3. Provision 2: Legal and regulatory framework

The legal and regulatory framework builds the basis for any country’s open government agenda. Having a solid legal and regulatory framework for open government is an essential pre-condition for successful reforms, as laws and regulations are the foundation on which an open government agenda is built (OECD, 2019[1]). Enshrining open government policies and practices in laws and regulations can foster institutionalisation and provide public officials with a clear mandate to foster openness and give stakeholders a means to hold them accountable.

Evidence collected through the OECD Open Government Reviews and Scans shows that the underlying legal and regulatory basis for the promotion of open government policies and practices in Adherents is usually very large (Box 3.1). It includes, among others, legislative provisions relating to the principles of open government in countries’ constitutions, as well as laws and regulations on access to information, stakeholder participation, anti-corruption, the protection of personal data and national archives, digital government, open data, whistle-blower protection, civic freedoms, etc. In addition, most countries have put in place legal requirements to involve stakeholders in law-making, regulatory policy and specific policy processes (e.g., environment, infrastructure, land-use) (OECD, 2022[2]). Moreover, forms of democratic participation, i.e., political rights (e.g., elections, petitions, referenda, etc.), are usually regulated by law (or in the Constitution).

Even before the existence of today’s legal and regulatory frameworks, some countries included notions and concepts related to the open government principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in their founding legal texts (e.g., Declarations). For example, Article 15 of the French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789 includes the concept of public accountability as a fundamental characteristic of the post-revolutionary regime (OECD, 2022[2]).

Today, most Adherents have included references to the principles of open government and specific rights and obligations associated with its principles in their Constitutions or other founding documents. For example, many Constitutions of Adherents establish access to public information (Figure 3.1) and citizen participation as basic constitutional rights. Moreover, they usually include specific provisions on the protection of civic space (e.g., freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, etc.). The protection of open government principles, policies and practices at the constitutional level can provide public institutions and stakeholders with a clear mandate to promote open government reforms. It further creates the necessary legal certainty and legitimacy for effective implementation of all subsequent legislation (OECD, 2019[1]).

In recent years, a number of Adherents have used their open government agendas to promote the adoption of new laws and regulations in different areas of open government. This has been most notable in the area of access to information. Examples of recent relevant laws and regulations that were adopted by Adherents include among other things: the Open Government Law of the Netherlands (2022), the E-Government Law and Open Data Law of Germany (2017 and 2021), the Right to Information Law (31.13) of Morocco (2018), Luxembourg’s Law on transparent and open administration (2018), Colombia’s Statutory Law on Citizen Participation (2015), Chile’s Law No 20.880 on Probity in the Public Function and Prevention of Conflicts of Interest (2016) and Presidential Instructive No 5/2012 on Open Government (2012) (Box 3.2).

An analysis of commitments included in OGP Action Plans shows that the promotion of stronger legal and regulatory frameworks through the OGP-process has been a priority for Adherents (for example, Australia, Greece, Chile and Italy have committed, included specific commitments to this end in their OGP Action Plans) (Box 3.3).

In order to provide clarity on the obligations and rights associated with open government, a small number of Adherents (and subnational governments in Adherents) have established dedicated regulatory documents on open government. In most cases, these regulatory documents have taken the form of a directive/decree which are usually more flexible than laws (OECD, 2020[12]). The adoption of executive decrees and directives on open government can be a strong indication as to the importance that a government is giving the open government agenda (Ibid.). Notable examples include the United States’ Open Government Directive and Canada’s Directive on open Government (Box 3.4).

Laws and regulations on access to public information (ATI) are key to an open government and have become a common practice in Adherents. Because of the importance of these laws for Adherents’ open government agendas and to reflect the historic focus that the OECD has put on ATI through its work on Open Government, this section focuses on this specific part of the legal and regulatory framework for Open Government.

All OECD Members but Costa Rica have these laws in place, incorporating – in most cases – both provisions regarding proactive and reactive disclosure of information and data. ATI laws are often coupled with laws on the protection of personal data and provisions included in national archives laws/public record laws.

Many of the first generation of ATI laws provided for the right of access to official "documents" or "records" – meaning documents officially created by the administration in the course of its duties. Recent laws have clarified the scope of the "right to access information" and the definition of "information" more broadly than documents or records; they refer to all material held by public authorities in any format (written, audio, visual, etc.). They have also strengthened proactive disclosure and have defined a clear mandate, responsibilities and a range of powers for bodies in charge of its implementation and/or oversight. In fact, many Adherents’ laws providing access to information have been amended since they were first adopted to expand the scope, introduce new technology or define institutional arrangements for the implementation of the law (see Provision 7 below for analysis of the implementation of provisions relating to proactive disclosure to information).

Even though ATI laws have been largely implemented, and some have reached a significant maturity level, there is limited evidence regarding the factors and circumstances that affect their effective implementation, as well as their long-term impact on broader policy objectives like governments’ transparency, accountability and integrity. Solid mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the law need to be established in order for governments to accurately gauge the impact of consistently and successfully granting public access to information.

Although the protection of civic space and open government initiatives are not always explicitly linked by public officials (see Figure 1.3), laws and regulations that protect civic space facilitate and are central to national open government agendas. In fact, freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly are fundamental civic freedoms that enable effective and inclusive civic participation, in addition to transparency and accountability.1 As such, they are an integral part of the analysis of the legal and regulatory framework for Open Government.

In all Respondents (100%), legal provisions specify that all persons (anyone physically present in a country, even temporarily or irregularly) are granted freedom of expression in their legal frameworks. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, defamation and hate speech2 are the two most common exceptions to freedom of expression, present in 97% of Adherents’ respective legal frameworks. Other exceptions focus on providing protection from certain kinds of speech such as incitement to violence (86%), discriminatory language (68%) or insults to heads of state (38%). Some exceptions such as defamation laws present challenges to civic space and open government principles such as transparency and accountability. Defamation laws generally aim to protect the reputation of individuals from false or offensive statements by limiting freedom of expression. According to the results of the Survey on Open Government (OECD, 2020[3]), defamation is criminalised in 86% of Respondents’ legal frameworks, while the remaining 14% foresee non-criminal remedies, such as civil proceedings. Out of the 32 Respondents that criminalise defamation, 91% have imprisonment as a potential sanction. International guidance on defamation has stressed that criminal sanctions in this area risk stifling freedom of expression by leading to self-censorship and that if sanctions are overly broad, there is also a risk of them being abused in some contexts, thus restricting access to information and legitimate journalistic reporting on matters of public interest (Council of Europe, 2007[14]; UN Human Rights Committee, 2011[15]; Griffen, 2017[16]).

Similar to freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly is essential for the public expression of people’s views and opinions, and underpins open government. The right to peaceful assembly is granted to anyone (meaning anyone physically present in a country, even temporarily or irregularly) in 92% of Respondents, although again with exceptions and challenges, particularly related to the use of force during protests and a failure to protect participants and journalists covering protests (OECD, 2021[18]; Frontline Defenders, 2020[19]; OECD, 2021[20]; Narsee, 2021[21]; US State Department of State, 2020[22]; ENNHRI, 2021[23]). There have also been cases of fatalities and injuries following engagement by state forces in the context of demonstrations (ACLED, 2021[24]; Article 19, 2020[25]). As a reaction to increased police violence during protests, recent court decisions and legal changes have been introduced by Respondents such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico to reduce and control the use of force during protests (Corte Suprema de Justicia, 2020[26]; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2021[27]; Ministerio del Interior, 2021[28]; Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2019[29]).

International human rights bodies have highlighted that advance notification requirements for holding assemblies, while permissible to ensure their smooth conduct, should not be used to stifle freedom of peaceful assemblies (UN Human Rights Committee, 2020[30]; OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2020[31]).

illustrates that in 78% of Respondents, assembly organisers are obliged to notify the relevant authority in advance, and in some countries, such as Italy and Korea, a failure of notification can lead to imprisonment. In a significant development in Brazil, in 2021, the Supreme Federal Court ruled that meetings and demonstrations are permitted in public places regardless of prior official communication to authorities, and that the state is obliged to compensate media professionals injured by police officers during news coverage of demonstrations involving clashes between the police and demonstrators (Supreme Federal Court, 2021[32]). As regards the use of public spaces for assemblies, international guidance suggests avoiding blanket restrictions or designating perimeters as areas where assemblies may not occur as such measures risk being disproportionate and can only be justified if there is a real danger of disorder. Some Adherents still have laws indicating public places where it is not permissible to hold assemblies (e.g., Tunisia, Romania) (OECD, 2022[17]).

In order for there to be an open and enabling environment for CSOs that facilitates citizen and stakeholder participation, it is important that they are free to operate. Legal provisions in 89% of Respondents specify that anyone (including anyone physically present in a country, even temporarily or irregularly) is granted freedom of association. In line with international guidance, CSOs should be able to operate as registered organisations (with legal personality) or remain unregistered (Kiai, 2012[33]; Council of Europe, 2007[34]; OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2015[35]). Figure 3.5 illustrates that in 46% of Respondents, CSOs are obliged to register in order to operate, contrary to international guidance, while in 54% of Respondents CSO registration is voluntary and/or only needed for entities that seek to obtain legal personality or in order to receive public interest or similar status. In some Adherent countries, such as Chile or Costa Rica, non-registration can lead to administrative fines and in Tunisia, a failure to register can result in imprisonment and fines (Boussen, 2021[36]; Freedom House, 2021[37]; Shahin, 2018[38]). 39% of Respondents have relatively short timelines of 15 days or less for registration. Long timelines of three months to one year for obtaining a decision on registration exist in a minority of countries (14%), such as in Canada, Colombia and Spain.

United Nations and Council of Europe bodies have emphasised that associations should be free to participate in states’ decision-making processes and in matters of political and public debate (United Nationas, 1998[39]; Kiai, 2012[33]; Council of Europe, 2007[14]; OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2015[35]). In 2022, the European Parliament noted in a resolution that in some EU member states restrictions have been placed on CSOs’ ability to engage in political activities (European Parliament, 2022[40]). Table 3.1 shows that the majority (59%) of Respondents do not have legally established limitations on CSO political activity. However, in 41% of Respondents there are restrictions in place; in 26% limitations apply specifically to CSOs that have public benefit or charitable status; in 9% there are general restrictions on political campaigning and activity for all types of CSOs; and in 6% there are disclosure requirements for certain political activities. A general restriction on political activity for any type of CSO exists in three Adherents. In one Adherent, political associations and any manifestations of a political nature by associations are prohibited. Whether particular activities of CSOs are characterised as being political ultimately depends on the interpretation of courts. Legal uncertainty that can result from provisions that link the public benefit status of CSOs to abstaining from political activity can lead to restrictions on politically committed CSOs out of fear of a withdrawal of their non-profit status.

The implementation period has seen Adherents putting increasing efforts into facilitating and accompanying the implementation of their existing laws and regulations on the open government principles. Most notably, many Adherents have used their open government agendas (and in many cases their OGP Action Plans) as a platform to elaborate materials, such as guidelines, toolkits and manuals to guide the implementation of relevant laws and regulations and build their staff’s and civil society’s open government literacy. These materials can help to materialise abstract principles and legal provisions into every-day practice.

Most commonly, Adherents offer resources on open government data (89.5%, 34 respondents) and citizen and stakeholder participation (78.9%, 30). Approximately two-thirds of the Respondents cover reactive (68.4%, 26) and proactive (65.8%, 25) disclosure. Almost one-third of responding Adherents (28.9%, 11) have guidelines or toolkits available on open government as an integrated concept (Figure 3.6). When it comes to guidelines for non-public stakeholders, 25 Respondents (67.6%) have these tools available for reactive disclosure of information and 24 (64.9%) for open government data. Only ten (27%) Respondents have guidelines specifically focusing on open government in place.

While the progressive design of guiding documents is a good practice that should be further pursued, evidence collected through the OECD Open Government Reviews and Scans indicates that Adherents could make further efforts to ensure that existing and new materials are known and used by public officials and non-public stakeholders. In many cases, public and non-public stakeholders are not even aware that materials to support them exist.

In order to put legislation into practice and ensure that legal provisions are being followed by all relevant actors, Adherents have established a variety of mechanisms to ensure compliance. The concrete institutional set-up for oversight with legislation varies according to the policy matter and to the specific national context. Accordingly, there can be large differences regarding the institutional arrangement for oversight. Enforcement and oversight mechanisms can include parliaments, Ombudsman offices, supreme audit institutions, independent commissions, and central government bodies, such as ministries, with a particular mandate for oversight of some policy areas. These oversight bodies are instrumental in guaranteeing sound accountability across the public administration. That said, for these bodies to effectively fulfil their mandate, it is key that their competencies are clearly defined, they have adequate human and financial resources, and they are sufficiently independent. Furthermore, they should have the ability to enforce their decisions through formal actions, such as applying sanctions. In addition to core oversight and enforcement mechanisms, citizens should also have opportunities for recourse and redress in cases where these bodies do not deliver on their responsibilities. For instance, if complaints and appeals to the oversight mechanisms do not produce results, judicial mechanisms and administrative courts often exist to serve this remedial function. The following sections provide selected examples of oversight mechanisms that are most common among Adherents.

An important factor in implementing ATI laws is the existence of institutional arrangements for oversight, monitoring and promotion of their application. Oversight bodies can be an independent information commission (or agency or other body) with a mandate purely to oversee the implementation of ATI laws (which is the case for 47% of Respondents, or they could be a body such as an Ombudsman with an ATI mandate as part of a wider remit (e.g., human rights, discrimination or gender) (which is the case for 24% of Respondents). The ATI oversight mandate can also be assigned to a central government body, which is not independent from the executive branch (which is the case for 50% of Respondents). Some respondents have systems in which two or more public bodies oversee the implementation of access to information laws such as in Colombia.

The mandate and responsibilities of these bodies vary widely among countries but can be grouped into enforcement, monitoring and promotion of the law. In relation to enforcement, bodies can be in charge of managing an ATI online portal, consolidating the proactively disclosed information from other government institutions, reporting to parliament on its implementation regularly (e.g., yearly) and redistributing misallocated or non-allocated requests among government institutions. It is also related to appeals and/or revisions processes, such as handling complaints on breaches to the law, initiating investigations on potential breaches, issuing opinions/witness in litigations on the law and sanctioning public officials/institutions for non-compliance.

Monitoring responsibilities can be related to compliance with the law itself, the internal appeals process and/or the awareness of the law among citizens. Finally, bodies responsible for promoting the law can be in charge of advising public institutions on its application and providing training and/or awareness-raising campaigns to civil servants and/or civil society. According to the Survey on Open Government findings, the most common responsibility of independent information commissions and central government authorities is advising public institutions on the application of the ATI law. For Ombudsman institutions, it is handling complaints on breaches of the law. Certain countries with two bodies with an ATI mandate were found to face competing responsibilities in terms of enforcement of the law.

The independence and enforcement capacity of these bodies is crucial. Some do not have the necessary enforcement capacities to sanction non-compliance, are not independent, or do not have the necessary resources (human and financial) to conduct their mandate. This can lead to weak implementation of ATI laws (OECD, 2019[41]). Evidence collected by the OECD suggests that common elements support the effective functioning of ATI oversight bodies. First, the establishment of a clear and well-disseminated mandate that sets roles and responsibilities is an important factor ensuring the body’s legitimacy. Second, the institutional autonomy and the independence of public officials within the organisation are key to reinforcing the impartiality of their decisions and operations. Last, their enforcement capacity – both in terms of their ability to issue sanctions and in having adequate human and financial resources to perform their role – is crucial for the oversight body to effectively conduct its mandate.

Increasingly, bodies responsible for ATI are moving towards combining their role on ATI and on personal data protection in order to protect both rights as in Argentina, Belgium, Mexico and the United Kingdom. Although both topics are treated as separate legal frameworks in most countries and require different technical capacities and training, their proximity and complementarities are pushing countries to centralising their role into a single institution. 

To further ensure a proper implementation of the law, several ATI laws currently require the establishment of an information office or officer responsible for ensuring compliance with the legal framework. These officers are generally appointed to guarantee both proactive and reactive disclosure of information, including but not limited to, consolidating proactively disclosed information, responding to information requests, redistributing misallocated or non-allocated requests among other public bodies, and supporting colleagues in responding to requests. Of the Adherents that responded to the Survey on Open Government, 57% stipulate the establishment of this office/r in their ATI law (Figure 3.8). That being said, while several countries may not directly include these provisions in the law, data from the survey found that they have established similar positions in practice.

State protection of civic freedoms is only effective if there are accessible mechanisms in place to counter violations of rights, both in law and in practice. National courts play a crucial role in providing effective enforcement and redress by recognising violations of civic freedoms and imposing sanctions. Aside from bodies of the executive and courts, publicly funded independent oversight mechanisms are fundamental to protecting civic space. These are essential as they provide complaint mechanisms for citizens, issue advisory opinions and publish related data. Figure 3.9 illustrates that according to the results of the 2020 Survey on Open Government, 86% of Respondents have established independent public institutions that address human rights complaints such as National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) or Ombudsperson offices. All these Respondents have either passed specific legislation establishing human rights complaint or oversight mechanisms or have set out the main elements of such institutions in their constitutions. In 84% of Respondents, the independent public institution may initiate human rights investigations of its own accord (suo moto), regardless of whether an individual human rights complaint was received or not. This is crucial to ensure complete and consistent human rights protection in a country, as in this way, human rights protection mechanisms can engage proactively in situations and are not dependent on complaints from other sources. This is especially important for sensitive matters where individuals may fear negative consequences if they lodge a complaint (Council of Europe, 2019[42]). 34 Adherents responded that they collect data on complaints regarding violations of civic freedoms, and 54% of Respondents disaggregate the data to some degree. Disaggregation is key to a detailed understanding that can guide interventions.

The independence of such bodies is best achieved when the procedure for the appointment of the leaders or members of national human rights institutions is described in an official act outlining the specific duration of their mandates and the duration is longer than the mandate of the appointing body. Financial independence can be ensured through the provision of sufficient funding via a separate budget line, which has been instituted by 86% of Respondents. Finally, data from the 2020 Survey on Open Government also shows that 52% of Adherents have separate oversight institutions that specialise in discrimination cases and in promoting equality.

As recognised by the 2017 OECD report The Role of Ombudsman Institutions in Open Government, Ombudsman institutions can play a significant role in promoting open government and strengthening democracy given their unique placement as an independent public body (OECD, 2018[43]). These institutions can act both as an interface and as mediators between citizens and public institutions at the supranational, national and local levels, and their work can span various policy sectors (e.g., health, education and youth). For example, while competencies and powers vary widely across countries, 19 OECD countries have created a specific Ombudsperson for youth or children at the regional or national/federal level to protect civic space for children and young people, promote their rights and hold governments accountable. Moreover, 11 more OECD countries have created an office dedicated to children or youth within the national Ombudsperson office, or included youth affairs as part of its mandate (OECD, 2018[44]). Furthermore, Ombudsman institutions are valuable actors in ensuring that public bodies adhere to good governance practices and achieve the highest standard of administrative processes, all with the intention of serving the public interest. Due to this position, they have a unique ability to advance the open government principles of transparency, accountability, integrity and stakeholder participation in their own functions and mainstream their application across the wider public administration (OECD, 2017[45]). However, despite the promising scope of their mandates, the potential of Ombudsman Institutions largely goes unfulfilled in most contexts. The below figure demonstrates that while 75% of surveyed Ombudsman Institutions3 responded that they contribute to public administration reform, only 34% noted that they contribute to open government reforms (Figure 3.10).

In terms of the legal and regulatory frameworks for open government (provision 2), progress in Adherents has been notable in recent years. In particular:

  • 2.1: Provisions relating to the open government principles are commonly enshrined in Adherents’ Constitutions or founding documents. Furthermore, all but one Adherent now have Access to Information (ATI) laws in place and a significant number of Adherents have strategically used their open government agendas to promote the adoption of new (or reform existing) laws and regulations on open government policies and practices. Moreover, all Adherents have legal frameworks granting fundamental civic freedoms that underpin protected civic space but there are notable exceptions to these rights and implementation varies. Moving forward, Adherents are encouraged to continue using their open government agendas to update relevant open government legislation. In particular, they are encouraged to review their civic space laws to ensure they are in line with international guidance in each area, whether as part of open government, human rights, democracy or other relevant agendas (OECD, 2022[17]).

  • 2.2: Adherents have made notable efforts to design guiding documents and materials to foster the implementation of the legal and regulatory framework on open government. However, more attention could be given to ensuring that guidelines are communicated widely and used on a day-to-day basis by public officials and non-public stakeholders.

  • 2.3: Adherents have made important efforts in implementing a legal framework for ATI, however more efforts need to be put in place to monitor and evaluate the legal framework to ensure its proper implementation. In addition, Adherents could ensure that a dedicated ATI oversight body to ensure oversight, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of the ATI law is established. This institution needs to have a clear mandate, sustained resources and an adequate level of independence, and capacity for enforcement needs to be provided to ensure the protection of the right. Where there is adequate institutional capacity, a long-term view could be taken to establishing an independent commission on ATI. The institution in place needs to be equipped to face new challenges (e.g., conciliating access to information and data protection). Lastly, establishing ATI information offices or officers in all public bodies and equip them with adequate resources is needed to carry out their activities to support public administrations in effectively implementing ATI laws.

  • 2.4: Finally, independent public institutions that address human rights complaints are a crucial enabler of protected civic space and require suo moto powers to fulfil their role, in addition to a legal structure (and related resources) to allow them to be independent and sustainable.

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[45] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438 (accessed on 23 August 2021).

[31] OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission (2020), Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)017rev-e.

[35] OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission (2015), Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association, https://www.osce.org/odihr/132371.

[38] Shahin, Y. (2018), Pushing Back against Narrowing Space for Civil Society in Tunisia, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181220_PushingBackTunisia_0.pdf.

[32] Supreme Federal Court (2021), “Estado tem o dever de indenizar jornalista ferido por policiais em cobertura de manifestação [State has a duty to compensate journalist injured by police officers covering a demonstration]”, Supreme Federal Court, http://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=467401&ori=1.

[30] UN Human Rights Committee (2020), General comment no. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21), CCPR/C/GC/37, 17 September 2020, para. 56, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3884725.

[15] UN Human Rights Committee (2011), General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf.

[39] United Nationas (1998), UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

[22] US State Department of State (2020), 2019 Country Reports on Human Practices, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/.

Notes

← 1. The OECD’s analysis of the protection of civic space draws on international standards, including those related to the protection of civic freedoms. Such guidance includes relevant United Nations standards (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) as well as regional human rights bodies and courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Analyses from CSOs and academic institutions are also considered where relevant, along with their insights.

← 2. For the purposes of this report, hate speech is defined as any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, and aims to incite discrimination or violence towards that person or group, e.g. based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.

← 3. The 2017 OECD Survey on the Role of Ombudsman Institutions in Open Government was responded to by 94 Ombudsman institutions in 65 countries and territories.

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