.

The CoG also plays a key role in translating the government agenda into public service objectives. Key functions include negotiation, sharing of information, monitoring and fostering commitment. They require communication skills, monitoring expertise and the ability to translate evidence into knowledge.

The CoG also has a central role to play in transition management, as discussed later. This includes record keeping, planning for government changes, sourcing and maintaining live documents that capture performance, long-term plans and strategic outlook and developing information storage systems that are accessible to decision-makers and incoming governments. A CoG best supports this type of work with a variety of staff, including those with specialist information management skills, strategic capacity and deep process understanding of government workings. Generally, the mix of skills required suggests that the CoG benefits from a mixture of political and administrative staff. Box 1.3 outlines Hungary’s approach to ensuring the right skills at the CoG.

Coalition governments are becoming more prominent for many reasons, including in the context of polarisation and threats to democracy. Coalition governments do not always have relationships or mechanisms to collaborate and function effectively, challenging the CoG’s role.

Coalition governments may require the CoG to increase focus on central co-ordination and relationships due to the necessity of maintaining good relationships with all parties. This may also involve sharing co-ordination powers with line ministries and engaging in discussions outside of the government (OECD, 2018[1]). This can also differ between parliamentary and presidential systems. Boxes 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 outline cases in Denmark, Finland and Spain, where coalition government arrangements have required the CoG to adapt.

Building and maintaining institutional memory is a key task for CoGs. The CoG can be effective at managing transitions due to its systemic leverage, including agreements, committees, digital record keeping and information-sharing platforms. It can also appoint permanent staff to oversee these.

Staff turnover is critical to institutional memory. The experience and issues of trust for the CoG can also be shaped by the number of political staff in critical roles within the CoG. Brazil and the United States (see Boxes 1.7 and 1.8), for example, have a high level of staff turnover with changes of government. This requires the safe transfer of information and accountability for records storage and the continuation of long-term programmes. Parliamentary systems, with numerous possible outcomes at times of transition, also require significant transition planning (Box 1.9).

A recent OECD survey showed that there is typically some level of continuity within the CoG (OECD, 2023[19]). This creates an opportunity for the CoG to build permanent systems and organisational memory.

  • The bridging role of the CoG is increasingly complex, with major global challenges and crises, alongside changing national agendas and geopolitical shifts. It can be more challenging with governments attempting to respond to declining trust and increasing polarisation.

  • CoGs need to ensure a productive, two-way relationship between the political and administrative interface. This relationship must allow for political directions to be implemented by the public administration. At the same time, it needs to allow for frank advice on the feasibility of policies from line ministries to be considered by the government.

  • Coalition governments may present unique challenges for the CoG. This context may require enhanced focus on communication and co-ordination mechanisms to maintain good working relationships between all parties.

  • Periods of transition, as moments when institutional memory and staff expertise are frequently replaced (including within the CoG), may also require the focus of the CoG. Managing transitions – through agencies or building processes and guidelines – can be a challenge for CoG staff to pre-empt and address.

  • Ensuring clarity between the roles, accountabilities and interaction mechanisms between the political and administrative spheres is important. CoGs can facilitate this through manuals, agreements and ongoing discussions.

  • CoGs should not just focus on transactional elements of the interface but also on relational elements. Some CoGs find it effective to have regular, informal discussions between both sides of the interface, including with the line ministries.

  • Building the right skills within the workforce is a crucial enabler for the continued effective functioning of CoGs. This is important to effectively manage co-ordination mechanisms, capacity building and generally leverage the expertise of the administration to execute priorities. CoG must ensure that the staff of the administration have the diverse skills necessary to perform at a high level. CoGs need to consider their overall mix of political versus non-political staff in this regard.

  • Clear mechanisms to translate the government agenda to the work of the public administration are also key enablers for the functioning of the government. A range of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms to do this can be useful. The alignment between the priorities of the administration at all levels is essential for the effective implementation of the government priorities.

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