6. Integration of refugees from Ukraine in Norway

The unprovoked large-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has generated a historical movement of people fleeing, unseen in Europe since the World War II. By mid-October, the UNHCR had recorded 4.2 million refugees1 from Ukraine registered for temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. By means of comparison, it took two years to reach 3 million Syrian refugees. While the neighbouring countries of Ukraine have received most of the refugees, high numbers have also found refuge in other OECD countries, including Norway. While flows to Norway have been well below those reported elsewhere, both in absolute terms and relative to the population (Figure 6.1), they are the most significant inflows of refugees in Norwegian history. In relative terms, numbers so far are also slightly higher than in Sweden.

The current crisis differs from earlier situations in many ways. This includes the high share of fleeing children and women, and the related high incidence of family separation. It is not clear if male partners will join their families in host countries. Together with the current uncertainty, this makes it difficult to assess the social and economic impact of the crisis as well as its duration. Nevertheless, many countries including Norway managed to respond swiftly to the new situation by issuing a set of policy changes to their migration and integration system. This chapter provides an overview of the policy changes in Norway as an immediate response to the aggression.

By mid-October 2022, close to 30 000 persons from Ukraine had applied for temporary protection in Norway, of whom half women (over 14 000) and slightly under 10 000 children (Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI), 2022[2]). The number is thus already at par with the 30 000 asylum seekers registered in the previous record year 2015. Over the first months, Norway received fewer applicants per month than Sweden, Denmark and Finland, but since July the numbers arriving in Norway have been higher, at least compared to Sweden and Denmark. Registrations in July and August 2022 have also been higher than in the previous two months.

In April, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) started to develop three scenarios estimating the future arrivals of refugees from Ukraine. The scenarios consider different parameters and result in planning levels of high, middle and low arrivals of refugees from Ukraine as well as a planning level. The latest update of the scenarios from mid-October recommended the municipalities and authorities to prepare for the middle scenario. The planning level suggested that around 40 000 Ukrainians will come to Norway in 2022 and additional 30 000 in 2023 (Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI), 2022[3]). This is a significantly higher number than the Directorate’s preparation for settling a total of 5 500 refugees from across the globe in 2022, before the invasion – and highlights the need for rapid scale-up of Norway’s reception and integration system (IMDi, 2022[4]).

Prior to the war, Ukrainian nationals who were holders of valid biometric passports benefited from visa-free travel allowing them to enter Norway without an entry visa, and stay for up to 90 days within 180 days.

On 24 February 2022, Norway suspended the exit obligation, allowing Ukrainian citizens who were in Norway on permits or visa-free visits set to expire to remain until further notice. On the same day, Ukrainian asylum seekers were also taken out of the 48-hour procedure. This is the process where applicants from countries that, in the opinion of the Directorate of Immigration (UDI), are considered as generally safe and where the application for asylum will be processed and rejected within 48 hours.

Whilst Norway is not bound by the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive, the government announced on 4 March 2022, it would mirror the EU’s decision in offering temporary collective protection to all Ukrainian citizens who had fled Ukraine after 24 February 2022. From 11 March, individuals received temporary collective protection with a valid permit for one year. Protection was also granted to other third country nationals and stateless persons who have had international or national protection in Ukraine and those who are close relatives of the mentioned groups (Office of the Prime Minister, 2022[5]). The changes included an exemption from the rule of individual assessment, which allows protection of an entire group of people. The last time this was done in Norway was during the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s. At the end of April 2022, Norway extended the temporary collective protection scheme for displaced people from Ukraine. Ukrainian citizens who were in Norway before 24 February could also receive collective protection.

The residence permit Ukrainians hold is valid for one year, but contrary to other humanitarian permits, this duration cannot count towards a permanent residence (which usually requires 5 years). The collective protection permit can be renewed twice, so be granted for three years in total. Thereafter, it is possible to apply for protection or another type of residence on individual grounds (work, family, education).

In most OECD countries, a change of status is possible. In Australia and Canada, an application for another permit (including for permanent residence) can be lodged after a certain time from the expiration of the previous status. In several EU countries, shifting from temporary protection to employment-based or family status is permitted, subject to eligibility criteria.

As in other OECD countries, arrivals from Ukraine to Norway were predominantly women with children but also a high share of elderly. Until mid-October, 29% of arrivals from Ukraine to Norway were at most 15 years of age, 19% between 16 and 29 and 11% above 60 years. Overall, 78% of working aged (20-59 years) arrivals from Ukraine were women (Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI), 2022[3]). The demographics of registrations in Norway are thus similar to those of other European countries like France, Greece or Spain where one-third of recorded arrivals were children. In contrast half of registrations in neighbouring countries such as Poland and Moldova were children (OECD, 2022[6]; OECD, 2022[7]).

The limited information currently available on the level of education of Ukrainian refugees to the OECD suggests that a higher share of them is tertiary educated than among other refugee groups. What is more, refugees from Ukraine seem to be higher educated than the general Ukrainian working-age population, among which 56% of the women and 43% of the men were tertiary educated in 2020. Some OECD countries have also reported that the initial arrival cohorts who came in March and April had a higher education level then those arriving in later months (OECD, 2022[7]).

Data on the group’s educational level in Norway has not yet been published. Preliminary findings from the EUAA-OECD Survey of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine (SAM-UKR) show that 71% of respondents who gave information about their educational background stated a tertiary education. Likewise, a survey of Ukrainian refugees in Germany in mid-March found that 73% of adults had tertiary education, this figure was 61% of registered adult Ukrainian refugees in Spain.

The Ukrainian-born population in Norway before the war was relatively small and counted to around 6 500 persons in the beginning of February 2022. Among them 3 000 were Ukrainian citizens and thereby eligible for the protection scheme, the remaining 43% of them had Norwegian citizenship. Before the crisis, Ukraine was the 35th most common country of birth among immigrants in Norway and only about 0.8% of Norway’s foreign-born population was born in Ukraine (Statistics Norway, 2022[8]). This contrasts with a large diaspora presence of Ukrainians across the EU, where they were representing the third-largest group of third-country nationals at the end of 2020, after those from Morocco and Türkiye (OECD, 2022[9]).

The majority of the Ukrainian-born living in Norway prior to the war were young and female, 60% under 40 years old and 70% were women. Most of them had come to Norway for family formation and other family reasons (60%), thereafter for work (20%) and education (20%) (Dzamarija, Sørlien Molstad and Østby, 2022[10]).

Norway has since the onset of Russia’s war against Ukraine made efforts to simplify the registration and settlement process. This has contributed to ensuring a faster processing and settlement of refugees. On 12 March, Norway decentralised its asylum registration to ensure that asylum seekers can register throughout the country. In addition to registering at the National Arrivals Centre in Råde, the National Police Immigration Service was expanded to register asylum seekers at several locations in eight police districts – Agder, Southwestern, Western, Møre og Romsdal, Trøndelag, Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. While Ukrainians can stay in Norway for 90 days without registration, Norway encouraged arrivals to register so the Norwegian authorities know who is in the country.

Registered individuals received a temporary identification number. The Norwegian Digitalisation agency (Digdir) set up an electronic ID scheme which allows refugees from Ukraine to quickly use public services, such as health care and a digital mailbox (Digdir, 2022[11]). This is a new arrangement with potential benefit for all future refugees.

In order to house the large number of individuals fleeing Ukraine as quickly as possible, more than half of EU and other OECD countries have relied, at least initially, upon the willingness of private citizens to host these refugees in their homes. This is also true for Norway, where early evidence suggest that around half of those who have fled Ukraine to Norway have found shelter in private accommodation. While the share is larger than for earlier inflows in Norway, it is lower than in some OECD countries for which data is available. In Finland and Latvia, for example the share of displaced persons in private accommodation is around two-thirds, while in Belgium and Italy it is around 85%-90% (OECD, 2022[9]).

Due to the rise in new arrivals, UDI has as of 1st of June set up 85 new emergency accommodation centres across the country, housing 20 000 refugees (UDI, 2022[12]). The quick set-up was made possible due to simplified rules concerning the construction and running of accommodation centres (Regjeringen.no, 2022[13]). The centres are temporary and will be dismantled as soon as the refugees are offered settlement or a place in a more permanent asylum reception centre.

Individuals fleeing from Ukraine with family members in Norway and those who found private accommodation can stay in these places and do not need to relocate to an asylum centre or the newly opened emergency accommodation centres. Amendments allow municipalities in these cases to be reimbursed for the costs of these Ukrainian refugees who choose to live in private homes, outside the asylum reception system (UDI, 2022[14]).

By the beginning of October 2022, among those 25 000 that had received temporary collective protection, over half, around 19 000 had been settled in a municipality. The rest are waiting to be settled and are either staying in a private accommodation or an asylum centre. On average, individuals have waited approximately one month after being granted collective protection until they are settled. This is a considerable faster settlement than in previous years. In comparison, the average waiting time was approximately five months over the years 2016-18, and a bit over 3 months in 2019.

According to IMDI, all municipalities have shown a strong willingness to adapt for and accept the unexpected higher numbers of new arrivals (IMDI, 2022[15]). Based on the request from IMDI, the municipalities have said they can settle close to 36 000 refugees in 2022, a much higher figure than the initial request to settle 5 500, before the invasion.

The settlement process for Ukrainian refugees initially differed somewhat from the ordinary procedure (Sveen and Bakken, 2022[16]). During the first weeks the mapping only included gathering information on family relationships, possible networks in Norway, needs for special facilitation (such as wheelchairs) and pets. Normally, humanitarian migrants are moved from the reception facilities to municipalities that match their professional and educational profile. However, in contrast to other groups of asylum seekers, the mapping of refugees with temporary collective protection is not mandatory before settlement. Instead, this group only has a right to such mapping after settlement in the municipality. While this provision allowed speeding up the settlement process, it also meant that initially the settlement placement did not consider the individual refugee’s needs and competencies, increasing the risk of an incorrect settlement. Since the end of May 2022, however, mapping also includes information on education and previous occupation (Regjeringen.no, 2022[17]).

Just like in the ordinary settlement procedure, all municipalities receive an integration grant for every refugee from Ukraine they settle – the grant shall cover the additional expenditure the municipalities have for the settlement and integration work for the first and following four years. In 2022, the grant for the first year of settlement ranged between NOK 190 000 and NOK 234 900 depending on the refugees age and background.

However, due to the lower numbers of arrivals over the past years it was not expected that all municipalities accept to settle refugees. This meant that at the beginning of the aggression, many municipalities were not ready to settle new arrivals, and given the uncertainty in arriving numbers, municipalities could not be sure if they would actually receive refugees even if they stepped up, invested and prepared for a potential arrival and signalled that to UDI.

To incentivise municipalities to welcome and settle the many new arrivals, the government decided that all municipalities will be compensated for their efforts to build-up and strengthen their settlement capacity, even in cases when refugees are never settled in their municipality. The compensation was set at NOK 50 000 per place in a municipality which was requested by IMDI and prepared for by the municipality but never filled with an arriving refugee.

The compensation scheme is temporary and only for 2022. Compensation will be paid in 2023 after the results for 2022 are summarised. While the scheme may be unnecessary in ‘normal’ times, it has an important function for crisis preparedness and its impact on municipalities’ willingness and capacity to accept refugees should be closely monitored.

To support the municipalities with the new arrivals, Norway has made it easier for the municipalities to temporarily recruit retired staff. Seniors who help with the reception of the Ukrainians for example in kindergarten or school can do so without seeing their total pension reduced.

Voluntary commitment also has an important supplementary role to the municipalities work and the government has apart from providing extra funding to NGO’s and other civil society organisations also encouraged municipalities to make use of the local voluntary organisations in their integration efforts. (Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2022[18]).

Compared to the majority of other receiving OECD countries, Norway’s integration offers and measures to Ukrainian refugees are generous and wide – providing them with almost the same offers as to other refugees. Individuals with temporary protection can work and reunite with their family in Norway, they have full access to kindergarten, education, health services etc. Beyond providing access and scaling up existing programmes, specific support is also in place for vulnerable groups (Box 6.1).

Not all OECD countries offer Ukrainian refugees similar access to integration offers as other refugee groups. Instead, they identified specific measures to assist Ukrainians with their immediate needs, considering their duration of stay as temporary in nature. Norway’s rationale is that whilst many have expressed the desire to go back to Ukraine as soon as possible, and the permit is temporary with return in mind, the government is also preparing for a scenario when this is not or no longer feasible.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Norway’s flagship integration scheme for refugees and their families is a multi-month, often multiannual full-time programme including language training, information courses, educational and labour market programmes called the Introduction Programme. All individuals under temporary protection have access to this.

To ensure a fast integration of the new arrivals from Ukraine, the Norwegian Government has made several changes to the Norwegian Introduction Programme (NIP). Changes aim to first, adapt the programme to Ukrainians’ specific needs and second, to support municipalities with the extra work from the overall high number of new arrivals.

Contrary to other refugees for whom NIP participation is mandatory, individuals under temporary collective protection (as is the case for refugees from Ukraine) have a right but no obligation to participate in the NIP. In contrast to other refugee groups, they are only entitled to Norwegian language training for up to one year.

The extent of participation in the NIP and the characteristics and outcomes of participants compared to non-participants will be crucial to monitor going forward. This can also provide valuable lessons for the programme at large.

For those who choose to participate, the NIP shall include work and education measures as well as language training and parental guidance. However, and in contrast to other groups, social studies, a course that teaches about Norwegian society and norms, is not mandatory.

The municipalities have a duty to provide a flexible programme for refugees with temporary collective protection. A key consideration hereto will be to consider the needs of single mothers.

As a key difference to the programme for other groups, municipalities have to offer training in English for those Ukrainians who want to participate in the NIP, but who do not want to train in Norwegian. Other and earlier refugee groups have no training in English (Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, 2022[21]). According to Norwegian officials, the English language classes are focused on preparing higher skilled participants for further studies in Norway, as many higher educational programmes require a certain level of English but not necessarily Norwegian.

While offering English language training may be more cost and time effective for temporary stays as it may help to speed up the labour market entry, it is also important that they do not come at an expense of longer integration efforts that include a focus on Norwegian language training. In general, irrespective of the short or long-term focus the integration measures offered such as education and upskilling courses may still help to build skills that will be useful when people return to Ukraine.

Individuals who choose not to participate in the NIP have a right to one year of Norwegian language training. They also have access to the recently introduced Klippekort in Norway (a possibility for EU citizens to train in Norwegian). Vouchers for language courses are also offered to Ukrainians in other countries, for example in Luxembourg.

The Nordic countries long have been in the forefront of offering long-term integration support for humanitarian migrants through their (multi)annual integration programmes. Yet, this time Norway and Sweden have for example chosen different approaches demonstrating their different expectations on the duration of the Ukrainian refugees in the country. Contrary to Norway, temporary protection holders in Sweden do not have access to “Swedish for Immigrants”, which otherwise is free of charge and available to all immigrants. There is no access to publicly funded language courses in Finland either.

The number of persons fleeing Ukraine since the Russian aggression is not only unprecedented in size, but also regarding their demographics. Of those seeking temporary collective protection from Ukraine in Norway by mid-October 2022, almost half were under the age of 30 and 26% were between 6 and 19 years old. This poses specific education challenges. (Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI), 2022[3])

Norway has adopted temporary measures to make it easier for kindergartens and schools to welcome refugees from Ukraine. The municipalities’ obligation to provide children with a full-fledged educational programme within one month after arrival was extended to a three-month deadline. This was done as the earlier one-month deadline was difficult to meet when many children were arriving at the same time with the risk that municipalities would refuse to accept further refugees.

All Ukrainian children will follow the ordinary Norwegian curricula, and while schools can choose to use the Ukrainian distance-learning programme, it is not mandatory and the programme should not replace the ordinary curricula (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2022[22]).

At the beginning of March 2022, the Ministry of Education and Research reached out to Norwegian universities about their capacity to accept Ukrainian students who have had to interrupt their education in Ukraine due to the war. Among the answering institutions, the University of Oslo has announced that it can accept 800 students. The University has also arranged digital language training in Norwegian for the Ukrainian students (Mikkelsen, 2022[23]). The Ministry of Education allocated funds for 1 000 study places set aside for refugees, primarily intended for people who have fled Ukraine. By the end of July, however, surprisingly few students from Ukraine had applied (Tønessen et al., 2022[24]).

To make it easier for refugees to start higher education in Norway, a temporary scheme, starting from fall 2022, will allow institutions to make exemptions for refugees who want to study at a higher educational institution without fulfilling certain academic requirements. The scheme applies to all refugees and is not limited to Ukrainians nor those with collective temporary protection. It is the institutions that assess each applicant individually and whether the applicant is considered qualified to complete the relevant programme (Regjeringen.no, 2022[25]).

The government has also tried to support Ukrainian students already in Norway when the aggression started. In March, the government established a scholarship scheme for students from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus who due to the war had lost access to subsistence funding. Eligible students were given up to NOK 11 500 per month from March to August. PhD students have received up to NOK 21 000 a month. Over the spring semester 50 Ukrainians, about 70 Russian and 1 Belarusian student applied for this support. For the fall semester 2022, only Ukrainian students are eligible for the scheme (Regjeringen.no, 2022[26]).

To facilitate a quick labour market entry Norway has made changes so that those with Ukrainian degrees can get their education recognised automatically on the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education’s (NOKUT) websites without having to apply to NOKUT for an individual assessment (NOKUT, 2022[27]). This is only applicable for non-regulated professions. While not officially needed (as not applicable for regulated professions), the automatically generated recognition certificate may still help when applying for a job and for matching job seekers with employers.

Officials from NOKUT have highlighted that most Ukrainians arrived in Norway with all or partial documents aiding the recognition processes immensely. Ukraine has also been at the forefront in digitalising student data, and the collaboration with the European Network of Information Centres is working well.

For regulated professions, Norway is looking into making it easier for Ukrainian health care professionals to work, via exemptions for certain documentation requirements. This is in line with efforts in other OECD countries. The Slovak Republic and Spain are two countries currently looking into how to facilitate access by medical personnel to the labour market. In Norway, this might mean a new and separate recognition scheme for health professions for refugees who lack documentation of completed education to ease their educational approval. An existing recognition scheme aimed at refugees does not yet apply to the health professions.

Another form of support for employment is the removal of qualification requirements, such as formal language requirements for certain professions. Lithuania will exempt Ukrainians with temporary protection from the language requirements for certain employment such as teaching for a period of two years. Individual qualification determinations will be at the discretion of employers.

In Norway, kindergarten and health staff are subject to formal minimum language requirements. And while removing or lowering these requirements for Ukrainian refugees may help this group enter these jobs, it could discriminate other groups. Another option is to encourage and incentive employers to temporarily lower their language requirements for all refugee groups.

In June 2022, a specific fast track for individuals with collective protection was launched. The track is called the ‘flexible fast track’ and is for refugees in the Introduction Programme who bring with them competence that is in demand in the Norwegian labour market. The track is primarily for refugees with completed upper secondary education. While it is similar to an existing fast track (Hurtigsporet) the programme for Ukrainians places particular focus on training in requirements and expectations in Norwegian working life, safety culture and the Norwegian working life model. The expectation is that the new arrivals will get into work earlier than past refugee groups. Yet, due to their short residence time, they may have poor knowledge of the requirements, expectations, rights and duties of an employee in Norway. The programme thus also provides information about rules and norms in Norwegian working context (IMDI, 2022[28]). In addition, the track may contain job-matching, qualifying measures and language training integrated with internship placement in private enterprises. Given the limited take-up of the existing fast-track measures for other refugee groups and the substantial flexibility in the standard NIP, the value-added of this new instrument is not clear.

There are no official numbers on how many of the Ukrainian refugees have found a job in Norway since the onset of the crisis. Yet, in August 2022, more than 6 100 Ukrainian were registered as employed, this is 1 600 more than the same month the year before. This includes 300 temporary workers, who are non-resident in Norway. Since April, the monthly rise in number of workers has been higher than the year before, likely due to the war. A fifth of the Ukrainians work in the health and social sector, and the majority (2/3) are women and 60% are under 40 years of age (Berge and Køber, 2022[29]).

The largest employer organisation for tourism in Norway has reported a strong interest from companies to be matched with the new arrivals (NHO Reiseliv, 2022[30]). Given Norway’s low unemployment levels and current labour shortages, there are good opportunities for employment among the Ukrainians. According to Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administrations (NAV) labour market assessment from June 2022, the refugee flow from Ukraine is likely to have only a small effect on unemployment levels in Norway. Just as the higher inflow will lead to increased labour supply, the demand for labour will also increase with the need for more kindergarten and school places as well as demand in the health and integration sector (Myklathun, Sørbø and Vidal-Gil, 2022[31]).

Norway has swiftly reacted to the challenges arising from the inflow of refugees from Ukraine. While all OECD countries stepped up their integration measures in reaction to the inflows, the scale and scope of the reaction has varied widely, mirroring different expectations regarding duration of stay. In contrast to other Nordic countries with similar systems, Norway provides full access to available integration programmes. This signals that Norway expects that a significant share of the refugees from Ukraine will stay for the longer term, as indeed is expected from the experience with previous refugee situations in OECD countries. In addition, full access to such programmes will provide learning opportunities and experiences that could also help those who return to rebuild Ukraine, one day.

Interestingly, despite a recent large-scale overhaul of its integration system in 2021, aimed at providing more flexible and tailored support, Norway undertook systemic changes for this specific group. This is partly explained by the different legal framework and socio-demographic composition of this group. One important difference relates to the possibility to obtain support for learning English during the Introduction Programme. Other exceptional measures in place, such as around easier skills recognition, higher education and labour market access, will also help ease labour market integration in Norway. These measures should be monitored and if successful, their broader introduction for all refugees considered. At the same time, it will be important to ensure that arrivals from Ukraine who stay, learn Norwegian and have a clear pathway to long-term residence, similar to other refugee groups.

Specific attention needs to be paid to vulnerable groups, including children, the elderly, and the many single mothers. Individuals should be encouraged to take part in the NIP if their stay is not explicitly short-term.

The specific framework in place for refugees from Ukraine also provides a unique opportunity to investigate take-up and impact of the NIP. It can also serve as a test for the overhaul of the system discussed in the other chapters of this report. The newly strengthened communication channels between actors and the sharing of responsibilities between municipality and county level will be key to monitor in this regard.

More broadly, given the impressive integration research and data infrastructure in Norway on integration and its comprehensive policy response, Norway’s experiences with the integration of refugees from Ukraine will provide important insights not only for the integration of refugees from Ukraine in other OECD countries, but for refugee integration at large.

References

[20] Barne- og familiedepartementet (2022), Høyring om tilpassingar og unntak frå barnevernlova for å handtere auken av flyktningar frå Ukraina til Noreg - regjeringen.no, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/hoyring-om-tilpassingar-og-unntak-fra-barnevernlova-for-a-handtere-auken-av-flyktningar-fra-ukraina-til-noreg/id2907430/ (accessed on 29 July 2022).

[29] Berge, C. and T. Køber (2022), Hvor mange ukrainere jobber i Norge?, https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/sysselsetting/statistikk/antall-arbeidsforhold-og-lonn/artikler/hvor-mange-ukrainere-jobber-i-norge (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[11] Digdir (2022), Lager elektronisk ID til flyktninger med kollektiv beskyttelse, https://www.digdir.no/digital-identitet/lager-elektronisk-id-til-flyktninger-med-kollektiv-beskyttelse/3500 (accessed on 1 June 2022).

[10] Dzamarija, M., C. Sørlien Molstad and L. Østby (2022), Så mange ukrainere bor det i Norge, https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/befolkning/artikler/sa-mange-ukrainere-bor-det-i-norge (accessed on 1 June 2022).

[19] Helse Norge (2022), Healthcare for asylum seekers and refugees in Norway, https://www.helsenorge.no/en/foreigners-in-norway/refugees-and-asylum-seekers/ (accessed on 1 June 2022).

[28] IMDI (2022), Fleksibelt hurtigspor, https://introduksjonsprogrammet.imdi.no/introduksjonsprogram-for-flyktninger-fra--ukraina/fleksibelt-hurtigspor/ (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[15] IMDI (2022), Kommunene vil ta imot rekordmange flyktninger.

[4] IMDi (2022), The municipalities will be asked to settle 35 000 refugees in 2022 | IMDi, https://www.imdi.no/om-imdi/aktuelt-na/kommunene-blir-bedt-om-a-bosette-35-000-flyktninger-i-2022/ (accessed on 31 May 2022).

[23] Mikkelsen, S. (2022), NTNU kartlegger hvordan de kan hjelpe ukrainske flyktninger, https://www.universitetsavisa.no/flyktninger-norskopplaering-ukraina/ntnu-kartlegger-hvordan-de-kan-hjelpe-ukrainske-flyktninger/209032 (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[18] Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (2022), 50 millioner til frivillige organisasjoner, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/50-millioner-til-frivillige-organisasjoner/id2906732/ (accessed on 1 June 2022).

[21] Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (2022), Prop. 107 L (2021–2022). Midlertidige endringer i lovverket som følge av ankomst av fordrevne fra Ukraina..

[31] Myklathun, K., J. Sørbø and E. Vidal-Gil (2022), “Utviklingen pa arbeidsmarkedet - NAVs arbeidsmarkedsprognose”, Vol. 2.

[30] NHO Reiseliv (2022), Clarion Hotel The Hub står klare til å ta imot flyktninger Millioner av mennesker er på flukt fra krigen i Ukraina, https://www.nhoreiseliv.no/nyheter/2022/clarion-hotel-the-hub-star-klare-til-a-ta-imot-flyktninger-som-trenger-arbeid/ (accessed on 1 June 2022).

[27] NOKUT (2022), Ukrainske utdanninger kan godkjennes automatisk, https://www.nokut.no/nyheter/ukrainske-utdanninger-kan-godkjennes-automatisk/ (accessed on 7 June 2022).

[9] OECD (2022), “Housing support for Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries”, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9c2b4404-en.

[1] OECD (2022), International Migration Outlook 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/30fe16d2-en.

[6] OECD (2022), Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/09beb886-en.

[7] OECD (2022), “The potential contribution of Ukrainian refugees to the labour force in European host countries”, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e88a6a55-en.

[5] Office of the Prime Minister (2022), Temporary collective protection for Ukrainians, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/temporary-collective-protection-for-ukrainians/id2903140/ (accessed on 31 May 2022).

[13] Regjeringen.no (2022), Enklere regler for rask etablering av akuttinnkvartering for ukrainere som søker beskyttelse i Norge - regjeringen.no, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/enklere-regler-for-rask-etablering-av-akuttinnkvartering-for-ukrainere-som-soker-beskyttelse-i-norge/id2903217/ (accessed on 5 July 2022).

[25] Regjeringen.no (2022), Regjeringen endrer opptaksreglene for flyktninger som vil studere, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/regjeringen-endrer-opptaksreglene-for-flyktninger-som-vil-studere/id2921641/ (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[26] Regjeringen.no (2022), Regjeringen forlenger stipendordningen for ukrainske studenter i Norge, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/regjeringen-forlenger-stipendordningen-for-ukrainske-studenter-i-norge/id2921637/ (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[17] Regjeringen.no (2022), Utvidet kartlegging før bosetting, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/utvidet-kartlegging-for-bosetting/id2914055/ (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[8] Statistics Norway (2022), Table 05184: Immigrants, by country background, contents and year. Statbank Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/05184/tableViewLayout1/ (accessed on 3 August 2022).

[16] Sveen, E. and J. Bakken (2022), NOAS mener bosetting av flyktninger fra Ukraina går for sakte – NRK Troms og Finnmark, NRK, https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/noas-mener-bosetting-av-flyktninger-fra-ukraina-gar-for-sakte-1.15935989 (accessed on 29 July 2022).

[24] Tønessen, E. et al. (2022), Få flyktninger er så langt tatt opp til høyere utdanning, http://khrono.no/fa-flyktninger-er-sa-langt-tatt-opp-til-hoyere-utdanning/704072 (accessed on 13 October 2022).

[14] UDI (2022), Alternativ mottaksplassering og muligheten til å bo privat, https://www.udi.no/aktuelt/alternativ-mottaksplassering-og-muligheten-til-a-bo-privat/ (accessed on 7 June 2022).

[12] UDI (2022), Avtaler om akuttinnkvartering, https://www.udi.no/aktuelt/nye-avtaler-om-akuttinnkvartering/ (accessed on 7 June 2022).

[22] Utdanningsdirektoratet (2022), Barnehage og opplæring for ukrainske barn og unge, https://www.udir.no/laring-og-trivsel/krig/ (accessed on 6 July 2022).

[2] Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI) (2022), Asylum applications from Ukraine in 2022, https://www.udi.no/statistikk-og-analyse/statistikk/asylsokere-fra-ukraina-i-2022/ (accessed on 3 August 2022).

[3] Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI) (2022), “Scenarioer for antall flyktninger fra Ukraina”, https://www.udi.no/globalassets/statistikk-og-analyse/ukraina/2201011-scenarioer-om-antall-flyktninger-fra-ukraina-11.-oktober.pdf (accessed on 3 August 2022).

Note

← 1. The term “refugee” is used in this chapter to refer to persons, who are fleeing from Russia’s war against Ukraine and have obtained some sort of international protection, including not only formal refugee status (as per the Geneva Convention) but also subsidiary and temporary protection (as in the case of most refugees from Ukraine).

Metadata, Legal and Rights

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Extracts from publications may be subject to additional disclaimers, which are set out in the complete version of the publication, available at the link provided.

© OECD 2022

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.